Assessing the Fed under Chairman Bernanke


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“Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”
Keynes, Chapter 12, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money

The Fed has failed, but failed conventionally, and is therefore being praised for what it has done.

The Fed has a stated goal of “maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long term interest rates” (Both the Federal Act 1913 and as amended in 1977).

It has not sustained full employment. And up until the recent collapse of aggregate demand, the Fed assumed it had the tools to sustain the demand necessary for full employment. In fact, longer term Federal Reserve economic forecasts have always assumed unemployment would be low and inflation low two years in the future, as those forecasts also assumed ‘appropriate monetary policy’ would be applied.

The Fed has applied all the conventional tools, including aggressive interest rate cuts, aggressive lending to its member banks, and extended aggressive lending to other financial markets. Only after these actions failed to show the desired recovery in aggregate demand did the Fed continue with ‘uncoventional’ but well known monetary policies. These included expanding the securities member banks could use for collateral, expanding its portfolio by purchasing securities in the marketplace, and lending unsecured to foreign central banks through its swap arrangements.

While these measures, and a few others, largely restored ‘market functioning’ early in 2009, unemployment has continued to increase, while inflation continues to press on the low end of the Fed’s tolerance range. Indeed, with rates at 0% and their portfolio seemingly too large for comfort, they consider the risks of deflation much more severe than the risks of an inflation that they have to date been unable to achieve.

The Fed has been applauded for staving off what might have been a depression by taking these aggressive conventional actions, and for their further aggressiveness in then going beyond that to do everything they could to reverse a dangerously widening output gap.

The alternative was to succeed unconventionally with the proposals I have been putting forth for well over a year. These include:

1. The Fed should have always been lending to its member banks in the fed funds market (unsecured interbank lending) in unlimited quantities at its target fed funds rate. This is unconventional in the US, but not in many other nations that have ‘collars’ where the Central Bank simply announces a rate at which it will borrow, and a slightly higher rate at which it will lend.

Instead of lending unsecured, the Fed demands collateral from its member banks. When the interbank markets ceased to function, the Fed only gradually began to expand the collateral it would accept from its banks. Eventually the list of collateral expanded sufficiently so that Fed lending was, functionally, roughly similar to where it would have been if it were lending unsecured, and market functioning returned.

What the Fed and the administration failed to appreciate was that demanding collateral from loans to member banks was redundant. The FDIC was already examining banks continuously to make sure all of their assets were deemed ‘legal’ and ‘appropriate’ and properly risk weighted and well capitalized. It is also obligated to take over any bank not in compliance. The FDIC must do this because it insures the bank deposits that potentially fund the entire banking system. Lending to member banks by the Fed in no way changes the asset structure of the banks, and so in no way increases the risk to government as a whole. If anything, unsecured lending by the Fed alleviates risk, as unsecured Fed lending eliminates the possibility of a liquidity crisis.

2. The Fed has assumed and continued to assume lower interest rates add to aggregate demand. There are, however, reasons to believe this is currently not the case.

First, in a 2004 Fed paper by Bernanke, Sacks, and Reinhart, the authors state that lower interest rates reduce income to the non government sectors through what they call the ‘fiscal channel.’ As the Fed cuts rates, the Treasury pays less interest, thereby reducing the income and savings of financial assets of the non government sectors. They add that a tax cut or Federal spending increase can offset this effect. Yet it was never spelled out to Congress that a fiscal adjustment was potentially in order to offset this loss of aggregate demand from interest rate cuts.

Second, while lowering the fed funds rate immediately cut interest rates for savers, it was also clear rates for borrowers were coming down far less, if at all. And, in many cases, borrowing rates rose due to credit issues. This resulted in expanded net interest margins for banks, which are now approaching an unheard of 5%. Funds taken away from savers due to lower interest rates reduces aggregate demand, borrowers aren’t gaining and may be losing as well, and the additional interest earned by lenders is going to restore lost capital and is not contributing to aggregate demand. So this shift of income from savers to banks (leveraged lenders) is reducing aggregate demand as it reduces personal income and shifts those funds to banks who don’t spend any of it.

3. The Fed is perpetuating the myth that its monetary policy will work with a lag to support aggregate demand, when it has no specific channels it can point to, or any empirical evidence that this is the case. This is particularly true of what’s called ‘quantitative easing.’ Recent surveys show market participants and politicians believe the Fed is engaged in ‘money printing,’ and they expect the size of the Fed’s portfolio and the resulting excess reserve positions of the banks to somehow, with an unknown lag, translate into a dramatic ‘monetary expansion’ and inflation. Therefore, during this severe recession where unemployment has continued to be far higher than desired, market participants and politicians are focused instead on what the Fed’s ‘exit strategy’ might be. The the fear of that presumed event has clearly taken precedence over the current economic and social disaster. A second ‘fiscal stimulus’ is not even a consideration, unless the economy gets substantially worse. Published papers from the NY Fed, however, clearly show how ‘quantitative easing’ should not be expected to have any effect on inflation. The reports state that in no case is the banking system reserve constrained when lending, so the quantity of reserves has no effect on lending or the economy.

4. The Fed is perpetuating the myth that the Federal Government has ‘run out of money,’ to use the words of President Obama. In May, testifying before Congress, when asked where the money the Fed gives the banks comes from, Chairman Bernanke gave the correct answer- the banks have accounts at the Fed much like the rest of us have bank accounts, and the Fed gives them money simply by changing numbers in their bank accounts. What the Chairman explained was there is no such thing as the government ‘running out of money.’ But the government’s personal banker, the Federal Reserve, as decided not publicly correct the misunderstanding that the government is running out of money, and thereby reduced the likelihood of a fiscal response to end the current recession.

There are also additional measures the Fed should immediately enact, such banning member banks from using LIBOR in any of their contracts. LIBOR is controlled by a foreign entity and it is counter productive to allow that to continue. In fact, it was the use of LIBOR that prompted the Fed to advance the unlimited dollar swap lines to the world’s foreign central banks- a highly risky and questionable maneuver- and there is no reason US banks can’t index their rates to the fed funds rate which is under Fed control.
There is also no reason I can determine, when the criteria is public purpose, to let banks transact in any secondary markets. As a point of logic, all legal bank assets can be held in portfolio to maturity in the normal course of business, and all funding, both short term and long term can be obtained through insured deposits, supplemented by loans from the Fed on an as needed basis. This would greatly simply the banking model, and go a long way to ease regulatory burdens. Excessive regulatory needs are a major reason for regulatory failures. Banking can be easily restructured in many ways for more compliance with less regulation.

There are more, but I believe the point has been made. I conclude by giving the Fed and Chairman Bernanke a grade of A for quickly and aggressively applying conventional actions such as interest rate cuts, numerous programs for accepting additional collateral, enacting swap lines to offset the negative effects of LIBOR dependent domestic interest rates, and creative support of secondary markets. I give them a C- for failure to educate the markets, politicians, and the media on monetary operations. And I give them an F for failure to recognize the currently unconventional actions they could have taken to avoid the liquidity crisis, and for failure inform Congress as to the necessity of sustaining aggregate demand through fiscal adjustments.


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China wanting to buy TIPS


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This is another blunder by the Obama administration due to not understanding the monetary system.

We don’t need China or any other investor to ‘buy the debt’ yet we think we do and think they are in a position to ‘demand’ anything.

Issuing/selling CPI indexed govt debt is functionally external debt. With we owe ‘real’ wealth rather than strictly nominal wealth, and are subject to nearly the same risks as if we were borrowing real goods and services and had to pay them back in kind.

The lack of understanding of the monetary system is getting more costly by the day.

U.S., in Nod to China, to Sell More TIPS

By Rob Copeland and Maya Jackson Randall

August 6 (WSJ) — The Treasury Department, responding to growing demand from China and other investors, will boost the sale of inflation-protected bonds that hold their value as consumer prices rise.

“We continue to hear growing demand for the product,” Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for Federal Financing Matt Rutherford said at a news conference announcing the plan on Wednesday.

The decision to increase sales of Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities, or TIPS, is part of a broader effort to ensure there is enough demand for Treasury bonds to help the U.S. finance its swelling budget deficit. The Treasury already has issued a record amount of debt in the past year, and the department said Wednesday it will sell a record $75 billion next week.

In particular, Treasury officials need to ensure demand from China, the largest holder of U.S. government debt. Last week’s auctions of fixed-rate notes saw lukewarm demand from China and other investors. Chinese officials had indicated they want inflation-protected securities, especially as the U.S. economy starts to recover.

“Inflation is the No. 1 worry,” said Marc Chandler, global head of currency strategy for Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. “This is the government saying, ‘We will take that inflation risk away from you.'”

Even with an increase, TIPS would remain a fraction of the overall market for Treasurys. Of the $6.66 trillion of government bonds issued between Oct. 1, 2008 and June 30 of this year, just $44 billion were TIPS.

The Treasury could easily sell as much as $10 billion more, said Jeffrey Elswick, director of fixed income at Frost Investment Advisors LLC. But those extra sales mightn’t be such great news for existing owners of inflation-protected notes. If the Treasury continues to ramp up TIPS sales, it will “cheapen” the bonds of existing investors, said Don Martin, a financial planner with Mayflower Capital in Los Altos, Calif.

The value of the securities fell after the announcement, sending the gap between TIPS and comparable nominal notes to a two-month high. The gap ended at 1.93 percentage points, signaling that investors expect annualized inflation of 1.93% over the next decade.

The Treasury also said it may issue 30-year TIPS in place of 20-year TIPS.


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TIPS 5 year 5 years fwd

This used to be one of the Fed’s major concerns as they are steeped in inflation expectations theory.

It could still signal a need to keep a modestly positive ‘real rate’ though the large ‘output gap’ is telling them otherwise.

History says they’ll put most of the weight on the output gap, though a negative real rate is problematic for most FOMC members.

Should core inflation measures go negative, they will be a lot more comfortable with the current zero rate policy.

Interesting that the employment cost was just reported up 1.8% which shows how little it went down even in the face of
a massive rise in unemployment.

The stupidity of this statement: “Huge supply coming…”


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Mike Norman Economics

The stupidity of this comment: “Bond market facing huge supply.”

Week after week after week, you hear these TV commentators or other “know-nothing” economists and analysts talk about the “huge supply” of new Treasuries that is coming and how that is going to cause interest rates to spike up.

One quick glance at the Treasury’s Daily Statement will show you that so far this fiscal year…the Treasury has sold
$7.4 Trillion

of securities and interest rates are
Zero!

We’re talking nine months, here, and nearly $8 trillion worth of sales and rates have done nothing but go down. And by the way…that’s on top of the
$5.6 trillion they sold last year!

And…you guessed it…rates
have come down!!

When will these ninnies wake up???

The money to buy Treasuries comes from government spending itself and the monetary operations of the Fed! The added reserve balances that come about as a result of government spending or the Fed buying securities (to reduce interest rates) are merely swapped for an interest bearing account of the U.S. Government known as a Treasury. And the government pays interest on those Treasuries the same way it pays for everything else…by crediting bank accounts.

Please pass this along!


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Homeowners Plan


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Glad they’re finally coming around!

Would have been nice to have offered this two years ago before a few million people had no choice but to leave and take down the neighborhood with them.

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   Hi Warren,
>   
>   Treasury plan to allow foreclosed homeowners to stay in their homes.
>   

Administration Weighs More Foreclosure Aid

By Renae Merle

July 17 (Washington Post) — A top Treasury Department official told a Senate panel yesterday that the government is considering a proposal to allow homeowners to stay in their home as renters after a foreclosure.

>   
>   I am a huge fan of the bottom up recovery plans.
>   I still wonder why this was not implemented at the
>   beginning. We could have given a few hundred billion
>   to Americans and had this crisis already over!
>   

Problem remains they still don’t understand the monetary system or the function of federal taxation.

Thanks!


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Nonsense from Wells Fargo


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Please send this on to Eugenio Aleman at Wells Fargo

Thinking The Unthinkable: The Treasury Black Swan, And The LIBOR-UST Inversion

Posted by Tyler Durden

>   The below piece is a good analysis of a hypothetical Treasury/Dollar black swan
>   event, courtesy of Eugenio Aleman from, surprisngly, Wells Fargo. Eugenio does
>   the classic Taleb thought experiment: what happens if the unthinkable become
>    not just thinkable, but reality. Agree or disagree, now that we have gotten to
>   a point where 6 sigma events are a daily ocurrence, it might be prudent to
>   consider all the alternatives.

In previous reports, I have touched upon the concerns I have regarding the overstretching of the federal government as well as of monetary policy while the Federal Reserve tries to maintain its independence and its ability, or willingness, to dry the U.S. economy of the current excess liquidity.

Excess reserves are functionally one day Treasury securities.
It’s a non issue.

Furthermore, we heard this week the Fed Chairman’s congressional testimony on the perils of excessive fiscal deficits and the effects these deficits are having on interest rates at a time when the Federal Reserve is intervening in the economy to try to keep interest rates low.

His thinking is still on the gold standard in too many ways.

Now, what I call “thinking the unthinkable” is what if, because of all these issues, individuals across the world start dumping U.S. dollar notes, i.e., U.S. dollar bills?

The dollar would go down for a while.
Prices of imports would go up.
Exports would go up for a while

All assuming the other nations would let their currencies appreciate and let their exporters lose their hard won US market shares, which is certainly possible, though far from a sure thing.

Why? Because one of the advantages the U.S. Federal Reserve has over almost all of the rest of the world’s central banks is that there seems to be an almost infinite demand for U.S. dollars in the world, which has made the Federal Reserve’s job a lot easier than that of other central banks, even those from developed countries.

In what way? They set rates, that’s all. It’s no harder or easier for the Fed than any other central bank.

if there is a massive run against the U.S. dollar across the world then the Federal Reserve will have to sell U.S. Treasuries to exchange for those U.S. dollars being returned to the country, which means that the U.S. Federal debt and interest payments on that debt will increase further.

Not true. First, they have a zero rate policy anyway so they can just sit as excess reserves should anyone deposit them in a bank account, and earn 0. Or they can hold the cash and earn 0.

This means that we will go from paying nothing on our “currency” loans to having to pay interest on those U.S. Treasuries that will be used to sterilize the massive influx of U.S. dollar bills into the U.S. economy, putting further pressure on interest rates.

No treasuries have to sold to sterilize anything.
A little knowledge about monetary operations would go a long way towards not letting this nonsense be published in respectable forums.

If we add the nervousness from Chinese officials regarding U.S. debt issues, then we understand the reason why we had Treasury secretary Timothy Geithner in China last week “calming” Chinese officials concerned with the massive U.S. fiscal deficits. I remember similar trips from the Bush administration’s Treasury officials pleading with Chinese officials for them to continue to buy GSEs (Freddie Mac and Freddie Mae) paper just before the financial markets imploded.

Yes, they have it wrong, and it’s making the administration negotiate from a perceived position of weakness while the Chinese and others take us for fools.

But the situation today is even more delicate because of the impressive amounts of U.S. Treasuries s we will have to issue during the next several years in order to pay for all the programs we have put together to minimize the fallout from this crisis.

Issuing Treasuries does not pay for anything. Spending pays for things, and spending is not operationally constrained by revenues.

The Treasuries issued support interest rates. They don’t ‘provide’ funds.

Furthermore, if China and other countries do not keep buying U.S. Treasuries, then interest rates are going to skyrocket.

There’s some hard scientific analysis. They go to the next highest bidder. The funds to pay for the securities come from government spending/Fed lending, so by definition the funds are always there and the term structure of rates is a matter of indifference levels predicated on future fed rate decisions.

This is one of the reasons why Bernanke was so adamant against fiscal deficits in his latest congressional appearance.

And because on a gold standard deficits can be deadly and cause default. He’s still largely in that paradigm that’s long gone.

Of course, the U.S. government knows that the Chinese are in a very difficult position: if they don’t buy U.S. Treasuries, then the Chinese currency is going to appreciate against the U.S. dollar and thus Chinese exports to the U.S., and consequently, Chinese economic growth will falter.

Yes, as I indicated above.

The U.S. and China are like Siamese twins joined at the chest and sharing one heart. This is something that will probably keep Chinese demand for Treasuries elevated during the next several years. However, this is not a guarantee, especially if the Chinese recovery is temporary and they have to keep on spending resources on more fiscal stimulus rather than on buying U.S. Treasuries.

Again, this shows no understanding of monetary operations and reserve accounting. The last two are not operationally or logically connected.

Thus, my perspective for the U.S. dollar is not very good. And now comes the caveat. Having said this, what is the next best thing? Hugo Chavez’s Venezuelan peso? Putin’s Russian rubble? The Iranian rial? The Chinese renminbi? Kirchner’s Argentine peso? Lula da Silva’s Brazilian real? That is, the U.S. dollar is still second to none!


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Tresury credit default swaps soar


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>   
>   On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 11:31 PM, Scott wrote:
>   
>   FYI. More insanity. Love it when the guy asks where the money comes
>   from. What are your thoughts on selling CDS on Tsy’s?
>   

I’d sell it!

I also suggested the Fed sell it.

They seemed to like the idea, but no action so far.

Treasury Credit Swaps Soar to Record on New $800 Billion Pledge

By Michael Shanahan and Abigail Moses

Nov. 26 (Bloomberg) — The cost of hedging against losses on U.S. Treasuries surged to an all-time high after the Federal Reserve’s new $800 billion effort to combat the financial crisis raised concern about how the ballooning debt will be funded.

Benchmark 10-year credit-default swaps on U.S. government bonds jumped six basis points to 56, according to CMA Datavision prices at 12:20 p.m. in London. The contracts have risen from below two basis points at the start of the credit crisis in July 2007.

“There is a lot more money to be spent and it is not clear how it is going to be financed,” said Tim Brunne, a Munich-based credit strategist at UniCredit SpA. “Credit spreads don’t reflect expectation of default, just the uncertainty over the enormous cost to the government.”

The Fed’s new plan to kick-start markets for loans to students, car buyers, credit-card borrowers and small businesses means it will be taking on credit risk by buying debt. The central bank pledged to purchase as much as $500 billion in mortgage-backed securities as well as up to $100 billion in direct debt of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the world’s two largest mortgage buyers, and Federal Home Loan Banks.

“They are loading their balance sheet with credit risk,” Brunne said in a phone interview. “Where does all the money come from?”

Five-Year Contracts

The cost of five-year contracts on Treasuries rose 3 basis points to 50.5, after earlier trading as high as 52, CMA prices show. That’s higher than the debt of Finland, Germany and Norway, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.


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In over their heads


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The Fed and Treasury decided ‘the problem’ was the LIBOR/Fed funds spread and threw everything they had at it.

What finally did the trick was the Fed’s unlimited swap lines with the MOF, BOJ, ECB, and SNB.

Unfortunately that turned a technical problem into a fundamental problem, as I’ve previously described.

Back tracking to why they wanted LIBOR rates lower- they wanted to assist the mortgage market and consumer debt in general.

There were other ways to do this, such as my plan for uncollateralized lending to their own member banks where government already regulates and supervises all bank assets and insures bank deposits.

That would have eliminated the interbank market for Fed member banks.

Euro banks would have still been paying up for USD borrowings and been distorting LIBOR.

The next step would be to get the BBA to adjust the USD LIBOR basket to not include banks who had to pay substantially higher for funds than the US member banks.

(This is supposed to happen automatically but the BBA is dragging its feet as it did with Japan years ago.)

And this would have immediately gotten LIBOR and Fed funds back in sync.

Also, they could have expanded treasury funding for the agencies to make mortgages to member banks in general for the same purpose and lowered mortgage rates that way.

Point- lots of other/better/more sensible ways that don’t increase systemic risk than the policy of unlimited (and functionally unsecured) USD lending lines for foreign commercial banks.

The ‘cure’ seems a lot worse than the new problems it creates.

Note the euro falling fast…


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