The news flow from last week was so voluminous it was nearly impossible to process. For good measure I want to start today’s commentary with a simple recap of what happened.

On the negative side -

· Greece called a referendum and threw bailout plans up in the air taking Greek 2yrs from 70% to 90% or +2000bps.
· Italian 10yr debt collapsed 40bps with spreads to Germany out 70bps. The moves were far larger in the 2yr sector.
· France 10y debt widened 25bps to Germany. At one point spreads were almost 40 wider.
· Italian PMI and Spanish employment data were miserable.
· German factory orders plunged 4.3 percent on the month.
· The planned EFSF bond for 3bio was pulled.
· Itraxx financials were +34 while subs were +45.
· Draghi predicted a recession for Europe along with disinflation.
· The G20 was flop – there was no agreement on IMF involvement in Europe.
· The US super committee deadline is 17 days away with no clear agreement.
· The 8th largest US bankruptcy in history took place.
· US 10yr and 30yr rallied 28bps, Spoos were -2.5%, the Dax was -6% and EURUSD was -3%.
· German CDS was up 16bps on the week.

On the positive side -

· The Fed showed its hand with tightening dissents now gone and an easing dissent in place.

Too bad what they call ‘easing’ at best has been shown to do nothing.

· The Fed’s significant downside risk language remained intact.

Downside risks sound like bad news to me.

· In the press conference Ben teed up QE3 in MBS space.

Which at best have been shown to do little or nothing for the macro economy.

· US payrolls, claims, vehicle sales and productivity came in better than expected.

And the real output gap if anything widened.

· S&P earnings are coming in at +18% y/y with implied corporate profits at +23 percent q/q a.r.

Reinforces the notion that it’s a good for stocks, bad for people economy.

· Mortgage speeds were much faster than expectations suggesting some easing refi pressures.

And savers holding those securities saw their incomes cut faster than expected.

· The ECB cut 25bps and indicated a dovish forward looking stance.

Which reduced euro interest income for the non govt sectors

· CME Margins were reduced.

Just means volatility was down some.

· There was a massive USDJPY intervention which may be a precursor to a Swiss style Japanese policy easing.

Which, for the US, means reduced costs of imports from Japan, which works against US exports, which should be a good thing for the US as it means for the size govt we have, taxes could be lowered to sustain demand, but becomes a bad thing as our leadership believes the US Federal deficit to be too large and so instead we get higher unemployment.

· The Swiss have indicated they want an even weaker CHF – possibly EURCHF 1.40.

When this makes a list of ‘positives’ you know the positives are pretty sorry

· The Aussies cut rates 25bps

Cutting net interest income for the economy.

I always wondered how that loan demand was accommodated.
Never looked like the kind of lending US regulators would sanction.

Karim writes:

The Fed was certain it knew what Japan had done wrong and wasn’t going to make THOSE mistakes.

So it

Cut rates much more aggressively.

Said it would do whatever it takes.

Figured out how to do its job as liquidity provider after only 6 months of alphabet soup programs.

Did heaps of Quantitative Easing.

Did the twist.

And now, realizing its done about all it can do, says monetary policy can’t do it all.

And still fails to recognize publicly the actual problem is the budget deficit is way too small.

And doesn’t directly inform Congress that

there is no such thing as a solvency problem,

the Fed controls government interest rates, and not the market,

there is no long term deficit problem with regards to finance,

the only thing we owe China is a bank statement,

Quantitative Easing and rate cuts remove interest income from the economy, which allows the deficit to be that much larger,

etc.

as we continue to go the way of Japan.

Karim writes:

Some improvement around the edges but the larger narrative is employment rising only at a rate fast enough to keep the unemployment rate stable (not higher or lower)

A no vote means a lot more immediate austerity than a yes vote.

A no vote means Greece can’t borrow at all, and therefore govt. checks will only clear if Greece immediately cuts back to where it is only spending tax revenue.

A yes vote means Greece can continue to spend quite a bit more than tax revenues, to the tune of the check from the benefactors.

And with no one in government at any level having any kind of a plan to leave the euro, and no idea how to manage a new currency in any case, that option continues to have no political support.

So the choices are:
Yes, we accept a relatively modest deficit cut as per the EU proposal.
No, we prefer to go cold turkey to a balanced budget and a seriously draconian cut.

Meanwhile, tick, tick, tick, the entire euro economy continues to slow, and continuously nudge up the entire region’s budget deficit, as they all work their way towards the same fate as Greece.

And, tick, tick, tick, the US deficit reduction process moves forward, with multi trillion dollar reductions already proposed by both parties.

Greek Vote Threatens Bailout

By Alkman Granitsas, Marcus Walker, and Costas Paris

November 1 (WSJ) — ATHENS—Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou stunned Europe by announcing a referendum on his country’s latest bailout—a high-stakes gamble that could undermine the international effort to preserve the euro.

A “yes” vote in the referendum could deflate the massive street protests and strikes that threaten to paralyze Greece as it tries to enact a brutal austerity program to earn rescue loans from the euro zone and the International Monetary Fund.

At the same time, the austerity continues to weaken the euro economies, with Q4 potentially going negative, driving deficits that much higher in the process.

The ‘answer’ remains the ECB writing the check, which they’ve sort of seemed to recognize, but they remain (errantly) concerned that reliance on the ECB is inherently inflationary, and thereby violates the ECB’s mandate for price stability. So it won’t happen until things again get bad enough to force it to happen.

The catastrophic risk remains a failure, when push comes to shove, to allow the ECB to write the check as they have been doing to allow it all to muddle through.

The range of outcomes couldn’t be wider. Write the check and not much happens, don’t write the check and there is unthinkable collapse.

Meanwhile, the 1% running the US looks to be trying to take the lead in the global austerity race to the bottom as the Democrats in the super committee on deficit reduction have led off by proposing a $4 trillion deficit reduction package.

Toss in West Texas crude prices heading to Brent levels of about $110/barrel as the strategic petroleum reserve release winds down over the next three weeks and the looks to me like the US consumer crawls back into his foxhole just in time for the holiday season.

Not to mention Japan now darning the torpedoes and buying dollars to take back a bit of the export market they lost by kowtowing to former tsy sec paulson’s demands to not be a ‘currency manipulator’ in the context of still weakening global demand in general.

The number one threat to world order remains a failure to sustain demand. The good news is sustaining aggregate demand is a simple matter once the monetary system is understood. The bad news is there seems to be no one of authority who doesn’t have it all backwards.

If so, WTI is marching towards $110/barrel which seems to me could trigger substantial market reactions.

And about the same time the super committee deficit reduction talks will be in full swing, euro financing stresses elevated, exacerbated by confirmation of the 0 gdp growth forecasts hit the headlines, and further slowdown news from China complicating things as well.

The ‘answer’ remains as simple as it is further away from political reality than ever, even though the right policy responses couldn’t be more attractive to both sides:

The US budget deficit is too small.

US Treasury May Issue Debt With Floating Interest Rate

By Jeff Cox

October 24 (CNBC) — Dealers and traders have been approached recently with plans to issue a floating-rate note that for investors would provide an opportunity to profit should rates go up and for the government a chance to restructure its debt even further.

The 8.5% federal budget deficit continues to provide fundamental nominal support for GDP and the domestic credit sectors are still too weak to subtract much if they do pull back.

And it still seems to me that the chances of a euro area event reducing aggregate demand in the US are reasonably low.

US Views : OK for Now, But Slowdown Ahead

By Jan Hatzius
October 9 (Goldman Sachs)

1. After the sharp slowdown earlier in the year, the US economy seems to have grown at roughly a trend pace over the summer. Our GDP “bean count” now stands at 2½% for the third quarter, the ISM indexes are broadly stable in the low 50s, payroll employment is growing at a pace of around 100k per month, and the unemployment rate has been flat for the past three months.

2. Although the recent US growth news has generally beaten low expectations, we expect a renewed deceleration to just a ½%-1% growth pace in the next two quarters and see the risk of renewed recession at about 40%. The main reason is the turmoil in the euro area, where we switched to a recession forecast last Monday. To be sure, there is more talk in Europe about the types of action that we think would help, including a larger financial safety net for sovereign issuers (perhaps achieved by “leveraging” the EFSF), proactive bank recapitalization, and monetary easing. But policy continues to move very slowly relative to the building risks in the financial system and the deterioration in the real economy. A true turnaround in the financial situation does not yet appear to be in sight, let alone a bottoming in the real economy.

3. There are several channels through which the European crisis is likely to weigh on US growth. The impact via reduced exports is the most obvious, but it is unlikely to be very large. Exports to the Euro area account for about 2% of US GDP, so an impact of much more than 0.1-0.2 percentage point would probably require a much deeper European recession than we are forecasting. The bigger issue is the significant tightening in financial conditions and the availability of credit. Since early summer, our financial conditions index has tightened by more than 50bp, a move that might shave ½ percentage point from growth over the next year. In addition, there are some early indications of tightening credit availability including an increase in the percentage of small firms reporting in the NFIB survey that “credit was harder to get” last time they tried to borrow (the next update is due on Tuesday). Tighter credit could easily shave another ½ point or more, for a total impact from Europe on US growth of 1-1½ percentage points. Should the European recession deepen, the risk of further dislocations in the financial system and greater spillovers into the US would grow (for more on this, see Andrew Tilton’s US weekly dated September 16 at US Economics Analyst: 11/37 – Will the European Storm Cross the Atlantic?).

4. One key question is whether the European crisis—and the unsettled fiscal policy environment more generally—has caused a sufficiently large increase in uncertainty to lead companies to postpone hiring and capex decisions in a self-reinforcing manner. There is some evidence that corporate behavior may be changing, as online job ads have dropped off and the percentage of firms increasing employment in the nonmanufacturing ISM survey has declined at the most rapid pace on record over the past two months (data go back to 1997). No such deterioration was visible in Friday’s payroll numbers, but online job ads lead by a month or two and most of the ISM responses probably came after the payroll survey week, so the jury is still out.

5. The other key drag on US growth is the tightening of fiscal policy. Our baseline assumption remains extension of the employee-side payroll tax cut and passage of a small business hiring incentive; we do not assume extension of emergency unemployment benefits (although this is a close call), a further expansion of the payroll tax cut as proposed by the President, additional infrastructure spending or aid to state governments, or another foreign repatriation tax break. We also expect the Congressional “supercommittee” to agree on spending cuts and revenue increases that cover part of the mandated $1.2 trillion in savings over 10 years; the remainder will likely come via automatic cuts that take place from 2013. Overall, we view the risks around our assumption of just under 1 percentage point of fiscal drag (excluding multiplier effects) in 2012 as roughly balanced at present.

6. Even in the baseline case of no recession, we expect additional monetary easing as the Federal Reserve supplements “Operation Twist” with yet more purchases of long-term securities financed by creation of excess bank reserves (that is, additional QE). We believe that this could still boost growth a bit by further reducing the term premium in the Treasury yield curve and thereby ease financial conditions. But policymakers are clearly running into diminishing returns. If they want a bigger impact, they will probably need to supplement additional QE with changes to the Fed’s monetary policy framework. A relatively incremental version of this is the proposal by Chicago Fed President Evans to promise no monetary tightening until the unemployment rate falls back to 7%-7½% and/or inflation rises to 3%. A more radical version would be a temporary increase in the Fed’s inflation target or a move to price level or nominal GDP level targeting as discussed by Jari Stehn a couple of weeks ago (see US Economics Analyst: 11/38 – The Fed’s “Unconventional” Unconventional Options).

7. While additional easing is likely eventually, we currently do not expect a big move at the November 1-2 FOMC meeting. This is based partly on the somewhat better data and partly on Fed Chairman Bernanke’s remark in his congressional testimony that Fed officials had “no immediate plans” to ease further. Of course, since Bernanke also said that he saw the economy as “close to faltering,” it probably would not take a huge amount of new information to change his mind, but for now our best guess is that the next statement will be less eventful than its two predecessors.

However, the US economic news still looks like modest improvement,
so I still suspect the reaction to the Fed will be temporary, and start wearing off around noon Eastern time today.

q3 still looking up from q2 which was up from q1.

And gasoline prices now moving lower help the consumer a bit more,
so q4 should be up more than q3.

With GDP sequentially better all year, makes sense to me that earnings in general will continue to grow.

Employment not doing much as there is still some underlying productivity growth
which also helps keep unit labor costs in check.

This means stocks still be in their ugly trading range, with the lower bound somewhere around current levels.

Though potential external shocks remain.

With the ECB again writing the check today by buying Italian and Spanish bonds
the current situation is in fact operationally sustainable, and I suspect what we are seeing
is the resolution. The ECB buys as needed in conjunction with imposing austerity,
and the euro zone muddles through with flat to modestly negative growth and deficits higher than they’d like.
Note too, that the ECB buys bonds are relatively high yields, and pays relative low rates of interest on the clearing balances it creates
to make the purchases. This results in a profit for the ECB that adds to their stated capital and their stated capacities.
So as long as they keep buying there’s no default and not only no losses, but rising ECB profits.
And there’s no inflationary consequences because none of this increases actual spending by the national govts.
All it does is allow them to fund their austerity budgets as dictated by the ECB.

China continues to decelerate and so far avoid reporting a hard landing,
and while the jury is still out on that score, trade and demand growth is slowing.
They know how to increase demand but are holding back due to concerns of inflation.

Commodities are finally selling off and heading towards their marginal costs of production,
just as the textbooks describe, as global tight fiscal keeps demand in check.

And with seemingly no one in any position of responsibility understanding how their monetary systems work,
and instead carrying on as if they were all operating under some sort of fixed exchange rate constraint,
the odds of an acceleration in aggregate demand any time soon remain remote.

Initial jobless claims dropped by 9,000 to 423,000 the week ended Sept. 17, as expected. Continuing claims fell by 28,000 to 3,727,000 in the week ended Sept. 10. The four-week moving average of new claims, a more reliable indicator of the labor market’s recent performance, rose by 500 to 421,000

 
FHFA House Price Index Up 0.8 Percent in July

 
The Conference Board Leading Economic Index® (LEI) for the U.S. increased 0.3 percent in August to 116.2 (2004 = 100), following a 0.6 percent increase in July and a 0.3 percent increase in June.