Research Reports – Fed Balance Sheet Explodes


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Yes, and when the proactive fiscal package kicks in next month adding to the already reasonably large deficit (from falling tax revenues and rising transfer payments) and starts driving up prices from liquidation levels, monetary policy will get the blame. Just like Greenspan’s getting blamed for the housing bubble that followed the 2003 fiscal adjustment and subsequent GDP growth.

Fed Balance Sheet Explodes

by Brian Wesbury and Robert Stein

Mar 18 (First Trust) — The Federal Reserve today went into overdrive in its attack on the US recession and financial system crisis.

We are definitely fearful of the long-term consequences of massively easy monetary policy, which today’s policy statement clearly signals. The US does not face a deflation problem, as February reports on producer and consumer prices revealed. As a result, easy money will become even more problematic than conventional wisdom believes or understands.


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Responses to comments on the ‘Comments on Brian Wesbury article’ post

Post: Comments on Brian Wesbury article

Comment by ‘Hoover Printing Press‘:

Warren congrats on your new website.

Thanks!

I keep reading that the bond insurers have let banks keep lots of “accounting issues” off the books – thus affecting tier 1 capital requirements – currently to the banks advantage. Without the bond insurers and their AAA rating by moody and sp (fitch has already lowered ratings down from AAA) the banks will have to scramble for lots of capital without the insurance, barclays recent estimate upwards of 150 billion. I remember Buffet referring to Financial WMD’s.

Yes, but that’s a matter of institutional structure. The government has several options.

For example:

  • The government could change bank ‘haircuts’ to capital by allowing AA insured bonds to have the same or only marginally higher capital charges as AAA bonds. The capital requirements are somewhat arbitrary to being with and meant to serve public purpose.
  • The government could offer some for of supplemental insurance at a fee to investors holding the AAA insured bonds in question. Again, for example, the fee could perhaps be 1%, and the government could guarantee a price of 97 to any investor who paid the fee. The government will probably make a profit on this type of program, as the monolines’ capital will still be in first lost position, and even if they are downgraded to AA, the implication is they will have more than sufficient capital to cover all losses. That is what AA means.

I read articles that NY is in a mad scramble to get buffet and others to bring some assurances to the bond insurance industry because the muni debt market is going to seize up without bond insurance and what the AAA ratings of that insurance lends to capital requirements and “accounting issues.”

Yes. There are some institutional ‘land mines’ in place that the government can either prevent from being tripped or defuse directly (for a fee), as above.

In hoover’s time I remember reading from Rothbard’s great depression I believe that he printed but the banks used the money to shore up their reserves, they did not want to lend and spur the economy at the cost of their own survival.

Under that gold standard regime, the government was limited in what it could do. Deficit spending carried the risk of loss of gold reserves, for example. And, in fact, the US was forced off the gold standard in 1934 domestically and devalued for foreign holders of $. This was the only actual default in US history.

So why is Bush and congress giving joe six pack 150B when he could have used that to back the bond insurers and the banks?

No comment.. You must be new here??? :)

Possibly getting the ratings agency to save some face and for fitch to bring AAA ratings back to the bond insurers?

Or the supplemental plan, above, that doesn’t bail out the insurers.

On another point, you claim a large difference between hoover’s problems and our problems today is the gold standard and floating exchange rates. Unfortunately I must press you as to how that is so when the folks at the top of this chart (china) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_current_account_balance have fixed exchange rates relating to the folks at the bottome of it (USA). Soros is claiming the USA will soon lose reserve currency status.

A fixed exchange rate ‘forces’ you to run a trade surplus to sustain sufficient reserves of gold or the reserve currency of choice. It also limits the ability to conduct countercyclical deficit spending as that leads to loss of reserves and default/devaluation/etc.

China has a ‘dirty float’, which means the currency is not convertible, but instead they intervene at various prices.

Not at all the same thing.

I am not so sure the Euro will be able to weather a global financial meltdown and perhaps in economic warfare, keeping reserve currency status is worth fighting over.

What is it, and why do you care?

With bush selling lots of scatter bombs to the house of Saud, at least we are trying to keep friends who have control over oil.

Still with the USA’s current account balance the worst of any country on the planet,

Imports are real benefits, exports real costs. In general, the larger your trade deficit, the higher your standard of living.

40K nukular bombs and a war machine that eats up large domestic resources, and a consumer base whose only skill is to shop till princess drops,

Consumption is the only point of economics.

I am not so sure what you are trying to save to get USA to deficit spend even MORE?

Right now, more deficit spending of the type proposed will mainly increase inflation.

Would it be so bad if that guy “dfense” from the mike douglas movie “FALLING DOWN” gets put out of a missle building job and starts fishing on the dock of the bay wasting time?


Comment by Scott Fullwiler:

Wesbury’s basically a monetarist (everything that goes wrong is the Fed’s fault for creating either too much or too little “liquidity”) operating with a gold standard model.

Yes, that’s where we don’t agree on causation and risks. But interesting that even in that paradigm, he doesn’t see the risks the Fed does, as they are in the same gold standard paradigm.

That said, he’s been bullish on the economy since 2002, and he’s been mostly right in that, except that he’s also been saying inflation is right around the corner since then, too, given weak dollar, strong gold.

And I’ve seen inflation underway due to Saudis acting as the swing producer and hiking price continuously.

And I see the weak $ as a change in preferences of non-resident holdings of financial assets.

Until a year and a half ago he was also claiming that the large spread b/n st and lt Treasuries was another a sign of inflation,

And I say it’s a sign of what investors think the Fed will be doing next. So to that extent, the curve reflects investor expectations. But there is also a lot of institutional structure that steers maturity preferences; so, the result is a mix of the two.

though he decided bond markets were being irrational once the yield curve inverted (again, if inflation is right around the corner).

Again, that reflects investor expectations.

I’ve used him in my classes for several years as a “balance” to the Levy view of “debt deflation’s around the corner.” Interesting to see that you and he are on the same page now at least regarding state of the economy, since you’ve been pessimistic (at least in long run, given small govt deficit) while he’s been a non-stop bull.

Yes, I’ve been expecting lower domestic demand since the financial obligations ratio go to where it go in Q2 2006, due to the shrinking budget deficit. What I missed was how strong exports would be, mainly on our three pronged weak dollar policy that has been scaring foreigners away from holding $US financial assets.

This includes calling CB’s currency manipulators if they buy $US, aggressive Middle Eastern policy, and the Fed’s apparent lack of concern for the value of the currency (inflation). Fundamentally, the falling budget deficit is good for the $US, but technically government policy has triggered an ‘inventory liquidation’ over seas that is causing exports to boom.

And now we are learning the hard way (or should be) what an export driven economy looks like – weak domestic demand due to high prices and full employment as we build goods and services for others.


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Comments on Brian Wesbury article

He’s got the data right, and I agree with all he concludes from it. All he’s missing is the difference he points two between now (unlimited funds available) and The Great Depression (banks short of lendable funds), including what the Fed presumably ‘did’ each time, are the differences between the constraints of the gold standard of that time vs today’s floating fx policy.

The Economy Is Fine (Really)

by Brian Wesbury

It is hard to imagine any time in history when such rampant pessimism about the economy has existed with so little evidence of serious trouble.

True, retail sales fell 0.4% in December and fourth-quarter real GDP probably grew at only a 1.5% annual rate. It is also true that in the past six months manufacturing production has been flat, new orders for durable goods have fallen at a 0.8% annual rate, and unemployment blipped up to 5%. Soft data for sure, but nowhere near the end of the world.

It is most likely that this recent weakness is a payback for previous strength. Real GDP surged at a 4.9% annual rate in the third quarter, while retail sales jumped 1.1% in November. A one-month drop in retail sales is not unusual. In each of the past five years, retail sales have reported at least three negative months. These declines are part of the normal volatility of the data, caused by wild swings in oil prices, seasonal adjustments, or weather. Over-reacting is a mistake.

A year ago, most economic data looked much worse than they do today. Industrial production fell 1.1% during the six months ending February 2007, while new orders for durable goods fell 3.9% at an annual rate during the six months ending in November 2006. Real GDP grew just 0.6% in the first quarter of 2007 and retail sales fell in January and again in April. But the economy came back and roared in the middle of the year — real GDP expanded 4.4% at an annual rate between April and September.

With housing so weak, the recent softness in production and durable goods orders is understandable. But housing is now a small share of GDP (4.5%). And it has fallen so much already that it is highly unlikely to drive the economy into recession all by itself. Exports are 12% of the economy, and are growing at a 13.6% rate. The boom in exports is overwhelming the loss from housing.

Personal income is up 6.1% during the year ending in November, while small-business income accelerated in October and November, during the height of the credit crisis. In fact, after subtracting income taxes, rent, mortgages, car leases and loans, debt service on credit cards and property taxes, incomes rose 3.9% faster than inflation in the year through September. Commercial paper issuance is rising again, as are mortgage applications.

Some large companies outside of finance and home building are reporting lower profits, but the over-reaction to very spotty negative news is astounding. For example, Intel’s earnings disappointed, creating a great deal of fear about technology. Lost in the pessimism is the fact that 20 out of 24 S&P 500 technology companies that have reported earnings so far have beaten Wall Street estimates.

Models based on recent monetary and tax policy suggest real GDP will grow at a 3% to 3.5% rate in 2008, while the probability of recession this year is 10%. This was true before recent rate cuts and stimulus packages. Now that the Fed has cut interest rates by 175 basis points, the odds of a huge surge in growth later in 2008 have grown. The biggest threat to the economy is still inflation, not recession.

Yet many believe that a recession has already begun because credit markets have seized up. This pessimistic view argues that losses from the subprime arena are the tip of the iceberg. An economic downturn, combined with a weakened financial system, will result in a perfect storm for the multi-trillion dollar derivatives market. It is feared that cascading problems with inter-connected counterparty risk, swaps and excessive leverage will cause the entire “house of cards,” otherwise known as the U.S. financial system, to collapse. At a minimum, they fear credit will contract, causing a major economic slowdown.

For many, this catastrophic outlook brings back memories of the Great Depression, when bank failures begot more bank failures, money was scarce, credit was impossible to obtain, and economic problems spread like wildfire.

This outlook is both perplexing and worrisome. Perplexing, because it is hard to see how a campfire of a problem can spread to burn down the entire forest. What Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke recently estimated as a $100 billion loss on subprime loans would represent only 0.1% of the $100 trillion in combined assets of all U.S. households and U.S. non-farm, non-financial corporations. Even if losses ballooned to $300 billion, it would represent less than 0.3% of total U.S. assets.

Beneath every dollar of counterparty risk, and every swap, derivative, or leveraged loan, is a real economic asset. The only way credit troubles could spread to take down the entire system is if the economy completely fell apart. And that only happens when government policy goes wildly off track.

In the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve allowed the money supply to collapse by 25%, which caused a dangerous deflation. In turn, this deflation caused massive bank failures. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Herbert Hoover’s tax hike passed in 1932, and then FDR’s alphabet soup of new agencies, regulations and anticapitalist government activity provided the coup de grace. No wonder thousands of banks failed and unemployment ballooned to 20%.

But in the U.S. today, the Federal Reserve is extremely accommodative. Not only is the federal funds rate well below the trend in nominal GDP growth, but real interest rates are low and getting lower. In addition, gold prices have almost quadrupled during the past six years, while the consumer price index rose more than 4% last year.

These monetary conditions are not conducive to a collapse of credit markets and financial institutions. Any financial institution that goes under does so because of its own mistakes, not because money was too tight. Trade protectionism has not become a reality, and while tax hikes have been proposed, Congress has been unable to push one through.

Which brings up an interesting thought: If the U.S. financial system is really as fragile as many people say, why should we go to such lengths to save it? If a $100 billion, or even $300 billion, loss in the subprime loan world can cause the entire system to collapse, maybe we should be working hard to build a better system that is stronger and more reliable.

Pumping massive amounts of liquidity into the economy and pumping up government spending by giving money away through rebates may create more problems than it helps to solve. Kicking the can down the road is not a positive policy.

The irony is almost too much to take. Yesterday everyone was worried about excessive consumer spending, a lack of saving, exploding debt levels, and federal budget deficits. Today, our government is doing just about everything in its power to help consumers borrow more at low rates, while it is running up the budget deficit to get people to spend more. This is the tyranny of the urgent in an election year and it’s the development that investors should really worry about. It reads just like the 1970s.

The good news is that the U.S. financial system is not as fragile as many pundits suggest. Nor is the economy showing anything other than normal signs of stress. Assuming a 1.5% annualized growth rate in the fourth quarter, real GDP will have grown by 2.8% in the year ending in December 2007 and 3.2% in the second half during the height of the so-called credit crunch. Initial unemployment claims, a very consistent canary in the coal mine for recessions, are nowhere near a level of concern.

Because all debt rests on a foundation of real economic activity, and the real economy is still resilient, the current red alert about a crashing house of cards looks like another false alarm. Warren Buffett, Wilbur Ross and Bank of America are buying, and there is
still $1.1 trillion in corporate cash on the books. The bench of potential buyers on the sidelines is deep and strong. Dow 15,000 looks much more likely than Dow 10,000. Keep the faith and stay invested. It’s a wonderful buying opportunity.

Mr. Wesbury is chief economist for First Trust Portfolios, L.P.