Karim writes:

The Saudis continue to set price and let quantity adjust, and output levels are ‘comfortable’ with substantial room to go higher or lower to support their target price. If they do leave it ‘in the 70-80 range’ there should be no inflation in the US and most other nations. The US has never had a serious ‘inflation problem’ that wasn’t oil driven.

Saudi’s Naimi Sees No Need to Alter OPEC Production

By Ayesha Daya and Grant Smith

March 16 (Bloomberg) — Saudi Arabia, the biggest and most influential member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, said oil prices are in the right range and there’s no need to change production policy.

“We are extremely happy with the market, the economy is doing well, it will do better down the road, so I don’t see any reason to disturb this happy situation,” Saudi Oil Minister Ali Al-Naimi said late yesterday in Vienna, where OPEC meets tomorrow. “The price has stayed very well in the range of $70 to $80. It is in a very happy situation.”

I arrived in Connecticut to begin a ‘listening tour’ before making the decision to run in the Democratic primary for United States Senate. Tonight I listened carefully to the Democratic candidates as they put forth their agendas for restoring the US economy and both fell far short of the mark. Neither had a credible economic agenda, and what they did propose- tax increases- would only make matters worse.

Making sure that people working for a living are paid enough to be able to buy the goods and services they produce has long been a core economic value of the Democratic party. And what drives the lion’s share of business, both large and small, is the competition to attract the consumer’s dollars by producing the goods and services working people want. Unfortunately, the current situation is clearly one where people working for a living are not taking home enough money to buy what business is desperately trying to sell. Consequently, business has been contracting and laying people off, which makes matters even worse.

The Republican response has traditionally been to give tax cuts and other monetary incentives to business rather than to the people doing the work. That does not result in new hires for the businesses, as business only hire when orders and sales pick up. Instead, it results in higher profits with the hope that those profiting will hire more domestic help and more gardeners, and produce a few jobs that way, which is known as trickle-down economics.

So while, in addition to tax hikes, both Democratic candidates for US Senate proposed tax relief, it was for small businesses- the traditional Republican approach, and indeed, the approach of the Obama administration. Note that last week’s jobs bill featured a $5,000 payroll tax reduction for businesses, and not for employees. In contrast, I have long been proposing a full ‘payroll tax holiday’ where a couple earning a combined $100,000 per year would see their take home pay rise by over $650 per month. That would be enough to fix the economy as people could then make their mortgage payments and car payments, and even do a little shopping. This is the Democratic approach which also gives businesses what they really need- people with enough money to spend to buy their products. It’s people with money to spend that creates the backlog of orders which then quickly results in the millions of new jobs we need to restore our economy to full employment levels and prosperity. The payroll tax holiday also reduces costs for business. In a competitive environment this translates into a combination of both lower prices and better cash flow for business that can be used for the new investment the recession has long delayed.

The reason the Democrats don’t propose this kind of tax cut is because they can’t answer the question of ‘how are you to replace the lost revenues.’ And, in fact the Obama administration has currently put Medicare and social security cuts on the table to ‘pay for’ what they’ve already spent. What both Democratic candidates are displaying is a failure to understand the difference between the function of Federal taxation and State and local government taxation. I grew up on the money desk at Banker’s Trust on Wall St. in the 1970’s, ran my own investment funds and securities dealer for 15 years, currently own a small Florida bank, and visit the Fed (Federal Reserve Bank) regularly to discuss monetary policy and monetary operations. I know how the payment system works, as does the Fed’s operations staff.

What we all know is that when Federal taxes are paid, all the Fed does is change the numbers down in our bank accounts. For example, if you have $5,000 in your bank account, and you pay a Federal tax of $1,000, all the Fed does is change the 5 on your bank statement to a 4, so you then have only $4,000 in your account. With online banking you can watch exactly that happen on your computer screen. The Fed doesn’t ‘get’ anything. It just changes the numbers in your account. And when the Federal government spends, it just changes numbers up in our bank accounts. It doesn’t ‘use up’ anything. In fact, the Federal government (unlike State and local governments and the rest of us who do need money in our accounts to be able to spend) never has nor doesn’t have dollars. Think if it as the score keeper for the dollar. When a touchdown is scored and 6 points go up on the scoreboard, does anyone ask where he stadium got those 6 points? Can the stadium run out of points to post on the score board? Of course not!

So why then does the Federal government tax, when it doesn’t get actual revenue (it just changes numbers down in our accounts) and it does not use up anything when it spends (it just changes numbers up in our accounts)? The fact is, taxes function to regulate the economy by controlling our take home pay. If taxes are too low, the result is excessive spending and the strong upward pressure on prices we call inflation. If we are over taxed, as we are today, and the Federal government is taking too much out of our paychecks, the result is a drop off in sales by businesses, and rising unemployment. Federal taxes are like the thermostat. If the economy is too hot (something I have never seen in my 37 years in the financial markets), they can be raised to cool it down. And when the economy goes ice cold, like it is now, my full payroll tax holiday is in order. The Federal government’s job is to keep the economy just right by keeping taxes low enough so people working for a living can afford to buy the goods and services they are capable of producing.

That’s what fiscal responsibility is all about. But until our politicians understand the difference between State finances and Federal finances, the will continue to fail to make sure our take home pay is high enough to sustain the high levels of output and employment that are the hallmarks of American prosperity.

Let me conclude with a word about China. It was stated in the Democratic debates and not disputed that the US was borrowing $4 billion from China to pay for the war in Afghanistan. However, close examination of monetary operations shows this is not at all as it seems. China has what amounts to a checking account at the Federal Reserve Bank. China gets its dollars by selling goods and services to the US, and those dollars are paid into that checking account at the Fed. And US Treasury securities are nothing more than fancy names for savings accounts at the Fed. So when China buys US Treasury securities, all the Fed does is shift China’s dollars from its checking account at the Fed to a savings account at the Fed. And when those Treasury securities become due and payable, all the Fed does is shift the dollars in the savings accounts (plus interest) back to China’s checking account at the Fed. That’s it. Debt paid. And it happens exactly this way every week as billions of Treasury securities are purchased and mature. And this process has no connection to Federal government spending for the war or anything else. Spending is always nothing more than the Fed changing numbers up in people’s bank accounts, no matter what China might be doing with their Fed accounts. That’s why the ‘national debt,’ which is nothing more than dollars in savings accounts at the Fed, has never created a financial problem, and never will, either for us or for our children. Yet the administration, the media, and the two Democratic candidates for US Senate from Connecticut have the story completely wrong as well, which results in proposals which are bad for Connecticut and bad for America.

America is grossly overtaxed and needs a full payroll tax holiday NOW to stop the bleeding and restore the American dream. The only thing standing in the way of economic prosperity is a lack of understanding of our monetary system.

Sincerely,
Warren Mosler

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Thu, Feb 25, 2010 at 12:54 PM, Roger wrote:
>   
>   am I reading this right?
>   
>   he seems to be admitting the difference between “structural” and nominal deficits, but
>   is still fixated on debt/GDP ratios, not to mention national “revenue”
>   
>   nevertheless, some progress is better than none, and ANY sign of movement is a
>   step in the right direction
>   

Agreed!

Looks like a serious chink in the armor of what used to be deficit terrorist #1???!!!

Address jobs now and deficits later

By LAWRENCE MISHEL & DAVID M. WALKER

Feb. 24 (Politico) — President Barack Obama is in a difficult position when it comes to deficits. Today’s high deficits will have to go even higher to help address unemployment. At the same time, many Americans are increasingly concerned about escalating deficits and debt. What’s a president to do?

The answer, from a policy perspective, is not that hard: A focus on jobs now is consistent with addressing our deficit problems ahead.

The difficulty is that many politicians and news organizations often cast deficit debates as a dichotomy: You either care about them or you don’t.

But this is rarely accurate. The fact that the two of us, who have philosophical differences on the proper role of government, find much to agree on about deficits is a testament to the importance of dropping this useless dichotomy and finally talking about deficits in a reasonable way.

As in every economic downturn, federal revenues have fallen steeply because individuals and corporations earn less in a recession. High unemployment also results in higher expenditures for safety net programs, like Medicaid, unemployment benefits and food stamps.

Not surprisingly then, a huge recession can yield a huge deficit. Efforts to put people back to work and help restore the economy, like the recovery package passed last February, can also increase short-term deficits.

Though a concern, most of the recent short-term rise in the deficit is understandable. Furthermore, public spending can help compensate for the fall in private spending, and help stem the pain of substantial job losses.

With more than a fifth of the work force expected to be unemployed or underemployed in 2010, there is an economic and a moral imperative to take action. Persistently high unemployment drives poverty up, makes it harder for families to find decent housing, increases family stress and, ultimately, harms children’s educational achievement. For young workers entering the workforce, the current jobs crisis reduces the amount they will earn over their lifetime.

In deep recessions, businesses tend to make fewer critical investments in research and development that can improve our economy’s productive capacity over the long term. Entrepreneurs usually find credit hard to obtain if they want to start a new business. These factors hurt U.S. global competitiveness and growth potential.

That’s why we agree that job creation must be a short-term priority. Job creation plans must be targeted so we can get the greatest return on investment. They must be timely, creating jobs this year and next. And they must be big enough to substantially fill the enormous jobs hole we’re in. They must also be temporary — affecting the deficit only in the next couple of years, without exacerbating our large and growing structural deficits in later years.

Funding key investment and infrastructure projects to promote economic growth and offering a job creation tax credit are among the policy ideas that meet all these standards. In addition, temporarily renewing extended unemployment benefits can lead to more jobs throughout the economy.
But these problems, and the resulting short-term deficits they cause, should not be confused with the primary deficit challenge facing our nation: structural deficits. These deficits are projected to exist in coming years — even when the country is at peace, even when the economy is growing, even when unemployment falls.

Specifically, the deficit could approach an already unsustainable 6 percent of gross domestic product 10 years from now, and will continue to rise thereafter.

While we address our short-term unemployment challenges, we must also immediately establish a path to address our large, and growing, structural deficits.

The Congressional Budget Office projects that after the economy has returned to full employment, spending will still substantially outstrip revenues. Over time, Medicare and Medicaid will be the key drivers of these structural deficits. This is primarily because these programs’ costs tend to mirror overall cost increases for health care, which have risen much faster than overall economic growth for decades, but also because of demographic changes.

Our nation’s fiscal picture will darken further with the passage of time, especially if interest rates increase.

These structural deficits are too substantial to close the gap without addressing both sides of the ledger: spending and revenues.

In doing so, it is important to distinguish critical and effective programs and tax policies from outdated and ineffective ones.

We must be careful to maintain the type of public investments that can help fuel broad-based economic growth while strengthening the safety net for our most vulnerable populations. And we should take into account growing retirement insecurity as employer pension systems erode and personal savings falter.

People should be able to count on government benefits they are promised. It is, therefore, critical that federal benefit and funding levels be reconciled.

None of this will be easy — not the policy or the politics. It will require hard choices, and an extraordinary process to engage the American people and to make recommendations to the Congress on budget controls, spending cuts and revenue increases.

Getting the deficit under control cannot be accomplished by simply ending “waste, fraud and abuse,” stopping all foreign aid or exiting Iraq and Afghanistan. Substantial progress could be made though by ending the tax cuts of 2001 and 2003, or paying for their extension through spending reductions. In the end, Congress must step up to the plate, not just with hearings, but with votes.

For all the disagreement in Washington, we both know that, like us, there are many who see the critical importance of addressing these challenges. We must accept higher deficits in the short-term in order to put people back to work.

At the same time, we must take immediate steps to agree on a path and a process for reducing the structural deficits that lie ahead.

In a town of division, this is one area where we need a real consensus now.

Forum on “A Fresh Perspective on Critical Development Issues”

Latest tsy tips results indicate ‘contained inflation expectations’ as well.

I still have that nagging feeling that the 0 rate policy is highly deflationary and without some supply shock, like a spike in crude prices, prices in general will remain weak.

The weak core CPI and high unemployment rate continues to keep a lot of daylight between current conditions and the Fed’s dual mandate.

And the discount rate hike shows an ongoing lack of understanding of their own monetary arrangements.

Up until a few years ago the discount rate was kept a bit below the fed funds rate, which facilitated easier control of the fed funds rate.

This policy changed in a misguided effort to make the discount rate a ‘penalty’ rate which is a throwback to a fixed fx/gold standard paradigm and is entirely inapplicable with our current non convertible currency and floating fx.

All they’ve done by raising the discount rate is make it a bit more problematic to control the fed funds rate should technicals cause a system wide reserve deficiency.

Putting a penalty rate in for solvent banks (the FDIC is charged with removing insolvent banks) having funding difficulties is a throwback to the long discredited and illogical notion of using the liability side of banking for market discipline.

for more detail click here

Subject: Fed’s Lockhard on Reuters

Front end USTs getting very well bid on the back of these comments…

10:11 19Feb10 RTRS-FED’S LOCKHART -

FED PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION TO INFLATION EXPECATIONS

10:13 19Feb10 RTRS-

FED’S LOCKHART - MARKET BELIEF IN HIGH PROBABILITY OF RATE RISE THIS YEAR “OVERBLOWN”

10:14 19Feb10 RTRS-

FED’S LOCKHART - CURRENT POLICY STANCE MORE LIKELY TO EXTEND INTO NEXT YEAR

Maybe someday we will get an FOMC that actually understands reserve accounting and monetary operations, and maybe even recognizes the currency for the simple public monopoly that it is and moves away from ‘expectations theory’ as the reason for ‘inflation.’

But for now that seems to be only a very remote possibility.

“Why might households expect an increase in inflation? The amount of federal government debt held by the private sector has gone up by over 30 percent since the beginning of 2008. This debt can only be paid by tax collections or by the Federal Reserve’s debt monetization (that is, by printing dollars to pay off the obligations incurred by Congress). If households begin to expect that the latter will be true—even if it is not—their inflationary expectations will rise as well.”

Series of audio interviews with Warren.

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Thanks, this is what might be scaring the western educated kids who came home steeped in inflation expectations theory.

And the same kids of course believe in export led growth and want to continue to be the world’s slaves as they continue to fight our efforts to assume that position.

>   
>   On Tue, Feb 2, 2010 at 9:23 AM, Evelyn wrote:
>   

HIGHLIGHTS

Experts say CPI may grow 1.8% in Jan

MOC: US protectionism endangers trade ties

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The circumstantial evidence builds that there’s already an inflation problem, politically, probably due to those up and coming kids with the western educations at the finest schools pestering their elders about it.

And, if so, when foreign direct investment loses its profitability due to rising domestic costs, the currency fundamentals could work to drive it lower, taking away the presumed option of reducing the cost of imports by letting it float higher.

An early warning might be a shrinking of the size of the premium in the currency forwards.

It seems possible that Chinese officials could allows their currency to strengthen in the first two weeks of Feb prior to the beginning of the Chinese New Year holidays. If there is one thing that Chinese officials fear the most it is inflation – inflation is the only thing that can touch everyone in China and continued low inflation is the best way to prevent social unrest. Clearly they are looking to any way they can to tighten financial conditions and stronger fx would be one component. It is interesting that recent press reports stated that Chinese officials wanted to call back January loans made to recent borrowers, possibly reducing the windfall speculative borrowers would get in a one time revaluation.

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At some point the FDI isn’t enough to hold up the currency and it depreciates as costs of production for exports rise.

Time to cage inflation tiger, say experts

China Regulator Pledges to Control Illegal Inflows

China Property Sales Rise 75.5% to 4.4 Trillion Yuan

China Reserve Ratio Increase Not a Tightening Sign, Xinhua Says

Time to cage inflation tiger, say experts

By Wang Xiaotian and Xin Zhiming

Jan. 19 (China Daily) — Economy chugs along at good pace, but some red lights ahead

Even as China is set to achieve its targeted goal of 8 percent growth in gross domestic product (GDP) for 2009, economists have stressed that tackling high inflation should be the top priority for policymakers this year.

Inflation is likely to accelerate to more than 5 percent before the middle of this year and reach 8 percent in the second half, Erwin Sanft, head of mainland and Hong Kong equities research at BNP Paribas, was quoted by Bloomberg as saying yesterday.

China’s GDP will surpass the 8 percent year-on-year growth in 2009 and continue to surge in 2010, Yao Jingyuan, chief economist of National Bureau of Statistics, said on Sunday. That confirms the consensus forecast by economists, although none of them are willing to estimate the actual growth figures.

The statistics bureau is scheduled to release the economic data for 2009 on Thursday, but the growth trend has become entrenched since the third quarter of 2009, when GDP expanded by an impressive 8.9 percent year-on-year.

“There are no doubts about robust economic growth this year,” said Zhou Qiren, an economics professor at Peking University. Consumption and exports will continue to strengthen as the global economy gets back to near-normal growth, he said.

The country initiated a massive $586 billion stimulus package in late 2008 and launched a series of industry-friendly policies along with a loose monetary policy to pump prime the economy during the global financial crisis.

The strong surge in new bank lending, however, may have sowed seeds for inflation and other problems, such as asset bubbles. China’s new bank lending in 2009 nearly doubled to 9.59 trillion yuan ($1.40 trillion) over the previous year.

BNP Paribas said China’s inflation rate could touch 8 percent this year. That forecast exceeds most other estimates. Most Chinese economists feel that China would be able to rein in inflation to below 4 percent on average this year.

Li Yining, a senior economist at Peking University, said if inflation soars above 4 percent, the authorities would have to impose tighter measures to stem the growth. “It should be the warning line,” he said.

China’s central bank last week unexpectedly raised the proportion of deposits that commercial lenders must set aside as the country’s credit boom threatens to worsen inflation, which rose by 0.6 percent in November, the first year-on-year growth since last January.

The consumer price index (CPI), the main gauge of inflation, may rise 1.4 percent in December, according to economists surveyed by Bloomberg, intensifying worries that high inflation is coming back as the economy picks up.

Apart from raising banks’ reserve requirement ratio, the People’s Bank of China, the central bank, raised the three-month central bank bill issuing rate for the first time since August 2009 on Jan 7. Analysts see this as a prelude to a series of tightening monetary policies, including interest rate hikes.

“The central bank is likely to increase interest rates twice by 27 basis points this year after April,” said Dong Xian’an, chief macroeconomics analyst with Industrial Securities.

“Gone are the days when we can have economies with high growth rates and inflation as low as 2-3 percent,” he said. top

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>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Mon, Jan 11, 2010 at 9:43 AM, Wray, Randall wrote:
>   
>   This passage is particularly embarrassing:
>   Conventional wisdom holds that the most effective way to break a liquidity trap is with
>   fiscal policy, levering up and risking up the sovereign’s balance sheet to support
>   aggregate demand, when the private sector is delevering and de-risking. In general, we
>   have no quarrel with that. But what holds in general does not necessarily hold in
>   specific countries. And Japan is indeed an exception, because the central bank uniquely
>   has the ability to foster rising inflationary expectations, lower real long-term interest
>   rates, and a lower real exchange value for the yen, all keys to breaking out of her
>   liquidity trap.
>   
>   AND JUST HOW DO WE KNOW THAT??? THE BOJ HAS BEEN TRYING TO CREATE
>    INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONS FOR 2 DECADES, WITH NO SUCCESS.
>   

Agreed.

And, of course the only risk associated with fiscal expansion is inflation which is what they are trying to accomplish.

If they think they have sufficient public goods and services and want domestic consumption and a shift towards inflation, the direct route of cutting domestic taxes, particularly on the lower income groups, will do the trick very quickly.

Someone ought to do the world a favor and tell them it’s up to the MoF and not the BoJ.

With global growth accelerating in the second half of 2009, policymakers and investors alike naturally turned to discussion and debate regarding central bank exit strategies from the extraordinary, conventional (near-zero policy rates) and unconventional (Quantitative/Credit Easing) accommodation needed to prevent the Great Recession from turning into Depression 2.0. Two key questions dominate: the how of exits and the when of exits.

The Federal Reserve has been exceedingly careful to distinguish between these two questions, providing detailed public discussion of the mechanics of exit, while stressing that economic fundamentals, notably below-target inflation in the context of huge resource slack, particularly labor markets, imply there is no urgent need to implement any exit for an extended period. Other central banks have provided similar guidance, with one major exception, the Bank of Japan (BoJ). And the reason is simple: Japan remains stuck in a deflationary liquidity trap, implying that not only would it be fundamentally wrong for the Bank of Japan to pull back from extraordinary accommodation, but that it should be even more extraordinary.

Thus, we were pleasantly surprised in December that the Bank of Japan publically acknowledged that it would “not tolerate a year-on-year rate of change in the CPI equal to or below 0 percent.” The BoJ’s path to anti-deflation redemption must start somewhere, and simply stating that its comfort zone for inflation does not include zero is a start. The fact of the matter is that the BoJ is trapped in a deflationary lacuna of its own making and can escape if it is willing to do the opposite of what central banks in other developed countries will eventually do in the matter of exit strategies. Simply put, the Bank of Japan needs to credibly commit to not exiting reflationary policies, even as other central banks proceed along that course.

Japan’s Liquidity Trap
An economy enters a liquidity trap when the monetary policy rate is pinned against zero, yet aggregate demand consistently falls short of aggregate supply potential. Such a state of affairs generates enduring economic slack, which in turn generates enduring deflation. That was a very real global risk a year ago, but was met head-on by BoJ’s sister central banks, in particular the Federal Reserve, whose mantra was “whatever it takes.” And while a relapse toward the fat tail risk of global deflationary pressures certainly still exists, that tail has been dramatically flattened by innovative, courageous, and explicitly reflationary policies. Not so for Japan, unfortunately: The country has been in a liquidity trap for almost two decades, with nominal GDP hovering near the levels of the early 1990s. And with a current output gap of 7-8% of its GDP, Japan faces perpetual deflation, unless and until the BoJ walks the reflationary walk.

To be sure, there are many, particularly in high-level policy positions in Japan, who argue that there is nothing more reflationary the BoJ can do, because the country’s liquidity trap is not a temporary one but rather a permanent one. The irony of the argument is that if it is followed, it is guaranteed to be “right,” or at least appear that way, as deflationary expectations remain entrenched and self-feeding. Yes, we recognize that Japan faces unique structural problems, most notably declining demographic growth. But neither in theory nor in practice does such a problem pre-ordain a permanent liquidity trap. It can be broken, if the BoJ were to become willing, in the famous words of Professor Krugman, to act responsibly irresponsible relative to monetary policy orthodoxy.

Conventional wisdom holds that the most effective way to break a liquidity trap is with fiscal policy, levering up and risking up the sovereign’s balance sheet to support aggregate demand, when the private sector is delevering and de-risking. In general, we have no quarrel with that. But what holds in general does not necessarily hold in specific countries. And Japan is indeed an exception, because the central bank uniquely has the ability to foster rising inflationary expectations, lower real long-term interest rates, and a lower real exchange value for the yen, all keys to breaking out of her liquidity trap. Yes, fiscal authorities in Japan can lever the sovereign’s balance sheet in a fashion that would make Keynes blush, but unless the monetary authority rejects orthodoxy, explicitly promising not to exit from reflationary policy, fiscal authorities’ stimulative efforts will be muted.

Krugman/Bernanke’s Prescriptions
Bank of Japan officials suggest that there is not much monetary policy can do, as evidenced by these comments in the minutes of its policy meeting on November 19-202 (our emphasis):

“A few members were of the opinion that the Bank should explain clearly to the public that the underlying cause of the continued decline in prices was the slack in the economy - in other words, the weakness in demand. These members added that to improve the situation it was essential to create an environment whereby final demand - specifically, business fixed investment and private consumption - could achieve self-sustaining growth, and for this purpose it was most important to alleviate households’ concerns about the future and underpin firms’ expectations of future economic growth.”

To be sure, there are indeed structural solutions besides resolutely reflationary monetary policy that would be helpful. For example, supply-side measures including increased immigration and child care facilities would be very helpful to mitigate Japan’s demographic trend. Likewise, a more flexible labor system would allow corporations to more quickly adjust employment to the levels sustainable in the New Normal, and allow them to invest for new opportunities emerging in Asia. Concurrently, accelerating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) would allow Japan Inc. to further benefit from Asia’s economic growth and to remain competitive. And the list goes on and on. So the BoJ does have a point: There needs to be many hands on the policy tiller.

But none of the non-monetary actions offers scope for what matters most: Breaking the private sector’s self-feeding deflationary expectations, while generating aggregate demand above the economy’s supply-side potential, lowering the output gap. Indeed, some desirable supply-side structural reforms would, on a cyclical horizon, actually increase the output gap. The unavoidable conclusion must be that reflationary monetary policy must be the workhorse to pull Japan out of its liquidity trap. For such an approach to be effective, it explicitly must not have an exit strategy, but the opposite: a promise to keep on keeping on, resisting all entreaties to pull back until inflation itself, not just inflationary expectations, is unleashed on the upside.

To its credit, the BoJ did adopt a commitment approach when it adopted Quantitative Easing (QE) in 2001, explicitly committing to a continuation of that regime until year-on-year change in the core CPI became positive in a “stable” manner. But when for a few months it appeared that “success” had been achieved in 2006, the BoJ exited QE. Whether or not it was a matter of a genuine policy mistake, made with the best intentions, or a policy mistake borne of a lack of will to be enduringly unorthodox is an open question. But the fact of the matter is that Japan slipped back into deflation soon thereafter. The missing ingredient was a commitment to not only resist pulling back from QE and avoiding rate hikes until inflation turned positive but to continue that policy even after inflation started moving up. And in terms of credibility, the cost has been high: Unless and until the BoJ commits credibly, backed by money-printing actions, to behaving “irresponsibly relative to orthodox, conventional thinking,” Japan will remain stuck in a liquidity trap.

If the BoJ needs academic footing to do what needs to be done, it could well follow then-Fed Governor Bernanke’s 2003 suggestion: Rather than targeting the inflation rate, the BoJ could target restoring the pre-deflation price level, meaning that deflationary sins are not forgiven. This way, Mr. Bernanke argued, the public would view reflationary increases in the BoJ’s balance sheet and the money stock as permanent, rather than something to be “taken back” at the earliest orthodox opportunity.

The BoJ: Time to Act Aggressively
Japan’s problem is deflation, not inflation as far as an eye can see. An “all-in” reflationary policy is what is needed.

Three concepts the BoJ could consider:

1. Explicitly promise there will be no exit from QE and no rate hikes until inflation is not just positive, but meaningfully positive. One way to do this would be to adopt a price level target rather than an inflation target, embracing the idea that past deflationary sins will not only not be forgiven but require even more aggressive reflationary atonement.

2. Buy unlimited amounts of the long-dated Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) to pull down nominal yields, with an accord with the fiscal authority to absorb any future losses on JGBs, once reflationary policy has borne its fruits, generating a bear market in JGBs.

3. Working with the Ministry of Finance, sell unlimited amounts of Yen against other developed countries’ currencies, printing the necessary Yen.

Our read is that the BoJ has not concluded that such bold steps are required. But as Mr. Bernanke intoned,3 no country with a fiat currency, which borrows in its own currency in the context of a current account deficit, should ever willingly embrace deflation. It is to be fervently hoped that the Bank of Japan’s rhetorical reflationary thaw of December, declaring it will not “tolerate” zero or below inflation, will give way to active reflationary green shoots by spring.

Meanwhile, markets don’t wait. And if it becomes clear that the BoJ really does “get it,” the currency markets will be way out in front of the BoJ.

Paul McCulley
Managing Director

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Mosler’s 11 steps to fix the economy

1. A full ‘payroll tax holiday’ where the US Treasury makes all FICA payments for us (15.3%). This will restore ’spending power’ and, by allowing households to make their mortgage payments, will fix banks from the bottom up. It may also keep prices down as competitive pressures may lead businesses to cut prices, passing on their tax savings to consumers even as sales increase.

2. A $500 per capita federal distribution to all the states to sustain employment in essential services, service debt, and reduce the need for state tax hikes. This can be repeated at perhaps 6 month intervals until GDP surpasses previous high levels at which point state revenues that depend on GDP would be restored.

3. A federally-funded $8/hr job and healthcare benefits for anyone willing and able to work. The economy will improve rapidly with my first two proposals and the private sector far more readily hires folks that are already employed. In 2001 Argentina implemented this proposal, putting to work 2 million people who had never held a ‘real’ job. Within 2 years, 750,000 of those 2 million were employed by the private sector.

4. Making banks utilities. The following are disruptive, serve no public purpose and should be done away with:

–Secondary market transactions
–Proprietary trading
–Lending against financial assets
–Business activities beyond approved lending and bank account services.
–Contracting in LIBOR. Fed funds should be used.
–Subsidiaries of any kind.
–Offshore lending.
–Contracting in credit default insurance.

5. Federal Reserve — The liability side of banking is the wrong place to impose market discipline.

The Fed should lend in the fed funds market to all member banks to ensure permanent liquidity. Demanding collateral from banks is disruptive and redundant, as the FDIC already regulates and supervises all bank assets.

6. The Treasury should issue nothing longer than 3 month bills. Longer term securities serve to keep long term rates higher than otherwise.

7. FDIC

–Remove the $250,000 cap on deposit insurance. Liquidity is no longer an issue when fed funds are available from the Fed.
–Don’t tax good banks for losses by bad banks. This serves only to raise interest rates.

8. The Treasury should directly fund the housing agencies to eliminate hedging needs while directly targeting mortgage rates at desired levels.

9. Homeowners being foreclosed should have the option to stay in their homes at fair market rents with ownership going to the government at the lower of the mortgage balance or fair market value of the home.

10. Remove ’self imposed constraints’ that are disruptive to operations and serve no public purpose.

–Dump the debt ceiling – Congress already votes on spending and taxes.
–Allow Treasury ‘overdrafts’ at the Fed rather than forcing it to sell notes and bonds. This is left over from the gold standard days and is currently inapplicable.

11. Federal taxes function to regulate aggregate demand, not to raise revenue per se, and therefore should be increased only to cool down an overheating economy, and not to ‘pay for’ anything.

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Well stated and agreed!!!

A few highlights(mine), below:

On Thu, Jan 7, 2010 at 8:57 AM, Lando, Joseph wrote:

In a bit of a surprising philosophical shift, Bill Gross came out yesterday strongly bearish and firmly in the camp of the deficit hawks: Link . My reaction:

1. Any major tightening of financial conditions due to a spike in rates right now, particularly back-end rates, would just be met with more QE anyway. That much was certainly clear in the Fed Minutes yesterday.

2. Given a battle between the fundamental input of deflation and the technical factor of supply, deflation will win hands down. And though many seem to disagree, the data and the Fed and our own economists still think risks are tilted the other way. This input is making the 100-200bp difference in 10yr yields. Supply issues make the ‘1-2 standard deviations rich/cheap’ (speaking in Sudoku terms) differences of 20-30bps. Which wins?

3. I actually think the technicals are the other way. New supply of private label AAA securities is down 1T MORE than Treasury supply is UP. De-levering is, BY DEFINTION, a reduction in the overall supply of investible term fixed income assets. Here’s a picture from a couple months ago from our Global Markets group.

4. The yield curve is offering more yield enhancement than EITHER vol OR credit spread to the investment community. Not to mention Treasuries are 0% weighted (AND state/local tax-advantaged). Where do you think banks will turn to generate NIM? At some point, they will change their behavior. Look at CURVE vs both VOL and CREDIT regression below. Perhaps most notably…


5. The deficit hawk premise is flawed to begin with. Government buys a bridge, bridgebuilder buys a coat, coatmaker deposits or saves the money…it’s a closed loop in which deficit spending CREATES the precise funding for the deficit itself. All that moves around is DURATION as the need for 10yr savings or 30yr savings is swapped around vs the demand for say, overnight savings (like T-bills or banks reserves). Deficits in the US (unlike a Muni or a EU power or a Corporation) don’t have a problem funding. The ‘problem’ is if the Treasury wants to issue 30yr paper and people only really want 5yr paper. Actually, the market sells off when the sum of all borrowers’ duration is longer than the sum of all the lender’s preferences/liabilities. Not when there is a mismatch in AMOUNT. The AMOUNT is the same! Which takes us to…

6. Japan.

7. I also respectfully but strongly disagree with Gross’ interpretation of QE. The Fed has actually been swapping the bank and fixed-income universe OUT of their term treasuries and mortgages and into cash. By definition they have actually been crowding OUT overall NIM in the universe. And generating revenue for the Treasury. It’s actually an investor tax not a bailout. When they step away, those (and by parity zero-sum principles they are there) who were swapped out of their investments and into cash will swap back into term duration. Asset transfers themselves are zero sum. Additionally, in getting mortgage rates down, the Fed has been TEMPERING the pace of de-levering by ensuring mortgage refi’s can continue. They ‘made happen’ many of the mortgages that they bought. It’s a very self-regulating supply universe. If they slow down, there are just plain fewer mortgages being originated for people to buy, and the pace of overall deleveraging picks back up, and well…it’s not bearish, for sure.

8. Actually I hope 10s go to 4.25 because that just means there will be more to make in the big rally that I think starts in 6 weeks or so when the data turns back from fiscal stimulus withdrawal, and the Treasury’s ‘extension of average maturity’ program – what is TRULY the cause of the steepening of the yield curve – tapers off. For now, am only tactical in the back-end.

But that’s why we all have a market and life, as ever, will remain interesting in fixed income this year.

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The Fed has a dual mandate of full employment and price stability. Both are still moving the wrong way for a hike.

When they move it will likely be based on their forecasts, which remain well on the dovish side.

Karim writes:

STAFF

..the projected pace of real output growth in 2010 and 2011 was expected to exceed that of potential output by only enough to produce a very gradual reduction in economic slack.

…the staff continued to project that core inflation would slow somewhat from its current pace over the next two years. Moreover, the staff expected that headline consumer price inflation would decline to about the same rate as core inflation in 2010 and 2011.

FOMC

..some participants remained concerned about the economy’s ability to generate a self-sustaining recovery without government support. In particular, they noted the risk that improvements in the housing sector might be undercut next year as the Federal Reserve’s purchases of MBS wind down, the homebuyer tax credits expire, and foreclosures and distress sales continue. Though the near-term outlook remains uncertain, participants generally thought the most likely outcome was that economic growth would gradually strengthen over the next two years as financial conditions improved further, leading to more-substantial increases in resource utilization.

The weakness in labor markets continued to be an important concern to meeting participants, who generally expected unemployment to remain elevated for quite some time. The unemployment rate was not the only indicator pointing to substantial slack in labor markets: The employment-to-population ratio had fallen to a 25-year low, and aggregate hours of production workers had dropped more than during the 1981-82 recession. Although the November employment report was considerably better than anticipated, several participants observed that more than one good report would be needed to provide convincing evidence of recovery in the labor market. Participants also noted that the slowing pace of employment declines mainly reflected a diminished pace of layoffs; few firms were hiring. Moreover, the unusually large fraction of those individuals with jobs who were working part time for economic reasons, as well as the uncommonly low level of the average workweek, pointed to only a gradual decline in unemployment as the economic recovery proceeded. Indeed, many business contacts again reported that they would be cautious in their hiring, saying they expected to meet any near-term increase in demand by raising their existing employees’ hours and boosting productivity, thus delaying the need to add employees.

Most participants anticipated that substantial slack in labor and product markets, along with well-anchored inflation expectations, would keep inflation subdued in the near term, although they had differing views as to the relative importance of those two factors. The decelerations in wages and unit labor costs this year, and the accompanying deceleration in marginal costs, were cited as factors putting downward pressure on inflation. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggested that most firms had little ability to raise their prices in the current economic environment. Some participants noted, however, that rising prices of oil and other commodities, along with increases in import prices, could boost inflation pressures going forward. Overall, many participants viewed the risks to their inflation outlooks as being roughly balanced. Some saw inflation risks as tilted to the downside, reflecting the quite elevated level of economic slack and the possibility that inflation expectations could begin to decline in response to the low level of actual inflation. But others felt that inflation risks were tilted to the upside, particularly in the medium term, because of the possibility that inflation expectations could rise as a result of the public’s concerns about extraordinary monetary policy stimulus and large federal budget deficits. Moreover, a few participants noted that banks might seek, as the economy improves, to reduce their excess reserves quickly and substantially by purchasing securities or by easing credit standards and expanding their lending. A rapid shift, if not offset by Federal Reserve actions, could give excessive impetus to spending and potentially result in expected and actual inflation higher than would be consistent with price stability. To keep inflation expectations anchored, all participants agreed that monetary policy would need to be responsive to any significant improvement or worsening in the economic outlook and that the Federal Reserve would need to continue to clearly communicate its ability and intent to begin withdrawing monetary policy accommodation at the appropriate time and pace.

Although members generally saw little risk that maintaining very low short-term interest rates could raise inflation expectations or create instability in asset markets, they noted that it was important to remain alert to these risks. All agreed that the path of short-term rates going forward would depend on the evolution of the economic outlook.

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Some of governments’ mystery money showed up in sovereign budgets funded by debt sold to investors, but more of it showed up on central bank balance sheets as a result of check writing that required no money at all.

The US govt never has nor doesn’t have dollars. It necessarily spends by changing numbers up in bank accounts, and taxes and borrows by changing numbers down in bank accounts.

The latter was 2009’s global innovation known as “quantitative easing,” where central banks and fiscal agents bought Treasuries, Gilts, and Euroland corporate “covered” bonds approaching two trillion dollars. It was the least understood, most surreptitious government bailout of all, far exceeding the U.S. TARP in magnitude.

Agreed! To the extent the purchases were govt and agency securities it was not a bailout for the issuers. To the extent it allowed investors to make profits from the govt over paying for outstanding securities it could be considered a bailout. But I think that was minimal at best.

In the process, as shown in Chart 1, the Fed and the Bank of England (BOE) alone expanded their balance sheets (bought and guaranteed bonds) up to depressionary 1930s levels of nearly 20% of GDP. Theoretically, this could go on for some time,

Indefinitely. Better still, the tsy could simply stop issuing the securities in the first place, as Charles Goodhart has recommended for the UK. That would save the transactions expenses, which are not trivial.

but the check writing is ultimately inflationary

Not per se. Only to the extent the resultant lower rates are inflationary, and the jury is out on that. Note the Fed just turned $60 billion or so in profits over to the tsy. This is interest income the private sector did not earn because the Fed bought the securities.

Point is, QE removes interest income from the non govt sectors and is thereby a contractionary bias.

and central bankers don’t like to get saddled with collateral such as 30-year mortgages that reduce their maneuverability and represent potential maturity mismatches if interest rates go up.

None of that should matter to central bankers, but agreed it does (for the wrong reasons).

So if something can’t keep going, it stops – to paraphrase Herbert Stein – and 2010 will likely witness an attempted exit by the Fed at the end of March, and perhaps even the BOE later in the year.

It can keep going, but agreed it is likely to stop.

Here’s the problem that the U.S. Fed’s “exit” poses in simple English: Our fiscal 2009 deficit totaled nearly 12% of GDP and required over $1.5 trillion of new debt to finance it. The Chinese bought a little ($100 billion) of that, other sovereign wealth funds bought some more, but as shown in Chart 2, foreign investors as a group bought only 20% of the total – perhaps $300 billion or so. The balance over the past 12 months was substantially purchased by the Federal Reserve. Of course they purchased more 30-year Agency mortgages than Treasuries, but PIMCO and others sold them those mortgages and bought – you guessed it – Treasuries with the proceeds. The conclusion of this fairytale is that the government got to run up a 1.5 trillion dollar deficit, didn’t have to sell much of it to private investors, and lived happily ever – ever – well, not ever after, but certainly in 2009.

I submit it could have easily issued at least that many 3 mo bills if it wanted to but chose not to, again for the wrong reasons.

It also could have issue no securities and simply let the deficit spending sit as additional excess reserves in member bank accounts at the fed, which would be my first choice. Reserve balances are functionally nothing more than one day securities. I see no reason to issue further out the curve and thereby support the term structure of rates at higher levels.

Now, however, the Fed tells us that they’re “fed up,” or that they think the economy is strong enough for them to gracefully “exit,” or that they’re confident that private investors are capable of absorbing the balance.

Yes, in fact, it’s a non event, much like when Japan ‘exited’ from its 30t yen of excess reserves several years ago.

Not likely. Various studies by the IMF, the Fed itself, and one in particular by Thomas Laubach, a former Fed economist, suggest that increases in budget deficits ultimately have interest rate consequences and that those countries with the highest current and projected deficits as a percentage of GDP will suffer the highest increases – perhaps as much as 25 basis points per 1% increase in projected deficits five years forward.

Wonder how they explain Japan with far higher deficits than the us, less QE, and a 10 year JGB of only 1.30% vs 3.80% for the us. The term structure of rates is a function of the combination of anticipated central bank rate settings and technicals. (the three month eurodollar futures add up to the 10 year swap rate, convexity adjusted)

If that calculation is anywhere close to reality,

No reason to think they will be. They aren’t based on reality.

investors can guesstimate the potential consequences by using impartial IMF projections for major G7 country deficits as shown in Chart 3.

Using 2007 as a starting point and 2014 as a near-term destination, the IMF numbers show that the U.S., Japan, and U.K. will experience “structural” deficit increases of 4-5% of GDP over that period of time, whereas Germany will move in the other direction. Germany, in fact, has just passed a constitutional amendment mandating budget balance by 2016.

Hopefully they don’t actually do that as the recession could be severe enough to bring down the entire system of govt.

If these trends persist, the simple conclusion is that interest rates will rise on a relative basis in the U.S., U.K., and Japan compared to Germany over the next several years and that the increase could approximate 100 basis points or more. Some of those increases may already have started to show up – the last few months alone have witnessed 50 basis points of differential between German Bunds and U.S. Treasuries/U.K. Gilts, but there is likely more to come.

The fact is that investors, much like national citizens, need to be vigilant and there has been a decided lack of vigilance in recent years from both camps in the U.S. While we may not have much of a vote between political parties, in the investment world we do have a choice of airlines and some of those national planes may have elevated their bond and other asset markets on the wings of central bank check writing over the past 12 months.

Yes, govt policy, or lack of it, sets the term structure of rates. When it comes to the risk free rate, govt is necessarily price setter, as it is the monopoly supplier of reserves at the margin.

Downdrafts and discipline lie ahead for governments and investor portfolios alike. While my own Pollyannish advocacy of “check-free” elections may be quixotic, the shifting of private investment dollars to more fiscally responsible government bond markets may make for a very real outcome in 2010 and beyond.Additionally, if exit strategies proceed as planned, all U.S. and U.K. asset markets may suffer from the absence of the near $2 trillion of government checks written in 2009.

True!

It seems no coincidence that stocks, high yield bonds, and other risk assets have thrived since early March, just as this “juice” was being squeezed into financial markets. If so, then most “carry” trades in credit, duration, and currency space may be at risk in the first half of 2010 as the markets readjust to the absence of their “sugar daddy.”

True, the curve could steepen some. But at the same time, if the output gap remains high, and it becomes more likely the fed will be low for long, the term structure of rates could decline accordingly, as it did in Japan.

There’s no tellin’ where the money went?

Where it always goes. One account at the Fed is debited and another credited.

Not exactly, but it’s left a suspicious trail. Market returns may not be “so fine” in 2010.

William Gross
Managing Director

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>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Tue, Dec 29, 2009 at 8:55 AM, wrote:
>   
>   Do you agree with their conclusion that monetary policy (low rates) didn’t affect housing
>   prices?

Yes, seems that way to me, too.

>   
>   I guess they did raise rates from 2003-06.
>   
>   Seems the very low short rates DID contribute to the ability to buy “more house” or qualify for
>   any house.
>   

Maybe some.

>   
>   For me it was the bush 2003 fiscal adjustment- spending increases, retro tax cuts, etc. that got
>   the deficit up to 200 billion by q303 which was about 8% of gdp annual. Then after a few years
>   the sub prime housing fraud started with loan officers on commission pushing fraudulent
>   appraisals and fraudulent income statements that turned the recovery into a mini boom that
>   actually didn’t get all that large before it crashed when the $trillion fraud was discovered.
>   

Fed: “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble”

Excerpt:
“Lessons
Our findings are both clear and limited in scope.

We find little evidence that the setting of U.S. monetary policy could have directly accounted for a substantial share of the strength in U.S. housing markets between 2003 and 2006. In particular, the rise in house prices or housing activity during this period was much faster than the pace consistent with the overall macroeconomic environment at that time.

But we also find that housing-specific developments were unusual in this period—and not only with respect to prices and activity. The form of mortgage finance—the prevalence and nature of mortgages with adjustable rates versus fixed rates, the role of other “new” or exotic mortgage features, and the role of different types of lenders and securitization paths—all shifted during this period. These shifts undoubtedly fed on each other, with strong demand for housing and rising house prices spurring unsustainable evolution in the nature and perceived risks associated with mortgage innovations and vice versa. This finding is quite limited in that it describes developments but does not explain why such developments occurred.

Nonetheless, our clear finding that traditional channels of monetary policy accounted for little of the rise in housing markets and that housing-specific factors involved the interaction of shifts in demand and mortgage finance suggest two important lessons for policy and certainly for subsequent research. In particular, our discussion connects to the questions of whether monetary policy should “lean against the wind” in the face of asset price bubbles and of how complimentary financial policies (for example, macroprudential regulation) may interact with monetary policy.”

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More on the Bernanke testimony:

Shortly after the failure of Lehman Brothers, I was in Brazil at an international meeting, and I had a meeting there with bankers, and I asked them how the Brazilian economy was doing. And they said well, it had been doing fine, but within a week after Lehman Brothers collapsed, it was like a frigid wind descended on the economy in Brazil. And there was an enormous impact almost immediately on their economy, on their ability to raise funds and make loans.

In dollars, I’m sure.

And it’s astonishing how quickly that one failure spread throughout the world, and created a very severe recession, not just in the U.S., but around the world.

The Federal Reserve, by making a large loan under very tough terms to AIG,

But allowing those funds to be used to meet margin calls on CDS and probably other related market losses. That’s perhaps the most controversial part. Those payments to creditors perhaps could have been labeled ‘loans from the Fed’ subject to AIG ultimate solvency rather than payments from the Fed.

prevented the failure of that institution, and, therefore, tried to contain the impact of the Lehman Brothers failure on the rest of the global financial system. I’ll come back and talk more about AIG, and those things later, but that was just the first step of many that we took to try to stop the crisis.

Subsequently, again, very concerned with the possibility of a global financial meltdown, we worked with Treasury and the Congress to develop a bill that would provide funding that the Fed, the Treasury and other agencies could use to stabilize the financial system, to prevent collapse of the financial system.

This immediately became relevant, because in mid-October, the crisis heated up again to the point that we thought that we were again within days or hours of a collapse of many of the largest financial firms in the world. It was a dramatic weekend. It was Oct. 10 or 11, Columbus Day weekend, when the Finance Ministers and the central bankers of seven of the largest industrial economies had a meeting here in Washington, which, of course, I attended. Usually, those meetings are very scripted and very dry. In this case, there was palpable concern among the participants that the collapse of their financial system might be just days away, and there was a great deal of discussion about how we, collectively, as the policy makers leading those countries could stop the collapse.

In the days that followed, countries all over the world, particularly the advanced industrial countries, took strong measures to prevent the collapse of the financial systems. That included putting capital into banks;

Obviously they didn’t know it was nothing more than regulatory forbearance.

it included preventing the failure of large financial firms; it included guaranteeing the debts of financial firms so they could borrow and keep themselves afloat; it included making short-term loans to firms so that they would have the short-term credit they needed to pay off lenders who were withdrawing their funding. And, again, this was the U.S. doing this, but also many of the most important industrial countries around the world simultaneously, including the U.K., Germany, France, Switzerland and others.

Again, many of those creditors ‘bailed out’ by the Fed’s liquidity provisions could have had those funds labeled ‘loans from the Fed’ rather than simply receiving payments from the Fed.

The result of this collective global effort over that week was essentially to succeed in stabilizing the global banking system, in that subsequent to that week the fears of utter collapse were largely overcome.

Now, in the following months after that, there were still many, many great difficulties in the financial markets. And the Fed, and other central banks and Treasuries around the world, worked very hard to restore the normal functioning of those markets. For example, following the Lehman failure, there was a run where ordinary investors went as quick as they could to pull their money out of money market mutual funds, which are a common investment vehicle for many Americans. It was very analogous to 100 years ago when a bank was about to fail, and the depositors would go to the bank, they would run and pull their money out as quickly as possible, and then the bank would fail. The money market mutual funds were experiencing exactly the same phenomenon.

The Fed and the Treasury working together provided short-term loans to these funds. The Treasury provided some insurance to depositors, or to investors so they would know they wouldn’t lose their money. We stopped the run on the money market mutual funds, and that was an example of how we helped stabilize the situation.

Not sure why that was critical?

There were many other steps we had to take helping individual institutions, and providing programs for backstop lending to make sure that the key markets in the financial system were functioning again, because for months after Lehman Brothers, the amount of fear and uncertainty in the financial markets was so elevated that these markets were, essentially, not functioning properly, and it took really many months until we had reached the point that these markets had begun to approach a normal state.

Doesn’t mention the dollar swap lines to foreign CB’s???

But bank lending is still weak. The banks had a near-death experience, they are now lending in a difficult economic environment. We are strongly encouraging them to lend. We have taken a lot of steps to help them raise new capital, so they’ll have a basis on which to make new loans. And we are taking a number of steps to try to open up markets through which investors invest directly in various forms of credit, like auto loans and credit card loans. All of these steps are improving the financial situation, but particularly the banking sector, we’re still in the convalescent stage.

They only bought AAA traunches which didn’t address the credit issues. They were more worried about taking losses than restoring auto credit, but wanted to give the appearance they were doing something.

As I said, I was a professor. I never worked for Wall Street. I have no connections on Wall Street. In fact, when I first became chairman, I was criticized in some quarters for not being close enough, or knowing enough about Wall Street. So, why did I take these actions?

I didn’t take these actions, or the Federal Reserve didn’t take these actions because we were trying to help bankers, or trying to help Wall Street. What I understood, and what knowledgeable people all around the world understood, is that the financial system is essential to the functioning of any economy. And that if the financial system had collapsed to the extent to which we believed was very likely in September and October 2008, then no force on earth, no policy, could have prevented the collapse of the entire U.S. economy with long-lasting and extreme consequences for every American.

How about a proportionate fiscal response, like a payroll tax holiday and per capita revenue distributions to the States? Instead, he continues to preach ‘fiscal responsibility.’

It was because we were concerned about jobs and incomes and the economic well-being of every American that we intervened to prevent the collapse of the financial system.

Now, going forward, we have a lot to do to get the economy back to stability, get jobs created. You can talk as much as you like about the things we’re doing there, but we’re also going to have to take some very strong steps to make sure that the crisis doesn’t ever happen again.

There were, certainly, weaknesses in our financial regulatory system. There were weaknesses in the way that financial regulators supervised the banks and other financial institutions. And the financial institutions themselves made lots of mistakes in terms of their ability to measure the risks that they were taking, and to control them properly. And to make sure we don’t ever have a crisis like this again, we need to have extensive reform in the private sector, in the public sector, to eliminate these risks in the future.

You had said that the banks were convalescent still, Mr. Chairman. Can you talk to us a little bit more about what that means?

Well, the banks have been stabilized. They’ve raised a good deal of capital, so they’re in much better shape than they were. They are lending, but they are not lending enough to support a healthy recovery. One important reason for that, is that given their losses, given what they’ve been through, they’re being very conservative in the face of what is still a very weak economy; and, therefore, a sense that many borrowers are quite risky.

As bank supervisors, we have a difficult challenge. We have told the banks very clearly that we want them to make loans to credit-worthy borrowers, where there are borrowers who can repay the loans. It’s in the interest of the banks, it’s in the interest of the economy, and, of course, it’s in the interest of the borrowers for those loans to get made.

But the problem is, of course, that we got into trouble in the first place by banks making loans that couldn’t be repaid, so we don’t want banks to make bad loans. Therefore, we are trying to work with banks to make sure that they are, in fact, able to make as many good loans as possible, that they have enough capital, that they have enough short-term funding, and that the examiners and the regulators who work with the banks are not unduly restricting the loans that they make. We want to work with the banks to make sure that they balance the appropriate prudence and caution against the need to make good loans for the economy, and for their own profits.

Banks and the entire private sector is necessarily procyclical.

Only govt via fiscal policy can be countercyclical.

So, what this means is that economic policy, and financial oversight have to take into account all the international dimensions of that. So, for example, on the monetary policy side, we have worked carefully and closely with other central banks to talk about monetary policy in different parts of the world. In fact, during the heat of the crisis in October 2008, the Federal Reserve and five other major central banks cut interest rates together on the same day, as a sign of how committed we were to cooperating on monetary policy.

Doesn’t seem concerned that interest rate cuts may in fact be deflationary as he knows they remove interest income for the private sectors (Bernanke, Sacks, Reinhart, 2004 Fed paper- see ‘the fiscal channel’)

The system worked.

It did work. It was an important first step. I mean, even after we took those steps, the financial markets were in a great deal of stress, and credit at all levels was very much constrained. But it stabilized the situation, and from there, we were able to take a number of steps to - both we, and our partners in other countries - to get the key markets working again, to get the banks stabilized, and to begin the very difficult process of getting the financial system back on its feet.

Never realizing that all the alphabet soup measures to get liquidity going missed the point that all the Fed had to do was lend fed funds to member banks without limit, as the ECB effectively did by immediately accepting any and all bank collateral, to immediately restore bank liquidity.

So, while it’s difficult to know exactly what the outcome would have been, certainly, just judging on what happened after the failure of a single firm, the collapse of the global financial system would surely have led to a far deeper recession, higher unemployment, much greater fiscal cost to the taxpayer, and to rebuild the financial system, and to get the economy moving again. And almost certainly, [we would have had] many, many years of subnormal - substandard - performance by the U.S. economy, and by other industrial economies, as well. Again, we can’t know precisely, but I think if anything, the financial crisis last fall was as severe, and as dangerous as anything we’ve ever seen, including the 1930s.

The whole point of going off the gold standard in 1934 was to be able to provide liquidity without limit to the banking system, so the fact that he did that, however belatedly, is nothing to brag about. It also allowed for unlimited fiscal responses, which he still seems to not fathom.

There is an irony here that’s literary, that here’s this man who spends his life distinguishing himself studying economic history. And then one day you wake up and realize that you’re at the center of economic history in this really unusual chapter. How do you process that personally? I mean, how does that change how you go from being the academic expert to you are in the arena?

Well, I certainly didn’t anticipate when I came to Washington in 2002, I certainly didn’t anticipate these events, or how things would evolve. No question about it. And when I became chairman in 2006, I thought that - I hoped that my main objectives would be improving the management, communication and monitoring policy.

We were certainly attentive to the risks of financial crisis. Secretary Paulson and I talk frequently to people on Wall Street, and we secured the Federal Reserve. We set up a team of staff drawn from different disciplines to try to identify problems and weaknesses in the financial sector. So, we were certainly aware of the risks of financial crisis, but one as large and as dangerous as this one, I certainly did not anticipate. I wish I had, but I didn’t.

Then when the crisis came, you know, rather unexpectedly, a different part of my training and research became relevant, which was to work on financial crises generally, and also on the Great Depression. And I believe very much that that experience, and that knowledge, was very helpful to me in many dimensions of this effort, ranging from - I think the most important lesson, there are many lessons, but I think the most important lesson was that we were not going to have a healthy stable economy with a completely dysfunctional financial system. We had to take strong measures to prevent that from happening.

And in the 1930s, the Federal Reserve was quite passive, and allowed the banks to fail, and we know the result of that. So, we were determined that that wasn’t going to happen on my watch, on our watch, so we were prepared to take very strong actions to avoid that.

That was under the gold standard. Nothing could be done without losing the nation’s gold supply. It was only after the banks reopened in 1934 with a non convertible currency could there be credible deposit insurance unlimited Fed provision of liquidity. Clearly he doesn’t understand that or a) he’d be stating it b) I don’t want to say…

You’ve been quite forthcoming, I think, in your testimony about saying, there’s a lot of things you didn’t see, there’s some things that we didn’t do. If I gave you a kind of do-over to go back as long as you want to say you know what, if we’d seen this, if we’d looked at the sub-prime mortgage crisis. I mean, how could you have handled it, and the Fed handled it better to have a different outcome?

Well, we have, based on the experience of the crisis, we - the Treasury and others - have made proposals for how the financial regulatory system ought to be reformed and restructured. I’ll say a word about that. If we had been in that forum, I think we would have avoided the crisis. So, there were some important lessons.

One was that our regulatory system was too myopic. It was too focused on individual firms, or individual markets, and there was nobody paying attention to the broad overall financial system. So, the Federal Reserve was not entrusted with looking at the whole financial system. We were - we had very specific assignments. We were supposed to look at specific institutions. Those institutions did not include many of the firms that had severe problems, like Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns or AIG. Those were outside of our purview, and since they were outside of our purview, we didn’t look at them.

They missed one critical factor- allowing bank loan officers to work on a commission basis. Nor, did the regulators look into actual loan files to check for fraudulent appraisals and income statements promoted by loan officers working on a commission basis. Regulation is necessarily a work in progress. Mistakes will be made, including mistakes of this scale. Critical to our well being is the knowledge of how to keep these errors in the financial sector from damaging the real economy. And that requires appropriate fiscal responses to sustain aggregate demand, preferably in an equitable manner.

But there were many situations where there was really nobody who was looking carefully at what was going on, and nobody who was looking at how the parts of the system fit together. So, a very important recommendation that we have made is that there be a more systemic approach - that is, have some arrangement whereby a regulator, or a group of regulators, has responsibility to look at the system as a whole, and try to identify emerging problems, or gaps in the regulatory apparatus, or weaknesses in individual institutions, as they relate to other institutions, that threaten the integrity of the system as a whole.

Better still, most of the issues came from allowing banking activities that in fact served no further public purpose. That includes any bank participation in secondary markets, loaning against financial assets, using LIBOR as an index, and many others.

We didn’t have that. Therefore, nobody paid enough attention to AIG, nobody paid enough to attention to credit and call swaps, nobody paid enough attention to some of the activities of investment banks. You go on, and on, and on. Again, if we had had a more comprehensive overview approach that would have been helpful.

A second key element is the problem too big to fail, and how to address that. So, I just want to be very, very clear that even though the Federal Reserve was involved in rescuing Bear Stearns and AIG, we did that extremely reluctantly, and with - it was a very distasteful thing for us to do. We did not do it - we were not set up to do it. We were - it was very difficult for us to do, but we did it because there was no appropriate mechanism, there was no set of laws that would allow the government to intervene in a situation like that in a way that would allow the firm to fail, but would not have all the negative consequences for the financial system and the economy.

So, we had a situation where there were firms who were literally too big to fail, or too complex to fail, or too interconnected to fail. When they came to the edge of collapsing, we had only two very, very bad choices: we either bailed them out, put taxpayer money at risk, put the Federal Reserve at risk in terms of our lending, or we could let them collapse and have all the hugely negative consequences for the financial system and for the economy.

So, what we did not have, and what we very much need going forward, is a third option, and that option should be a legal framework which allows the government - and I think that means, in practice, the Treasury and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation - to intervene when a large complex systemically critical firm is about to fail, and to allow the firm to fail, impose losses on the lenders, the creditors of the firm, the shareholders, fire the management, protect the taxpayer, but be able to do that in a way that protects the system, so that the financial system is protected from the immediate impact of that collapse.

I submit we already have that for the large banks, and the others as well. He just didn’t grasp how to use it. The receivership they did set up did not have to pay off all the creditors, and if there were issues, it would have been a relatively simple matter to petition congress for an ‘emergency’ alteration of current law. They didn’t even try.

We did not have a system like that in place. I think if we had, we could have dealt with Lehman Brothers and AIG in a much more satisfactory way. We would have avoided many of the problems. And, most importantly, we would have not, in some sense, rewarded failure, which is what happened. In the future, it’s important that firms be allowed to fail if they, in fact, take excessive risks, and make bad gambles.

But that mechanism is not in place now.

The mechanism is not in place, and we have asked Congress to address it, and I believe that they will. But until they do, we are really still in a situation where we don’t have good options in dealing with potential collapse of a global financial firm.

It isn’t that hard to do.

Right now people are sort of looking to you, and to Congress, to kind of break the back of unemployment. And you’ve talked about how that is really our biggest challenge right now. Do you feel there is anything else that can be done, or has the Fed shot all its bullets, and has Congress shot all its bullets?

Well, the Federal Reserve has been very aggressive on the unemployment side. So, let me just first say that even though the recession may be technically over., in a sense that the economy is growing, it’s going to feel like a recession for some time, because unemployment remains very high, about 10%. And even people who have jobs, there are many people who are on short hours, that are in voluntary part-time, or maybe people who are not technically unemployed, only because they stopped looking. So, the labor market is in very weak condition, and we’re not going to see a healthy, vibrant economy again until the labor market - the job market - has recovered. So, that is really an extraordinarily important objective for policy going forward. And, certainly, our job won’t be done until the economy is growing again, and jobs are being created.

The Federal Reserve’s attempts to address employment issues, we’ve done several things. Certainly, one of the things is we’re using our monetary policy. In December 2008, while the crisis was still in an intense phase, we cut the short-term interest rate that is the measure of our monetary policy almost to zero. The first time that had ever been the case, the Fed had ever done that, in order to provide the maximum amount of support to the economy, and it remains close to zero today. So, that is a very powerful measure.

Again, he gives no weight to the possibility that the interest income he removed from ’savers’ is weighing on the economy, even though it’s in his own paper from 2004.

Having used that tool to its maximum extent, we have then turned to new and innovative tools, things that have never been done before in the Federal Reserve. I’ll give you two examples. One, we’ve purchased about $1 trillion worth of mortgages that are guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the U.S. Treasury. And in doing those purchases, we have succeeded in reducing the national 30-year fixed-rate mortgage rate from about 6-1/2% to about 4.8%. By lowering mortgage rates that way, we have helped to stabilize the housing sector, to help stabilize the housing crisis, and allow people to refinance, to buy homes. And that, obviously, should get construction started again and house prices stabilizing, and people being able to meet their mortgages. That’s obviously going to be helpful.

The far more effective way would be to directly fund the agencies at the fixed rate the Fed wanted for mortgages and allow that funding to be prepaid without penalty if the mortgages prepaid. But that was never even a consideration.

We’ve also created a program that helps bring credit from Wall Street to support a wide variety of consumer and small-business loans. So, for example, our program allows Wall Street money to come in and support auto loans, credit card loans, student loans, small business loans, commercial real estate loans. By providing that conduit, we are supporting what the banks are doing to get credit flowing into those important sectors.

But only the AAA pieces, as previously discussed.

And I guess a third thing, an additional thing I would mention is that we serve not only as monetary policy makers, but also as bank supervisors. And there we’ve been sparing no effort, as I talked about earlier, to get the banks able and willing to lend again, to create - particularly the small businesses - to create the credit that’s needed to create new jobs and get employment back on track.

I would mention, in particular, our leadership of the stress tests. In the spring, the Federal Reserve led an effort to evaluate the balance sheets of 19 of the largest banking companies in the U.S., and our report on those balance sheets, along with the FDIC, the OCC, to other banking agencies, our reports on those balance sheets is public, greatly increased the confidence in the banking system, which meant that they were able to go out and raise new capital in the stock market, and many of them have paid back the capital to the government.

Still no clue it was only regulatory forbearance.

But by raising new capital, they increased their own capacity to lend. And, as conditions improve, they’ll be able to make new loans as well.

So, by keeping interest rates low, including both short-term rates and long-term rates, like mortgage rates, by supporting a flow of credit to small businesses, consumers and the like, that is our primary effort. Those are the tools that we have. We can always do more, if necessary, but those are the tools that we are applying trying to get job growth going again.

They have more tools but aren’t using them? Unless this is a bluff, what are they waiting for? This is an extraordinary statement.

And we have seen, obviously, the labor market is still very weak, but the last report we saw shows that we’re now coming closer to the point where we’ll stop seeing job losses and start seeing job gains.

We’ve talked about a lot of those extraordinary things you’ve done. But is that it? Like now do we have to - because there’s still really bad numbers, even your forecasts are like what, 10% [unemployment] this year, 9% going forward, I think like 8% in 2012. Do we just have to kind of now sit back and take it?

Well, the Federal Reserve will continue to see what other policy actions we can take. And we’ve really been very aggressive, thus far. And the additional steps aren’t as obvious or clear as the ones that we’ve already taken.

Right, they don’t have any actual ideas.

A lot of the scope now is on the fiscal side of the house. As you know, the government passed a major fiscal program earlier this year, and I think it was just today the President announced a number of individual - a package of programs to try to address unemployment. So, [there are] a lot of new initiatives probably coming from the fiscal side.

While he preaches fiscal responsibility. See below.

Did they ask you for your opinion of those before…

Well, our staffs confer frequently with the Treasury and other parts of the Economic Advisory Groups that advise the President. And we often give our views. Our views are solicited. But, of course, they are responsible for their policy choices.

Have you said before, or are you prepared to say now, that a second stimulus, a round of incentives, is a good idea, on the fiscal side?

So, my domain is monetary policy and financial stability. And we have done, of course, a lot of aggressive things to try to support the economy, try to support job creation. I generally leave the details of fiscal programs to the Administration and Congress. That’s really their area of authority and responsibility, and I don’t think it’s appropriate for me to second guess.

You have said that there’s a long-term deficit program that needs to be dealt with. You said health care costs ought to be cut back, so it’s not like you won’t talk at all about the fiscal situation. Regardless of the details, which I understand that you don’t want to tell them how to do it, do you think that the fiscal side ought to do something?

Well, let me say this, I think that it’s very important that whatever actions that Congress and Administration take on the fiscal side, that they begin soon, or even sooner, to develop a credible medium-term interest strategy for fiscal policy, one that will persuade the markets and the public that over the medium term, the next few years, we will - we, as government, we, as a country - will be able to bring our deficits down to a level that could be sustained over a period of time.

Yes, he’s clearly part of the problem, not part of the answer. He’s failed to realize the ramifications of lifting convertibility in 1934 (and 1971 internationally) and is one of the leading deficit terrorists.

If we can do that, which will increase the confidence of the markets in American fiscal policy, that would give us more scope to take action today, because, again, there would be confidence that we have a way out, a way back towards sustainability.

There is no sustainability issue and he should know that. But he doesn’t even fully understand monetary operations of the Fed itself.

In your testimony the other day, one Senator talked about here’s the money that the federal government takes in, here’s what we spend on entitlements. It’s basically the same. Everything else we have to borrow for. I mean, there are a lot of people saying that it’s not sustainable, as you have said. And they said one of the only solutions is some kind of tax, a sales tax, value-added tax, something other than an income tax. But would you be in favor of any of those alternatives?

So, the way I put this before Congress before is that the one law that I strongly advocate is the law of arithmetic. (Laughter.) That law of arithmetic says that if you are a low-tax person, then you have to - you are responsible for finding ways on saving on expenditure, so that you don’t have enormous imbalances between revenues and spending. And by the same law of arithmetic, if you were somebody who believes that government spending is important, and you are for bigger and more spending, and bigger programs, then it’s incumbent upon you to figure out where the revenues are going to come from to meet that spending. So, again, I think that’s, again, Congress’ main responsibility.

I have spoken about deficit, and I think deficits are important, because they address broad economic and financial stability. We need to talk about that. But in terms of the specifics about how to get to fiscal balance, that’s the elected officials’ responsibility.

He sees spending as revenue constrained where that concept is entirely inapplicable to non convertible currency and floating fx policy.

Do you think Congress is fiscally illiterate? Economically illiterate?

No, of course not. But what they have to deal with is not just a question of understanding. It’s a question of making very, very tough choices, and in a political environment, where people understandably are resistant to cuts in programs or benefits, or increases of taxes. So, there needs to be tough choices made, there needs to be leadership. And I don’t envy Congress those choices, because they’re very difficult ones to make.

Are you saying that time for fiscal and monetary stimulus is over? And, if so, what’s the downside of pushing even harder?

There are not easy solutions. It’s an enormous problem. I think the Federal Reserve - one direction that we can go is to continue to encourage the extension of credit, small businesses, in particular, create a lot of jobs, particularly during economic recoveries. And we have lots and lots of evidence and anecdotes suggesting that small businesses are particularly harmed by the tightness of the bank lending standards and unavailability of credit. So, everything we can do, and that the Administration and Congress can do, to support credit extension to all business, but primarily small business, would be a very powerful.

You don’t think it’s a liquidity problem?

Well, I mean, interest rates are very low, so I think it’s going to be a question, first of all, of getting credit flowing again. And the Federal Reserve has got a role to play there. And then, Congress and the Administration will consider possible programs and fiscal policies.

You’re definitely not okay with long-term profligacy, but are you okay with them doing something in the short-term?

I think if they do that, it’s critically important they clarify the longer-term plan for establishing sustainable fiscal [policy].

Again ducking the question. But it’s clear he is not a supporter of using fiscal adjustments to sustain aggregate demand.

Adair Turner, the chief British [financial services] regulator, said that we’ve learned that much of what the financial services sector did in the past 10 years has no economic or social value. Do you agree? Did the financial services sector just get too big, and should it be smaller?

Okay. Well, a strong financial system is very important. It allocates capital to new businesses and new industries. It allows for people to invest in a wide range of activities, so it’s critically important to have a good financial system. And the evidence for that is that when the financial system breaks down, the system just doesn’t function.

That is not evidence for that. Seems a breakdown of logic???

You see what the impact has had on the economy. With that being said, the financial system is unique to the extent, first, that it is so critical to the economy, and, secondly, to the very, very old tendency to succumb to booms and busts.

Again, this is too confused to not be an insight into his basic sense of logic.

And, therefore, we do need to have an effective comprehensive financial regulatory system that will essentially allow us to tame the beast so that it provides the benefits, the growth and development without creating these kinds of crisis.

And then this says it all regarding his understanding of monetary operations:

Okay. When the Federal Reserve buys mortgages, it pays for them by creating reserves the banks hold in Federal Reserve. So, as we purchase $1 trillion of mortgages, we’ve created roughly $1 trillion of reserves that banks hold at the Federal Reserve. The banks, at this point, are just willing to hold those reserves with the Fed, and not do anything with them.

Banks don’t ‘do anything’ with reserves.

Ultimately, if the economy normalized, and the Fed took no action, the banks would take those reserves, try to lend them out, and they would begin to circulate, and the money supply would start to grow.

Banks don’t ‘lend out’ reserves.

And then, ultimately, that would create an inflationary risk.

This is not how it works.

So, therefore, as the economy begins to recover, and as we move away from this very weak economic environment, the Federal Reserve is going to have to pull those reserves out of the system.

We have a number of means for doing that, which we have explained to the markets, and the public, and everyone is confident we can do that. And we will do that over time, in order to make sure that as we come out of this crisis, we don’t generate inflation at the end.

Reserve management has nothing to do with inflation with a non convertible currency and floating fx. This is ancient gold standard rhetoric.

So, the reserves can be pulled out through various mechanisms or can mobilize. And we don’t have to do that yet, but when the time comes, we have tools to do that.

And are there lurking dangers in those mortgages that you purchased that we don’t even know about now?

Well, the mortgages are guaranteed. The credit, even if they go bad, Fannie and Freddie with the backing of the U.S. Treasury will pay them off, so the Fed is not taking any credit risk by holding these mortgages.

It’s comforting for you, but not for the taxpayers. Right?

Well, on the other hand, what’s happening is that we earn the interest from those mortgages, and then we remit that interest back to the Treasury, so the money finds its way back to the taxpayer.

That’s exactly how the Fed’s portfolio removes interest income from the private sectors.

And, indeed, the Federal Reserve will be paying the Treasury a good bit more money the next few years than it has in the past, because of the interest we’re earning on these mortgages we acquired.

On that note, this week we did learn the TARP is going to pay back nearly all of what it was required to from the taxpayer. Looking back a year later, are surprised by that?

Well, we said at the beginning that the TARP money was an investment. It was going to acquire assets, and that most or all might come back to the taxpayer. Right now, if you look at all these repayments from banks, and the fact that the government is sitting on capital gains, as well as other investments, I think it’s a reasonable probability that the TARP money invested in financial institutions, that the great majority of it will come back to the taxpayer. So, in the end, we will have stabilized the financial system and avoided this global crisis at not a small amount of money, but relative to the alternative, a quite small amount of money.

Were there days where you woke up and you thought, what am I not thinking of that we could be doing?

We had a philosophy right here, which was what we called blue-sky thinking. And what blue-sky thinking was, was we have a problem, I want everybody to give me just three associations. What can you think of? How can we approach this, what can we do? And we’ll worry about getting rid of the silly answers later. So, there’s been a lot of creativity here, and I give credit to terrific staff . I think one of the lessons of the depression, and this is something that Franklin Roosevelt demonstrated, was that when orthodoxy fails, then you need to try new things. And he was very willing to try unorthodox approaches when the orthodox approach had shown that it was not adequate.

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I was asked by a reporter to state how I’d fix the economy in 500 words and replied:

Fixing the Economy

1. A full ‘payroll tax holiday’ where the US Treasury makes all FICA payments for us (15.3%). This will restore ’spending power’ allowing households to make their mortgage payments, which ‘fixes the banks’ from the ‘bottom up.’ It also helps keep prices down as competitive pressures will cause many businesses to lower prices due to the tax savings even as sales increase.

2. A $500 per capita Federal distribution to all the States to sustain employment in essential services, service debt, and reduce the need for State tax hikes. This can be repeated at perhaps 6 month intervals until GDP surpasses previous high levels at which point state revenues that depend on GDP are restored.

3. A Federally funded $8/hr job for anyone willing and able to work that includes healthcare. The economy will improve rapidly with my first two proposals and the private sector far more readily hires people already working vs people idle and unemployed.
In 2001 Argentina, population 34 million, implemented this proposal, putting to work 2 million people who had never held a ‘real’ job. Within 2 years 750,000 were employed by the private sector.

4. Returning banking to public purpose. The following are disruptive and do not serve no public purpose:
a. No secondary market transactions
b. No proprietary trading
c. No lending vs financial assets
d. No business activities beyond approved lending and providing banking accounts and related services.
e. No contracting in LIBOR, only fed funds.
f. No subsidiaries of any kind.
g. No offshore lending.
h. No contracting in credit default insurance.
5. Federal Reserve- The liability side of banking is not the place for market discipline. The Fed should lend in the fed funds
market to all member banks to ensure permanent liquidity. Demanding collateral from banks is disruptive and redundant, as
the FDIC already regulates and supervises all bank assets.
6. The Treasury should issue nothing longer than 3 month bills. Longer term securities serve to keep long term rates higher than
otherwise.
7. FDIC
a. Remove the $250,000 cap on deposit insurance. Liquidity is no longer an issue when fed funds are available from the Fed.
b. Don’t tax the good banks for losses by bad banks. All that does is raise interest rates.
8. The Treasury should directly fund the housing agencies to eliminate hedging needs and directly target mortgage rates at
desired levels.
9. Homeowners being foreclosed should have the option to stay in their homes at fair market rents with ownership going to the
government at the lower of the mortgage balance or fair market value of the home.
10. Remove the ’self imposed constraints’ that are disruptive to operations and serve no public purpose.
a. Treasury debt ceiling- Congress already voted for the spending and taxes
b. Allow Treasury ‘overdrafts’ at the Fed. This is left over from the gold standard days and is currently inapplicable.
11. Federal taxes function to regulate aggregate demand, not to raise revenue per se, and therefore should be increased only
to cool down an overheating economy, and not to ‘pay for’ anything.

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Yet another legend (or two) slips into the ‘better lucky than good’ category.

They may be right, but it will be for a different reason:

Top hedge funds bet on big yields rise

By Henry Sender

Dec. 22 (FT) —The recent rise in long-term US interest rates comes as good news for several leading hedge fund managers, including John Paulson, who have positioned their trading books to benefit from higher yields on US Treasury securities.

Mr Paulson, who made big gains earlier this decade by betting against the subprime mortgage market and whose firm, Paulson & Co, manages $33bn, has said he believes government stimulus efforts will inevitably lead to higher inflation and a corresponding rise in rates.

“It will be difficult for the government to withdraw the economic stimulus,” Mr Paulson said in a speech. “An increase in the monetary base leads to an increase in the money supply, which leads to inflation.”

Bond prices fall as yields rise, and Mr Paulson told the Financial Times last week that he has been hoping to benefit in the Treasury market by buying options that would become profitable if rates headed higher. TPG-Axon’s Dinakar Singh has been making similar options trades, according to a person familiar with the matter.

Julian Robertson, the hedge fund manager, has pursued a related strategy, hoping to benefit from a bigger difference between short-term and long-term interest rates, known as a steeper yield curve, a person familiar with his trades said.

The yield on the 10-year Treasury, which hit a crisis low of 2.055 per cent last year, has moved from 3.2 per cent last month to 3.75 per cent on Tuesday.

Hedge fund managers, however, have been hesitant to engage in short sales of Treasury bonds to profit from the rising yields – and falling prices – because of the Federal Reserve’s heavy involvement in the market. This has led some to buy options – dubbed “high strike receivers” – that would enable them to profit from sharply higher Treasury yields, hedge fund managers say. These trades, which are relatively cheap to execute because they are so out of the money, are based on the thesis that yields could hit 7 or 8 per cent.

“If they are right, and the world ends, they will make a fortune,” said one fund manager who is sceptical of the idea. “If they are wrong, they haven’t lost much.”

Some traders are cautious because many peers lost large sums betting that rates would rise in Japan in the 1990s – as yields fell to less than half a percentage point. The trade was termed the “black widow” because it left so many victims.

“Nobody understood the extent of deflation and economic weakness in Japan,” said Dino Kos of Portales Partners, a research consultancy, who was then a Fed official. “More money was lost on that trade than on any other single trade. Everyone piled in when rates were at 3 per cent and then at 2.5 per cent and then at 2 per cent.”

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