Comments on Brian Wesbury article

He’s got the data right, and I agree with all he concludes from it. All he’s missing is the difference he points two between now (unlimited funds available) and The Great Depression (banks short of lendable funds), including what the Fed presumably ‘did’ each time, are the differences between the constraints of the gold standard of that time vs today’s floating fx policy.

The Economy Is Fine (Really)

by Brian Wesbury

It is hard to imagine any time in history when such rampant pessimism about the economy has existed with so little evidence of serious trouble.

True, retail sales fell 0.4% in December and fourth-quarter real GDP probably grew at only a 1.5% annual rate. It is also true that in the past six months manufacturing production has been flat, new orders for durable goods have fallen at a 0.8% annual rate, and unemployment blipped up to 5%. Soft data for sure, but nowhere near the end of the world.

It is most likely that this recent weakness is a payback for previous strength. Real GDP surged at a 4.9% annual rate in the third quarter, while retail sales jumped 1.1% in November. A one-month drop in retail sales is not unusual. In each of the past five years, retail sales have reported at least three negative months. These declines are part of the normal volatility of the data, caused by wild swings in oil prices, seasonal adjustments, or weather. Over-reacting is a mistake.

A year ago, most economic data looked much worse than they do today. Industrial production fell 1.1% during the six months ending February 2007, while new orders for durable goods fell 3.9% at an annual rate during the six months ending in November 2006. Real GDP grew just 0.6% in the first quarter of 2007 and retail sales fell in January and again in April. But the economy came back and roared in the middle of the year — real GDP expanded 4.4% at an annual rate between April and September.

With housing so weak, the recent softness in production and durable goods orders is understandable. But housing is now a small share of GDP (4.5%). And it has fallen so much already that it is highly unlikely to drive the economy into recession all by itself. Exports are 12% of the economy, and are growing at a 13.6% rate. The boom in exports is overwhelming the loss from housing.

Personal income is up 6.1% during the year ending in November, while small-business income accelerated in October and November, during the height of the credit crisis. In fact, after subtracting income taxes, rent, mortgages, car leases and loans, debt service on credit cards and property taxes, incomes rose 3.9% faster than inflation in the year through September. Commercial paper issuance is rising again, as are mortgage applications.

Some large companies outside of finance and home building are reporting lower profits, but the over-reaction to very spotty negative news is astounding. For example, Intel’s earnings disappointed, creating a great deal of fear about technology. Lost in the pessimism is the fact that 20 out of 24 S&P 500 technology companies that have reported earnings so far have beaten Wall Street estimates.

Models based on recent monetary and tax policy suggest real GDP will grow at a 3% to 3.5% rate in 2008, while the probability of recession this year is 10%. This was true before recent rate cuts and stimulus packages. Now that the Fed has cut interest rates by 175 basis points, the odds of a huge surge in growth later in 2008 have grown. The biggest threat to the economy is still inflation, not recession.

Yet many believe that a recession has already begun because credit markets have seized up. This pessimistic view argues that losses from the subprime arena are the tip of the iceberg. An economic downturn, combined with a weakened financial system, will result in a perfect storm for the multi-trillion dollar derivatives market. It is feared that cascading problems with inter-connected counterparty risk, swaps and excessive leverage will cause the entire “house of cards,” otherwise known as the U.S. financial system, to collapse. At a minimum, they fear credit will contract, causing a major economic slowdown.

For many, this catastrophic outlook brings back memories of the Great Depression, when bank failures begot more bank failures, money was scarce, credit was impossible to obtain, and economic problems spread like wildfire.

This outlook is both perplexing and worrisome. Perplexing, because it is hard to see how a campfire of a problem can spread to burn down the entire forest. What Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke recently estimated as a $100 billion loss on subprime loans would represent only 0.1% of the $100 trillion in combined assets of all U.S. households and U.S. non-farm, non-financial corporations. Even if losses ballooned to $300 billion, it would represent less than 0.3% of total U.S. assets.

Beneath every dollar of counterparty risk, and every swap, derivative, or leveraged loan, is a real economic asset. The only way credit troubles could spread to take down the entire system is if the economy completely fell apart. And that only happens when government policy goes wildly off track.

In the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve allowed the money supply to collapse by 25%, which caused a dangerous deflation. In turn, this deflation caused massive bank failures. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Herbert Hoover’s tax hike passed in 1932, and then FDR’s alphabet soup of new agencies, regulations and anticapitalist government activity provided the coup de grace. No wonder thousands of banks failed and unemployment ballooned to 20%.

But in the U.S. today, the Federal Reserve is extremely accommodative. Not only is the federal funds rate well below the trend in nominal GDP growth, but real interest rates are low and getting lower. In addition, gold prices have almost quadrupled during the past six years, while the consumer price index rose more than 4% last year.

These monetary conditions are not conducive to a collapse of credit markets and financial institutions. Any financial institution that goes under does so because of its own mistakes, not because money was too tight. Trade protectionism has not become a reality, and while tax hikes have been proposed, Congress has been unable to push one through.

Which brings up an interesting thought: If the U.S. financial system is really as fragile as many people say, why should we go to such lengths to save it? If a $100 billion, or even $300 billion, loss in the subprime loan world can cause the entire system to collapse, maybe we should be working hard to build a better system that is stronger and more reliable.

Pumping massive amounts of liquidity into the economy and pumping up government spending by giving money away through rebates may create more problems than it helps to solve. Kicking the can down the road is not a positive policy.

The irony is almost too much to take. Yesterday everyone was worried about excessive consumer spending, a lack of saving, exploding debt levels, and federal budget deficits. Today, our government is doing just about everything in its power to help consumers borrow more at low rates, while it is running up the budget deficit to get people to spend more. This is the tyranny of the urgent in an election year and it’s the development that investors should really worry about. It reads just like the 1970s.

The good news is that the U.S. financial system is not as fragile as many pundits suggest. Nor is the economy showing anything other than normal signs of stress. Assuming a 1.5% annualized growth rate in the fourth quarter, real GDP will have grown by 2.8% in the year ending in December 2007 and 3.2% in the second half during the height of the so-called credit crunch. Initial unemployment claims, a very consistent canary in the coal mine for recessions, are nowhere near a level of concern.

Because all debt rests on a foundation of real economic activity, and the real economy is still resilient, the current red alert about a crashing house of cards looks like another false alarm. Warren Buffett, Wilbur Ross and Bank of America are buying, and there is
still $1.1 trillion in corporate cash on the books. The bench of potential buyers on the sidelines is deep and strong. Dow 15,000 looks much more likely than Dow 10,000. Keep the faith and stay invested. It’s a wonderful buying opportunity.

Mr. Wesbury is chief economist for First Trust Portfolios, L.P.


Gasoline demand

this doesn’t look like the stuff of recession:

FUNDAMENTALS TO SUPPORT

Barclays Capital said gasoline demand indications from the U.S., the world’s largest consumer, have been robust.

“Gasoline is showing the strongest year-on-year growth in demand for January-to-date,” it said in a research note.

“In each of the past six years, February has marked the start of a run of six months of consecutive month-on-month gasoline demand increases, and we have no reason to expect 2008 to break that pattern.”


Re: BTIG Earnings Recap for January 23, 2008

(an email)

On Jan 23, 2008 8:51 PM, Joshua wrote:
>
> Economy is in dire condition?!?!?! Look at today’s earnings reports and
> forecasts…anecdotal, but not so dire at all!

Yes, they’ve been forecasting recession for about a year and it keeps getting put off a quarter.

Now the term is morphing to ‘growth recession’ which mean growth slows for a few quarters.

Hardly the stuff of rate cuts for a mainstream economist when inflation is ripping.

warren

> Subject: BTIG Earnings Recap for January 23, 2008
>
> Stocks staged a late day rally (biggest in 2 months) on a report NY
> regulators met with banks to discuss aid for bond insurers. Trading on
> earnings (6:15pm): COF +0.30 (+0.7%), CTXS -1.02 (-3.2%), EBAY -1.63
> (-6.7%), FFIV +3.91 (+19.4%), GILD -0.81 (-1.8%), ISIL -0.72 (-3.1%) , NFLX
> -0.06 (-0.25%), PLCM +1.72 (+7.7%), QCOM +2.67 (+7.3%), QLGC +0.17 (+1.3%),
> SANM +0.04 (+2.8%), SYMC +1.40 (+9.1%) and WDC +1.36 (+5.5%). Expected to
> report in the morning: ABC, BAX, COL, CY, DHR, ED, F, HSY, KMB, LCC, LMT,
> MHP, NOK, NOC, NUE, POT, RESP, SPWR, T, TXT, UNP and XRX. Economic data for
> tomorrow includes Initial Claims for 1/19, December Existing Home Sales and
> Crude Inventories for 1/19.
>
> TickerAnnouncementNote
> AMCC+ 1c better, revs better
> AVCT+ 10c better, revs inline
> BKHM+ 5c better, revs betterguides Q3 revs inline
> CAVM+ 1c better, revs better
> CBT+ 24c better, revs better
> CHIC+ 1c better, revs inlineguides Q2 EPS inline
> CNS+ 2c better, revs better
> CTXS+ 6c better, revs betterguides Q1 inline, FY08 inline
> GILD+ 1c better, revs inline
> HXL+ 1c better, revs betterguides FY08 inline
> ISIL+ 1c better, revs betterguides Q1 EPS, revs inline
> KNX+ 1c better, revs better
> LSI+ 6c better, revs betterguides Q1 inline
> MOLX+ 2c better, revs betterguides Q3 EPS inline, revs above
> NFLX+ 10c better, revs inlineguides Q1 EPS inline, revs above; FY08 EPS
> above, revs inline
> NVEC+ 6c better, revs better
> PLCM+ 3c better, revs better
> PLXS+ 2c worse, revs inlineguides Q2 EPS above, revs above
> PRXL+ 1c better, revs betterguides Q3 EPS inline, revs above; guides FY08
> EPS, revs above
> QLGC+ 3c better, revs better
> QTM+ inline, revs lower
> RGA+ 6c better, revs lowerguides FY08 EPS above
> RKT+ 4c better, revs better
> RYL+ 53c (ex-items), vs loss of 17c (First Call), revs better
> SANM+ 1c better, revs betterguides Q2 EPS inline, revs above
> SXL+ 10c better, revs better
> SYMC+ 4c better, revs betterguides Q4 EPS above, revs above
> TSS+ 3c better, revs inlineguides FY08 above, revs inline
> VAR+ 3c worse, revs betterissues Q2, FY08 guidance
> VARI+ 2c better, revs better
> WDC+ 31c better, revs better
> EFII= inline, revs inlinereaffirms Q1 guidance
> FFIV= inline, revs inlineannounces share repurchase up to $200mln
> SRDX= inline, revs better
> ACXM- 2c worse, revs lowerissues FY08 guidance
> CBST- 1c worse, revs inline
> CLDN- 1c worse, revs better
> COF- 3c worse, revs lower
> DGII- 3c worse, revs inlinereaffirms FY08 inline
> EBAY- 4c better, revs betterguides Q1 EPS, revs below; FY08 EPS inline, revs
> below
> MRCY- 9c better, revs inlineguides Q3 EPS, revs below, FY08 EPS, revs below
> MTSC- 10c worse, revs betterreaffirms FY08 guidance
> NE- 1c worse, revs inline
> PSSI- 1c worse, revs inlinereaffirms FY08 EPS guidance
> PTV- 2c better, revs betterguides Q1 EPS below, FY08 EPS, revs inline
> QCOM- 1c worse, revs betterguides Q2 EPS, revs inline; reaffirms FY08 EPS,
> guides FY08 revs inline
> RJF- 11c worse, revs lower
> SOV- 4c worse
> SYK- inline, revs betterguides FY08 inline
> WSTL- loss of 4c vs loss of 6c (may not be comp), revs slightly betterguides
> Q4 below
>


No recession, yet..

real-gdp.gif

  • No Recession, yet..

new-home-sales.gif

  • Demand drop of 1% of GDP began over a year ago when home buying by subprime borrowers ceased..

current-account-balance.gif

  • And exports picked up the slack.
    And with housing as low as it is, further reductions, if any, will have minimal macro effects.
  • Losses not that large so far, only about $100 billion in write offs have been announced and with at least some prospects of recovery.
    Far less than the 1998 (inflation adjusted) losses, for example, when $100 billion was lost in just the first day when Russia defaulted August 17 with no prospects of recovery.
  • Financial sector looses are not direct reductions of aggregate demand, just the ‘rearranging of financial assets.’
  • Falling demand due to supply side credit issues and capital constraints are primarily fixed exchange rate phenomena and are rare and brief with floating exchange rate policy and a non convertible currency.
    Even in Japan with a floating exchange rate, when most bank capital was lost, credit expansion was a function of demand, while with fixed exchange rates, supply side issues dominated – Argentina, Russia, Mexico, the US in the 30s (gold standard), and the panic of 1907 Governor Mishkin referenced in his speech.

government-spending-trailing-twelve-months.gif

  • Government spending has been ‘moved forward’ from 2007 to 2008. Friday reported up over 8% year over year (NOTE: graph not updated for this last data point.)
  • Alt minimum tax capped helps demand some in 2008.

personal-spending-personal-income.gif

  • Personal income and spending not falling.
  • No econometric evidence of a significant ‘wealth effect’ from asset prices on the way up or on the way down. Income is better correlated.
  • Government employees and pensioners got GPI pay increases. This ‘half’ of the demand side keeps growing at 5% + nominal rates so to go into recession, the other half has to go down more than that.

government-revenue-trailing-twelve-months.gif

  • Government tax receipts still rising.

initial-continuing-claims-4-wk-mvg-avg.gif

  • Jobless claims remain too low for a recession.

labor-participation-rate.gif

  • Labor force participation rate climbing even as demographics suggest natural drift lower.

cpi-core-cpi-pce-price-index-core-pce.gif

export-prices-crb-index.gif

iron-steel-scrap-prices.gif

  • World and domestic demand is strong enough to support elevating prices of food, energy, and rising US imports and export prices.

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A tale of mixed metaphors

Ben Bernanke will save the world, but first we bleed

Posted by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard on 14 Dec 2007 at 12:48

The Bernanke ‘Put’ has expired.

Are Bernanke’s academic doctrines blurring his vision?

The Fed cuts a quarter point, and what happens? Wall Street’s ungrateful wretches knock 294 off the Dow 294 in an hour and half; the home builders index dives 10pc; Japanese bond surge; Euribor spreads rise to an all-time high of 99 basis points.

Have the markets begun to digest the awful possibility that central banks cannot cut rates fast enough to prevent a profits crunch because they are caught between the Scylla of the credit crunch and the Charybdis of inflation, a new deviant form of stagflation?

Nor is there any evidence or credible theory that interest rate cuts would help. For example, fed economists say that 1% rates didn’t do much – it was the fiscal impulse of 03 that added aggregate demand and turned the economy.

US headline CPI is stuck at around 3.5pc to 4pc, German CPI is 3pc (and wholesale inflation 5.7pc), China is 6.9pc, and Russia is skidding out of control at 10pc.

Note ‘out of control’. Mainstream theory says inflation will accelerate once it gets going.

As for the Fed, it now has to fret about the dollar – Banquo’s ghost at every FOMC meeting these days. A little beggar-thy-neighbour devaluation is welcome in Washington: a disorderly rout is another matter. No Fed chairman can sit idly by if half Asia and the Mid-East break their dollar pegs, threatening to end a century of US dollar primacy.

They are more worried about ‘imported inflation’ than ‘primacy’.

Yes, inflation is a snapshot of the past, not the future. It lags the cycle. After the dotcom bust, US prices kept rising for ten months. Alan Greenspan blithely ignored it as background noise, though regional Fed hawks put up a fight.

He had a deflationary global context, as he said publicly and in his book. That has changed, and now import prices are instead rising substantially.

Ben Bernanke has not yet acquired the Maestro’s licence to dispense with the Fed staff model when it suits him.

As above, different global context.

In any case, his academic doctrines may now be blurring his vision.

Not sure why they are, but all evidence is they are based on fixed exchange rate/gold standard theory.

So, in case you thought that every little sell-off on Wall Street was a God-given chance to load up further on equities, let me pass on a few words of caution from the High Priests of finance.

A deluge of pre-Christmas predictions have been flooding into my E-mail box, some accompanied by lavish City lunches. The broad chorus-by now well known – is that the US will hit a brick wall in 2008.

Yes, originally scheduled for 07. Not saying we won’t, but I am saying those forecasting it hae a poor record and suspect models.

Less understood is that Europe, Asia, and emerging markets will also flounder to varying degrees, knocking away yet another prop for US equities – held aloft until now by non-US global earnings.

Yes, that is a risk.

Morgan Stanley has just added a “mild recession” alert for Japan (Buckle Up) on top of its “manufacturing recession risk” for the eurozone. It’s US call (`Recession Coming’), it is no longer hedged about with many ifs or buts. Americans face a “perfect storm” and CAPEX is buckling. Demand will shrink by 1pc a quarter for nine months.

The bank has cut its target MSCI emerging market equities by 6pc next year. I suspect that this will be cut a lot further as the plot thickens, but you have to start somewhere.

They have been bearish all year.

Merrill Lynch has much the same overall view. “The US consumer is on the precipice of its first recessionary phase since 1991. The earnings recession has already arrived.”

Maybe, but no evidence yet. Employment remains sufficient for the consumer to muddle through, and exports are picking up the slack.

“Real estate deflations are unique and have never ended well for the consumer, the credit market, or the economy. Maybe it will be different this time, but we fail to see why.”

The subtraction to aggregate demand due to real estate is maybe a year behind us and rising exports have filled the gap.

And this from a Goldman Sachs note entitled “Quantifying the Stock Market Impact of a Possible Recession.”

“Our team believes that there is about a 40pc to 45pc chance that the US will enter recession over the next six months. If a recession does occur, it has the potential to feed on itself,” said bank’s global markets strategist Peter Berezin.

Goldman just upped their Q4 GDP foregast by 1.5%, and it’s now at 1.8%.

“We expect home prices to decline 7% in 2007 and a further 7% in 2008. But if the US does fall into a recession, home prices could decline by as much 30% nationwide, which would make it the worst housing bust since at least the Great Depression.

“If global growth slows next year as we expect, cyclical stocks that so far have held up quite well may feel more pressure. It seems unlikely that the elevated earnings estimates for next year can be sustained,” he said.

Lots of ‘if’ and ‘we expect’ language, but no actual ‘channels’ to that end. No one seems to have any. Best I can determine if exports hold up, we muddle through.

Now, stocks can do well in a soft-landing (which Goldman Sachs still expects, on balance), since falling interest rates offset lost earnings. But if this does tip over into outright contraction, History is not kind.

Stocks are likely to adjust PE’s to higher interest rates now that expectations are moving toward lower odds of rate cutting due to inflation.

The average fall in S&P 500 over the last 9 recessions is 13pc from peak to trough. These include 1969 (18pc), 1981 (23pc) and 2001 (52pc).

Still up 5% for the year. And it has been an OK leading indicator as well for quite a while.

As for the canard that stocks are currently cheap at a projected P/E ratio of 15.3, this is based on an illusion. US profit margins are currently inflated by 250 basis points above their ten-year average.

Inflated? Seems a byproduct of productivity and related efficiencies. No telling how long that continues. And products changes so fast there is no time for ‘competitive forces’ to drive down prices to marginal revenue with many products; so, margins remain high.

While Goldman Sachs does not use the term, this is obviously a profits bubble. Super-cheap credit in early 2007 – the lowest spreads ever seen – flattered earnings.

Not sure it’s related to ‘cheap credit’ as much as productivity.

I would add too that free global capital flows have allowed corporations to engage in labour arbitrage, playing off cheap Asian wages against the US and European wages. This game is surely played out. Chinese wages are shooting up.

Yes, as above, and this is the global context Bernanke faces – import prices rising rather than falling.

Voters in industrial democracies will not allow capitalists to continue take an ever larger share of the pie. Hence Sarkozy, Hillary Clinton, and the Labour victory in Australia.

Not sure both sides are pro profits. That’s where the campaign funding is coming from and most voters are shareholders or otherwise profit directly and indirectly from corporate profits. Wage earners are a shrinking constituency with diminishing political influence.

Once you strip out this profits anomaly, Goldman Sachs says the P/E ratio is currently 26. This compares with a post-war average of 18, and a pre-recession average of 17.

As above. PE’s are more likely to adjust down near term due to valuation issues – rising interest rates and perception of risk.

“It is clear that if the US enters a recession, there is significant scope for both earnings and stock prices to decline beyond what the market has already priced. The average lag between peak and nadir in stock prices is only 4 months. This implies a swift correction in equity prices.”

Sure, but that’s a big ‘if’.

The spill-over would be a 20pc fall in the DAX (Frankfurt) and the CAC (Paris), 19pc fall on London’s FTSE 250, 13pc on the IBEX (Madrid), and 10pc on the MIB (Milan).

Doesn’t sound catastrophic.

Be advised, this is not a Goldman Sachs prediction: it is merely a warning, should the economy tip over.

Yes, but without a direct reason for a recession, nor a definition of a recession, for that matter.

Now, whatever happens to US, British, French, Spanish, Italian, and Greek house prices, and whatever happens to the Shanghai stock bubble or to Latin American bonds, the Fed and fellow central banks can – and ultimately will – come to the rescue with full-throttle reflation.

Wrong, the fed doesn’t have that button. Lower interest rates maybe, if they dare to do that with the current inflation risks of the triple supply shock of crude, food, and the lower $US.

But as shown with Japan, low rates do not add aggregate demand as assumed.

Merrill says the Fed may cut rates to 2pc. (rates were 1pc in 2003 and 2004). Let me go a step further. It would not surprise me if debt deflation in the Anglo-Saxon countries proves so serious that we reach Japanese extremes – perhaps zero rates, with a dollop of ‘quantitative easing’ for good measure.

Right, and with the same consequences – those moves have nothing to do with aggregate demand.

The Club Med states may need the same, but they will not get it because they no longer control their monetary policy. So Heaven help them and their democracies.

True, the systemic risk is in the Eurozone. Not sure he knows why.

The central banks are not magicians, of course. We forget now that Keynes and his allies in the early 1930s knew that monetary policy ‘a l’outrance’ could be used to flood the system by buying bonds. They concluded that such a policy might backfire – possibly causing panic – since investors were not ready for revolutionary methods.

Keynes was right but was talking in the context of the gold standard of the time. Not directly applicable today without ‘adjustments’ to current floating fx regimes.

This at least has changed. The markets expect a bail-out, demand it, and believe religiously in its benign effects.

Ben Bernanke said in his 2002 ‘helicopter’ speech that there was practically no limit to what sorts of assets the Fed could buy in order to inject money.

No limits, but big differences to aggregate demand. Buying securities has no effect on demand, while buying real goods and services has an immediate effect, also as Keynes and others have pointed out many times.

The bank’s current mandate does not allow it to buy equities, but that could be changed easily enough.

Yes. Won’t support demand, but will support equity prices.

So yes, in the end, the Fed can always stop a deflationary spiral.

Yes, but more precisely, the tsy, as they can buy goods and services without nominal limit and support demand at any level they desire. The ‘risks’ are ‘inflation’ not solvency. (See ‘Soft Currency Economics‘.)

As Bernanke said to Milton Freidman on his 90th birthday, the Fed will not repeat the monetary crunch it allowed to happen 1930-32.

That was in the context of the gold standard of the day. Not applicable currently.

“Regarding the Great Depression. You’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.”

Thanks to floating the $, it hasn’t happened since.

Bernanke is undoubtedly right. The Fed won’t do it again. But before the United States can embark on an economic course that radically transforms the nature of capitalism, speculative markets may have to take a beating – for appearances sake, at least.


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