the euro zone in transition

As previously discussed since inception, operationally the euro zone, much like every other nation with its own currency, will, one way or another, wind up with the ECB, the issuer of the currency,
‘funding’ fiscal deficits sufficient to meet any net savings desires in that currency, as well as funding the banking system’s liabilities.

The open question has always been is how it gets from here to there, and the answer to that has never been clear.

So far it’s doing it with great reluctance, with the ECB funding the banking system and select national govts only as a last resort, and not yet in the normal course of business.

A weakening global economy now seems to be forcing the next move towards the ultimate expected outcome.

We may have reached that point where their austerity measures, rather than bringing national govt deficits down, will instead make those deficit go up, as they induce macro economic weakness which ‘automatically’ increases transfer payments and decreases tax revenues.

This is a highly unstable equilibrium condition that can accelerate into a variety of forms of oblivion, which ultimately reaches the core as default risk premiums move down the line, much like a multi car pile up as one car after another crashes into the lead pack of wrecked cars.

And as the core is threatened, holders of euro financial assets, including foreign govts that hold various forms of euro financial assets as foreign currency reserves, feel the walls closing in, as one credit after another falls by the wayside.

Only a sudden increase in world aggregate demand, or a sudden change of policy that includes pro active ECB funding, is likely to be able to reverse what’s been happening

more on ECB funding dependence in the eurozone

Yet another substantiation of just how much the entire system is (necessarily) dependent on ECB funding/backstopping.

The ECB’s Secret Bailout Strategy

By: Hans-Werner Sinn

Excerpt:
The amount of the ECB’s “replacement lending” is shown by the so-called Target2 account, which measures the deficit or surplus of a country’s financial transactions with other countries. As the account includes international payments for both trade in goods and financial claims, a deficit in a country’s Target account indicates foreign borrowing via the ECB, whereas a surplus denotes foreign lending via the ECB.

The balance is not reported on the ECB’s balance sheet, since it is zero in the aggregate, but it does show up on the respective balance sheets of the national central banks as interest-bearing claims against, and liabilities to, the ECB system. Until mid-2007, the Target accounts were close to zero, but since then, they have grown by about €100 billion per year.

For example, the Bundesbank’s Target claims ballooned from €5 billion in 2006 to €323 billion by March 2011. The counterpart to these claims were the PIGS’ liabilities, which had grown to about €340 billion by the end of last year. Interestingly, the PIGS’ cumulative current-account deficits from 2008 through 2010 were of roughly the same order of magnitude – €365 billion, to be precise.

Had the ECB failed to finance these deficits, the PIGS would have had a hard time finding the money to pay for their net imports. If they succeeded at all, high interest rates would have induced them to tighten their belts, and their current-account deficits, which in the case of Greece and Portugal exceeded 10% of GDP, would have diminished.