Bernanke speech


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Chairman Ben S. Bernanke- At the Stamp Lecture, London School of Economics, London, England

Jan 13, 2009

The Crisis and Policy Response

(Some text omitted)

Heightened systemic risks, falling asset values, and tightening credit have in turn taken a heavy toll on business and consumer confidence and precipitated a sharp slowing in global economic activity. The damage, in terms of lost output, lost jobs, and lost wealth, is already substantial.

Yes, they have reduced aggregate demand. The question is what the Fed can do, if anything, to restore demand?

The global economy will recover, but the timing and strength of the recovery are highly uncertain.

Yes, after the federal budget deficit gets large enough to restore aggregate demand.

The Federal Reserve’s Response to the Crisis

The Federal Reserve has responded aggressively to the crisis since its emergence in the summer of 2007. Following a cut in the discount rate (the rate at which the Federal Reserve lends to depository institutions) in August of that year, the Federal Open Market Committee began to ease monetary policy in September 2007, reducing the target for the federal funds rate by 50 basis points.1 As indications of economic weakness proliferated, the Committee continued to respond, bringing down its target for the federal funds rate by a cumulative 325 basis points by the spring of 2008.

Maybe some day the underlying assumption that lower rates adds to aggregate demand will fall by the wayside.

The ‘math’ shows lower rates takes more income from savers than it adds to borrowers, as government is a net payer of interest.

The different propensities to consume between borrower and savers would have to be far wider than ever measured by econometrics to result in lower rates adding to demand.

In other words, there’s a good chance lower rates have made things worse.

In historical comparison, this policy response stands out as exceptionally rapid and proactive. In taking these actions, we aimed both to cushion the direct effects of the financial turbulence on the economy and to reduce the virulence of the so-called adverse feedback loop, in which economic weakness and financial stress become mutually reinforcing.

Lower rates have failed to do this. Maybe their ‘interest rate theory’ is backwards, as all evidence and logic shows???

These policy actions helped to support employment and incomes during the first year of the crisis.

No, incomes suffered from lower interest income. Employment was sustained from what was a temporary boom in exports and government spending.

Unfortunately, the intensification of the financial turbulence last fall led to further deterioration in the economic outlook. The Committee responded by cutting the target for the federal funds rate an additional 100 basis points last October, with half of that reduction coming as part of an unprecedented coordinated interest rate cut by six major central banks on October 8. In December the Committee reduced its target further, setting a range of 0 to 25 basis points for the target federal funds rate.

And all their economies got worse.

The Committee’s aggressive monetary easing was not without risks.

The largest risk was that Congress would believe they might help and not implement large enough fiscal measures, which is exactly what happened.

During the early phase of rate reductions, some observers expressed concern that these policy actions would stoke inflation. These concerns intensified as inflation reached high levels in mid-2008, mostly reflecting a surge in the prices of oil and other commodities.

As costs of production, lower interest rate reduce costs of national output.

The Committee takes its responsibility to ensure price stability extremely seriously, and throughout this period it remained closely attuned to developments in inflation and inflation expectations. However, the Committee also maintained the view that the rapid rise in commodity prices in 2008 primarily reflected sharply increased demand for raw materials in emerging market economies,

And pension funds and trend followers- don’t they know about that?

in combination with constraints on the supply of these materials, rather than general inflationary pressures. Committee members expected that, at some point, global economic growth would moderate, resulting in slower increases in the demand for commodities and a leveling out in their prices–as reflected, for example, in the pattern of futures market prices. As you know, commodity prices peaked during the summer and, rather than leveling out, have actually fallen dramatically with the weakening in global economic activity. As a consequence, overall inflation has already declined significantly and appears likely to moderate further.

No talk of the Great Mike Masters Futures Led Inventory Liquidation triggered in July.

It had nothing to do with monetary policy or the economy.

The Fed’s monetary easing has been reflected in significant declines in a number of lending rates, especially shorter-term rates, thus offsetting to some degree the effects of the financial turmoil on financial conditions.

They do control interest rates, whether they know it or not, and whether they know what buttons to push or not.

However, that offset has been incomplete, as widening credit spreads, more restrictive lending standards, and credit market dysfunction have worked against the monetary easing and led to tighter financial conditions overall. In particular, many traditional funding sources for financial institutions and markets have dried up, and banks and other lenders have found their ability to securitize mortgages, auto loans, credit card receivables, student loans, and other forms of credit greatly curtailed. Thus, in addition to easing monetary policy, the Federal Reserve has worked to support the functioning of credit markets and to reduce financial strains by providing liquidity to the private sector. In doing so, as I will discuss shortly, the Fed has deployed a number of additional policy tools, some of which were previously in our toolkit and some of which have been created as the need arose.

Beyond the Federal Funds Rate: The Fed’s Policy Toolkit

Although the federal funds rate is now close to zero, the Federal Reserve retains a number of policy tools that can be deployed against the crisis.

One important tool is policy communication. Even if the overnight rate is close to zero, the Committee should be able to influence longer-term interest rates by informing the public’s expectations about the future course of monetary policy.

It can also directly set risk-free long term rates by intervening in the treasury markets and/or swap markets, targeting rates and letting quantity fall where it may.

To illustrate, in its statement after its December meeting, the Committee expressed the view that economic conditions are likely to warrant an unusually low federal funds rate for some time.2 To the extent that such statements cause the public to lengthen the horizon over which they expect short-term rates to be held at very low levels, they will exert downward pressure on longer-term rates,

Why not just have a bid for long term rates at their target rate of choice?

stimulating aggregate demand.

This assumes aggregate demand is a function of rates, and in the direction they think it is. I would argue they are most likely backwards in that respect.

It is important, however, that statements of this sort be expressed in conditional fashion–that is, that they link policy expectations to the evolving economic outlook. If the public were to perceive a statement about future policy to be unconditional, then long-term rates might fail to respond in the desired fashion should the economic outlook change materially.

Other than policies tied to current and expected future values of the overnight interest rate, the Federal Reserve has–and indeed, has been actively using–a range of policy tools to provide direct support to credit markets and thus to the broader economy. As I will elaborate, I find it useful to divide these tools into three groups. Although these sets of tools differ in important respects, they have one aspect in common: They all make use of the asset side of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. That is, each involves the Fed’s authorities to extend credit or purchase securities.

The first set of tools, which are closely tied to the central bank’s traditional role as the lender of last resort, involve the provision of short-term liquidity to sound financial institutions. Over the course of the crisis, the Fed has taken a number of extraordinary actions to ensure that financial institutions have adequate access to short-term credit.

They are actually reversing extraordinary actions taken in the past to obstruct bank access to short term credit.

In particular demanding collateral from member banks when the Fed lends to them. This is both redundant (FDIC already insures bank deposits and regulates assets, etc.) and obstructive.

These actions include creating new facilities for auctioning credit and making primary securities dealers, as well as banks, eligible to borrow at the Fed’s discount window.3 For example, since August 2007 we have lowered the spread between the discount rate and the federal funds rate target from 100 basis points to 25 basis points;

Why is it above the Fed funds rate and not the same rate? The idea of a ‘penalty rate’ is a result of a lack of understanding of monetary operations with a non-convertible currency.

increased the term of discount window loans from overnight to 90 days;

Yes, this hints at what I was saying before- they can set the entire term structure of rates at will.

created the Term Auction Facility, which auctions credit to depository institutions for terms up to three months;

But sets a quantity and lets an auction process determine the rate. This is backwards. They should always set a rate and let the quantity fall where it may.

put into place the Term Securities Lending Facility, which allows primary dealers to borrow Treasury securities from the Fed against less-liquid collateral;

This is better done by having the Fed lend against that collateral directly. Not sure why they do it this way.

and initiated the Primary Dealer Credit Facility as a source of liquidity for those firms, among other actions.

That should have been done via their designated agents, the banks, via qualified guarantees.

Because interbank markets are global in scope, the Federal Reserve has also approved bilateral currency swap agreements with 14 foreign central banks. The swap facilities have allowed these central banks to acquire dollars from the Federal Reserve to lend to banks in their jurisdictions, which has served to ease conditions in dollar funding markets globally. In most cases, the provision of this dollar liquidity abroad was conducted in tight coordination with the Federal Reserve’s own funding auctions.

Yes, this was an act of madness- functionally unsecured loans of over $600 billion to foreign CBs.

Congress has no idea what’s going on, and I suspect they would put quick halt to this if they had any understanding of it.

There are far less risky alternatives to bringing LIBOR down to the Fed’s targets for it..

Importantly, the provision of credit to financial institutions exposes the Federal Reserve to only minimal credit risk; the loans that we make to banks and primary dealers through our various facilities are generally overcollateralized and made with recourse to the borrowing firm.The Federal Reserve has never suffered any losses in the course of its normal lending to banks and, now, to primary dealers. In the case of currency swaps, the foreign central banks are responsible for repayment, not the financial institutions that ultimately receive the funds; moreover, as further security, the Federal Reserve receives an equivalent amount of foreign currency in exchange for the dollars it provides to foreign central banks.

This is no different than the Fed buying foreign ‘dollar bonds’ from the foreign governments, which have repeatedly gone bad in the past.

Is he really thinking foreign governments ‘automatically’ are good credit risks?

The line to Mexico is $30 billion, for example, and the ECB line is actually stated to be ‘unlimited’.

The currency the Fed ‘receives’ is nothing more than a deposit on the foreign central banks own books.

And the outstanding total is over $600 billion!

How does he miss all this???

Liquidity provision by the central bank reduces systemic risk by assuring market participants that, should short-term investors begin to lose confidence, financial institutions will be able to meet the resulting demands for cash without resorting to potentially destabilizing fire sales of assets.

True. It should have been set up years ago to make sure the liability side of banking is not the place of market discipline.

Moreover, backstopping the liquidity needs of financial institutions reduces funding stresses and, all else equal, should increase the willingness of those institutions to lend and make markets.

On the other hand, the provision of ample liquidity to banks and primary dealers is no panacea. Today, concerns about capital, asset quality, and credit risk continue to limit the willingness of many intermediaries to extend credit, even when liquidity is ample. Moreover, providing liquidity to financial institutions does not address directly instability or declining credit availability in critical nonbank markets, such as the commercial paper market or the market for asset-backed securities, both of which normally play major roles in the extension of credit in the United States.

Lending is pro-cyclical, get over it! Only government can be counter cyclical with fiscal policy.

To address these issues, the Federal Reserve has developed a second set of policy tools, which involve the provision of liquidity directly to borrowers and investors in key credit markets.

Actually addresses interest rates.

Notably, we have introduced facilities to purchase highly rated commercial paper

Are these the same guys that were critical of investors relying on ratings agencies???

at a term of three months and to provide backup liquidity for money market mutual funds. In addition, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have jointly announced a facility that will lend against AAA-rated asset-backed securities collateralized by student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration. The Federal Reserve’s credit risk exposure in the latter facility will be minimal, because the collateral will be subject to a “haircut” and the Treasury is providing $20 billion of capital as supplementary loss protection. We expect this facility to be operational next month.

Interesting how he explains how the Fed is safe at least partially because it shifted risk to the treasury.

Seems they are both on the same team in the same game???

The rationales and objectives of our various facilities differ, according to the nature of the problem being addressed. In some cases, as in our programs to backstop money market mutual funds, the purpose of the facility is to serve, once again in classic central bank fashion, as liquidity provider of last resort. Following a prominent fund’s “breaking of the buck”–that is, a decline in its net asset value below par–in September, investors began to withdraw funds in large amounts from money market mutual funds that invest in private instruments such as commercial paper and certificates of deposit. Fund managers responded by liquidating assets and investing at only the shortest of maturities. As the pace of withdrawals increased, both the stability of the money market mutual fund industry and the functioning of the commercial paper market were threatened.

It was part of the ongoing process of shifting funding back to the banking system as risk was being re-priced.

The Federal Reserve responded with several programs, including a facility to finance bank purchases of high-quality asset-backed commercial paper from money market mutual funds. This facility effectively channeled liquidity to the funds, helping them to meet redemption demands without having to sell assets indiscriminately.

This obstructed the process of moving funding back to its own banking system. The assets were moving to spreads wide enough to be held in bank portfolios. The Fed could have facilitated that process rather than obstructing it.

Together with a Treasury program that provided partial insurance to investors in money market mutual funds, these efforts helped stanch the cash outflows from those funds

Outflows to the Fed’s member banks.

and stabilize the industry.

Which can only compete with banks with help from the Fed.

The Federal Reserve’s facility to buy high-quality (A1-P1) commercial paper

Again with the ratings agencies!

at a term of three months was likewise designed to provide a liquidity backstop, in this case for investors and borrowers in the commercial paper market. As I mentioned, the functioning of that market deteriorated significantly in September, with borrowers finding financing difficult to obtain, and then only at high rates and very short (usually overnight) maturities.

The Fed could have facilitated the transition back to the banking system with provisions for banks to obtain Fed funding for the assets moving in their direction. Again, they got it wrong.

By serving as a backup source of liquidity for borrowers, the Fed’s commercial paper facility was aimed at reducing investor and borrower concerns about “rollover risk,” the risk that a borrower could not raise new funds to repay maturing commercial paper. The reduction of rollover risk, in turn, should increase the willingness of private investors to lend, particularly for terms longer than overnight. These various actions appear to have improved the functioning of the commercial paper market, as rates and risk spreads have come down and the average maturities of issuance have increased.

Would have been more constructively accomplished via the banking system.

In contrast, our forthcoming asset-backed securities program, a joint effort with the Treasury, is not purely for liquidity provision. This facility will provide three-year term loans to investors against AAA-rated securities backed by recently originated consumer and small-business loans.

Again, part of the Fed’s position of rate setter, and again, could have been better done via its member banks.

Unlike our other lending programs, this facility combines Federal Reserve liquidity with capital provided by the Treasury, which allows it to accept some credit risk.

You’re on the same team, guys!

By providing a combination of capital and liquidity, this facility will effectively substitute public for private balance sheet capacity, in a period of sharp deleveraging and risk aversion in which such capacity appears very short.

The banking system is already public balance sheet as banks have unlimited access to a variety of federally insured liabilities.

Why not use the banks for the purpose they are designed for? They already have the infrastructure necessary to manage this.

Instead, the Fed hires private managers!!!

If the program works as planned, it should lead to lower rates and greater availability of consumer and small business credit. Over time, by increasing market liquidity and stimulating market activity, this facility should also help to revive private lending. Importantly, if the facility for asset-backed securities proves successful, its basic framework can be expanded to accommodate higher volumes or additional classes of securities as circumstances warrant.

Nothing the banks can’t do given the same guarantees from the Fed.

The Federal Reserve’s third set of policy tools for supporting the functioning of credit markets involves the purchase of longer-term securities for the Fed’s portfolio. For example, we recently announced plans to purchase up to $100 billion in government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) debt and up to $500 billion in GSE mortgage-backed securities over the next few quarters. Notably, mortgage rates dropped significantly on the announcement of this program and have fallen further since it went into operation.

Hopefully no surprise! Again, the Fed is rate setter for the entire term structure as desired.

Lower mortgage rates should support the housing sector. The Committee is also evaluating the possibility of purchasing longer-term Treasury securities.

It would be functionally identical for the treasury simply not to issue them, as proposed by the BOE’s Goodhart today.

In determining whether to proceed with such purchases, the Committee will focus on their potential to improve conditions in private credit markets, such as mortgage markets.

These three sets of policy tools–lending to financial institutions, providing liquidity directly to key credit markets, and buying longer-term securities–have the common feature that each represents a use of the asset side of the Fed’s balance sheet, that is, they all involve lending or the purchase of securities. The virtue of these policies in the current context is that they allow the Federal Reserve to continue to push down interest rates and ease credit conditions in a range of markets, despite the fact that the federal funds rate is close to its zero lower bound.

Yes! It’s about price (interest rates) and not quantity.

Credit Easing versus Quantitative Easing

The Federal Reserve’s approach to supporting credit markets is conceptually distinct from quantitative easing (QE), the policy approach used by the Bank of Japan from 2001 to 2006. Our approach–which could be described as “credit easing”–resembles quantitative easing in one respect: It involves an expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet. However, in a pure QE regime, the focus of policy is the quantity of bank reserves, which are liabilities of the central bank; the composition of loans and securities on the asset side of the central bank’s balance sheet is incidental. Indeed, although the Bank of Japan’s policy approach during the QE period was quite multifaceted, the overall stance of its policy was gauged primarily in terms of its target for bank reserves. In contrast, the Federal Reserve’s credit easing approach focuses on the mix of loans and securities that it holds and on how this composition of assets affects credit conditions for households and businesses. This difference does not reflect any doctrinal disagreement with the Japanese approach, but rather the differences in financial and economic conditions between the two episodes. In particular, credit spreads are much wider and credit markets more dysfunctional in the United States today than was the case during the Japanese experiment with quantitative easing. To stimulate aggregate demand in the current environment, the Federal Reserve must focus its policies on reducing those spreads and improving the functioning of private credit markets more generally.

Another similarity is that neither did much for credit demand.

Note that the Fed’s ‘expanded balance sheet’ means that over $2 trillion of financial assets have been shifted to the Fed in exchange for a like amount of excess reserves and treasury securities being held by the private, non-government sectors.

If the average coupon on the securities the Fed removed (purchased) from the private sector was maybe 2% (more for some securities, less for others) that means this Fed action has removed over $40 billion per year of income from the private sector. This means about that much aggregate demand was removed which can only be ‘replaced’ by private credit expansion.

Seems this policy might not have been all that well thought out.

While I support the lower interest rates, I also recognize they probably do not add to demand and instead require a fiscal adjustment to sustain demand.

The stimulative effect of the Federal Reserve’s credit easing policies depends sensitively on the particular mix of lending programs and securities purchases that it undertakes. When markets are illiquid and private arbitrage is impaired by balance sheet constraints and other factors, as at present, one dollar of longer-term securities purchases is unlikely to have the same impact on financial markets and the economy as a dollar of lending to banks, which has in turn a different effect than a dollar of lending to support the commercial paper market.

Most likely none of them change demand enough to even offset the loss of interest income to the private sector as above.

Because various types of lending have heterogeneous effects, the stance of Fed policy in the current regime–in contrast to a QE regime–is not easily summarized by a single number, such as the quantity of excess reserves or the size of the monetary base. In addition, the usage of Federal Reserve credit is determined in large part by borrower needs and thus will tend to increase when market conditions worsen and decline when market conditions improve. Setting a target for the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, as in a QE regime, could thus have the perverse effect of forcing the Fed to tighten the terms and availability of its lending at times when market conditions were worsening, and vice versa.

Finally, the Fed setting ‘price’ rather than ‘quantity!’ too bad it hasn’t figured this out for the TAFF and other operations.

The lack of a simple summary measure or policy target poses an important communications challenge. To minimize market uncertainty and achieve the maximum effect of its policies, the Federal Reserve is committed to providing the public as much information as possible about the uses of its balance sheet, plans regarding future uses of its balance sheet, and the criteria on which the relevant decisions are based.

We’ve seen the max effect.

Exit Strategy

Some observers have expressed the concern that, by expanding its balance sheet, the Federal Reserve is effectively printing money,

Only by narrow definitions of ‘money’ as below. Net financial assets held outside of government are always unchanged by Fed operations.

an action that will ultimately be inflationary.

Another questionable theory. But the Fed is worried about inflation expectations, which is yet one more questionable theory.

The Fed’s lending activities have indeed resulted in a large increase in the excess reserves held by banks. Bank reserves, together with currency, make up the narrowest definition of money, the monetary base; as you would expect, this measure of money has risen significantly as the Fed’s balance sheet has expanded. However, banks are choosing to leave the great bulk of their excess reserves idle, in most cases on deposit with the Fed.

There is no other option for the banking system as a whole.

Consequently, the rates of growth of broader monetary aggregates, such as M1 and M2, have been much lower than that of the monetary base. At this point, with global economic activity weak and commodity prices at low levels, we see little risk of inflation in the near term; indeed, we expect inflation to continue to moderate.

Right, as long as commodities keep going down.

However, at some point, when credit markets and the economy have begun to recover, the Federal Reserve will have to unwind its various lending programs. To some extent, this unwinding will happen automatically, as improvements in credit markets should reduce the need to use Fed facilities. Indeed, where possible we have tried to set lending rates and margins at levels that are likely to be increasingly unattractive to borrowers as financial conditions normalize. In addition, some programs–those authorized under the Federal Reserve’s so-called 13(3) authority, which requires a finding that conditions in financial markets are “unusual and exigent”–will by law have to be eliminated once credit market conditions substantially normalize. However, as the unwinding of the Fed’s various programs effectively constitutes a tightening of policy, the principal factor determining the timing and pace of that process will be the Committee’s assessment of the condition of credit markets and the prospects for the economy.

As lending programs are scaled back, the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet will decline, implying a reduction in excess reserves and the monetary base. A significant shrinking of the balance sheet can be accomplished relatively quickly, as a substantial portion of the assets that the Federal Reserve holds–including loans to financial institutions, currency swaps, and purchases of commercial paper–are short-term in nature and can simply be allowed to run off as the various programs and facilities are scaled back or shut down.

It will be interesting to see how the currency swaps run off. In the past governments with that much in dollar loans have not paid them off.

As the size of the balance sheet and the quantity of excess reserves in the system decline, the Federal Reserve will be able to return to its traditional means of making monetary policy–namely, by setting a target for the federal funds rate.

Why would it not continue to set the term structure of rates??? (Though again, personally I’d leave a zero rate policy in place at all times)

Although a large portion of Federal Reserve assets are short-term in nature, we do hold or expect to hold significant quantities of longer-term assets, such as the mortgage-backed securities that we will buy over the next two quarters. Although longer-term securities can also be sold, of course, we would not anticipate disposing of more than a small portion of these assets in the near term, which will slow the rate at which our balance sheet can shrink. We are monitoring the maturity composition of our balance sheet closely and do not expect a significant problem in reducing our balance sheet to the extent necessary at the appropriate time.

Importantly, the management of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and the conduct of monetary policy in the future will be made easier by the recent congressional action to give the Fed the authority to pay interest on bank reserves. In principle, the interest rate the Fed pays on bank reserves should set a floor on the overnight interest rate, as banks should be unwilling to lend reserves at a rate lower than they can receive from the Fed. In practice, the federal funds rate has fallen somewhat below the interest rate on reserves in recent months, reflecting the very high volume of excess reserves, the inexperience of banks with the new regime, and other factors.

Yes, like a few institutions that still do not earn interest on reserves.

However, as excess reserves decline, financial conditions normalize, and banks adapt to the new regime, we expect the interest rate paid on reserves to become an effective instrument for controlling the federal funds rate.

Moreover, other tools are available or can be developed to improve control of the federal funds rate during the exit stage. For example, the Treasury could resume its recent practice of issuing supplementary financing bills and placing the funds with the Federal Reserve; the issuance of these bills effectively drains reserves from the banking system, improving monetary control. Longer-term assets can be financed through repurchase agreements and other methods, which also drain reserves from the system. In considering whether to create or expand its programs, the Federal Reserve will carefully weigh the implications for the exit strategy. And we will take all necessary actions to ensure that the unwinding of our programs is accomplished smoothly and in a timely way, consistent with meeting our obligation to foster full employment and price stability.

How about asking Congress for permission to trade Fed funds directly with member banks? Again, requiring collateral is redundant with FDIC insurance and regulation already in place. That way the Fed could simply bid and offer Fed funds at its target rate and the Fed funds rate would be perfectly stable, with little or no interbank trading required.

Stabilizing the Financial System

The Federal Reserve will do its part to promote economic recovery, but other policy measures will be needed as well. The incoming Administration and the Congress are currently discussing a substantial fiscal package that, if enacted, could provide a significant boost to economic activity. In my view, however, fiscal actions are unlikely to promote a lasting recovery unless they are accompanied by strong measures to further stabilize and strengthen the financial system. History demonstrates conclusively that a modern economy cannot grow if its financial system is not operating effectively.

I don’t agree. Ongoing attention to fiscal balance that sustains output and employment will do just that, with or without the financial sector ‘operating efficiently,’ whatever that means.

In the United States, a number of important steps have already been taken to promote financial stability, including the Treasury’s injection of about $250 billion of capital into banking organizations,

Doesn’t hurt but doesn’t address the real problem- banks need borrowers with sufficient income and income prospects to make their payments.

a substantial expansion of guarantees for bank liabilities by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,

Another half measure. They need to remove the cap on the size of FDIC insured deposits at the same time they remove the collateral requirement at the discount window, and drop the discount rate to their target rate.

and the Fed’s various liquidity programs. Those measures, together with analogous actions in many other countries, likely prevented a global financial meltdown in the fall that, had it occurred, would have left the global economy in far worse condition than it is in today.

It didn’t need to happen at all.

However, with the worsening of the economy’s growth prospects, continued credit losses and asset markdowns may maintain for a time the pressure on the capital and balance sheet capacities of financial institutions. Consequently, more capital injections and guarantees may become necessary to ensure stability and the normalization of credit markets. A continuing barrier to private investment in financial institutions is the large quantity of troubled, hard-to-value assets that remain on institutions’ balance sheets. The presence of these assets significantly increases uncertainty about the underlying value of these institutions and may inhibit both new private investment and new lending. Should the Treasury decide to supplement injections of capital by removing troubled assets from institutions’ balance sheets, as was initially proposed for the U.S. financial rescue plan, several approaches might be considered. Public purchases of troubled assets are one possibility.

And highly problematic. They only ‘help’ if prices are above ‘market value,’ which means a direct subsidy.

Another is to provide asset guarantees, under which the government would agree to absorb, presumably in exchange for warrants or some other form of compensation, part of the prospective losses on specified portfolios of troubled assets held by banks.

Government already stands to ‘absorb’ all the losses in excess of bank capital via deposit insurance.

Yet another approach would be to set up and capitalize so-called bad banks, which would purchase assets from financial institutions in exchange for cash and equity in the bad bank.

Same issue as public purchases, above.

These methods are similar from an economic perspective, though they would have somewhat different operational and accounting implications. In addition, efforts to reduce preventable foreclosures, among other benefits, could strengthen the housing market and reduce mortgage losses, thereby increasing financial stability.

Banks need for borrowers to have sufficient income to make their mortgage payments.

Nothing the Fed does address this.

Only a fiscal adjustment can add net financial assets and income to the non-government sectors.

The public in many countries is understandably concerned by the commitment of substantial government resources to aid the financial industry when other industries receive little or no assistance. This disparate treatment, unappealing as it is, appears unavoidable. Our economic system is critically dependent on the free flow of credit, and the consequences for the broader economy of financial instability are thus powerful and quickly felt. Indeed, the destructive effects of financial instability on jobs and growth are already evident worldwide. Responsible policymakers must therefore do what they can to communicate to their constituencies why financial stabilization is essential for economic recovery and is therefore in the broader public interest.

If government understood the role of fiscal policy in sustain aggregate demand and thereby output and employment, with or without the financial sector, this would be mostly moot.

Even as we strive to stabilize financial markets and institutions worldwide, however, we also owe the public near-term, concrete actions to limit the probability and severity of future crises. We need stronger supervisory and regulatory systems under which gaps and unnecessary duplication in coverage are eliminated, lines of supervisory authority and responsibility are clarified, and oversight powers are adequate to curb excessive leverage and risk-taking.

Helpful, but more helpful is to understand the role of fiscal policy.

In light of the multinational character of the largest financial firms and the globalization of financial markets more generally, regulatory oversight should be coordinated internationally to the greatest extent possible. We must continue our ongoing work to strengthen the financial infrastructure–for example, by encouraging the migration of trading in credit default swaps and other derivatives to central counterparties and exchanges.

Right, that will bring back home buyers in droves…

The supervisory authorities should develop the capacity for increased surveillance of the financial system as a whole, rather than focusing excessively on the condition of individual firms in isolation; and we should revisit capital regulations, accounting rules, and other aspects of the regulatory regime to ensure that they do not induce excessive procyclicality in the financial system and the economy. As we proceed with regulatory reform, however, we must take care not to take actions that forfeit the economic benefits of financial innovation and market discipline.

What benefits? In 1972 housing starts were 2.6 million with a population of 215 million, and all we had were a bunch of sleep savings and loan associations taking in deposits and making mortgages, with modestly paid bank officers playing golf at 3:30 every day (I was one of them in 1973-75). A couple of years ago we peaked at 2 million housing starts with over 300 million people and called it ‘gangbusters’ and an unsustainable ‘bubble.’ And let’s just leave it at ‘a much larger and more highly paid’ financial sector dominating housing.

That’s progress?

Particularly pressing is the need to address the problem of financial institutions that are deemed “too big to fail.” It is unacceptable that large firms that the government is now compelled to support to preserve financial stability were among the greatest risk-takers during the boom period. The existence of too-big-to-fail firms also violates the presumption of a level playing field among financial institutions.

Not true. The ‘institution’ might be too big to fail, but not the shareholders, which is what matters regarding risk taking.

In the future, financial firms of any type whose failure would pose a systemic risk must accept especially close regulatory scrutiny of their risk-taking. Also urgently needed in the United States is a new set of procedures for resolving failing nonbank institutions deemed systemically critical,

True!

analogous to the rules and powers that currently exist for resolving banks under the so-called systemic risk exception.

Conclusion

The world today faces both short-term and long-term challenges. In the near term, the highest priority is to promote a global economic recovery. The Federal Reserve retains powerful policy tools and will use them aggressively to help achieve this objective. Fiscal policy can stimulate economic activity, but a sustained recovery will also require a comprehensive plan to stabilize the financial system and restore normal flows of credit.

Despite the understandable focus on the near term, we do not have the luxury of postponing work on longer-term issues. High on the list, in light of recent events, are strengthening regulatory oversight and improving the capacity of both the private sector and regulators to detect and manage risk.

Finally, a clear lesson of the recent period is that the world is too interconnected for nations to go it alone in their economic, financial, and regulatory policies. International cooperation is thus essential if we are to address the crisis successfully and provide the basis for a healthy, sustained recovery.

No, any nation can independently sustain domestic demand, output, and employment with appropriate fiscal policy.


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Bernanke on the swap lines


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Last week’s swap line number reported by the Fed was down to $521 billion from $608 billion. While still a very large number, it is coming down, and hopefully will continue to do so.

However, the continued fall in commodities prices, particularly crude oil, means dollars are ‘harder to get’ for the foreign sector, as they must export more product to the US for the same amount of dollars. And with the US consumer weakening, obtaining $US via exporting to the US will be that much more problematic.

Here is what Chairman Bernanke said yesterday about the swap lines.

Federal Reserve Policies in the Financial Crisis

In our globalized financial markets, the provision of dollar liquidity has international as well as domestic aspects. To improve dollar funding conditions in important foreign markets, the Federal Reserve has approved bilateral currency swap agreements with 14 foreign central banks. Swap facilities allow each of the central banks involved to borrow foreign currency from the other; in this case, foreign central banks such as the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, the Bank of
England, and the Swiss National Bank

And the Bank of Mexico, and other lesser CB’s.

have borrowed dollars from the Federal Reserve to re-lend to banks in their jurisdictions.

Yes, it’s a case of $US loans to foreign governments.

This is functionally no different than the Fed buying, for example, Mexican $ bonds.

Because short-term funding markets are interconnected, the provision of dollar
liquidity in major foreign markets eases conditions in dollar funding markets globally, including here in the United States.

Yes, that is true.

Lending to those less credit worthy does decrease their demand to borrow USD.

And that’s exactly the reason the Fed is lending virtually unsecured to lesser credits- to get interest rates down?

On a risk/reward basis this makes no sense to me.

There are far less costly ways to get USD LIBOR down.

Importantly, these swap arrangements pose essentially no credit risk because our counterparties are the foreign central banks themselves, which take responsibility for the extension of dollar credit within their jurisdictions.

So lending to the Bank of Mexico poses no credit risk?

And the ECB is shell company not guaranteed by the national governments.

And they’ve been criticizing the banking industry for poor underwriting criteria- this is far, far worse.

And would Congress approve the purchase of foreign USD bonds solely as a means to lower USD LIBOR? Is Congress aware that the Fed is authorized to do this?

Hopefully we get lucky and all the central banks politely pay us back.


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Re: Kohn to ROW- You hike, not us (today’s speech)


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(an interoffice email)

On Thu, Jun 26, 2008 at 7:48 AM, Karim wrote:
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Global Economic Integration and Decoupling


Vice Chairman Donald L. Kohn
At the International Research Forum on Monetary Policy, Frankfurt, Germany
June 26, 2008

For the moment, higher headline rates of inflation have shown only a few tentative signs of embedding themselves in core inflation or in longer-term inflation expectations.

>   -talking about u.s. here
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However, policymakers around the world must monitor the situation carefully for signs that the increases in relative prices globally do not generate persistently higher inflation. Additionally, in those countries where strong commodity demands are associated with rapid growth in aggregate demand that outstrips potential supply, actions to contain inflation by restraining aggregate demand would contribute to global price stability.

>   -not describing/talking about u.s. here;
>   focusing on EM primarily.
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right, gets back to bernankes testimony a while back that the falling dollar has been a good thing as it works to lower the trade gap via increasing US exports that sustain US demand. the old ‘beggar they neighbor’ policy from the 30’s.

unfortunately for us it’s actually a ‘beggar thyself’ policy on closer examination as most mainstream economists will attest. they all say you don’t ‘inflate your way to prosperity’ by weakening your currency. otherwise latin america and africa for example would be the most prosperous places in the world

seems they are still in the mercantalist mode where exports are good and imports bad, and this policy is making us look like a bananna republic at an increasing rate.

recall from previous emails the dollar decline has been triggered by paulson succeeding in keeping cb’s from buying $US, Bush keeping oil producing monetary authorities from accumulating $US, and Bernanke discouraging foreign portfolio managers from accumulating same.

(more later on how it’s actually not happening due to fed rate policy, but they think it is)

as suspected, the $US is most likely to take another major leg down as it adjusts to a level where the trade gap is in line with foreign desire to accumulate $US financial assets which is probably a lot lower than the current 55-60 billion per month.

the ‘cost push inflation’ is pouring in through the trade channel, and the fed is increasingly taking the heat from the mainstream (not me- i’m the only one who thinks inflation isn’t a function of rates the way they do) for its apparent weak $US/inflate your way out of debt approach.

furthermore, the mainstream (and the stock market) sees the low interest rate/weak dollar policy as taking away US domestic demand as higher price for food/fuel leave less domestic income for everything else, including debt service.

that is, they see the falling dollar hurting us domestic demand more than the low interest rates are helping it.

the reality is there’s foreign monopolist- the saudis (and maybe russians)- that’s milking us for all they can with price hikes, and keeping us alive buying our goods and service and thereby keeping US gdp muddling through.

the real standard of living for most working americans has dropped by perhaps 10% as they work, get paid enough to eat and drive to work, and the rest of their real output is exported.

and our policy makers, including bernanke and paulson who’ve ‘engineered it’ think this is all a good thing- they think imports are bad and exports good and we are paying the price in declining real terms of trade.

while in my book interest rates are not a factor, the mainstream thinks they are, and the response when the inflation gets bad enough will be higher interest rates. The ‘correct’ anti-inflation rate last August was 5.25 when the fed didn’t cut.

by Jan 08 it was probably at least 7% with headline moving through 3% to get a sufficient ‘real rate.’

today it’s probably moved up to 8%+ as cpi is forecast to go through 5% over the next few months and gdp muddles through around 1%.

the mainstream (not me) will say that by having a real rate that’s too low now the fed will need a rate that much higher down the road as inflation accelerates due to over accommodative fed policy.

by the time the cost push inflation works its way to core- probably over the two quarters- the fed will ‘suddenly’ feel itself way behind the inflation curve and recognize they made a horrible mistake and now the cost of bringing down inflation is far higher than it would have been early on- just like they’ve always said.

the mainstream knows this, and now sees a fed with its head in the sand regarding inflation. they also see this weak dollar policy as subversive as it undermines the currency and inflation accelerates.

i expect there will be a groundswell of mainstream economists calling for the replacement of bernanke, kohn and the entire fomc very soon.

ironically, in my book low rates have helped moderate inflation via cost channels and have helped moderate domestic demand via interest income channels.

rate hike will add to domestic demand as net interest income of the private sectors from higher government interest payments add to personal income and demand.

and rate hikes will add to the cost push inflation via higher interest costs for firms.

it’ all going down hill fast, with policy makers both going the wrong way on key issues as they have the fundamentals backwards.

the only near term ‘solutions’ are near term crude oil supply responses like 30 mph speed limits which isn’t even under consideration in any form, nor are any other crude supply responses. most other alternative energy sources don’t replace crude.

medium term supply responses include pluggable hybrids that only start being produced in late 2010.

longer term supply responses include nuclear which might come on line 15 years down the road.

a collapse in world demand is possible if china/india let up on their deficit spending and growth, but so far that doesn’t seem in the cards. all their ‘tightebning’ seems to be on the ‘monetary’ side which does nothing of consequence apart from further increase inflation.

so with no supply responses on the horizon expect the saudis to keep hiking prices, and keep spending the new revenues to keep world gdp muddling through, cb’s hiking interest rates that will bring results that will cause them to hike further, and continuously declining real terms of trade for oil importers.

what to do?

cds on germany- it’s one go all go over there, and germany is the least expensive insurance.

forward muni bmas over 80 with no interest rate hedge as markets should discount the obama lead and long move up with inflation.


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Another look at Kohn’s June 11th speech


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This still reads hawkish to me:

The results of such exercises imply that, over recent history, a sharp jump in oil prices appears to have had only modest effects on the future rate of inflation. This result likely reflects two factors. First, commodities like oil represent only a small share of the overall costs of production, implying that the magnitude of the direct pass-through from changes in such prices to other prices should be modest, all else equal. Second, inflation expectations have been well anchored in recent years, contributing to a muted response of inflation to oil price shocks. But the anchoring of expectations cannot be taken as given; indeed, the type of empirical exercises I have outlined reveal a larger effect of the price of oil on inflation prior to the last two decades, a period in which inflation expectations were not as well anchored as they are today.

Nonetheless, repeated increases in energy prices and their effect on overall inflation have contributed to a rise in the year-ahead inflation expectations of households, especially this year. Of greater concern is that some measures of longer-term inflation expectations appear to have edged up since last year. Any tendency for these longer-term inflation expectations to drift higher or even to fail to reverse over time would have troublesome implications for the outlook for inflation.

The central role of inflation expectations implies that policymakers must look beyond this type of reduced-form exercise for guidance. After all, the lags of inflation in reduced-form regressions are a very imperfect proxy for inflation expectations. As emphasized in Robert Lucas’s critique of reduced-form Phillips curves more than 30 years ago, structural models are needed to have confidence in the effect of any shock on the outlook for inflation and economic activity.

This was considered the dovish part:

In particular, an appropriate monetary policy following a jump in the price of oil will allow, on a temporary basis, both some increase in unemployment and some increase in price inflation. By pursuing actions that balance the deleterious effects of oil prices on both employment and inflation over the near term, policymakers are, in essence, attempting to find their preferred point on the activity/inflation variance-tradeoff curve introduced by John Taylor 30 years ago.

So the question is whether that point was realized by a 2% Fed funds rate currently?

Such policy actions promote the efficient adjustment of relative prices: Since real wages need to fall and both prices and wages adjust slowly, the efficient adjustment of relative prices will tend to include a bit of additional price inflation and a bit of additional unemployment for a time, leading to increases in real wages that are temporarily below the trend established by productivity gains.

But it was then qualified by this return to hawkishness regarding the inflation expectations that he previously said showed signs of elevating:

I should emphasize that the course of policy I have just described has taken inflation expectations as given. In practice, it is very important to ensure that policy actions anchor inflation expectations. This anchoring is critical: As demonstrated by historical experiences around the world and in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s, efforts to bring inflation and inflation expectations back to desirable levels after they have risen appreciably involve costly and undesirable changes in resource utilization.11 As a result, the degree to which any deviations of inflation from long-run objectives are tolerated to allow the efficient relative price adjustments that I have described needs to be tempered so as to ensure that longer-term inflation expectations are not affected to a significant extent.

And the FOMC all agree that long term inflation expectations have been affected to some extent already.

Summary
To reiterate, the Phillips curve framework is one important input to my outlook for inflation and provides a framework in which I can analyze the nature of efficient policy choices. In the case of a shock to the relative price of oil or other commodities, this framework suggests that policymakers should ensure that their actions balance the deleterious economic effects of such a shock in the short run on both unemployment and inflation.

Of course, the framework helps to define the short-run goals for policy, but it doesn’t tell you what path for interest rates will accomplish these objectives. That’s what we wrestle with at the FOMC and is perhaps a subject for a future Federal Reserve Bank of Boston conference.

This all could mean a Fed funds rate that causes unemployment to grow and dampen inflation expectations down, but not grow so much as to bring inflation down quickly is in order.

The question then is whether the appropriate Fed funds rate for this ‘balance’ between growth, employment, and inflation expectations is 2% or something higher than that.

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Comments on Bernanke speech

Although economic growth slowed in the fourth quarter of last year from the third quarter’s rapid clip, it seems nonetheless, as best we can tell, to have continued at a moderate pace.

Q4 GDP seen as ‘moderate’ – that is substantially better than initial expectations of several weeks ago.

Recently, however, incoming information has suggested that the baseline outlook for real activity in 2008 has worsened and the downside risks to growth have become more pronounced.

They initially said this for Q3 and for Q4.

Notably, the demand for housing seems to have weakened further, in part reflecting the ongoing problems in mortgage markets.

Maybe, but even if so, housing is now a much smaller influence on GDP.

In addition, a number of factors, including higher oil prices,

Yes, this slows consumer spending on other items, but oil producers have that extra income to spend, and if they continue to do so, GDP will hold up and exports will remain strong.

lower equity prices, and softening home values, seem likely to weigh on consumer spending as we move into 2008.

The fed has little if any evidence those last two things alter consumer spending.

Financial conditions continue to pose a downside risk to the outlook for growth.

Market participants still express considerable uncertainty about the appropriate valuation of complex financial assets and about the extent of additional losses that may be disclosed in the future. On the whole, despite improvements in some areas, the financial situation remains fragile, and many funding markets remain impaired. Adverse economic or financial news has the potential to increase financial strains and to lead to further constraints on the supply of credit to households and businesses.

Yes, his main concern is on the supply side of credit. With a floating fx/non convertible currency, there is a very low probability. Even Japan with all its financial sector problems was never credit constrained.

Debilitating credit supply constraints are byproducts of convertible currency/fixed fx regimes gone bad, like in the US in the 1930s, Mexico in 1994, Russia in 1998, and Argentina in 2001.

I expect that financial-market participants–and, of course, the Committee–will be paying particular attention to developments in the housing market, in part because of the potential for spillovers from housing to other sectors of the economy.

A second consequential risk to the growth outlook concerns the performance of the labor market. Last week’s report on labor-market conditions in December was disappointing, as it showed an increase of 0.3 percentage point in the unemployment rate and a decline in private payroll employment. Heretofore, the labor market has been a source of stability in the macroeconomic situation, with relatively steady gains in wage and salary income providing households the wherewithal to support moderate growth in real consumption spending. It would be a mistake to read too much into any one report.

Right, best to wait for the revisions. November was revised to a decent up number, and October was OK as well. And today’s claims numbers indicate not much changed in December.

However, should the labor market deteriorate, the risks to consumer spending would rise.

Yes, if..

Even as the outlook for real activity has weakened,

Yes, the outlook has always been weakening over the last six months, while the actual numbers subsequently come in better than expected. Seems outlooks are not proving reliable.

there have been some important developments on the inflation front. Most notably, the same increase in oil prices that may be a negative influence on growth is also lifting overall consumer prices and probably putting some upward pressure on core inflation measures as well.

Interesting that he mentions upward pressure on core – must be in their forecast. It took them a long time to get core to moderate, and even in August they did not cut as upward risks remained.

Last year, food prices also increased exceptionally rapidly by recent standards, further boosting overall consumer price inflation. Thus far, inflation expectations appear to have remained reasonably well anchored,

They have very little information on this. They only know when they become unglued, and then it is too late.

and pressures on resource utilization have diminished a bit. However, any tendency of inflation expectations to become unmoored or for the Fed’s inflation-fighting credibility to be eroded could greatly complicate the task of sustaining price stability and reduce the central bank’s policy flexibility to counter shortfalls in growth in the future.

Meaning once they go, it is too late.

Accordingly, in the months ahead we will be closely monitoring the inflation situation, particularly as regards inflation expectations.

The fed has no credibility here. Markets ignore this, and the financial press does not even report it.

Monetary policy has responded proactively to evolving conditions. As you know, the Committee cut its target for the federal funds rate by 50 basis points at its September meeting and by 25 basis points each at the October and December meetings. In total, therefore, we have brought the funds rate down by a percentage point from its level just before financial strains emerged. The Federal Reserve took these actions to help offset the restraint imposed by the tightening of credit conditions and the weakening of the housing market. However, in light of recent changes in the outlook for and the risks to growth, additional policy easing may well be necessary.

Reads a bit defensive to me.

The Committee will, of course, be carefully evaluating incoming information bearing on the economic outlook. Based on that evaluation, and consistent with our dual mandate, we stand ready to take substantive additional action as needed to support growth and to provide adequate insurance against downside risks.

Financial and economic conditions can change quickly. Consequently, the Committee must remain exceptionally alert and flexible, prepared to act in a decisive and timely manner and, in particular, to counter any adverse dynamics that might threaten economic or financial stability.

This was to come out at 1PM, instead it was released at noon.

This seems they meant to send a signal that they are ready to go 50.

It may take another 0.3% core CPI number, low claims numbers, and further tightening of the FF/LIBOR spread to get them to think twice about not cutting.

Their fixed fx paradigm supply side fears elevates their perception of the downside risks.


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