Re: fed’s action

>
>     On Wed, Mar 12, 2008 at 8:40 PM, Davidson, Paul wrote
>
>     Warren:
>
>     Don’t you think it was a strange open market operation —
>     where the Fed was moving Treasuries from their balance
>     sheets to private balance sheets (even temporarily) —
>     while accepting as collateral the highest grade mortgage
>     backed securities? Usually open market operations involve
>     Treasuries going one way and bank deposits (not
>     collateral) going the other way.
>
>

Hi Paul,

It was a ‘securities lending operation’ and was probably done that way to be in compliance with existing Fed regulations regarding interaction with the dealer community.

The Fed probably already had authority to lend securities to the primary dealers from their portfolio, and either get cash in return or other securities rated AAA or better (govt, agency, etc). So they offered to loan their tsy secs and accepted the dealer’s securities as collateral for the transaction.

Note that the dealers remain as beneficial owner of the securities pledged to the Fed in return for the tsy secs, and so the Fed is not assuming that risk. The dealers do get tsy secs which they can then in turn use as collateral for loans in the market place at much lower rates than loans vs the collateral they gave the Fed.

So the end result is the dealers get to borrow at the lower rates.

No ‘money’ is added to the system by the Fed. The Fed just sets rates as is always the case.

However, this is not to say they didn’t have other reasons for doing it this way. They continue to display a very limited knowledge of monetary operations and it’s not always clear why they do what they do.

Best to Louise!

Warren

Bloomberg: from Fisher the hawk

While Fisher is perhaps the most hawkish voting member and voted against Bernanke at the last meeting, continuously rising crude/food prices and a not so large output gap are causing more voting members to firm their anti-inflation rhetoric in recent weeks:

Fisher Says Credit Markets May Not Force Fed to Act

by Naga Munchetty and Scott Lanman

Enlarge Image/Details

(Bloomberg) Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Richard Fisher said investors shouldn’t assume that rising credit costs will force the central bank to cut interest rates as deeply as it did in January or in an emergency meeting.

“We reacted with very deliberate actions that took place over a very short timeframe” in January, Fisher said in an interview with Bloomberg Television in Paris. “That shouldn’t lead markets to expectations that we will continue to react in that manner.”

Fisher also downplayed speculation that the Fed is set to reduce its benchmark interest rate before policy makers’ next scheduled session on March 18. Yesterday, yields on agency mortgage-backed securities rose to a 22-year high relative to U.S. Treasuries, while the cost to protect corporate bonds from default climbed to a record.

“I would discourage you from thinking that simply because of a significant action in the credit markets, like we had yesterday, that suddenly we’re going to have an Open Market Committee meeting, and that suddenly we’re going to move Fed funds rates in response,” said Fisher. “It doesn’t work that way.”

Traders see a 100 percent chance that the Fed will lower its 3 percent benchmark rate by three-quarters of a percentage point this month, according to futures contracts. The probability a month ago of such a move was 30 percent.

`Process’ Turmoil
At the same time, Fisher said that the credit-market turmoil “has to be processed.”

That is, the Fed is more inclined to give markets time to work things out. While demand is weak, the output gap has remained modest.

And now, with inflation and inflation expectations elevated, they need a larger output gap to bring it down (rising MNOG).

The world’s 45 biggest banks and securities firms have written off $181 billion since the beginning of 2007, reflecting the collapse of the U.S. subprime-mortgage market.

Without a failure, so far, and without the feared supply-side constraints. Yes, credit standards have tightened, but not due to actual ‘money shortages’.

“There’s a danger if the Fed reacts to new information immediately,” said Fisher, 58, a former money manager and U.S. Senate candidate who joined the Dallas Fed in 2005. “But obviously we take into account all the information as closely as we can.”

Fed officials have cut the target for the overnight interbank lending rate by 2.25 percentage points since August, taking it to 3 percent. The 1.25 percentage point of reductions in January was the fastest easing of policy in two decades. Yields on two-year Treasuries fell to 1.41 percent at 11:55 a.m., the lowest since 2003, as traders anticipate further cuts.

Fisher was the lone voting member of the Federal Open Market Committee who dissented from the Jan. 30 decision to reduce the rate by a half point.

Jobs Report
The FOMC’s decisions in January were in response to a “weaker prospect for the economy,” Fisher said.

Which is why he voted against it. When the risks shifted from ‘market functioning induced collapse’ to ‘slowing demand/weaker GDP/larger output gap’, he stepped aside.

The U.S. Commerce Department releases February payroll- growth and unemployment figures at 8:30 a.m. Washington time today. The jobless rate probably rose to a two-year high and payrolls increased at a quarter of last year’s pace as builders and manufacturers fired more workers, economists said before the report.

A modestly larger output gap is expected. Fisher and others aren’t so sure that it will be large enough to bring down the rate of inflation, as it’s still going up even with current weakness.

Yes, inflation is a lagging indicator, but oil prices are a leading indicator and drive future inflation for years down the road.

Fisher was in Paris for a conference on globalization, inflation and monetary policy, hosted by France’s central bank. In a speech before the interview, Fisher said “persistent” increases in commodity prices make it harder for central bankers to determine precisely how much inflation may be rising.

Exactly. And so far, the rate cuts are seen to have been driving down the dollar, driving up crude prices and future inflation, and not doing a whole lot for market functioning.

Plosser speech

From Philadelphia Fed President Plosser:

To be more concrete, many versions of the simple rules that I refer to when gauging the current stance of monetary policy call for a funds rate that is above the current funds rate.

‘Taylor Rule’ etc.

But the severity of the events affecting the smooth functioning of financial markets suggests that rates, perhaps,

PERHAPS???

should be somewhat lower than simple rules might suggest. However, determining the appropriate extent of such extra accommodation is difficult to quantify, but should also be disciplined by systematic policy.

Consequently, there are, and should be, limits to such departures from the guidance given by simple rules.

Seems he’s in the camp that the Fed is at or near its limits regarding rate cuts when inflation is this threatening.

One cannot, and should not, ignore other fundamental aspects of policy, especially the tendency for inflation to accelerate when policy is unduly easy.

This is the mainstream view – inflation doesn’t just go up, it accelerates when expectations begin to elevate.

Moreover, departures from the more systematic elements of making policy decisions must be relatively transitory and reversed in due course if we are to keep expectations of future inflation well-anchored.

Bernanke conspicuously left this out of his testimony last week.

Otherwise we risk eroding the public’s confidence in monetary policy’s commitment to deliver price stability, and we know from the 1970s and early 1980s that the cost of regaining the public’s confidence can be quite high.

Sounds like he’s in the Fisher camp and not inclined to favor another cut with inflation where it is.

The benefits of operating in an environment with the transparency afforded by simple rules is that it gives monetary policymakers the ability to anchor expectations and affords them the opportunity to temporarily deviate from the simple rules in extraordinary circumstances without eroding central bank credibility. We are now, perhaps,

‘PERHAPS’ again – meaning we might not be.

in a period of extraordinary circumstances and have deviated from the benchmarks suggested by simple rules. But such deviations should be temporary and limited and promptly reversed when conditions return to normal.

Can’t be more clear on this.

Monetary policymakers should continue to pursue their efforts to develop and put into practice more rule-like behavior. It is one of the more important paths to sound monetary policy over the long-run.

Looks like more movement to the Fisher camp as the March 18 meeting approaches.

Re: falling interest rates

(an intersibling email)

>
> On 3/3/08,  seth wrote:
> who is buying 2 year notes at 1.63????
> seth
>

simple:

high food and gas prices= weaker consumer= fed cutting rates = weaker $= even higher food and gas prices= even weaker consumer = fed cutting rates even more= even weaker $… = prices at infinity and rates at minus infinity

get long!!!

Central bank debate: Is it inflation or deflation?

Here’s how the inflation can persist indefinitely:

  1. In addition to the India/China type story for resource demand, this time around nominal demand for commodities is also coming from our own pension funds who are shifting more of their financial assets to passive commodity strategies.

    Pension funds contributions have traditionally been invested primarily in financial assets, making them ‘unspent income’ and therefore ‘demand leakages.’ Other demand leakages include IRAs (individual retirement accounts), corporate reserve funds, and other income that goes ‘unspent’ on goods and services.

    Supporting these demand leakages are all kinds of institutional structure, but primarily tax incentives designed to increase ‘savings’.

    These come about due to the ‘innocent fraud’ that savings is necessary for investment, a throwback to the gold standard days of loanable funds and the like.

    A total of perhaps $20 trillion of this ‘unspent income’ has accumulated in the various US retirement funds and reserves of all sorts.

    This has ‘made room’ for the government deficit spending we’ve done to not be particularly inflationary. In general terms, the goods and services that would have gone unsold each year due to our unspent income have instead been purchased by government deficit spending.

    But now that is changing, as a portion of that $20 trillion is being directed towards passive commodity strategies. While the nature of these allocations varies, a substantial portion is adding back the aggregate demand that would have otherwise stayed on the sidelines.

    That means a lot less government deficit spending might be needed to sustain high levels of demand than history indicates.

    And, of course, the allocations directly support commodity prices.
  1. We are faced with the same monopoly supplier/swing producer of crude oil as in the 1970’s.

    Back then the oil producers simply accumulated $ financial assets and were the source of a massive demand leakage that caused widespread recession in much of the world. And didn’t end until there was a supply response large enough to end the monopoly pricing power.

    But it did persist long enough for the ‘relative value story’ of rising crude prices to ‘turn into an inflation story’ as costs were passed through the various channels.

    And a general inflation combined with the supply response served to return the real terms of trade/real price of crude pretty much back to where they had been in the early 1970’s.
  1. This time around rather than ‘hoard’ excess oil revenues the producers seem to be spending the funds, as evidence by both the trillions being spent on public infrastructure as well as the A380’s being built for private use, and the boom in US exports- 13% increase last month.

    This results in increased exports from both the US and the Eurozone to the oil producing regions (including Texas) that supports US and Eurozone GDP/aggregate demand.

    At the macro level, it’s the reduced desire to accumulate $US financial assets that is manifested by increasing US exports.

    (This reduced desire comes from perceptions of monetary policy toward inflation, pension fund allocations away from $US financial assets, Paulson calling CBs who buy $US currency manipulators and outlaws, and ideological confrontation that keeps some oil producers from accumulating $US, etc. This all has weakened the $ to levels where it makes sense to buy US goods and services – the only way foreigners can reduce accumulations of $US is to spend them on US goods and services.)

    The channels are as follows:

    1. The price of crude is hiked continuously and the revenues are spent on imports of goods and services.
    2. This is further supported by an international desire to reduce accumulation of $US financial assets that lowers the $ to the point where accumulated $ are then spent on US goods and services.

    For the US this means the export channel is a source of inflation. Hence, the rapid rise in both exports and export prices along with a $ low enough for US goods and services (and real assets) to represent good value to to foreigners.

  1. This is not a pretty sight for the US. (Exports are a real cost to the US standard of living, imports a real benefit.)

    Real terms of trade are continually under negative pressure.

    The oil producers will always outbid domestic workers for their output as a point of logic.

    Real wages fall as consumers can find jobs but can’t earn enough to buy their own output which gets exported.

    Foreigners are also outbidding domestics for domestic assets including real estate and equity investments.
  1. The US lost a lot off aggregate demand when potential buyers with subprime credit no longer qualified for mortgages.

    Exports picked up the slack and GDP has muddled through.

    The Fed and Treasury have moved in an attempt to restore domestic demand. Interest rate cuts aren’t effective but the fiscal package will add to aggregate demand beginning in May.

    US export revenues will increasingly find their way to domestic aggregate demand, and housing will begin to add to GDP rather than subtract from it.

    Credit channels will adjust (bank lending gaining market share, municipalities returning to uninsured bond issuance, sellers ‘holding paper,’ etc.) and domestic income will continue to be leveraged though to a lesser degree than with the fraudulent subprime lending.

    Pension funds will continue to support demand with their allocations to passive commodity strategies and also directly support prices of commodities.
  1. Don’t know how the Fed responds – my guess is rate cuts turn to rate hikes as inflation rises, even with weak GDP.
  1. We may be in the first inning of this inflation story.

    Could be a strategy by the Saudis/Russians to permanently disable the west’s monetary system, shift real terms of trade, and shift world power.

Re: Bernanke/data

(an interoffice email)

Yes, and he reaffirmed that he’s using the futures prices to predict where prices are going.  He pointed to crude being at $95 in the back months and stated that translates to a forecast for prices to come down from current levels.

Also indicated the lower dollar is useful for bringing down the trade deficit.  This ‘works’ for as long as US labor costs are ‘well anchored’.  Congress didn’t grasp this part, as it no doubt would have evoked quite an outcry if they had understood it.

Bernanke plainly stated he considered export growth a desired outcome versus domestic consumption.

Initial claims telling today.  Other numbers point to surprises on the upside.  This could be partially tempered by Q4 GDP being revised up.

FF futures already discounting cuts to below 2% over the next six months.

While crude inventories are up, markets are saying it’s ‘desired’ inventory as the term structure is still backwardated and WTI is still higher than Brent.

On Wed, Feb 27, 2008 at 12:32 PM, Karim wrote:
All you need to know about BB’s testimony courtesy of the Xinhua news agency:

WASHINGTON, Feb 27, 2008 (Xinhua via COMTEX) — Federal Reserve Chairman Ben

Bernanke told Congress on Wednesday the central bank will again lower interest

rates to boost U.S. economy.

 

Other highlights:

 

Commenting on new Fed forecasts from last week:

The risks to this outlook remain to the downside.  The risks include the possibilities that the housing market or labor market may deteriorate more than is currently anticipated and that credit conditions may tighten substantially further.

 

… financial markets continue to be under considerable stress

 

Important comment on the time frame over which policy should aim to attain objective inflation rates

The inflation projections submitted by FOMC participants for 2010–which ranged from 1.5 percent to 2.0 percent for overall PCE inflation–were importantly influenced by participants’ judgments about the measured rates of inflation consistent with the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate and about the time frame over which policy should aim to attain those rates.

 

Concluding comments highlight downside risks to growth and inflation pressures but when addressing ACTION, only mentions supporting growth and providing insurance against downside risks.

A critical task for the Federal Reserve over the course of this year will be to assess whether the stance of monetary policy is properly calibrated to foster our mandated objectives of maximum employment and price stability in an environment of downside risks to growth, stressed financial conditions, and inflation pressures.  In particular, the FOMC will need to judge whether the policy actions taken thus far are having their intended effects.  Monetary policy works with a lag.  Therefore, our policy stance must be determined in light of the medium-term forecast for real activity and inflation as well as the risks to that forecast.  Although the FOMC participants’ economic projections envision an improving economic picture, it is important to recognize that downside risks to growth remain.  The FOMC will be carefully evaluating incoming information bearing on the economic outlook and will act in a timely manner as needed to support growth and to provide adequate insurance against downside risks.

 

Data-wise, more of the same:

  • Durable goods orders down 5.3% after 4.4% rise last month. Core component down 1.4% after 5.2% rise. Capex too small a part of economy and potential rates of change too little to have much bearing on end growth at this stage.
  • New home sales down another 2.8% in January and mths supply makes a new high, rising from 9.5 to 9.9; Y/Y median price drops to -15.1% from -7.8%

Bernanke testimony

Mercantilism is alive and well

Most telling statement when asked about what he wanted for the economy-

moderate domestic consumption, more investment, and more exports to eliminate the trade deficit.
(I’m looking for the transcript now to get the exact quotes.)

This fits with the policy of a lower interest rates, lower $, lower domestic real consumption due to higher import prices, and higher exports to sustain demand (at the ‘expense’ of the country you are exporting to who ‘loses’ demand for its products). This can be done for as long as nominal domestic wages remain ‘well anchored’ thereby reducing real wages, particularly vs our intended markets.

This is the old ‘beggar thy neighbor’ policy last seen in the 1930’s. The purpose was to accumulate the world’s gold supply, and increase ‘national savings.’ The policy was called mercantilism. It’s the logical end that follows from being on a gold standard.
A trade surplus tended to increase gold reserves, while a trade deficit tended to drain gold reserves.

Today we have non convertible currency, so government accumulation of its own currency per se is meaningless. However, we have retained some of the gold standard accounting nomenclature, such as ‘national savings’ which still features govt. accumulation of it’s own currency (as well as foreign exchange, which at least does represent value).

Fed Chairman Bernanke, the student of the great depression of the 30’s, sees the tail risk as that of gold standard deflationary collapses, and is cutting interest rates to bring the $ down and increase exports. He deems trade deficits ‘bad’ and ‘unsustainable,’ trade surpluses ‘good’ and ‘wealth enhancing,’ and increasing ‘national savings’ the mark of success.

(Mainstream economics, with all its shortcomings, does recognize the differences between convertible and non convertible currency regimes that Bernanke seems to be missing.)

Additionally Chairman Bernanke made it clear today that he sees lower futures prices for crude oil, a non perishable commodity, as indicative of market expectations for future prices, and is making decisions on that basis.

Ironically, the backwardated crude market is the result of the Saudis/Russians acting as swing producer setting price and letting quantity adjust (imperfect competition), which is functionally an engineered spot ‘shortage’ that supports price.

This brings us back to the present condition of the US economy-

Weak domestic real demand due to ‘well anchored nominal wages’ and falling real wages,

GDP muddling through with the support of booming export demand and a falling trade deficit,

And cost push inflation accelerating.

However,

Based on today’s testimony, the FOMC seems fine with the lower $ and the associated rising costs of imports, as the weak $ supports export growth.

It will get concerned about inflation when it sees signs unit labor costs are accelerating.

Inflation, growth, and Fed policy

Stocks up big, oil up big, dollar down big, and interest rates lower. How does this happen?

Review

Twin themes remain

  • weakness
  • inflation

Sources of weakness

  1. Shrinking gov budget deficit caused the financial obligations ratio to get too high by Q2 2006 to support the private sector credit growth needed to sustain previous levels of aggregate demand.
  2. Subprime business plan failed (mainly due to lender fraud) and removed that bid from the housing market.
  3. Lower interest rates reduce personal/household income.

Supporting GDP

  1. Exports booming due to a reduced desire of non residents to accumulate $US financial assets. (This drives the $US down to levels where non residents are spending them on US goods and services.)
    1. Paulson branding any country that buys $ a ‘currency manipulator’
    2. Apparent lack of Fed concern about inflation discouraging holders of $US financial assets
    3. Bush policies discouraging ‘less then friendly’ oil producers from accumulating $US financial assets
  2. Govt. spending moved forward from 07 to 08 now kicking in.
  3. Fiscal package begins to distribute funds in May.
  4. Pension funds adding to allocations for passive commodity strategies

Sources of Inflation

  1. Sufficient demand for Saudis/Russians to act as swing producers and set crude prices as high as they want to
  2. Biofuels linking energy prices to food prices as we burn up the world’s food supply for fuel
  3. Govt. payrolls and transfer payments indexed to CPI
  4. Weak $US policies driving higher import and export prices
  5. Pension funds adding to allocations for passive commodity strategies
  6. Pension funds contributing to the $ decline by allocating funds away from domestic equities to foreign equities
  7. Sovereign wealth funds allocating to passive commodity strategies

An export economy looks like this

  1. Weak domestic demand and domestic consumption
  2. Exports strong enough to sustain reasonable levels of employment (but generally not full employment)
  3. Employment and output stays reasonably high.
  4. Domestic prices are high enough relative to domestic wages to subdue domestic consumption.
  5. Foreigners ‘outbid’ domestics for the remaining output that thereby gets exported.
  6. The domestic economy works more and consumes less (lower standard of living), with the difference accounted for as ‘rising savings.’

Mainstream history (not mine) will show the following errors made by the Fed

  1. They ‘paused’ a couple of years ago as the great commodity boom was hitting it’s stride, monetizing (whatever that is) the price increases, and allowing a relative value story to turn into an inflation story.
  2. They cut aggressively into a triple negative supply shock exacerbating the monetization (whatever that is) process due to the following fundamental errors of judgement:
    1. They read futures prices in food and energy as ‘expectations’ of lower prices in the future, rather than as indicators of current inventory conditions.
    2. They assumed gold standard tail risks to a non convertible currency regime.
    3. They failed to recognize the source of rising crude prices was foreign monopoly pricing.
    4. They delayed introducing the TAF for several months.
    5. They pushed the President and Congress into increasing the budget deficit with an inflationary cash give handout.
  3. Failure to recognize the influence of pension funds on inflation and aggregate demand
  4. Failed to understand reserve accounting and liquidity issues
    1. Thought open market operations altered functional quantitative measures, not just interest rates
    2. Delayed implementing the TAF for several months to accept additional bank assets as collateral
    3. Failed to recognize that the liability side of Fed member banks is not an appropriate source of market discipline

Back to the present

  • Stocks are up as financial risks ease with the monolines sorting things out, and energy and export businesses boom.
  • Stocks are up as markets believe the Fed doesn’t care about inflation and will leave rates low for an extended period of time.
  • Crude is up as Saudis/Russians continue to hike prices.
  • The falling dollar results in higher import prices including gold, silver, copper, and most everything else.

Interest rates are down as markets read the Kohn speech as saying the Fed expects inflation to come down so there’s no need to be concerned or take action. And inflation is a lagging indicator that historically comes down after the Fed cuts rates when the economy weakens.

Kohn speech

After the speech, crude up $1.61 and back over $100.
Yields down on fixed income as markets anticipate Fed won’t respond to inflation anytime soon:

February 26, 2008

The U.S. Economy and Monetary Policy

(SNIP)

Several major developments are shaping current economic performance, the outlook, and the conduct of monetary policy. The most prominent of these developments is the contraction in the housing market that began in early 2006. Both the prices and pace of construction of new homes rose to unsustainable levels in the preceding few years. For a time, the resulting correction was largely confined to the housing market, but the consequences of that correction have spread to other sectors of the economy.

The financial markets are playing a key role in the transmission of the housing downturn to the rest of the economy.

(SNIP)

The result has been a substantial tightening in credit availability for many firms and households.

At the same time, continued sizable increases in the prices of food, energy, and other commodities have raised inflation. To some extent, those increases have resulted from strong demand in rapidly growing emerging-market economies, like China and India. But the increases likely also reflect conditions such as adverse weather in some parts of the world, the use of agricultural commodities to produce energy, and geopolitical developments that threaten supplies in some petroleum-producing centers. The higher prices have eroded the purchasing power of household income, adding to restraint on spending.

(SNIP)

Recent Economic and Financial Developments

The pace of real economic activity stepped down sharply toward the end of last year and has remained sluggish in recent months. Real gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have risen only slightly in the fourth quarter. The contraction in the housing market continues to drag down economic growth. Declines in real residential investment subtracted nearly 1 percentage point from the overall increase in real GDP in 2007. Even so, the inventory of unsold new homes remains unusually high, because the demand for housing has fallen about as rapidly as the supply. Problems in the subprime market have virtually cut off financing in this sector. Prime jumbo mortgages are being made, but the lack of a secondary market has caused the spread between rates on these mortgages and on those that have been eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to widen substantially. Even the standards for conforming mortgages have been tightened of late. Weak demand, in turn, is leading to widespread declines in the actual and expected prices of houses, further discouraging buyers. Starts of new single-family homes continued to fall in January, dropping to fewer than 750,000 units–a level of activity more than 1 million units below the peak in early 2006. Judging from the further decline in permits last month, additional cutbacks in construction are likely. It appears that the correction in the housing market has further to go.

For the better part of the past two years, the trouble in the housing market was contained; however, over the past several months, the weakness appears to have spread to other sectors of the economy. Tighter credit, reductions in housing and equity wealth, higher energy prices, and uncertainty about economic prospects seem to be weighing on business and household spending. Labor demand has softened in recent months. Private nonfarm payrolls were little changed in January, and the unemployment rate moved up to 4.9 percent, on average, during December and January, after remaining around 4-1/2 percent from late 2006 through most of 2007. The higher level of weekly claims for unemployment insurance suggests continued softness in employment this month.

Agreed, the economy has hit the ‘soft spot’ previously forecast by the Fed and private economists.

Apart from the labor market, the hard data on economic activity in the first quarter are limited, but, on the whole, the data suggest economic activity has remained very sluggish. Retail sales were up moderately in nominal terms in January, but after adjusting for the rise in prices of consumer goods, real spending on non-auto goods appears to have been little changed last month. In addition, unit sales of new motor vehicles weakened. Total industrial production rose just 0.1 percent in January for a second consecutive month, and manufacturing output was unchanged. Much of the other information about the current quarter has come in the form of surveys of business and consumers–and most all of it has been downbeat. That said, I can still see a few bright spots. One is that the level of business inventories does not appear worrisome at present. Another is that international trade continued to be a solid source of support for the economy through the end of last year. The worsening financial conditions and slower growth in the United States have had some effect on the rest of the world, but the prospects for foreign growth remain favorable.

Agreed, weak domestic demand supported by rising exports.

The most recent news on inflation–the January report on the consumer price index (CPI)–was disappointing. Once again, total or headline CPI was boosted by a jump in energy prices and relatively large increases in food prices; last month’s rise left the twelve-month change in the overall CPI at 4.3 percent–twice the pace a year ago. In addition, the January increase of 0.3 percent in the CPI excluding food and energy was slightly higher than the average monthly rate in 2007. Nonetheless, the twelve-month change in this measure of core inflation, at 2-1/2 percent, was still slightly below the rate one year earlier. The recent readings on core inflation suggest that the higher costs of energy, a pickup in prices of imported goods, and, perhaps, the persistent upward price pressures in commodity markets may be passing through a bit to core consumer prices.

Headline passing through to core – not good.

The Implications of Financial Stress for the Economic Outlook

(SNIP)

The pressures from the financial turmoil have been most intense for those financial intermediaries that have been exposed to losses on mortgages and other credits that are repricing, as well as for those institutions now required to bring onto their balance sheets loans that previously would have been sold into securities markets. As those intermediaries take steps to protect themselves from further losses and conserve capital, and as investors more broadly have responded to the evolving risks, spreads on household and business debt in securities markets have widened, the availability of bank credit has decreased, and equity prices have weakened.

In addition to the drying up of large portions of mortgage finance that I referred to previously, conditions have firmed on loans for a variety of other purposes. Responses to our Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey in January showed that banks have tightened terms and standards for household and commercial mortgages, commercial and industrial loans, and consumer loans.

The Fed puts a lot of weight on this and reads it differently than I do. Yes, they have tightened standards, but that doesn’t mean those who had previously qualified no longer qualified under the new standards. For example, requiring a larger down payment is considered tightening, and there’s no evidence yet that would be borrowers don’t simply put more money down. Same with other ‘tightening standards’ issues.

In corporate bond markets, spreads have been widening on both investment- and speculative-grade issues. Lenders are demanding much higher risk premiums for commercial real estate loans. And equity prices have fallen substantially over the past seven months, reducing household wealth and increasing the cost of raising equity capital for businesses.

All true, but part of the great repricing of risk. Arguably spreads were unsustainably narrow a year ago.

To be sure, the easing of monetary policy that I will be discussing in a minute has, quite deliberately, been intended to offset the effect of this tightening, resulting in some borrowers seeing lower interest rates. But financing costs have risen, on balance, for riskier credits, and almost all borrowers are dealing with more cautious lenders who have adopted more stringent standards. Those financial market developments are, in many respects, a healthy correction to previous excesses.

Yes, agreed with that.

But, in some cases, they may represent an overreaction, or at least positioning for the small probability of very adverse economic conditions. In any case, they have the potential to adversely affect household and business spending.

Yes, they have that potential. And regulatory over reach is also a problem he doesn’t address, as the OCC is unnecessarily making things more difficult for small banks to function ‘normally’.

The recovery in financial markets is likely to be a prolonged process. The length of the recuperation will depend importantly on the course of the economy, particularly on developments in the housing market. If the deterioration in the housing market were greater than expected in coming months, the losses borne by financial institutions would be even greater, and lenders might further reduce credit availability. More widespread macroeconomic weakness could make lenders more cautious and could cause the financial problems to spread further. The recent problems of financial guarantors, with possible implications for municipal bond markets as well as for bank balance sheets, are an indication that the financial sector remains vulnerable.

Agreed that parts of the financial sector remains vulnerable, while others are doing exceptionally well.

Even in a more favorable economic environment, some time is likely to be required to restore the functioning and liquidity of a number of markets.

(SNIP)

The Monetary Policy Response

(SNIP)

As the deterioration in financial markets increasingly has threatened to hold down spending and employment, the FOMC has eased monetary policy, reducing the federal funds rate target by 2-1/4 percentage points since the turmoil erupted in August. Those actions have been intended to counteract the effects on the overall economy of tighter terms and conditions in credit markets, the drop in equity and housing wealth, and the steep decline in housing activity. Our objective has been to promote sustainable growth and maximum employment over time.

(SNIPS BELOW)

What policy can do is attempt to limit the fallout on the economy from this adjustment.

Lower interest rates should support aggregate demand over time, even in the face of widespread contraction in the supply of credit.


Among other things, lower rates should facilitate the refinancing of mortgage loans, and they will hold down the cost of capital to business.

Easier policy should also support asset prices–or at least cushion declines that otherwise would have occurred.

And expected policy easing likely contributed to the drop in the foreign exchange value of the dollar, which is bolstering our exports.

Yes, the ‘inflate your way out of debt’ approach. Highly unusual for a central bank to aggressively do this. Harks back to the ‘beggar thy neighbor’ policies of the 1930s.

The extent of the financial adjustment, as I mentioned previously, is itself highly dependent on how housing and the economy evolve. Part of the rise in risk spreads, reduction in credit availability, and the declines in stock prices in the past few months reflect investor efforts to protect themselves against the potential for very adverse economic outcomes–that is, the exposures and losses that would accompany a persistent steep decline in house prices and a significant recession. Of course, these actions–reducing exposures, tightening credit standards, demanding extra compensation for taking risk–themselves make these “tail risk” scenarios even more likely. In circumstances like these, the decisions of policymakers must take account of not only the most likely course of the economy, but also the possibility of very unfavorable developments.

Not including inflation?

Doing so should reduce the odds on an especially adverse outcome not only by having policy a little easier than otherwise, but also by reassuring lenders and spenders that the central bank recognizes such a possibility in its policy deliberations. Whether the Federal Reserve has done enough in this regard is a question this policymaker will be weighing carefully over coming months.

Even as we respond to forces currently weighing on real activity, we must also set policy to resist any tendency for inflation to increase on a sustained basis. Allowing elevated rates of inflation to become entrenched in inflation expectations would be costly to reverse, constrain our ability to cushion further downward shocks to spending, and result over time in lower and less stable economic expansion. Inflation expectations generally have appeared reasonably well anchored, giving the FOMC room to focus on supporting economic growth. Moreover, as I will explain below, for a variety of reasons, I do not expect the recent elevated inflation rates to persist. In my view, the adverse dynamics of the financial markets and the economy have presented the greater threat to economic welfare in the United States. But the recent information on prices underlines the need to continue to monitor the inflation situation very carefully.

The Outlook for Economic Activity and Inflation

How long the adjustment in financial markets will take and the consequences of that adjustment for economic activity are subject to considerable uncertainty. In my view, the most likely scenario is one in which the economy experiences a period of sluggish growth in demand and production in the near term that is accompanied by some further increase in joblessness.

New building activity will continue to decline until the overhang of inventories of unsold homes has been substantially reduced, and the demand side of the market is not likely to revive appreciably until buyers sense that price declines are abating and financing conditions for mortgages are improving. Consumer spending will be damped by the effects on real incomes of a weak labor market and rising energy prices and by the effects of declines in the stock market and home prices on household wealth. Business spending on capital equipment should be held down by slower sales and production and by caution in a very uncertain economic environment. Nonresidential construction is likely to lose some momentum in the wake of both weak growth in overall economic activity and tighter credit. Some modest offset to these areas of weakness should come from export demand, which should be boosted by the lagged effects of recent declines in the dollar and supported by still-solid growth abroad.

Seems he doesn’t realize export demand is part of the cause of higher prices, as non-residents compete with residents to buy the US output of goods and services. That’s what an export economy looks like, and this will continue for as long as non-resident desires to accumulate $US financial assets continues to fall.

By midyear, economic activity should begin to benefit from several factors. One is the fiscal stimulus package that the Congress recently enacted. The rebates that households are scheduled to begin to receive in May should provide a temporary boost to consumption. Although the timing and the magnitude of the spending response is uncertain, economic studies of the previous experience suggest that a noticeable proportion of households are quite sensitive to temporary cash flow. The potential effects of the business incentives are perhaps more uncertain. Although economic theory suggests that they should bring forward some capital spending, past experience has been mixed.

Second, the decline in residential investment should begin to abate later this year as the overhang of unsold homes is worked off, reducing what has been a significant drag on economic growth over the past two years. Finally, the declines in interest rates that began last summer should be supporting activity over coming quarters, and their effects should show through more clearly to improvements in economic activity as the stress in financial markets dissipates.

Although a firming in the growth of economic activity after midyear now appears the most likely scenario, the outlook is subject to a number of important risks. Further substantial declines in house prices could cut more deeply into household wealth and intensify the problems in mortgage markets and for those intermediaries holding mortgage loans. Financial markets could remain quite fragile, delaying the restoration of more normal credit flows. As observed in the minutes of its most recent meeting, the FOMC has expressed a broad concern about the possibility of adverse interactions among weaker economic activity, stress in financial markets, and credit constraints.

I expect the run-up in headline inflation to be reversed and core inflation to edge lower over the next few years. This projection assumes that energy and other commodity prices will level out, as suggested by the futures markets.

No other reasons? Not much to bet the ranch on? And futures prices for non perishables are not about expectations, but about inventory conditions. Contango indicates a surplus of desired spot inventories and backwardation a shortage of desired spot inventories.

The current backwardated term structure of oil and other futures is indicating shortages, which, if anything, tell me the risk is more to the upside than the downside, as well as support my position that the Saudis/Russians are acting as swing producers and setting price.

Moreover, greater slack in the economy should reduce pressure on prices and wages.

Maybe, but also a risky stance.

Rising import prices are in fact rising real wages for US, as many imports have high labor contents.

And given rising import prices of labor intensive goods and services due to the weak $, lower US domestic real wages shift production back to domestic firms, who support US nominal wages and keep employment firmer than otherwise.

Despite high resource utilization over the past couple of years and periods of elevated headline inflation, labor cost increases have remained quite moderate, and inflation expectations remain reasonably well anchored.

As above, rising import prices represent rising labor costs, and inflation expectations have dropped to only ‘reasonably’ well anchored.

Nonetheless, policymakers must remain very attentive to the outlook for inflation. As I mentioned earlier, the recent uptick in core inflation may reflect some spillover of the higher costs of food, energy, and imports into core prices.

To the mainstream economists, this is a serious development.

And the prices of crude oil and other commodities have moved up further in recent weeks. A related concern is that inflation expectations might drift higher if the current rapid rates of headline inflation persist for longer than anticipated or if the recent easing in monetary policy is misinterpreted as reflecting less resolve among Committee members to maintain low and stable inflation over the medium run. Persistent elevated inflation would undermine the performance of the economy over time.

Worse, to a mainstream economist, including Governor Kohn, it’s a necessary condition for optimal growth and employment.

Conclusion

These have been difficult times for the U.S. economy. The correction of excesses in sectors of the economy and financial markets has spilled over more broadly. Growth has slowed, and unemployment has increased; both borrowers and lenders are facing problems, and the functioning of the financial markets has been disrupted. At the same time, inflation has risen.

Yes, weakness and higher prices.

I believe we will see a return to stronger growth, lower unemployment, lower inflation and improved flows in financial markets, but it probably will take a little while.

This ‘belief’ is at best scantily supported in this speech. Lower inflation because futures are lower? Lower employment/output gap and bringing inflation down to comfort zone at the same time?

And adverse risks to this most likely scenario abound: Uncertainty could trigger an even greater withdrawal from risk-taking by households, businesses, and investors, resulting in more pronounced and prolonged economic weakness; events beyond our borders could continue to put upward pressure on inflation rates.

Yes.

But we should not lose sight of some fundamental strengths of our economy. Our markets have proven to be flexible and resilient, able to absorb shocks, and quick to adapt to changing circumstances. Those markets reward entrepreneurship and risk-taking, and many people are looking for opportunities to buy distressed assets and restructure and strengthen businesses to take advantage of the economic rebound that will occur. Monetary policy has proven itself, under a wide variety of circumstances, very effective in recent decades in damping inflation when needed

Yes, but only by hiking rates. There is no other policy option for bringing down inflation.

and in stimulating demand and activity when that has been appropriate. Our job at the Federal Reserve is to put in place those policies that will promote both price stability and growth over time. We have the tools.

They have one tool – setting the interbank interest rates and other rates as desired.

They have no way of directly increasing or decreasing aggregate demand. That requires direct buying or selling of actual goods and services, not just financial assets.

Treasury spending/taxing directly add/removes demand.

As Chairman Bernanke often emphasizes: We will do what is needed.

Yes, to the best of their knowledge and ability.

This is a relatively neutral speech with more inflation talk than in previous, dovish speeches.

Conclusion:
High February CPI numbers before the next meeting will make it very difficult for the FOMC to vote on a cut without a more than anticipated decline of economic activity.