Category Archives: Treasury

Why it matters how the 700 billion is accounted for

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It would be counter productive to add the $700 billion to the budget deficit calculation if the proposal goes through and is executed, since Congress is likely to take measures to somehow constrain spending or increase revenues to try to ‘pay for it’. This would be highly contractionary at precisely the wrong time.

Note that if the Fed buys mortgage securities it doesn’t add to the deficit, while the Treasury buying the same securities does? And in both cases treasury securities are sold to ‘offset operating factors’; either way, Fed or Treasury, the government exchanges treasury securities for mortgage securities.

When any agent of the government buys financial assets, that particularly spending per se doesn’t add to aggregate demand, or in any way or directly alter output and employment.

Yet here we are listening to the Fed Chairman, the Treasury Secretary, and members of Congress talking about $700 billion of ‘taxpayer money’ and a potential increase in the deficit of $700 billion.
And no one argues with statements like ‘it is even more than we spent in Iraq’ and ‘that much money could better spent elsewhere’. Unfortunately for the US economy, this supposed addition to the deficit is likely to negatively impact future spending, perhaps at the time when it’s needed most to support demand.

I recall something like this happened in 1937, when revenues collected for social security weren’t ‘counted’ as part of the Federal budget, and the millions collected to go into the new trust fund
were in fact simply a massive tax hike. Unemployment went from something like 12% to maybe 19% (and stayed about that high until WWII deficit spending brought unemployment down to near zero). After that happened much was written regarding public vs private accounting and the cash flow from social security and other programs was subsequently counted as part of the federal budget calculation, as it is today, and for the same reason.


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Congressional confusion

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Congress seems confused over who are the bad guys that need to be punished.

They seem to be leaning towards punishing shareholders if their management decides to accept any form of federal assistance under the new plan.

This puts management in a bind: sell a few securities to the Treasury and let shareholders lose value to the government, or muddle through and don’t dilute the shareholders.

Management is likelty to do what’s best for management, and sell securities to the Treasury and sell the shareholders up (down?) the river. Just like they do when they issue a convert when stock prices fall, to shore up capital.

But Congress also thinks management needs to be punished with some form of salary and bonus caps. This would discourage management from utilizing whatever new facilities Congress comes up with. Which also makes shares less valuable.

Looks like a lose/lose for the shareholders?

It seems to me if Congress finds anyone at fault (whatever that means) it would be managers rather than shareholders.

What have shareholders done wrong, even in theory? It’s a stretch to come up with anything.

And who are the shareholders? Pension funds, ira’s, individuals? Why are they the objects of Congressional wrath?

With each government intervention, shareholders have been a favorite target to justify the utilization of ‘taxpayer money’ (whatever that means with an asset purchase).

Congress isn’t looking at who’s at fault, they are only looking to minimize risk to ‘taxpayer money’, even if that means taking funds from innocent shareholders.

Congress can be counted on to do what they think is best for them politically. So with something like 75% of the voters owning shares, it seems odd that they are the target.

And, of course, none of this address aggregate demand which is the key to output and employment (the drivers of corporate prosperity) and share holder value.


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Treasury plan cont’d

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This is what was submitted:

Treasury fact sheet on asset plan

Treasury will have authority to issue up to $700 billion of Treasury securities to finance the purchase of troubled assets. The purchases are intended to be residential and commercial mortgage-related assets, which may include mortgage-backed securities and whole loans. The Secretary will have the discretion, in consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, to purchase other assets, as deemed necessary to effectively stabilize financial markets. Removing troubled assets will begin to restore the strength of our financial system so it can again finance economic growth.

While this won’t alter bank capital, bank asset sales shrink balance sheets and ‘make room’ for new lending.

In fact, that was the ‘originate to sell’ model.

This will support output and employment only to the extent it has been constrained by limited capability of banks to lend.

The major effect of having these problematic assets on the books has been in the secondary markets, including interbank lending, which have lesser and only indirect consequence for output and employment.

Supporting the housing agencies ability to lend at lower rates to any credit worthy borrowers directly supports housing and other sectors.

What banks need most is an increase in aggregate demand sufficient enough to increase employment and output.

This proposal for the Treasury to buy bank assists will have little direct effect on aggregate demand.

The timing and scale of any purchases will be at the discretion of Treasury and its agents, subject to this total cap. The price of assets purchases will be established through market mechanisms where possible, such as reverse auctions.

The question of price is problematic.

This is vague as the Treasury doesn’t have clarity on how this might work. It is doubtful that Congress will either. Reverse auctions can result in gross overpricing, which they do not want to happen.

And note the congressional discussion on salary caps for institutions that sell assets to the Treasury – no telling how that will shake out!

The dollar cap will be measured by the purchase price of the assets. The authority to purchase expires two years from date of enactment. Asset and Institutional Eligibility for the Program. To qualify for the program, assets must have been originated or issued on or before September 17, 2008. Participating financial institutions must have significant operations in the U.S., unless the Secretary makes a determination, in consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, that broader eligibility is necessary to effectively stabilize financial markets.


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