Re: energy and the dollar

(an email)

> On Feb 19, 2008 10:03 AM, Mike wrote:

> Warren, note spec comments and dollar issues, a big hurdle to overcome
> if they go the other way …
> Mike

Hi Mike,

Agreed the dollar may have bottomed. Seems to have reached a level where exports are now growing at about 13% which maybe is the right number to accommodate the pressure from the non resident sector to slow it’s accumulation of $US financial assets.
However I continue to conclude the price of crude is being set by the Saudi’s/Russians acting as swing producer, and that there is sufficient demand to keep them in the driver’s seat. Quantity pumped keeps creeping up at current prices, with Saudis last reporting 9.2 million bpd output.

Crude at 98.70 now. Note crude goes up on news a refinery is down, when refineries are the only buyers of crude, so in fact it’s going up for other reasons (price setting by the swing producer?). Also, WTI is now ahead of Brent, indicating whatever was causing the sag in WTI vs Brent is over. WTI would ordinarily trade higher than Brent due to shipping charges.

Warren

Stagflation

Yes, the below analysis has also been the Fed’s position, up until this week’s speeches.

It’s been about a crude/food/$ negative supply shock, supported by Saudis/Russians acting as swing producer and biofuels linking crude prices to food prices.

The fed has called the price hikes relative value stories that they don’t want turning into an inflation story. They feel they have room to cut rates as long as expectations stay well anchored, which includes wage demands but other things as well.

Yellen the dove, along with the hawks, now saying inflation expectations are showing signs of elevating, and saying energy costs are being passed through to core inflation is a departure from previous Fed rhetoric and may signal they are at or near their limits regarding ff cuts (data dependent, of course).

Also, Bernanke pushing Congress and the President to add to the deficit could also be a sign he is reaching his inflation tolerance regarding lowering the FF rate. The mainstream belief is that inflation is a function of monetary policy, not fiscal policy.

Now with the ECB perhaps throwing in the towel on inflation as well, look at how the commodities are responding. ‘Cost push inflation’ is ripping, and the perception is the CB’s around the world will act to sustain demand, including pushing for larger fiscal deficits.

Difficult to explain why so many have stagflation on the brain It is difficult to explain why so many folks still have stagflation or inflation on the brain just because wheat prices have soared to new highs. We have to distinguish between relative and absolute pricing. Not only that, but unlike the 1970s, the current ‘inflation’ backdrop is much more narrowly confined. The key is the labor market. And here we have a 4-quarter growth rate in unit labor costs of a mere 1% in 4Q (a three-year low), which compares to 4% heading into the 2001 downturn. In other words, as far as the labor market is concerned, inflation is less of a threat to the economy than it was at this same stage of the cycle seven years ago. In fact, heading into the 1990 recession, the trend in ULC was also 4% – the Fed sliced the funds rate from almost 10% to 3% that cycle, for crying out loud. In fact, scouring more than 50 years’ worth of data, at no time in the past has the year-to-year trend in unit labor costs been as low as it is today heading into an official recession. Make no mistake, deflation is going to emerge as the next major macro theme.


♥

Yellen on inflation

SF Fed president Yellen on inflation, from yesterday’s speech in Hawaii:

Now let me turn to inflation. The recent news has been disappointing. Over the past three months, the personal consumption expenditures price index excluding food and energy, or the core PCE price index—one of the key measures included in the FOMC’s quarterly forecasts—has increased by 2.7 percent, bringing the increase over the past 12 months to 2.2 percent. This rate is somewhat above what I consider to be price stability.

Yellen is the most dovish Fed president and not currently a voting member. Notable that 2.2% core PCE is clearly above her comfort zone.

I expect core inflation to moderate over the next few years, edging down to around 1¾ percent under appropriate monetary policy.

Appropriate monetary policy is a requirement to bring inflation down.

Such an outcome is broadly consistent with my interpretation of the Fed’s price stability mandate. Moreover, I believe the risks on the upside and downside are roughly balanced. First, it appears that core inflation has been pushed up somewhat by the pass-through

Up until now, the Fed has taken comfort that ‘pass through’ was not happening. This is what brings core up to headline, something the Fed has previously believed was not happening.

of higher energy and food prices and by the drop in the dollar. However, recently, energy prices have turned down in response to concerns that a slowdown in the U.S. will weaken economic growth around the world, and thereby lower the demand for energy.

Meaning an upturn in energy prices will do the reverse. Seems inflation is now a function of energy prices. This is a change from energy prices weakening demand and causing deflation. Now, it is passing through and causing core inflation.

Another factor that could restrain inflationary pressures is the slowdown in the U.S. economy. This can be expected to create more slack in labor and goods markets, a development that typically has been associated with reduced inflation in the past.

Yes. This is the remaining dove position. Previous speeches this week by the hawks have expressed concerns that economic weakness and slack in the labor markets will not bring down core inflation.

This is the problem of the trade-off between unemployment and inflation. Seems that the applicable historical data now shows that it takes ever larger moves in unemployment to move the inflation needle in either direction.

A key factor for inflation going forward is inflation expectations. These appear to have become well-anchored over the past decade or so as the Fed’s inflation resolve has gained credibility. Very recently, far-dated inflation compensation—a measure derived from various Treasury yields—has risen, but it’s not clear whether this rise is due to higher inflation expectations or to changes in the liquidity of those Treasury instruments or inflation risk. Going forward, we will need to monitor inflation expectations carefully to ensure that they do indeed remain well anchored.

All speeches have now stated that there are signs inflation expectations may be elevating.

There are two schools of thought on this at the Fed. The majority will state that when expectations begin to rise, it is too late. The minority say you can let them rise a ‘little bit’, but then they must take decisive action.

Since August, the Fed forecasts have been projecting that economic weakness will bring down prices. With both hawks and doves now acknowledging that this my not be the case, it could be the official Fed forecasts have elevated their near- and medium-term inflation forecasts.

The long-term Fed inflation forecast will remain the same, as it indicates what their long-term inflation target is. But also in the forecasts is what Yellen called the ‘appropriate monetary policy’ to achieve that target.

This could mean the official forecasts now have higher interest rates built into their forecasting model.

And more so now that Congress passed the fiscal package today. Private forecasts are saying it will add maybe 1% of GDP by Q2 and may double that in Q3. At a minimum, this will help support domestic gasoline demand. (And raising the mortgage cap won’t hurt either.)

My twin themes that began in Q2 2006 remain:

  1. Weakening domestic demand due to the government deficit being too small, but supported by strong exports due to non-residents’ reduced desire to accumulate $US financial assets and now some additional support to demand from today’s fiscal package.
  1. Rising prices are due to Saudis/Russians acting as swing producer and setting price at ever higher levels until demand falls below their pain thresholds.

For the last five months, I have been underestimating the Fed’s inflation tolerance. They all firmly believe that price stability is a necessary condition for optimal long-term growth and employment.

And they all do not want a relative-value story to turn into an inflation story as happened in the 1970s.

The Fed is data dependent; the question is which data.

At some point, it becomes the inflation data, and at that point, the Fed is way behind the inflation curve.

For example, rates are up to 7.25% in Australia and their inflation is 1% lower than ours.

Bernanke spends next week. The fixed exchange rate types of deflationary risks he has feared have not materialized.

It is looking more like the 1970s than the 1930s.

If Bernanke confirms inflation expectations have been elevating, the easing cycle may be over.

No matter how weak the economy may get in the near term.


Oil comments

Iraqi Oil Minister Sees No Output Change from OPEC

(Reuters) Iraq’s oil minister Hussain al-Shahristani said on Thursday there was no sign of any shortage of oil in international markets and he did not expect OPEC to change its output levels at a meeting this week.

Saudis might like letting prices sag in front of meetings to stave off production increase talk.

“Quite frankly, the data we are looking at do not show any shortage of oil on the market. The prices are not really affected by any fundamental market forces,”

Right, just the Saudis (and probably Russians as well) setting price and letting the quantity they pump adjust, aka acting as swing producer.

Shahristani said ahead of the meeting on Friday of OPEC oil ministers in Vienna.

Twin themes continue – moderating demand and inflation.

So far, the Fed is directing all its efforts to the demand issue, including support for the coming fiscal package.


2008-01-21 Update

Major themes intact:

  • weak economy
  • higher prices

Weakness:

US demand soft but supported by exports.

US export strength resulting from non resident ‘desires’ to reduce the rate of accumulation of $US net financial assets. This driving force is ideologically entrenched and not likely to reverse in the next several months.

In previous posts, I suggested the world is ‘leveraged’ to the US demand for $700 billion per year in net imports, as determined by the non resident desire to accumulate 700 billion in $US net financial assets.

US net imports were something over 2% of rest of world GDP, and the investment to support that demand as it grew was probably worth another 1% or more of world GDP.

The shift from an increasing to decreasing US trade deficit is a negative demand shock to rest of world economies.

This comes at a time when most nations have decreasing government budget deficits as a percent of their GDP, also reducing demand.

The shift away from the rest of world accumulation of $US financial assets should continue. Much of it came from foreign CB’s. And now, with Tsy Sec Paulson threatening to call any CB that buys $US a ‘currency manipulator’, it is unlikely the desire to accumulate $US financial assets will reverse sufficiently to stop the increase in US exports. I’m sure, for example, Japan would already have bought $US in substantial size if not for the US ‘weak dollar’ policy.

All else equal, increasing exports is a decrease in the standard of living (exports are a real cost, imports a benefit), so Americans will be continuing to work but consuming less, as higher prices slow incomes, and output goes to non residents.

I also expect a quick fiscal package that will add about 1% to US GDP for a few quarters, further supporting a ‘muddling through’ of US GDP.

Additional fiscal proposals will be coming forward and likely to be passed by Congress. It’s an election year and Congress doesn’t connect fiscal policy with inflation, and the Fed probably doesn’t either, as they consider it strictly a monetary phenomena as a point of rhetoric.

Higher Prices:

Higher prices world wide are coming from both increased competition for resources and imperfect competition in the production and distribution of crude oil. In particular, the Saudis, and maybe the Russians as well, are acting as swing producer. They simply set price and let output adjust to demand conditions.

So the question is how high they will set price. President Bush recently visited the Saudis asking for lower prices, and perhaps the recent drop in prices can be attributed to those meetings. But the current dip in prices may also be speculators reducing positions, which creates short term dips in price, which the Saudis slowly follow down with their posted prices to disguise the fact they are price setters, before resuming their price hikes.

At current prices, Saudi production has actually been slowly increasing, indicating demand is firm at current prices and the Saudis are free to continue raising them as long as desired.

The current US fiscal proposals are designed to help people pay the higher energy prices, further supporting demand for Saudi oil.

They may also be realizing that if they spend their increased income on US goods and services, US GDP is sustained and real terms of trade shift towards the oil producers.

Conclusion:

  • The real economy muddling through
  • Inflation pressures continuing

A word on the financial sector’s continuing interruptions:

With floating exchange rates and countercyclical tax structures we won’t see the old fixed exchange rate types of real sector collapses.

The Eurozone banking sector is the exception, and remains vulnerable to systemic failure, as they don’t have credible deposit insurance in place, and, in fact, the one institution that can readily ‘write the check’ (the ECB) is specifically prohibited by treaty from doing so.

Today, in most major economies, fiscal balances move to substantial, demand supporting deficits with an increase in unemployment of only a few percentage points. Note the US is already proactively adding 1% to the budget deficit with unemployment rising only 0.3% at the last initial observation in December. In fact, fiscal relaxation is being undertaken to relieve financial sector stress, and not stress in the real economy.

Food and energy have had near triple digit increases over the last year or so. Even if they level off, or fall modestly, the cost pressures will continue to move through the economy for several quarters, and can keep core inflation prices above Fed comfort zones for a considerable period of time.

Fiscal measures to support GDP will add to the perception of inflationary pressures.

The popular press is starting to discuss how inflation is hurting working people. For example, I just saw Glen Beck note that with inflation at 4.1% for 07 real wages fell for the first time in a long time, and he proclaimed inflation the bigger fundamental threat than the weakening economy.

I also discussed the mortgage market with a small but national mortgage banker. He’s down 50% year over year, but said the absolute declines leveled off in October, including California. He also pointed out one of my old trade ideas is back – when discounts on pools become excessive to current market rates, buy discounted pools of mortgages and then pay mortgage bankers enough of that discount to be able refinance the individual loans at below market rates.


♥

No recession, yet..

real-gdp.gif

  • No Recession, yet..

new-home-sales.gif

  • Demand drop of 1% of GDP began over a year ago when home buying by subprime borrowers ceased..

current-account-balance.gif

  • And exports picked up the slack.
    And with housing as low as it is, further reductions, if any, will have minimal macro effects.
  • Losses not that large so far, only about $100 billion in write offs have been announced and with at least some prospects of recovery.
    Far less than the 1998 (inflation adjusted) losses, for example, when $100 billion was lost in just the first day when Russia defaulted August 17 with no prospects of recovery.
  • Financial sector looses are not direct reductions of aggregate demand, just the ‘rearranging of financial assets.’
  • Falling demand due to supply side credit issues and capital constraints are primarily fixed exchange rate phenomena and are rare and brief with floating exchange rate policy and a non convertible currency.
    Even in Japan with a floating exchange rate, when most bank capital was lost, credit expansion was a function of demand, while with fixed exchange rates, supply side issues dominated – Argentina, Russia, Mexico, the US in the 30s (gold standard), and the panic of 1907 Governor Mishkin referenced in his speech.

government-spending-trailing-twelve-months.gif

  • Government spending has been ‘moved forward’ from 2007 to 2008. Friday reported up over 8% year over year (NOTE: graph not updated for this last data point.)
  • Alt minimum tax capped helps demand some in 2008.

personal-spending-personal-income.gif

  • Personal income and spending not falling.
  • No econometric evidence of a significant ‘wealth effect’ from asset prices on the way up or on the way down. Income is better correlated.
  • Government employees and pensioners got GPI pay increases. This ‘half’ of the demand side keeps growing at 5% + nominal rates so to go into recession, the other half has to go down more than that.

government-revenue-trailing-twelve-months.gif

  • Government tax receipts still rising.

initial-continuing-claims-4-wk-mvg-avg.gif

  • Jobless claims remain too low for a recession.

labor-participation-rate.gif

  • Labor force participation rate climbing even as demographics suggest natural drift lower.

cpi-core-cpi-pce-price-index-core-pce.gif

export-prices-crb-index.gif

iron-steel-scrap-prices.gif

  • World and domestic demand is strong enough to support elevating prices of food, energy, and rising US imports and export prices.

♥

Re: Bernanke

(email)

On 11 Jan 2008 11:17:34 +0000, Prof. P. Arestis wrote:
>   Dear Warren,
>
>   Many thanks. Some good comments below.
>
>   The paragraph that I think is of some importance is this:
>
> >  The Committee will, of course, be carefully evaluating incoming
> >  information bearing on the economic outlook. Based on that evaluation,
> >  and consistent with our dual mandate, we stand ready to take
> >  substantive additional action as needed to support growth and to
> >  provide adequate insurance against downside risks.
>
>   If I am not wrong this is the first time for Bernanke that the word
>   inflation does not appear explicitly in his relevant statement. But also
>   there is no mention of anything relevant that might capture their motto
>   that winning the battle against inflation is both necessary and sufficient
>   for their dual mandate.
>
>   Are the economic beliefs of BB changing, I wonder? I rather doubt it but
>   see what you think.

Dear Philip,

I see this is all part of the Bernanke conumdrum.

Implied is that their forecasts call for falling inflation and well anchored expectations, which can only mean continued modest wage increases.

They believe inflation expectations operate through two channels-accelerated purchases and wage demands.

Their forecasts use futures prices of non perishable commodities including food and energy. They don’t seem to realize the
‘backwardation’ term structure of futures prices (spot prices higher than forward prices) is how futures markets express shortages.

Instead, the Fed models use the futures prices as forecasts of where prices will be in the future.

So a term structure for the primary components of CPI that is screaming ‘shortage’ is being read for purposes of monetary policy as a deflation forecast.

Bernanke also fears convertible currency/fixed fx implosions which are far more severe than non convertible currency/floating fx slumps. Even in Japan, for example, there was never a credit supply side constraint – credit worthy borrowers were always able to borrow (and at very low rates) in spite of a near total systemic bank failure. And the payments system continued to function. Contrast that with the collapse in Argentina, Russia, Mexico, and the US in the 30’s which were under fixed fx and gold standard regimes.

It’s like someone with a diesel engine worrying about the fuel blowing up. It can’t. Gasoline explodes, diesel doesn’t. But someone who’s studied automobile explosions when fuel tanks ruptured in collisions, and doesn’t understand the fundamental difference, might be unduly worried about an explosion with his diesel car.

More losses today, but none that directly diminish aggregate demand or alter the supply side availability of credit.

And while the world does seem to be slowing down some, as expected, the call on Saudi oil continues at about 9 million bpd,
so the twin themes of moderating demand and rising food/fuel/import prices remains.

I also expect core CPI to continue to slowly rise for an extended period of time even if food/fuel prices stay at current levels as
these are passed through via the cost structure with a lag.

All the best,

Warren

>
>  Best wishes,
>
>  Philip

Comments on Bernanke speech

Although economic growth slowed in the fourth quarter of last year from the third quarter’s rapid clip, it seems nonetheless, as best we can tell, to have continued at a moderate pace.

Q4 GDP seen as ‘moderate’ – that is substantially better than initial expectations of several weeks ago.

Recently, however, incoming information has suggested that the baseline outlook for real activity in 2008 has worsened and the downside risks to growth have become more pronounced.

They initially said this for Q3 and for Q4.

Notably, the demand for housing seems to have weakened further, in part reflecting the ongoing problems in mortgage markets.

Maybe, but even if so, housing is now a much smaller influence on GDP.

In addition, a number of factors, including higher oil prices,

Yes, this slows consumer spending on other items, but oil producers have that extra income to spend, and if they continue to do so, GDP will hold up and exports will remain strong.

lower equity prices, and softening home values, seem likely to weigh on consumer spending as we move into 2008.

The fed has little if any evidence those last two things alter consumer spending.

Financial conditions continue to pose a downside risk to the outlook for growth.

Market participants still express considerable uncertainty about the appropriate valuation of complex financial assets and about the extent of additional losses that may be disclosed in the future. On the whole, despite improvements in some areas, the financial situation remains fragile, and many funding markets remain impaired. Adverse economic or financial news has the potential to increase financial strains and to lead to further constraints on the supply of credit to households and businesses.

Yes, his main concern is on the supply side of credit. With a floating fx/non convertible currency, there is a very low probability. Even Japan with all its financial sector problems was never credit constrained.

Debilitating credit supply constraints are byproducts of convertible currency/fixed fx regimes gone bad, like in the US in the 1930s, Mexico in 1994, Russia in 1998, and Argentina in 2001.

I expect that financial-market participants–and, of course, the Committee–will be paying particular attention to developments in the housing market, in part because of the potential for spillovers from housing to other sectors of the economy.

A second consequential risk to the growth outlook concerns the performance of the labor market. Last week’s report on labor-market conditions in December was disappointing, as it showed an increase of 0.3 percentage point in the unemployment rate and a decline in private payroll employment. Heretofore, the labor market has been a source of stability in the macroeconomic situation, with relatively steady gains in wage and salary income providing households the wherewithal to support moderate growth in real consumption spending. It would be a mistake to read too much into any one report.

Right, best to wait for the revisions. November was revised to a decent up number, and October was OK as well. And today’s claims numbers indicate not much changed in December.

However, should the labor market deteriorate, the risks to consumer spending would rise.

Yes, if..

Even as the outlook for real activity has weakened,

Yes, the outlook has always been weakening over the last six months, while the actual numbers subsequently come in better than expected. Seems outlooks are not proving reliable.

there have been some important developments on the inflation front. Most notably, the same increase in oil prices that may be a negative influence on growth is also lifting overall consumer prices and probably putting some upward pressure on core inflation measures as well.

Interesting that he mentions upward pressure on core – must be in their forecast. It took them a long time to get core to moderate, and even in August they did not cut as upward risks remained.

Last year, food prices also increased exceptionally rapidly by recent standards, further boosting overall consumer price inflation. Thus far, inflation expectations appear to have remained reasonably well anchored,

They have very little information on this. They only know when they become unglued, and then it is too late.

and pressures on resource utilization have diminished a bit. However, any tendency of inflation expectations to become unmoored or for the Fed’s inflation-fighting credibility to be eroded could greatly complicate the task of sustaining price stability and reduce the central bank’s policy flexibility to counter shortfalls in growth in the future.

Meaning once they go, it is too late.

Accordingly, in the months ahead we will be closely monitoring the inflation situation, particularly as regards inflation expectations.

The fed has no credibility here. Markets ignore this, and the financial press does not even report it.

Monetary policy has responded proactively to evolving conditions. As you know, the Committee cut its target for the federal funds rate by 50 basis points at its September meeting and by 25 basis points each at the October and December meetings. In total, therefore, we have brought the funds rate down by a percentage point from its level just before financial strains emerged. The Federal Reserve took these actions to help offset the restraint imposed by the tightening of credit conditions and the weakening of the housing market. However, in light of recent changes in the outlook for and the risks to growth, additional policy easing may well be necessary.

Reads a bit defensive to me.

The Committee will, of course, be carefully evaluating incoming information bearing on the economic outlook. Based on that evaluation, and consistent with our dual mandate, we stand ready to take substantive additional action as needed to support growth and to provide adequate insurance against downside risks.

Financial and economic conditions can change quickly. Consequently, the Committee must remain exceptionally alert and flexible, prepared to act in a decisive and timely manner and, in particular, to counter any adverse dynamics that might threaten economic or financial stability.

This was to come out at 1PM, instead it was released at noon.

This seems they meant to send a signal that they are ready to go 50.

It may take another 0.3% core CPI number, low claims numbers, and further tightening of the FF/LIBOR spread to get them to think twice about not cutting.

Their fixed fx paradigm supply side fears elevates their perception of the downside risks.


♥

Saudi production up a tad

2008-01-08 Saudi Production

Saudi production increased marginally for January, and all indications are net demand is holding up at the higher prices.

While this bodes for continued price hikes, markets may have likely sold off on the news, believing the higher production is a sign of a proactive supply increase that will drive prices down.

It’s the difference between getting your offer lifted vs your bid hit. Saudi (and Russian) offers are clearly getting lifted.


♥