Consumer Borrowing Rises $5.1 billion

Down a bit from April, but the larger question is whether higher gasoline prices led to more borrowing to buy what previously was bought from income.

Yes, savings is growing, but that is mainly in the form of reduced and unwanted private sector debt, and not dollars in savings accounts.

Consumer Borrowing Rises for Eighth Straight Month

July 8 (AP) — Americans borrowed more in May for the eighth straight month and used their credit cards more for only the second time in nearly three years.

The Federal Reserve says consumer borrowing rose $5.1 billion following a revised gain of $5.7 billion in April. Borrowing in the category that covers credit cards increased, as did borrowing in the category for auto and student loans.

The increase in credit card borrowing marked only the second monthly gain since August 2008. Since the financial crisis, consumers have been cutting back on the use of credit cards, which has depressed economic growth because it has held back consumer spending.

Subversion???!!!

Do we have enemies that are using our misunderstanding of our monetary system to undermine our actual national defense?

Could they be playing on our deficit phobia that’s taken hold to subdue us?

Or is it all just innocent fraud?

While there is certainly spending on waste and fraud in the military that should be addressed, weakening our actual defense capabilities we would otherwise elect to support is an entirely different matter.

What was a serious problem has just taken on a new dimension.

The deficit terrorists are now a force that’s subverting our real defense needs.

On Mon, Jun 14, 2010 at 5:37 AM, Project on Defense Alternatives wrote:

Dear Warren Mosler: I am pleased to announce publication of “Debt, Deficits, and Defense: A Way Forward” by the Sustainable Defense Task Force (members listed below). The report, which is now publically accessible, identifies options for $100 billion annual savings in the US defense budget for consideration by the recently appointed deficit reduction commission.


You can access the report on the home page of the Project on Defense Alternatives here: http://www.comw.org/pda


You will also find there a video of the briefing the Task Force held on 11 June in the US Capitol with over 100 congressional staffers, NGO leaders, and journalists in attendance.

The report concludes that, in order to find significant savings and put defense on a sustainable path, we must change how we produce military power and the ways in which we put it to use. It sees recent official reform efforts as a first step, but concludes that “they fall far short of what is possible and what is needed to put defense spending and defense strategy back in check.” The report offers suggestions for strengthening current reforms and argues that, in addition, we must rethink our military commitments and our defense strategy.


You can follow discussion of the report and other debates on US Defense Policy on the PDA Defense Strategy Review page, here http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/


Thanks, Carl Conetta and Charles Knight – best contact: pda@comw.org

Sustainable Defense Task Force

– Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives
– Benjamin H Friedman, Cato Institute
– William D Hartung, New America Foundation
– Christopher Hellman, National Priorities Project
– Heather Hurlburt, National Security Network
– Charles Knight, Project on Defense Alternatives
– Lawrence J Korb, Center for American Progress
– Paul Kawika Martin, Peace Action
– Laicie Olson, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
– Miriam Pemberton, Institute for Policy Studies
– Laura Peterson, Taxpayers for Common Sense
– Prasannan Parthasarathi, Boston College
– Christopher Preble, Cato Institute
– Winslow Wheeler, Center for Defense Information

50% Chance NYC Will Default On Its Debt


[Skip to the end]

NYC defaulted when I first started in the early 70’s.

Charlie Sanford, my department head at Banker’s Trust, was the one who pulled the plug.

He was at a meeting for a revenue anticipation bond and said in his distinctive voice something like, “Revenue, what revenue? We’re out.”

>   
>   On Tue, Mar 3, 2009 at 10:35 AM, Russell wrote:
>   
>   Gambling man?
>   

50% Chance NYC Will Default on Its Debt in 5 Years

by Joe Weisenthal

Mar 3 (Business Insider)


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IMF warns of ‘disturbing’ UK debt


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IMF warns of ‘disturbing’ UK debt

The level of debt in the UK is “disturbing,” the head of the International Monetary Fund has said.

But Dominique Strauss-Kahn told the BBC that given the severity of the economic downturn, more government borrowing was the lesser of two evils.

No, he’s the greater evil. Another deficit terrorist.


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Re: Will the Fed Issue Debt?


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(email exchange)

Paying interest on reserves is functionally identical to issuing debt.

The difference would just be the different maturities.

This could be used to support higher short term rates, if that’s what they want.

Lots of CB’s have done this.

>   
>   On Thu, Dec 11, 2008 at 12:50 AM, Scott wrote:
>   
>   I hope all is well down under. This is interesting!
>   

BOTTOM LINE: News reports indicate that Fed officials may be considering issuing debt. At this stage, we do not know how credible this is. They certainly do not need this to expand their balance sheet but may be motivated either by perceptions that existing options (reserve expansion) are too inflationary or by plans to acquire longer-term risky assets. The idea is not without risk as the existence of Federal Reserve debt would provide the basis on which markets could then take positions on the solvency of the central bank.

MAIN POINTS:

1. According to news reports, Fed officials are considering issuance of debt as an alternative way of expanding their balance sheet. Apart from the fact that these reports have appeared in several places, which often signals that they have some basis, we do not know if Fed officials are seriously considering this alternative. If they are, we think they would need Congressional authorization before proceeding and suspect they would seek it even if they did not think it necessary from a legal standpoint.

2. The idea is a bit puzzling as the Fed already has an effective means of expanding its balance sheet without limit by creating reserves. For example, if officials want to increase the size of an existing liquidity facility or create a new one, all they have to do is extend a loan in one of these facilities and credit the reserve account of the bank that borrows the funds. (If the counterparty is not a bank, then the Fed can provide the funds as Federal Reserve notes – i.e., “print money”). In normal circumstances this would push the federal funds rate down, which officials might not want to do, but currently the effective funds rate is so close to zero that this would not seem to be a significant consideration.

3. So why consider the alternative of issuing debt? We can think of two motivations:

a) Fed officials are uncomfortable with the speed with which the monetary base (bank reserves plus currency in circulation) has expanded over the past two months, either on their own account or because the public may see this as creating a huge inflation problem down the road. In the week ended December 3, the monetary base was $1.47trn; three months earlier it was $843bn. However, in our view this is a misguided concern for a couple of reasons:

i) At a time when concerns about deflation are mounting, Fed officials should want the public to see its current liquidity program as inflationary, to prevent such concerns from translating into expectations that prices will fall in a broad-based and sustained fashion.

ii) Such concerns usually take as an implied premise that the liquidity will be difficult to remove – in essence that the Fed will find itself on a razor’s edge of having to withdraw massive amounts of liquidity in a very short period once the economy starts to improve. This is highly unlikely in our view. By our reckoning, the output gap is already 4% of GDP (unemployment is about 2 points above the natural rate, and each point is worth 2% of GDP) and likely to go much higher before the economy starts to grow at a trend rate. This should give the Fed plenty of time to put its balance sheet back in order before inflation becomes a genuine risk.

Moreover, as the economy starts to improve, the excess liquidity should unwind on its own, as banks’ needs for liquidity facilities diminish in a natural fashion and the Fed begins to raise the federal funds rate target.

b) The other possible motivation is to lay the financing groundwork for large-scale direct purchases of longer-term risky assets, such as private-label mortgages and corporate bonds (which would also require congressional approval). If this is the motivation, then one implication is that the debt would be long-term in nature (again, we have no way of knowing what officials themselves are thinking in this regard). The idea would be such financing might need to be in place long after the liquidity facilities have been unwound, as the assets thus acquired take time to mature or be sold back into the private markets.

4. If the Fed were to issue debt, some interesting questions and possible unintended consequences arise, which we simply raise at this point for further discussion: (a) how would Fed debt stand relative to Treasury debt of comparable maturity? Would it be senior, junior, or pari passu? (b) would it be subject to some limit, as the Treasury’s debt is, and if not could this facilitate a situation in which some programs currently authorized for the Treasury (like TARP) would effectively be financed by comparable operations undertaken by the Fed? (c) if Fed debt does come into existence and begin to trade in the markets, prices on such debt (and on the inevitable CDS to be based on it) would allow the markets effectively to trade on the credibility of the central bank. It is not obvious to us that Fed officials would really want this to happen.


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A very British bubble for Mr Brown

A very British bubble for Mr Brown

Leader
Sunday December 16 2007
The Observer

The buzz words in the world of finance these days are ‘moral hazard’. That is economist-speak for what happens when people who have engaged in risky business and fallen foul of market forces are let off the hook. It is the recognition that when you give dodgy lenders and borrowers an inch, they recklessly gamble for another mile.

When the City started to feel the ‘credit crunch’ over the summer, the Bank of England at first took a tough line on moral hazard. But it subsequently changed its mind. It rescued Northern Rock.

It rescued the depositors. Hardly a moral hazard issue. The shareholders still stand to lose if the assets don’t have the hoped for cash flows over time.

Last week it joined a coordinated action with US, Canadian and European central banks to provide easy credit to any institution that can’t borrow elsewhere.

Sort of, the CB’s job is to administer policy interest rates. And, again, there is nothing yet to indicate shareholders are getting baled out.

That was the right course of action. The banking sector may be in a mess of its own making – it over-exposed itself to US sub-prime mortgages – but the danger to the wider economy of a prolonged cash drought is too big to ignore.

What is a ‘cash drought’???

But even if last week’s intervention gets the wheels of global finance moving again,

Whatever that means. GDP seems to be muddling through as before.

the danger will not have receded. That is because high street lenders have no reason to pass central bank largesse onto their customers. Ordinary people will still find it hard to borrow and will still pay more than before to service their debts.

Haven’t seen any evidence of that, apart from would be subprime borrowers who perhaps never should have had access to funds anyway.

Since Britons are some of the most indebted people in the world, that puts us in a particularly vulnerable position. Per capita, Britons borrow more than twice as much as other Europeans. The average family pays 18 per cent of disposable income servicing debt. If the world economy slumps, the bailiffs will knock at British doors first.

More confused rhetoric. Aggregate demand is about spending. The risk to output and employment remains a slump in spending.

It might not come to that. The best case scenario envisages a mild downturn, consumers turning more prudent, demand dipping and inflation falling, which would free the Bank of England to cut interest rates and re-energise the economy for a prompt comeback.

No evidence cutting rates adds to demand in a meaningful way. It takes a strong dose of fiscal for that or for the non resident sector to start spending its hoard of pounds in the UK.

But in the worst case scenario, the credit crunch turns into a consumer recession.

If it results in a cut in aggregate demand, which it might, but somehow this discussion does not get into that connection.

House prices fall dramatically. People feel much poorer and stop spending.

OK, there is a possible channel, but it is a weak argument. Seems to take a cut in income for spending to fall.

Small businesses can’t get credit and fold.

Could happen, but if consumers spend at the remaining businesses that do not fold and employment and income stays constant, GDP stays pretty much the same.

But high fuel and commodity prices keep inflation high. Unemployment rises

When that happens, it is trouble for GDP, but he skirts around the channels that might lead to a loss of income, spending, and employment.

and millions of people default on their debts. Boom turns to bust.

Right, and the policy response can be an immediate fiscal measure that sustains demand and prevents that from happening.

The problem is with ‘high inflation’ and an inherent fear of government deficits; policy makers may not want to go that route.

The government can hope for the best, but it must prepare for the worst.

Fallout shelters?

That means talking to banks, regulators and debt relief charities to work out ways to help people at risk of insolvency.

Actually, bankruptcy is a means of sustaining demand. Past debts are gone and earned income goes toward spending and often spending beyond current income via new debt.

They must look first at reform of Individual Voluntary Arrangements. These are debt restructuring packages that fall short of personal bankruptcy declarations. In theory, they allow people to consolidate and write off some of their debt, paying the rest in installments.

This could hurt demand unless the installment payments get spend by the recipients.

There is no debtors prison over there anymore, last I heard?

But in practice they are sometimes scarcely more generous than credit card balance transfer deals, with large arrangement fees and tricky small print. There is emerging evidence they have been mis-sold to desperate debtors.

In theory, individuals can also negotiate debt relief directly with banks. But that requires the pairing of a financially literate, assertive consumer with a generous-hearted lender – not the most common combination. The government and banks should already be planning their strategy to make impartial brokering of such deals easier.

But the first hurdle on the way to easing a private debt crisis is political. Gordon Brown has constructed a mythology of himself as the alchemist Chancellor who eliminated the cycle of boom-and-bust from Britain’s economy. To stay consistent with that line, he has to pretend that Britain is well insulated from financial turbulence originating in the US.

Banning CNBC would help out a lot!

That simply isn’t true. The excessive level of consumer borrowing in recent years is a very British bubble and the government can deny it no longer. If the bubble bursts, we will face a kind of moral hazard very different from the one calculated by central banks when bailing out the City. It is the hazard of millions of people falling into penury.

Rising incomes can sustain rising debt indefinitely. It is up to the banks to make loans to people who can service them; otherwise, their shareholders lose. That is the market discipline, not short term bank funding issues.