Fed minutes – longish version


[Skip to the end]

I cut quite a bit, but still a lot worth a quick read:

In view of continuing strains in interbank and other financial markets, the Committee took up proposals to expand several of the liquidity arrangements that had been put in place in recent months. Chairman Bernanke indicated his intention to increase the overall size of the Term Auction Facility under delegated authority from the Board of Governors, and he proposed increases in the swap lines with the European Central Bank and Swiss National Bank to help address pressures in short-term dollar funding markets.

Still problems with USD funding in the eurozone.

By unanimous votes, the Committee approved the following three resolutions:

The Federal Open Market Committee directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to increase the amount available from the System Open Market Account under the existing reciprocal currency arrangement (“swap” arrangement) with the European Central Bank to an amount not to exceed $50 billion. Within that aggregate limit, draws of up to $25 billion are hereby authorized. The current swap arrangement shall be extended until January 30, 2009, unless further extended by the Federal Open Market Committee.

The Federal Open Market Committee directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to increase the amount available from the System Open Market Account under the existing reciprocal currency arrangement (“swap” arrangement) with the Swiss National Bank to an amount not to exceed $12 billion. Within that aggregate limit, draws of up to $6 billion are hereby authorized. The current swap arrangement shall be extended until January 30, 2009, unless further extended by the Federal Open Market Committee.

The information reviewed at the April meeting, which included the advance data on the national income and product accounts for the first quarter, indicated that economic growth had remained weak so far this year. Labor market conditions had deteriorated further, and manufacturing activity was soft. Housing activity had continued its sharp descent, and business spending on both structures and equipment had turned down. Consumer spending had grown very slowly, and household sentiment had tumbled further. Core consumer price inflation had slowed in recent months, but overall inflation remained elevated.

The stronger than expected April numbers hadn’t been released yet, including the drop in the unemployment rate to 5.0%.

Although industrial production rose in March, production over the first quarter as a whole was soft, having declined, on average, in January and February. Gains in manufacturing output of consumer and high-tech goods in March were partially offset by a sharp drop in production of motor vehicles and parts and by ongoing weakness in the output of construction-related industries. The output of utilities rebounded in March following a weather-related drop in February, and mining output moved up after exhibiting weakness earlier in the year. The factory utilization rate edged up in March but stayed well below its recent high in the third quarter of 2007.

Real consumer spending expanded slowly in the first quarter. Real outlays on durable goods, including automobiles, were estimated to have declined in March, but expenditures on nondurable goods were thought to have edged up, boosted by a sizable increase in real outlays for gasoline. For the quarter as a whole, however, real expenditures on both durable and nondurable goods declined. Real disposable personal income also grew slowly in the first quarter, restrained by rapidly rising prices for energy and food. The ratio of household wealth to disposable income appeared to have moved down again in the first quarter, damped by the appreciable net decline in broad equity prices over that period and by further reductions in house prices. Measures of consumer sentiment fell sharply in March and April; the April reading of consumer sentiment published in the Reuters/University of Michigan Survey of Consumers was near the low levels posted in the early 1990s.

That’s how it goes in an export driven economy. They haven’t recognized that yet:

Residential construction continued its rapid contraction in the first quarter. Single-family housing starts maintained their steep downward trajectory in March, and starts of multifamily homes declined to the lower portion of their recent range. Sales of new single-family homes declined in February to a very low rate and dropped further in March. Even though production cuts by homebuilders helped to reduce the level of inventories at the end of February, the slow pace of sales caused the ratio of unsold new homes to sales to increase further. Sales of existing homes remained weak, on average, in February and March, and the index of pending sales agreements in February suggested continued sluggish activity in coming months. The recent softening in residential housing demand was consistent with reports of tighter credit conditions for both prime and nonprime borrowers.

Recent signs of housing stabilizing haven’t materialized yet.

The U.S. international trade deficit widened in February. Imports rose sharply, more than offsetting continued robust growth of exports. Most major categories of non-oil imports increased in February, and imports of natural gas, automobiles, and consumer goods surged. Imports of services continued to rise at a robust pace. By contrast, oil imports moved down. Increases in exports in February were concentrated in agricultural goods, automobiles, and industrial supplies, particularly fuels. Exports of capital goods declined for the second consecutive month, with weakness evident across a wide range of products.

The March numbers weren’t out yet, and they bounced back strongly, resulting in upward revisions to Q1 GDP.

Real economic growth in the major advanced foreign economies was estimated to have slowed further in the first quarter and consumer and business sentiment was generally down. In Japan, business sentiment fell significantly and indicators of investment remained weak. In the euro area, growth was estimated to have remained subdued in the first quarter, with Germany and France faring better than Italy and Spain. Growth in the United Kingdom slowed in the first quarter, as credit conditions tightened. Available data for Canada indicated a continued substantial drag from exports in the first quarter, although domestic demand appeared relatively robust. In emerging market economies, economic growth slowed some in the fourth quarter and was estimated to have held about steady in the first quarter. In emerging Asia, real economic growth was estimated to have picked up in the first quarter from a robust pace in the fourth quarter, led by brisk expansions in China and Singapore. Growth in other emerging Asian economies generally remained subdued. The pace of expansion in Latin America likely declined some in the first quarter, largely because the Mexican economy slowed in the wake of softer growth in the United States.

Headline inflation in the United States was elevated in March. Although the increase in food prices slowed in March relative to earlier in the year, energy prices rose sharply. Excluding these categories, core inflation rose at a relatively subdued rate again in March. The core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index increased at a somewhat more moderate rate in the first quarter than in the fourth quarter of 2007. Survey measures of households’ expectations for year-ahead inflation rose further in early April, but survey measures of longer-term inflation expectations moved relatively little. Average hourly earnings increased in March at a somewhat slower pace than in January and February. This wage measure rose significantly less over the 12 months that ended in March than in the previous 12 months. The employment cost index for hourly compensation continued to rise at a moderate rate in the first quarter.

Food and energy have since gone up further than forecast at the meeting.

At its March 18 meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) lowered its target for the federal funds rate 75 basis points, to 2-1/4 percent. In addition, the Board of Governors approved a decrease of 75 basis points in the discount rate, to 2-1/2 percent. The Committee’s statement noted that recent information indicated that the outlook for economic activity had weakened further; growth in consumer spending had slowed, and labor markets had softened. It also indicated that financial markets remained under considerable stress, and that the tightening of credit conditions and the deepening of the housing contraction were likely to weigh on economic growth over the next few quarters. Inflation had been elevated, and some indicators of inflation expectations had risen, but the Committee expected inflation to moderate in coming quarters, reflecting a projected leveling-out of energy and other commodity prices and an easing of pressures on resource utilization.

Which didn’t happen.

Still, the Committee noted that uncertainty about the inflation outlook had increased, and that it would be necessary to continue to monitor inflation developments carefully. The Committee said that its action, combined with those taken earlier, including measures to foster market liquidity, should help to promote moderate growth over time and to mitigate the risks to economic activity. The Committee noted, however, that downside risks to growth remained, and indicated that it would act in a timely manner as needed to promote sustainable economic growth and price stability.

Conditions in U.S. financial markets improved somewhat, on balance, over the intermeeting period, but strains in some short-term funding markets increased. Pressures on bank balance sheets and capital positions appeared to mount further, reflecting additional losses on asset-backed securities and on business and household loans. Against this backdrop, term spreads in interbank funding markets and spreads on commercial paper issued by financial institutions widened significantly. Financial institutions continued to tap the Federal Reserve’s credit programs. Primary credit borrowing picked up noticeably after March 16, when the Federal Reserve reduced the spread between the primary credit rate and the target federal funds rate to 25 basis points. Demand for funds from the Term Auction Facility stayed high over the period. In addition, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility drew substantial demand through late March, although the amount outstanding subsequently declined somewhat. Early in the period, historically low interest rates on Treasury bills and on general-collateral Treasury repurchase agreements indicated a considerable demand for safe-haven assets. However, Federal Reserve actions that increased the availability of Treasury securities to the public apparently helped to improve conditions in those markets. In five weekly auctions beginning on March 27, the Term Securities Lending Facility provided a substantial volume of Treasury securities in exchange for less-liquid assets. Yields on short-term Treasury securities and Treasury repurchase agreements moved higher, on balance, following these auctions; nonetheless, “haircuts” applied by lenders on non-Treasury collateral remained elevated, and in some cases increased somewhat, toward the end of the period.

In longer-term credit markets, yields on investment-grade corporate bonds rose, but their spreads relative to Treasury securities decreased a bit from recent multiyear highs. In contrast, yields on speculative-grade issues dropped, and their spreads relative to Treasury yields narrowed significantly. Gross bond issuance by nonfinancial firms was robust in March and the first half of April and included a small amount of issuance by speculative-grade firms. Supported by increases in business and residential real estate loans, commercial bank credit expanded briskly in March despite the report of tighter lending conditions in the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices conducted in April. Part of the strength in commercial and industrial loans was apparently due to increased utilization of existing credit lines, the pricing of which reflects changes in lending policies only with a lag.

Also, though standards were ‘tightened’, that doesn’t mean most borrowers can’t meet those standards.

Some banks surveyed in April reported that they had started to take actions to limit their exposure to home equity lines of credit, draws on which had grown rapidly in recent months. After having tightened considerably in March, conditions in the conforming segment of the residential mortgage market recovered somewhat. Spreads of rates on conforming residential mortgages over those on comparable-maturity Treasury securities decreased, and credit default swap premiums for the government-sponsored enterprises declined substantially. Broad stock price indexes increased markedly over the intermeeting period, mainly in response to earnings reports and announcements of recapitalizations from major financial institutions that evidently lessened investors’ concerns about the possibility of severe difficulties materializing at those firms.

Conditions in the money markets of major foreign economies remained strained, particularly in the United Kingdom and the euro area. Term interbank funding spreads rose in these areas, despite steps taken by their central banks to help ease liquidity pressures. Yields on sovereign debt in the advanced foreign economies moved up in a range that was about in line with the increases in comparable Treasury yields in the United States. The trade-weighted foreign exchange value of the dollar against major currencies rose.

The dollar is back down now.

M2 expanded briskly again in March, as households continued to seek the relative liquidity and safety of liquid deposits and retail money market mutual funds. The increases in these components were also supported by declines in opportunity costs stemming from monetary policy easing.

Over the intermeeting period, the expected path of monetary policy over the next year as measured by money market futures rates moved up significantly on net, apparently because economic data releases and announcements by large financial firms imparted greater confidence among investors about the prospects for the economy’s performance in coming quarters. Futures rates also moved up in response to both the Committee’s decision to lower the target for the federal funds rate by 75 basis points at the March 18 meeting, which was a somewhat smaller reduction than market participants had expected, and the Committee’s accompanying statement, which reportedly conveyed more concern about inflation than had been anticipated.

Yes.

The subsequent release of the minutes of the March FOMC meeting elicited limited reaction. Consistent with the higher expected path for policy and easing of safe-haven demands, yields on nominal Treasury coupon securities rose substantially over the period, and the Treasury yield curve flattened. Measures of inflation compensation for the next five years derived from yields on inflation-indexed Treasury securities were quite volatile around the time of the March FOMC meeting and on balance increased somewhat over the intermeeting period, although they remained in the lower portion of their range over the past several months. Measures of longer-term inflation compensation declined, returning to around the middle of their recent elevated range.

They seem to continue to give these quite a bit of weight.

In the forecast prepared for this meeting, the staff made little change to its projection for the growth of real gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008 and 2009. The available indicators of recent economic activity had come in close to the staff’s expectations and had continued to suggest that a substantial softening in economic activity was under way. The staff projection pointed to a contraction of real GDP in the first half of 2008 followed by a modest rise in the second half of this year, aided in part by the fiscal stimulus package.

Doesn’t look like there will be a contraction; so, GDP is likely to be higher than staff forecasts.
The forecast showed real GDP expanding at a rate somewhat above its potential in 2009, reflecting the impetus from cumulative monetary policy easing, continued strength in net exports, a gradual lessening in financial market strains, and the waning drag from past increases in energy prices. Despite this pickup in the pace of activity, the trajectory of resource utilization anticipated through 2009 implied noticeable slack. The projection for core PCE price inflation in 2008 as a whole was unchanged; it was reduced a bit over the first half of the year to reflect the somewhat lower-than-expected readings of recent core PCE inflation and raised a bit over the second half of the year to incorporate the spillover from larger-than-anticipated increases in prices of crude oil and non-oil imports since the previous FOMC meeting.
Here’s where the subsequent talk of headline measures passing into core was discussed.

The forecast of headline PCE inflation in 2008 was revised up in light of the further run-up in energy prices and somewhat higher food price inflation; headline PCE inflation was expected to exceed core PCE price inflation by a considerable margin this year. In view of the projected slack in resource utilization in 2009 and flattening out of oil and other commodity prices, both core and headline PCE price inflation were projected to drop back from their 2008 levels, in line with the staff’s previous forecasts.

They are relying on slack in 2009 to bring down this year’s inflation.

In conjunction with the FOMC meeting in April, all meeting participants (Federal Reserve Board members and Reserve Bank presidents) provided annual projections for economic growth, the unemployment rate, and inflation for the period 2008 through 2010. The projections are described in the Summary of Economic Projections, which is attached as an addendum to these minutes.

These were all before subsequent ‘better than expected’ releases, higher crude prices, and a falling USD.

In their discussion of the economic situation and outlook, FOMC participants noted that the data received since the March FOMC meeting, while pointing to continued weakness in economic activity, had been broadly consistent with their expectations. Conditions across a number of financial markets were judged to have improved over the intermeeting period, but financial markets remained fragile and strains in some markets had intensified. Although participants anticipated that further improvement in market conditions would occur only slowly and that some backsliding was possible, the generally better state of financial markets had caused participants to mark down the odds that economic activity could be severely disrupted by a further substantial deterioration in the financial environment.

Their concern of systematic tail risk has gone down substantially.

Economic activity was anticipated to be weakest over the next few months, with many participants judging that real GDP was likely to contract slightly in the first half of 2008. GDP growth was expected to begin to recover in the second half of this year, supported by accommodative monetary policy and fiscal stimulus, and to increase further in 2009 and 2010. Views varied about the likely pace and vigor of the recovery through 2009, although all participants projected GDP growth to be at or above trend in 2010. Incoming information on the inflation outlook since the March FOMC meeting had been mixed. Readings on core inflation had improved somewhat, but some of this improvement was thought likely to reflect transitory factors, and energy and other commodity prices had increased further since March. Total PCE inflation was projected to moderate from its current elevated level to between 1-1/2 percent and 2 percent in 2010, although participants stressed that this expected moderation was dependent on food and energy prices flattening out and critically on inflation expectations remaining reasonably well anchored.

As per Kohn’s latest speech, they have seen these inflation expectations begin to elevate.

Conditions across a number of financial markets had improved since the previous FOMC meeting. Equity prices and yields on Treasury securities had increased, volatility in both equity and debt markets had ebbed somewhat, and a range of credit risk premiums had moved down. Participants noted that the better tone of financial markets had been helped by the apparent willingness and ability of financial institutions to raise new capital. Investors’ confidence had probably also been buoyed by corporate earnings reports for the first quarter, which suggested that profit growth outside of the financial sector remained solid,

Yes, they have noted that outside the financial sector and housing the economy looks pretty good.

and also by the resolution of the difficulties of a major broker-dealer in mid-March.

Probably Bear Stearns.

NOTE: They didn’t refer to it by name.

Moreover, the various liquidity facilities introduced by the Federal Reserve in recent months were thought to have bolstered market liquidity and aided a return to more orderly market functioning. But participants emphasized that financial markets remained under considerable stress, noted that the functioning of many markets remained impaired, and expressed concern that some of the recent recovery in markets could prove fragile. Strains in short-term funding markets had intensified over the intermeeting period, in part reflecting continuing pressures on the liquidity positions of financial institutions. Despite a narrowing of spreads on corporate bonds, credit conditions were seen as remaining tight. The Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices conducted in April indicated that banks had tightened lending standards and pricing terms on loans to both businesses and households. Participants stressed that it could take some time for the financial system to return to a more normal footing, and a number of participants were of the view that financial headwinds would probably continue to restrain economic activity through much of next year. Even so, the likelihood that the functioning of the financial system would deteriorate substantially further with significant adverse implications for the economic outlook was judged by participants to have receded somewhat since the March FOMC meeting.
The housing market had continued to weaken since the previous meeting, and participants saw little indication of a bottoming out in either housing activity or prices. Housing starts and the demand for new homes had declined further, house prices in many parts of the country were falling faster than they had towards the end of 2007, and inventories of unsold homes remained quite elevated. A small number of participants reported tentative signs that housing activity in a few areas of the country might be beginning to pick up, and a narrowing of credit risk spreads on AAA indexes of sub-prime mortgages in recent weeks was also noted. Nonetheless, the outlook for the housing market remained bleak, with housing demand likely to be affected by restrictive conditions in mortgage markets, fears that house prices would fall further, and weakening labor markets. The possibility that house prices could decline by more than anticipated, and that the effects of such a decline could be amplified through their impact on financial institutions and financial markets, remained a key source of downside risk to participants’ projections for economic growth.

There have been subsequent glimmers of hope that housing has stabilized and may be turning.

Growth in consumer spending appeared to have slowed to a crawl in recent months and consumer sentiment had fallen sharply. The pressure on households’ real incomes from higher energy prices and the erosion of wealth resulting from continuing declines in house prices likely contributed to the deceleration in consumer outlays. Reports from contacts in the banking and financial services sectors indicated that the availability of both consumer credit and home equity lines had tightened considerably further in recent months and that delinquency rates on household credit had continued to drift upwards. Consumer sentiment and spending had also been held down by the softening in labor markets–nonfarm payroll employment had fallen for the third consecutive month in March and the unemployment rate had moved up. The restraint on spending emanating from weakness in labor markets was expected to increase over coming quarters, with participants projecting the unemployment rate to pick up further this year and to remain elevated in 2009.

Subsequently, the unemployment rate fell.

Consumption spending was likely to be supported in the near term by the fiscal stimulus package, which was expected to boost spending temporarily in the middle of this year. Some participants suggested that the weak economic environment could increase the propensity of households to use their tax rebates to pay down existing debt and so might diminish the impact of the package. However, it was also noted that the tightening in credit availability might mean a significant number of households may be credit constrained and this might increase the proportion of the rebates that is spent. The timing and magnitude of the impact of the stimulus package on GDP was also seen as depending on the extent to which the boost to consumption spending is absorbed by a temporary run-down in firms’ inventories or by an increase in imports rather than by an expansion in domestic output.

The jurry is still out on this. My guess is the rebates will add more to GDP than forecasted.

The outlook for business spending remained decidedly downbeat. Indicators of business sentiment were low, and reports from business contacts suggested that firms were scaling back their capital spending plans. Several participants reported that uncertainty about the economic outlook was leading firms to defer spending projects until prospects for economic activity became clearer. The tightening in the supply of business credit was also seen as holding back investment, with some firms apparently reluctant to reduce their liquidity positions in the current environment. Spending on nonresidential construction projects continued to slow, although the extent of that slowing varied across the country. A few participants reported that the commercial real estate market in some areas remained relatively firm, supported by low vacancy rates.

Yes.

The strength of U.S. exports remained a notable bright spot. Growth in exports, which had been supported by solid advances in foreign economies and by declines in the foreign exchange value of the dollar, had partially insulated the output and profits of U.S. companies, especially those in the manufacturing sector, from the effects of weakening domestic demand. Several participants voiced concern, however, that the pace of activity in the rest of the world could slow in coming quarters, suggesting that the impetus provided from net exports might well diminish.

The March numbers subsequently released showed further acceleration of exports.

The information received on the inflation outlook since the March FOMC meeting had been mixed. Recent readings on core inflation had improved somewhat, although participants noted that some of that improvement probably reflected transitory factors. Moreover, the increase in crude oil prices to record levels, together with rapid increases in food and import prices in recent months, was likely to put upward pressure on inflation over the next few quarters. Prices embedded in futures contracts continued to point to a leveling-off of energy and commodity prices.

Still misreading the info implied from futures prices:

Although these futures contracts probably remained the best basis for projecting movements in commodity prices, participants emphasized the considerable uncertainty attending the likely path of commodity prices and cautioned that commodity prices in recent years had often advanced more quickly than had been implied by futures contracts. Several participants reported that business contacts had expressed growing concerns about the increase in their input costs and that there were signs that an increasing number of firms were seeking to pass on these higher costs to their customers in the form of higher prices. Other participants noted, however, that the extent of the pass-through of higher energy and food prices to core retail prices appeared relatively limited to date, and that profit margins in the nonfinancial sector remained reasonably high, suggesting that there was some scope for firms to absorb cost increases without raising prices. Available data and anecdotal reports indicated that gains in labor compensation remained moderate, and some participants suggested that wage growth was unlikely to pick up sharply in coming quarters if, as anticipated, labor markets remained relatively soft. However, several participants were of the view that wage inflation tended to lag increases in prices and so may not provide a useful guide to emerging price pressures.

Agreed!

On balance, participants expected the recent increases in oil and food prices to continue to boost overall consumer price inflation in the near term; thereafter, total inflation was projected to moderate, with all participants expecting total PCE inflation of between 1-1/2 percent and 2 percent by 2010. Participants stressed that the expected moderation in inflation was dependent on the continued stability of inflation expectations.

One can’t overstate the weight they all put on inflation expections, which are now seen as elevating.

A number of participants voiced concern that long-term inflation expectations could drift upwards if headline inflation remained elevated for a protracted period or if the recent substantial policy easing was misinterpreted by the public as suggesting that Committee members had a greater tolerance for inflation than previously thought.

This was again expressed recently by Vice Chair Kohn in his speech.

The possibility that inflation expectations could increase was viewed as a key upside risk to the inflation outlook. However, participants emphasized that appropriate monetary policy, combined with effective communication of the Committee’s commitment to price stability, would mitigate this risk.

‘Appropriate monetary policy’ opens the door for rate hikes.

Participants stressed the difficulty of gauging the appropriate stance of policy in current circumstances. Some participants noted that the level of the federal funds target, especially when compared with the current rate of inflation, was relatively low by historical standards. Even taking account of current financial headwinds, such a low rate could suggest that policy was reasonably accommodative. However, other participants observed that the pronounced strains in banking and financial markets imparted much greater uncertainty to such assessments and meant that measures of the stance of policy based on the real federal funds rate were not likely to provide a reliable guide in the current environment. Several participants expressed the view that the easing in monetary policy since last fall had not as yet led to a loosening in overall financial conditions, but rather had prevented financial conditions from tightening as much as they otherwise would have in response to escalating strains in financial markets. This view suggested that the stimulus from past monetary policy easing would be felt mainly as conditions in financial markets improved.

Seems there are three ‘camps’ on this point.

In the Committee’s discussion of monetary policy for the intermeeeting period, most members judged that policy should be eased by 25 basis points at this meeting. Although prospects for economic activity had not deteriorated significantly since the March meeting, the outlook for growth and employment remained weak and slack in resource utilization was likely to increase. An additional easing in policy would help to foster moderate growth over time without impeding a moderation in inflation.

There hasn’t been any forward looking sign of moderation since that meeting.

Moreover, although the likelihood that economic activity would be severely disrupted by a sharp deterioration in financial markets had apparently receded, most members thought that the risks to economic growth were still skewed to the downside. A reduction in interest rates would help to mitigate those risks. However, most members viewed the decision to reduce interest rates at this meeting as a close call.

Interesting statement!

The substantial easing of monetary policy since last September, the ongoing steps taken by the Federal Reserve to provide liquidity and support market functioning, and the imminent fiscal stimulus would help to support economic activity. Moreover, although downside risks to growth remained, members were also concerned about the upside risks to the inflation outlook, given the continued increases in oil and commodity prices and the fact that some indicators suggested that inflation expectations had risen in recent months. Nonetheless, most members agreed that a further, modest easing in the stance of policy was appropriate to balance better the risks to achieving the Committee’s dual objectives of maximum employment and price stability over the medium run.
The Committee agreed that that the statement to be released after the meeting should take note of the substantial policy easing to date and the ongoing measures to foster market liquidity. In light of these significant policy actions, the risks to growth were now thought to be more closely balanced by the risks to inflation. Accordingly, the Committee felt that it was no longer appropriate for the statement to emphasize the downside risks to growth. Given these circumstances, future policy adjustments would depend on the extent to which economic and financial developments affected the medium-term outlook for growth and inflation. In that regard, several members noted that it was unlikely to be appropriate to ease policy in response to information suggesting that the economy was slowing further or even contracting slightly in the near term, unless economic and financial developments indicated a significant weakening of the economic outlook.

In other words, no thought of more rate cuts without that change in outlook.

Votes for this action: Messrs. Bernanke, Geithner, Kohn, Kroszner, and Mishkin, Ms. Pianalto, Messrs. Stern and Warsh.

Votes against this action: Messrs. Fisher and Plosser.

Messrs. Fisher and Plosser dissented because they preferred no change in the target federal funds rate at this meeting. Although the economy had been weak, it had evolved roughly as expected since the previous meeting. Stresses in financial markets also had continued, but the Federal Reserve’s liquidity facilities were helpful in that regard and the more worrisome development in their view was the outlook for inflation. Rising prices for food, energy, and other commodities; signs of higher inflation expectations; and a negative real federal funds rate raised substantial concerns about the prospects for inflation. Mr. Plosser cited the recent rapid growth of monetary aggregates as additional evidence that the economy had ample liquidity after the aggressive easing of policy to date. Mr. Fisher was concerned that an adverse feedback loop was developing by which lowering the funds rate had been pushing down the exchange value of the dollar, contributing to higher commodity and import prices, cutting real spending by businesses and households, and therefore ultimately impairing economic activity. To help prevent inflation expectations from becoming unhinged, both Messrs. Fisher and Plosser felt the Committee should put additional emphasis on its price stability goal at this point, and they believed that another reduction in the funds rate at this meeting could prove costly over the longer run.

By notation vote completed on April 7, 2008, the Committee unanimously approved the minutes of the FOMC meeting held on March 18, 2008.


[top]

Review of Kroszner Speech

Governor Randall S. Kroszner
At the Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
November 30, 2007

Innovation, Information, and Regulation in Financial Markets

Good afternoon. I am pleased to participate in the excellent annual Philadelphia Federal Reserve Policy Forum to discuss this year’s timely topic of innovations in financial markets. Innovations in financial markets have created a wide range of investment opportunities that allow capital to be allocated to its most productive uses

This is highly questionable but assumed by the fed to be true. The allocation is necessarily a function of the market forces operating within the legislated institutional structure.

and risks to be dispersed across a wide range of market participants. Yet, as we are now seeing, innovation can also create challenges if market participants face difficulties in valuing a new instrument because they realize that they do not have the information they need or if they are uncertain about the information they do have. In such situations, price discovery and liquidity in the market for those innovative products can become impaired.

Yes, that has been the fed’s issue for the last three months. What they call ‘market functioning’ as related to the real economy.

In my remarks today, I would like to explore the role of information in the development of new financial products and then draw some lessons about risk management and regulation. In particular, I will examine the role that investment in information gathering, processing, and evaluating plays in supporting the price discovery process and how such investment can lead toward a tendency to greater standardization as markets for innovative financial products mature. Examples from both history and current experience will help to illustrate this tendency with respect to loan work-outs and restructurings. I will then conclude by considering how a regulatory approach that encourages transparency and sound risk management, such as Basel II, can be valuable in fostering a robust environment for the introduction of innovative financial products.

Experimentation and Learning in New Instrument Development

Typically, when a new product is being developed, there is an initial experimentation phase in which market participants learn a great deal about the product’s performance and risk characteristics. This phase involves gathering and processing information and modeling the performance of the product in various scenarios and under different market conditions. It may then take time for market participants to understand what, exactly, they need to know to value a product. During the early phases, a fair amount of due diligence is appropriate, given the greater uncertainty associated with innovative products. The investment in gathering, processing, and evaluating information then, as I will discuss, often leads to greater standardization of products and contract terms, which can enhance liquidity of products as their markets mature.

In the initial experimentation phase, the terms and characteristics of a new product are adjusted in response to market acceptance–or lack thereof. During this period, market participants are seeking and providing information so that they can properly value the product, judge its potential for risk and return, assess its market acceptance and liquidity, and determine the extent to which the risks of the product can be hedged or mitigated.

When a product’s track record is not well established, there should be a strong market demand for information in order to facilitate price discovery. Price discovery is the process by which buyers’ and sellers’ preferences, as well as any other available market information, result in the “discovery” of a price that will balance supply and demand and provide signals to market participants about how most efficiently to allocate resources. This market-determined price will, of course, be subject to change as new information becomes available, as preferences evolve, as expectations are revised, and as costs of production change.

In order for this process to work most effectively, market participants must utilize information relevant to value that product. Of course, searching out and using relevant sources of information–as well as determining what information is relevant–has its own costs. To underscore the last point, with new instruments, it may not even be clear exactly what information is needed for price discovery–that is, some market participants may not know what they do not know and they may therefore terminate the information-gathering stage prematurely, unwittingly bearing the risks and costs of incomplete information.

He leaves out the fact that fed member banks are specifically designated to be outside this process. They lend based on internal credit analysis based on standards set by federal regulators. The loans are reviewed continuously regarding the borrower’s ability to make timely payment of principal and interest, both short term and long term. If these are not deemed adequate, loans must be ‘qualified’ and banks must add to their loss reserve. for all practical purposes, banks must have government insured liabilities which exert no ‘market discipline’ on assets, and therefore government regulation is required to fill that function. This system operates independently of market pricing of these bank assets. Market discipline comes via shareholders in first loss position with regulators determining appropriate capital ratios. Over the years, this has proved a much more stable platform for credit expansion.

The current problem areas are the ‘market price’ based activity that is outside of the above standard bank model. One result has been a short decline in commercial paper, for example, and a corresponding increase in bank lending, as the underlying lending has been replaced by traditional, nonmarket, bank lending, and credit analysis.

Price Discovery

Due diligence is an important part of the price discovery process. The due-diligence process allows market participants to “trust but verify”market-provided information through a range of activities, from assessing risks and exposures through stress-testing to assessing the enforceability of the contracts that define the legal relationship among originators, sponsors, investors, and guarantors. The due diligence is complemented by risk-management structures that allow participants to interpret, understand, and act appropriately in response to the information in the market.

Recently we have seen how a lack of information and inadequate due diligence and risk management have created problems in the market for certain structured finance products. Let me focus a moment on structured investment vehicles, or SIVs. SIVs have been created with a variety of terms and characteristics–for example, different underlying assets, different levels of liquidity support or guarantees, and various triggers that require the forced sale of assets or liquidation of the structure. Although SIVs or similar vehicles have existed for many years, many recent SIV structures involved a much higher level of complexity of the underlying credit risks, legal structures, and operations. This complexity–and the lack of information about where the underlying credit, legal, and operational risks resided–made these products more difficult and costly to value than many investors originally thought. Investors suddenly realized that they were much less informed than they assumed and, not surprisingly, they pulled back from the market.

The better way to state this is that risk was repriced. The spreads got wide enough for banks to underwrite and ‘absorb’ the loan demand. That’s how those markets function under current institutional structure.

We have seen similar problems in the subprime residential mortgage-backed securities market and the related derivatives markets. The lack of long historical data on the performance of these instruments, and their correlations with other assets and instruments, made it difficult to assess their overall risk-return profile, especially in times of stress. Moreover, in the subprime residential mortgage-backed securities market, many market participants were willing to proceed without conducting robust due diligence and without establishing appropriate risk-management structures and processes.

This means they priced the risk low enough to ‘win’ the right to invest. They changed their minds, and at that point owned over priced securities, to be sold only at lower prices/higher yields.

Same below..

They did not follow “trust but verify,” that is, they instead accepted the investment-grade ratings of these securities as substitutes for their own risk analysis. Ratings keyed to expected default or credit loss do not adequately capture the full range or magnitude of risks to which a product may be subject, including–as we have seen most dramatically–market liquidity risks. In addition, some originators may not have demanded sufficient information about the purchased assets underlying these structures and therefore may not have fully appreciated the credit risk of the assets and the consequential risk that the structures would come back on balance sheet when the assets defaulted.

When the problems in the subprime mortgage market began to emerge and delinquencies exceeded rating agency estimates and the defaults predicted by limited historical data, we had moved beyond our past experience with these instruments. Information was not readily available about the extent to which the economic context had changed, or even whether underlying loans would or could be modified to prevent default. When ratings were downgraded, investors lost confidence in the quality of the ratings and hence the quality of the information they had about subprime investments. Lack of information, a disrupted price-discovery process, and a stressed environment led to a reassessment of risk, not only in the subprime market but also in the residential mortgage market across the board.

Of course, this is not the first time that participants in a market for an innovative product have suffered losses. In the early 1990s, participants in the collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) market and the markets for structured notes and certain types of interest rate derivatives did not have adequate information about the potential volatility and prepayment risk involved. Consequently, market participants did not appropriately model these risks and suffered significant losses when market interest rates rose sharply in the mid-1990s. As in the case of the residential mortgage-backed securities market today, the general market reaction was a flight away from these instruments. However, over time, the market was restored as market participants came to better understand the risks and as standardized methods were developed to measure the risks and model the value of these instruments under alternative scenarios. Increased information and standardized pricing conventions, such as the use of option-adjusted spreads, moved these instruments from the experimentation and learning phase to the phase of broad market acceptance.

When market participants realize that they do not have the information necessary for proper valuation of risks, the price-discovery process can be disrupted, and market liquidity can become impaired. A significant investment in information gathering, processing, and evaluation may be necessary to revive the price discovery process. This revival is likely to take time and the market may not look the same when it re-emerges.

We’ve had three months since the ‘crisis’ began. We made it through so far. Risk has been repriced. Spreads are wider. Less is trading which is not necessarily a ‘bad thing’ at the macro level. Banks are lending aggressively directly to borrowers in good standing.

Let me describe in a bit more detail the ways in which these investments will take place and hence why recovery of price discovery may be a gradual process. First, market participants will likely need to collect more-detailed data in a more systematic manner in order to better understand the nature and risks of the instruments and their underlying assets. Second, investments in enhanced systems to warehouse and model data related to these instruments will facilitate a better understanding of their risks, particularly under stress conditions. Third, investors need to ensure that they have the so-called human capital expertise–that is, the people–to underst and, interpret, and act appropriately on the results of the modeling and analysis of the information gathered. The pay-off from these investments will be a greater understanding of risks and greater ability to value the instruments.

Yes, and that’s why it took several weeks for the banking system to ‘absorb’ market based lending. That process is now well underway.

The Development of Greater Standardization in a Market

Another consequence of information investments is a tendency towards greater standardization of many of the aspects of an instrument, which can help to increase transparency and reduce complexity. As was demonstrated in the CMO market, as the market gains information about a product and develops a level of confidence in that information, the product tends to become increasingly standardized. Standardization in the terms and in the contractual rights and obligations of purchasers and sellers of the product reduces the need for market participants to engage in extensive efforts to obtain information and reduces the need to verify the information that is provided in the market through due diligence. Reduced information costs in turn lower transaction costs, thereby facilitating price discovery and enhancing market liquidity. Also, standardization can reduce legal risks because litigation over contract terms can result in case law that applies to similar situations, thus reducing uncertainty.

The benefits of the development of standardization for enhancing the liquidity of financial markets have a long history. One particularly clear example dates back to the development of exchange-traded commodities futures contracts in the mid-1800s. The standardization of the futures markets improved the flow of information to market participants, reducing transaction costs and fostering the emergence of liquid markets.

Fostered an army of traders who could have been out curing cancer or something else more useful. Little or none of the ‘financial innovation’ has led to more efficient allocations of real resources, but instead has absorbed the brightest and best in to the world of ‘rearranging of financial assets’ encouraged under current institutional structure, including tax law and tax advantage savings programs under the misguided notion that ‘savings is needed to provide funds for investment’ as every economist is (or at one time was) well aware.

In the early days of the Chicago Board of Trade, in the mid-1850s, standardization took the form of creating “grades” or quality categories for commodities such as wheat, allowing for the fungibility of grains stored in elevators and warehouses, and breaking the link between ownership rights and specific lots of a physical commodity.Traders no longer needed to verify that a certain quantity of grain was of a sufficiently high grade because the exchange established a system of internal controls in the form of grain inspectors and a self-regulatory system to arbitrate disputes. The grain inspectors charged a set fee to certify the quality of the grain for any receipt traded at the board, a system with parallels to the mechanisms employed today by the rating agencies.1

In effect, standardization and related controls reduced traders’ information requirements and, thus, their transaction costs. In 1865,the Chicago Board of Trade standardized the delivery dates for the contracts, thus fostering the emergence of liquid markets in which traders could readily hedge the risk of price changes in the commodities and contracts. A final step toward standardization came years later with the adoption of the clearinghouse for the exchange as the common counter party to all of the contracts traded on the exchange. With a central counterparty, the costs and uncertainties of failures and restructurings were significantly reduced, thereby reducing work-out costs and enhancing liquidity of the contracts traded on the exchange.2

As above, for what further purpose??? He is treating ‘market functioning’ as an end rather than a means with a proper cost/benefit analysis.

The benefits of standardization can be realized not only on organized exchanges but also in over-the-counter markets. In more recent times,for example, the creation of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) master agreement for over-the-counter swaps and derivatives contracts has brought about the benefits of standardization while also allowing for product flexibility and customization. The ISDA master agreement provides standard definitions and a general outline for the contract but allows latitude in customizing terms. The master agreement also sets forth a template for workout procedures if a counterparty defaults, allowing parties to the agreement to adjust their risk-management strategies in light of the agreed-upon work-out process. This standardization reduces uncertainty about the instruments, which lowers transaction costs and facilitates price discovery and market liquidity.

Yes the most efficient structures would be a futures contract which the dealers have successfully blocked over the years.

The examples from the long- and more recent- past may hold some valuable lessons for how improvements in standardization could help to address some of the challenges in the subprime market. Uncertainty about the work-out process and the options that are available, for example, could be contributing to the difficulties in reviving price discovery and liquidity in the market for subprime residential mortgage-backed securities.

How about just let the banks underwrite the mtgs to regulatory standards???

Part of the valuation challenge is gauging the extent of the difficulties that borrowers will have in making payments and being able to stay in their homes given the reduction in house price appreciation–or actual declines in some areas–and the large number of interest rate resets coming on many adjustable-rate mortgages. From now until the end of next year, monthly payments for an average of roughly 450,000 subprime mortgages per quarter are scheduled to undergo their first interest rate reset. In addition, tightening credit conditions as reported in the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Surveys on Bank Lending Practices suggest that refinancing may become more difficult.

Lenders and servicers generally would want to work with borrowers to avoid foreclosure, which, according to industry estimates, can lead to a loss of as much as 40 percent to 50 percent of the unpaid mortgage balance. Loss mitigation techniques that preserve homeownership are typically less costly than foreclosure, particularly when applied before default. Borrowers who have been current in their payments but could default after reset may be able to work with their lender or servicer to adjust their payments or otherwise change their loans to make them more manageable.

The govt has to either ban the origination of adjustable rate mtgs but not legally enforcing any such contracts or face the consequences of allowing them, which we are seeing. Either you believe in that much personal freedom and risk taking or you don’t.

It is imperative that we work together as a financial services community to look for ways to help borrowers address their mortgage challenges, particularly for those who may have fewer alternatives, such as lower-income families. The Federal Reserve and other regulators have been active in encouraging lenders and servicers to take a proactive approach to work with borrowers who may be at risk of losing their homes. For example, the agencies have issued statements underscoring that prudent workout arrangements that are consistentwith safe and sound lending practices are generally in the long-termbest interest of both the investor and the borrower and have had numerous meetings with interested parties to foster the development and implementation of work-out arrangements.

Given the substantial number of resets from now through the end of 2008, I believe it would behoove the industry to go further than it has to join together and explore collaborative, creative efforts to develop prudent loan modification programs and other assistance to help large groups of borrowers systematically. I am not suggesting a one-size-fits-all approach, but a bottom-up approach designed to appropriately balance the needs of all parties. Getting to borrowers who have been making payments but are at risk of falling behind before they actually do become delinquent, for example, can help to preserve work-out and refinancing options.

Some industry participants and consumer groups have begun to work collaboratively to develop loan-modification templates, standards, and principles that can help to streamline the work-out and modification process. This can reduce transaction costs and potentially provide timely relief to a wider range of borrowers. A systematic approach to loan modifications would likely reduce some of the uncertainties in the market for such subprime mortgage-backed securities, helping to restore price-discovery and liquidity. This would help to ease the tightening of credit conditions in the market.

I am privileged to serve as a board member of Neighbor Works America, anational nonprofit that partners with the HOPE NOW Alliance. This alliance is developing ways to facilitate the flow of information between servicers and distressed borrowers and to work toward clarification of loan-modification procedures. Increased standardization and certainty could also benefit investors in the mortgage market by improving information flows and the price-discovery process, thereby improving market liquidity while at the same time helping to avoid foreclosures and promoting sustainable homeownership.

A Regulatory Environment That Encourages Sound Risk Management and Transparency

Recent market events have underscored the need for better market information about new products, robust due diligence to verify that information, and risk-management strategies to utilize the information in management decision making. The supervisory agencies and the industry both are addressing the need for improved risk management in light of the market disruptions The newly adopted Basel II capital framework for large internationally-active banking organizations, for example, is an important advance that encourages the types of investment in information I discussed earlier. The Basel II framework is comprised of three pillars. Pillar 1 requires information gathering and robust modeling techniques to better take into account the risks of different types of instruments and securities than under the traditional Basel I framework. It also provides incentives for more robust risk management in connection with certain higher-risk activities, such as securitization and other off-balance-sheet activities. Pillar 2 emphasizes the further stress testing and analysis of the data in conjunction with an ongoing evaluation of the institution’s capital adequacy in light of its risks through the internal capital adequacy assessment process. Pillar 3 reflects the need for better information through investments in data gathering and analysis that are reflected in enhanced public disclosures and regulatory reporting. More-comprehensive and more-transparent information allows investors to better understand the banking organization’s risk profile and thus reduces transaction costs and facilitates price discovery and market liquidity. The three pillars of Basel II promote precisely the three types of investment in information discussed earlier that facilitate the price discovery process.

In addition to supervisory initiatives, industry leaders’ efforts to influence the adoption of sound practices and codes of conduct can efficiently and effectively facilitate market-correcting behaviors. To this end, the industry is actively engaged in efforts to improve sound practices for risk management through improved stress-testing practices to cover contingent exposures, marketwide events, and potential contagion and enhanced due diligence and modeling for new products. As they look into the causes of the recent market disruptions and determine the appropriate response, both supervisory and industry groups are carefully analyzing the weaknesses in risk management and the lack of transparency in complex structures–and the implications of that lack of transparency for proper valuations.

Conclusion

The recent market disruptions have dramatically underscored the importance of gathering and analyzing information about innovative products. When the price-discovery process for a product is disrupted, both investors and sellers need to engage in a period of information gathering, processing, and analysis in order to re-establish a market price. This can be a gradual process and one that results in fundamental changes to the market for the product. Efforts underway by both supervisors and the industry should encourage improvements in risk analysis and management and, thus, price discovery. We are hopeful that our efforts to increase the standardization of loan-modification options and processes for subprime loans will help to provide more information to lenders, investors, homeowners, and communities faced with potential mortgage loan defaults while at the same time helping to provide more timely relief for borrowers in distress.


Footnotes
1. See Randall S. Kroszner (1999), “Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk? The Development of Derivatives Clearing Houses and Recent Over-the-Counter Innovations,” Journal of Money,Credit, and Banking, vol. 31 (August), p. 600. Return to text
2. See Kroszner, “Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk?”, p. 601.