MBS Repo Markets

Thanks Pat, good report.

Yes, the Fed knows the assets won’t go away, and all they want is to see funding spreads narrow to help insure the banks aren’t forced to sell due to funding issues and thereby distort prices beyond prudent repricing of risk.


TAF auction (20bb) results announcement will come out tomorrow Wednesday 12/19 at 10:30am. Results of the program have had limited impact on repo rates but have reduced Libor rates by 20bps.Turn levels from Bank of America

UST GC= 2.80 / 2.40

AGCY MBS = 5.15

The problem with funding balance sheets hasn’t disappeared. The TAF and The Treasuries TTL programs have simply reduced the cost of funding but have not, and cannot, make an impact on balance sheet size or composition problems. Balance sheets are bloated with ABCP/ CLO / CDO / Enhanced Cash / Structured ABS / etc….

A quick survey of 4 dealers illustrates how balance sheet pressures and the liquidity of balance sheets have affected the bid for repo collateral. Usually dealers across the maturities dealers are within 5bps of each other. Currently the dispersion of bids is very wide.

At the same time we are finding dealers with balance sheet to lend. It’s just the prices of cash vary by dealer and by term and depend on which banks have bought term liquidity and what term they bought it for.

  1w 1m 3m 6m 9m 1y
MS 4.50 4.75 4.55 4.36   4.15
Citi 4.65 5.20 5.05 4.95 4.70 4.55
CSFB 4.45 4.90 4.80 4.70 4.60  
BoA 4.80 5.10 4.65 4.40 4.30 4.20
Ave 4.60 4.99 4.76 4.60 4.53 4.30
Range 0.35 0.45 0.50 0.59 0.40 0.40

The MBS spreads to LIBOR has narrowed as well. Agcy MBS had been trading as much as L-50 for 3m and longer terms. Now we are close to L-20. This seems to be a result of the TAF and CBK liquidity programs providing cheaper funds along the curve and reflects a relative downward move in LIBOR rates as the MBS and OIS markets are essentially unchanged from a week ago.


Libor Settings, Eur, and UK leading the way lower…

Currency TERM Today Monday Friday Thursday Wednesday Tuesday
USD ON 4.40 4.4175 4.3025 4.30 4.34 4.4325
  1M 4.94875 4.965 4.99625 5.0275 5.1025 5.20375
  3M 4.92625 4.94125 4.96625 4.99063 5.057 5.11125
EUR ON 3.8275 3.98875 3.85875 4.04625 4.055 4.05
  1M 4.58813 4.92375 4.93375 4.935 4.945 4.9225
  3M 4.84875 4.94688 4.94688 4.94938 4.9525 4.92688
GBP ON 5.5975 5.5975 5.600 5.60875 5.685 5.7000
  1M 6.49125 6.54125 6.5925 6.60375 6.74625 6.73875
  3M 6.38625 6.43125 6.49625 6.51375 6.62688 6.625

Seems coordinated – move working as expected.

The sizes should be unlimited- it’s about price and not quantity – the size of the operations doesn’t alter net reserve balances.

All they are doing/can do is offering a lower cost option to member banks, not additional funding.

Bank lending is not constrained by reserve availability in any case, just the price of reserves.

Bank lending is constrained by regulation regarding ‘legal’ assets and bank judgement of creditworthiness and willingness to risk shareholder value.

The Fed’s $ lines to the ECB allows the ECB to lower the cost of $ funding for it’s member banks. To the extent they are in the $ libor basket that move serves to help the Fed target $ libor rates.

Regarding the $:

As per previous posts, when a eurozone bank’s $ assets lose value, they are ‘short’ the $, and cover that short by selling euros to buy $.

The ECB also gets short $ if it borrows them to spend. So far that hasn’t been reported. There has been no reported ECB intervention in the fx markets, nor is any expected.

When the ECB borrows $ to lend to eurozone banks it is acting as broker and not getting short $ per se. It is helping the eurozone banks to avoid forced sales/$ losses of $ assets due to funding issues. If the assets go bad via defaults and $ are lost that short will then get covered as above.

‘Borrowing $ to spend’ is ‘getting short the $’ regardless of what entity does it. So the reduction in credit growth due to sub prime borrowers no longer being able to borrow to spend was ‘deflationary’ and eliminated a source of $ weakness.

The non resident sector is, however, going the other way as they are increasing imports from the US and reducing their deflationary practice of selling in the US and not spending their incomes.

Portfolio shifts- both by domestics and foreigners- out of the $ driven by management decision (not trade flows) drive down the currency to the point where buyers are found. The latest shift seems to have moved the $ down to where the the real buyers have come in due to ppp (purchasing power parity) issues, which means that in order to get out of the $ positions the international fund managers had to drive the price down sufficiently to find buyers who wanted $ US to
purchase US domestic production.

These are ‘real buyers’ who are attracted by the low prices of real goods and services created by the portfolio managers dumping their $ holdings. They are selling their euros, pounds, etc. to obtain $US to buy ‘cheap’ real goods, services, real estate, and other $US denominated assets.

Given the tight US fiscal policy and lack of sub prime ‘short sellers’ borrowing to purchase (as above), these buyers can create a bottom for the $ that could be sustained and exacerbated by some of those managers (and super models) who previously went short ‘changing their minds’ and reallocated back to the $US.

Seems US equity managers are vulnerable to getting caught in this prolonged short squeeze as well.

It’s been brought to my attention that over the last several years equity allocations us pension funds- private, state, corporate, etc – have been gravitating to ever larger allocations to non US equities, and are now perhaps 65% non US.

This is probably a result of the under performance of the US sector, and once underway the portfolios are sufficiently large to create a large, macro, ‘bid/offer’ spread. The macro bid side for the trillions that were shifted/reallocated over the last several years was low enough to find buyers for this shift out of both the $ and the US equities to the other currencies. And the shift from $ to real assets also added to agg demand and was an inflationary bias for the $US.

Bottom line – changing portfolio ‘desires’ were accommodated by these portfolios selling at low enough prices to attract ‘real buyers’ which is the macro ‘bid’ side of ‘the market.’

When portfolio desires swing back towards now ‘cheap’ $US assets and these desires accelerate as these assets over perform they only way they can be met in full is to have prices adjust to the ‘macro offered side’ where real goods and services, assets, etc. are reallocated the other direction by that same price discovery process.

more later!


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Re: liquidity or insolvency–does it matter?

(email with Randall Wray)

On Dec 15, 2007 9:05 PM, Wray, Randall wrote:
> By ________
>
> This time the magic isn’t working.
>
> Why not? Because the problem with the markets isn’t just a lack of liquidity – there’s also a fundamental problem of solvency.
>
> Let me explain the difference with a hypothetical example.
>
> Suppose that there’s a nasty rumor about the First Bank of Pottersville: people say that the bank made a huge loan to the president’s brother-in-law, who squandered the money on a failed business venture.
>
> Even if the rumor is false, it can break the bank. If everyone, believing that the bank is about to go bust, demands their money out at the same time, the bank would have to raise cash by selling off assets at fire-sale prices – and it may indeed go bust even though it didn’t really make that bum loan.
>
> And because loss of confidence can be a self-fulfilling prophecy, even depositors who don’t believe the rumor would join in the bank run, trying to get their money out while they can.

If there wasn’t credible deposit insurance.

>
> But the Fed can come to the rescue. If the rumor is false, the bank has enough assets to cover its debts; all it lacks is liquidity – the ability to raise cash on short notice. And the Fed can solve that problem by giving the bank a temporary loan, tiding it over until things calm down.

Yes.

> Matters are very different, however, if the rumor is true: the bank really did make a big bad loan. Then the problem isn’t how to restore confidence; it’s how to deal with the fact that the bank is really, truly insolvent, that is, busted.

Fed closes the bank, declares it insolvent, ‘sells’ the assets, and transfers the liabilities to another bank, sometimes along with a check if shareholder’s equity wasn’t enough to cover the losses, and life goes on. Just like the S and L crisis.

>
> My story about a basically sound bank beset by a crisis of confidence, which can be rescued with a temporary loan from the Fed, is more or less what happened to the financial system as a whole in 1998. Russia’s default led to the collapse of the giant hedge fund Long Term Capital Management, and for a few weeks there was panic in the markets.
>
> But when all was said and done, not that much money had been lost; a temporary expansion of credit by the Fed gave everyone time to regain their nerve, and the crisis soon passed.

More was lost then than now, at least so far. 100 billion was lost immediately due to the Russian default and more subsequently. So far announced losses have been less than that, and ‘inflation adjusted’ losses would have to be at least 200 billion to begin to match the first day of the 1998 crisis (August 17).

>
> In August, the Fed tried again to do what it did in 1998, and at first it seemed to work. But then the crisis of confidence came back, worse than ever. And the reason is that this time the financial system – both banks and, probably even more important, nonbank financial institutions – made a lot of loans that are likely to go very, very bad.

Same in 1998. It ended only when it was announced Deutsche Bank was buying Banker’s Trust and seemed the next day it all started ‘flowing’ again.

>
> It’s easy to get lost in the details of subprime mortgages, resets, collateralized debt obligations, and so on. But there are two important facts that may give you a sense of just how big the problem is.
>
> First, we had an enormous housing bubble in the middle of this decade. To restore a historically normal ratio of housing prices to rents or incomes, average home prices would have to fall about 30 percent from their current levels.

Incomes are sufficient to support the current prices. That’s why they haven’t gone down that much yet and are still up year over year. Earnings from export industries are helping a lot so far.

>
> Second, there was a tremendous amount of borrowing into the bubble, as new home buyers purchased houses with little or no money down, and as people who already owned houses refinanced their mortgages as a way of converting rising home prices into cash.

Yes, there was a large drop in aggregate demand when borrowers could no longer buy homes, and that was over a year ago. That was a real effect, and if exports had not stepped in to carry the ball, GDP would not have been sustained at current levels.

>
> As home prices come back down to earth, many of these borrowers will find themselves with negative equity – owing more than their houses are worth. Negative equity, in turn, often leads to foreclosures and big losses for lenders.

‘Often’? There will be some losses, but so far they have not been sufficient to somehow reduce aggregate demand more than exports are adding to demand. Yes, that may change, but it hasn’t yet. Q4 GDP forecasts were just revised up 2% for example.

>
> And the numbers are huge. The financial blog Calculated Risk, using data from First American CoreLogic, estimates that if home prices fall 20 percent there will be 13.7 million homeowners with negative equity. If prices fall 30 percent, that number would rise to more than 20 million.

Not likely if income holds up. That’s why the fed said it was watching labor markets closely.

And government tax receipts seem OK through November, which is a pretty good coincident indicator incomes are holding up.

>
> That translates into a lot of losses, and explains why liquidity has dried up. What’s going on in the markets isn’t an irrational panic. It’s a wholly rational panic, because there’s a lot of bad debt out there, and you don’t know how much of that bad debt is held by the guy who wants to borrow your money.

Enough money funds in particular have decided to not get involved in anyting but treasury securities, driving those rates down. That will sort itself out as investors in those funds put their money directly in banks ans other investments paing more than the funds are now earning, but that will take a while.

>
> How will it all end?

This goes on forever – I’ve been watching it for 35 years – no end in sight!

> Markets won’t start functioning normally until investors are
> reasonably sure that they know where the bodies – I mean, the bad
> debts – are buried. And that probably won’t happen until house prices
> have finished falling and financial institutions have come clean about
> all their losses.

And by then it’s too late to invest and all assets prices returned to ‘normal’ – that’s how markets seem to work.

> All of this will probably take years.
>
> Meanwhile, anyone who expects the Fed or anyone else to come up with a plan that makes this financial crisis just go away will be sorely disappointed.

Right, only a fiscal response can restore aggregate demand, and no one is in favor of that at the moment. A baby step will be repealing the AMT and not ‘paying for it’ which may happen.

Meanwhile, given the inflationary bias due to food, crude, and import and export prices in genera, a fiscal boost will be higly controversial as well.


♥

Lender of next-to-last resort?

There seems to be an alternative to the discount stigma – is the liquidity problem too big for (orthodox) central banks?

The Federal Home Loan Bank System: Lender of Next-to-Last Resort?

Morten Bech, Federal Reserve Bank of New York

When we look at the FHLB balance sheet, we see a $746b surge in net lending to the banking system (at an annualized rate) in Q3. Is it true, then, that banks are suffering from an access to funding? If banks have been shy about tiptoeing to the discount window, they seem to have had no such bashfulness on their way to borrowing or securing advances from FHLB.

How, then, can any Fed official get in front of a microphone with a straight face and say we have a liquidity problem, best addressed by a TAF facility, which at the moment is scheduled to auction off a fraction of that which has already been loaned by FHLB to the banking system?

‘Liquidity’ for fed member banks is about price, not quantity. There is a ‘liquidity problem’ when the term structure of interbank rates isn’t to the fed’s liking.

Currently, the issue seems to be LIBOR – the fed wants the spread over fed funds to be narrower, particularly over year end. The ‘new facility’ should directly address this particular pricing issue.

There is another problem with this injecting liquidity story. If the Fed wishes to maintain the fed funds rate at the current target, assuming the demand curve for reserves remains stable, the Fed will have to remove as many reserves through open market operations as they inject through the TAF.

Yes. Not a problem. The TAF should function exactly that way to narrow spreads above.

If they don’t, the reserves will be in surplus, and the fed funds rate will fall below the target. In fact, the Fed’s balance sheet has been growing relatively slowly, even though they have been easing, especially when compared to the unprecedented expansion of FHLB balance sheet growth.

Yes, again, it’s all about price, not quanity.

The FHLB is acting as a broker – long with some investors/banks/etc and short with others.


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A tale of mixed metaphors

Ben Bernanke will save the world, but first we bleed

Posted by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard on 14 Dec 2007 at 12:48

The Bernanke ‘Put’ has expired.

Are Bernanke’s academic doctrines blurring his vision?

The Fed cuts a quarter point, and what happens? Wall Street’s ungrateful wretches knock 294 off the Dow 294 in an hour and half; the home builders index dives 10pc; Japanese bond surge; Euribor spreads rise to an all-time high of 99 basis points.

Have the markets begun to digest the awful possibility that central banks cannot cut rates fast enough to prevent a profits crunch because they are caught between the Scylla of the credit crunch and the Charybdis of inflation, a new deviant form of stagflation?

Nor is there any evidence or credible theory that interest rate cuts would help. For example, fed economists say that 1% rates didn’t do much – it was the fiscal impulse of 03 that added aggregate demand and turned the economy.

US headline CPI is stuck at around 3.5pc to 4pc, German CPI is 3pc (and wholesale inflation 5.7pc), China is 6.9pc, and Russia is skidding out of control at 10pc.

Note ‘out of control’. Mainstream theory says inflation will accelerate once it gets going.

As for the Fed, it now has to fret about the dollar – Banquo’s ghost at every FOMC meeting these days. A little beggar-thy-neighbour devaluation is welcome in Washington: a disorderly rout is another matter. No Fed chairman can sit idly by if half Asia and the Mid-East break their dollar pegs, threatening to end a century of US dollar primacy.

They are more worried about ‘imported inflation’ than ‘primacy’.

Yes, inflation is a snapshot of the past, not the future. It lags the cycle. After the dotcom bust, US prices kept rising for ten months. Alan Greenspan blithely ignored it as background noise, though regional Fed hawks put up a fight.

He had a deflationary global context, as he said publicly and in his book. That has changed, and now import prices are instead rising substantially.

Ben Bernanke has not yet acquired the Maestro’s licence to dispense with the Fed staff model when it suits him.

As above, different global context.

In any case, his academic doctrines may now be blurring his vision.

Not sure why they are, but all evidence is they are based on fixed exchange rate/gold standard theory.

So, in case you thought that every little sell-off on Wall Street was a God-given chance to load up further on equities, let me pass on a few words of caution from the High Priests of finance.

A deluge of pre-Christmas predictions have been flooding into my E-mail box, some accompanied by lavish City lunches. The broad chorus-by now well known – is that the US will hit a brick wall in 2008.

Yes, originally scheduled for 07. Not saying we won’t, but I am saying those forecasting it hae a poor record and suspect models.

Less understood is that Europe, Asia, and emerging markets will also flounder to varying degrees, knocking away yet another prop for US equities – held aloft until now by non-US global earnings.

Yes, that is a risk.

Morgan Stanley has just added a “mild recession” alert for Japan (Buckle Up) on top of its “manufacturing recession risk” for the eurozone. It’s US call (`Recession Coming’), it is no longer hedged about with many ifs or buts. Americans face a “perfect storm” and CAPEX is buckling. Demand will shrink by 1pc a quarter for nine months.

The bank has cut its target MSCI emerging market equities by 6pc next year. I suspect that this will be cut a lot further as the plot thickens, but you have to start somewhere.

They have been bearish all year.

Merrill Lynch has much the same overall view. “The US consumer is on the precipice of its first recessionary phase since 1991. The earnings recession has already arrived.”

Maybe, but no evidence yet. Employment remains sufficient for the consumer to muddle through, and exports are picking up the slack.

“Real estate deflations are unique and have never ended well for the consumer, the credit market, or the economy. Maybe it will be different this time, but we fail to see why.”

The subtraction to aggregate demand due to real estate is maybe a year behind us and rising exports have filled the gap.

And this from a Goldman Sachs note entitled “Quantifying the Stock Market Impact of a Possible Recession.”

“Our team believes that there is about a 40pc to 45pc chance that the US will enter recession over the next six months. If a recession does occur, it has the potential to feed on itself,” said bank’s global markets strategist Peter Berezin.

Goldman just upped their Q4 GDP foregast by 1.5%, and it’s now at 1.8%.

“We expect home prices to decline 7% in 2007 and a further 7% in 2008. But if the US does fall into a recession, home prices could decline by as much 30% nationwide, which would make it the worst housing bust since at least the Great Depression.

“If global growth slows next year as we expect, cyclical stocks that so far have held up quite well may feel more pressure. It seems unlikely that the elevated earnings estimates for next year can be sustained,” he said.

Lots of ‘if’ and ‘we expect’ language, but no actual ‘channels’ to that end. No one seems to have any. Best I can determine if exports hold up, we muddle through.

Now, stocks can do well in a soft-landing (which Goldman Sachs still expects, on balance), since falling interest rates offset lost earnings. But if this does tip over into outright contraction, History is not kind.

Stocks are likely to adjust PE’s to higher interest rates now that expectations are moving toward lower odds of rate cutting due to inflation.

The average fall in S&P 500 over the last 9 recessions is 13pc from peak to trough. These include 1969 (18pc), 1981 (23pc) and 2001 (52pc).

Still up 5% for the year. And it has been an OK leading indicator as well for quite a while.

As for the canard that stocks are currently cheap at a projected P/E ratio of 15.3, this is based on an illusion. US profit margins are currently inflated by 250 basis points above their ten-year average.

Inflated? Seems a byproduct of productivity and related efficiencies. No telling how long that continues. And products changes so fast there is no time for ‘competitive forces’ to drive down prices to marginal revenue with many products; so, margins remain high.

While Goldman Sachs does not use the term, this is obviously a profits bubble. Super-cheap credit in early 2007 – the lowest spreads ever seen – flattered earnings.

Not sure it’s related to ‘cheap credit’ as much as productivity.

I would add too that free global capital flows have allowed corporations to engage in labour arbitrage, playing off cheap Asian wages against the US and European wages. This game is surely played out. Chinese wages are shooting up.

Yes, as above, and this is the global context Bernanke faces – import prices rising rather than falling.

Voters in industrial democracies will not allow capitalists to continue take an ever larger share of the pie. Hence Sarkozy, Hillary Clinton, and the Labour victory in Australia.

Not sure both sides are pro profits. That’s where the campaign funding is coming from and most voters are shareholders or otherwise profit directly and indirectly from corporate profits. Wage earners are a shrinking constituency with diminishing political influence.

Once you strip out this profits anomaly, Goldman Sachs says the P/E ratio is currently 26. This compares with a post-war average of 18, and a pre-recession average of 17.

As above. PE’s are more likely to adjust down near term due to valuation issues – rising interest rates and perception of risk.

“It is clear that if the US enters a recession, there is significant scope for both earnings and stock prices to decline beyond what the market has already priced. The average lag between peak and nadir in stock prices is only 4 months. This implies a swift correction in equity prices.”

Sure, but that’s a big ‘if’.

The spill-over would be a 20pc fall in the DAX (Frankfurt) and the CAC (Paris), 19pc fall on London’s FTSE 250, 13pc on the IBEX (Madrid), and 10pc on the MIB (Milan).

Doesn’t sound catastrophic.

Be advised, this is not a Goldman Sachs prediction: it is merely a warning, should the economy tip over.

Yes, but without a direct reason for a recession, nor a definition of a recession, for that matter.

Now, whatever happens to US, British, French, Spanish, Italian, and Greek house prices, and whatever happens to the Shanghai stock bubble or to Latin American bonds, the Fed and fellow central banks can – and ultimately will – come to the rescue with full-throttle reflation.

Wrong, the fed doesn’t have that button. Lower interest rates maybe, if they dare to do that with the current inflation risks of the triple supply shock of crude, food, and the lower $US.

But as shown with Japan, low rates do not add aggregate demand as assumed.

Merrill says the Fed may cut rates to 2pc. (rates were 1pc in 2003 and 2004). Let me go a step further. It would not surprise me if debt deflation in the Anglo-Saxon countries proves so serious that we reach Japanese extremes – perhaps zero rates, with a dollop of ‘quantitative easing’ for good measure.

Right, and with the same consequences – those moves have nothing to do with aggregate demand.

The Club Med states may need the same, but they will not get it because they no longer control their monetary policy. So Heaven help them and their democracies.

True, the systemic risk is in the Eurozone. Not sure he knows why.

The central banks are not magicians, of course. We forget now that Keynes and his allies in the early 1930s knew that monetary policy ‘a l’outrance’ could be used to flood the system by buying bonds. They concluded that such a policy might backfire – possibly causing panic – since investors were not ready for revolutionary methods.

Keynes was right but was talking in the context of the gold standard of the time. Not directly applicable today without ‘adjustments’ to current floating fx regimes.

This at least has changed. The markets expect a bail-out, demand it, and believe religiously in its benign effects.

Ben Bernanke said in his 2002 ‘helicopter’ speech that there was practically no limit to what sorts of assets the Fed could buy in order to inject money.

No limits, but big differences to aggregate demand. Buying securities has no effect on demand, while buying real goods and services has an immediate effect, also as Keynes and others have pointed out many times.

The bank’s current mandate does not allow it to buy equities, but that could be changed easily enough.

Yes. Won’t support demand, but will support equity prices.

So yes, in the end, the Fed can always stop a deflationary spiral.

Yes, but more precisely, the tsy, as they can buy goods and services without nominal limit and support demand at any level they desire. The ‘risks’ are ‘inflation’ not solvency. (See ‘Soft Currency Economics‘.)

As Bernanke said to Milton Freidman on his 90th birthday, the Fed will not repeat the monetary crunch it allowed to happen 1930-32.

That was in the context of the gold standard of the day. Not applicable currently.

“Regarding the Great Depression. You’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.”

Thanks to floating the $, it hasn’t happened since.

Bernanke is undoubtedly right. The Fed won’t do it again. But before the United States can embark on an economic course that radically transforms the nature of capitalism, speculative markets may have to take a beating – for appearances sake, at least.


♥

UK Inflation expectations rise

Sends a chill up the spine of any red blooded mainstream central banker!

Inflation expectations rise

Thu Dec 13, 2007 9:37am GMT – Britons’ expectations of future inflation rose to hit a series high of 3.0 percent in November, well above the actual rate of inflation, a survey by the Bank of England showed on Thursday.

The central bank’s quarterly survey showed median expectations for the rate of inflation over the coming year picked up from 2.7 percent in August to its highest level since the survey began in 1999.

The survey also showed people’s perception of the current rate of inflation rose to a series high of 3.2 percent, from 2.8 percent in August. The latest official figures showed inflation at 2.1 percent in October, just above the central bank’s 2.0 percent target.

The figures may hamper the Bank of England’s ability to cut interest rates much further, after lowering borrowing costs by 25 basis points to 5.5 percent last week.

Money markets are pricing in three more quarter point cuts before the end of 2008.

Policymakers, who had access to the survey before last week’s rate cut, have expressed concern that inflation expectations have not fallen even though headline inflation has come back to near target.

Inflation hit a series high of 3.1 percent in March.

Expectations of inflation can become self-fulfilling as people are encouraged to demand higher wages, potentially fueling a wage-price spiral.

(c) Reuters2007All rights reserved


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Bank losses remain less than a year’s earnings

(Reuters article)

Big Banks Lower Outlook, Overshadowing Fed Plan

Three major U.S. banks said they expect more write-downs and loan losses in the fourth quarter, eroding investor enthusiam over a Federal Reserve plan to ease the global credit crunch.

The warnings from the three banks, Bank of America, Wachovia and PNC Financial Services Group, triggered a selloff in financial stocks and reversed a huge rally in the markets.

Nell Redmond / AP

Executives of all three spoke at a Goldman Sachs conference in New York.

Lewis said Bank of America is likely to be profitable in the quarter but expects to set aside $3.3 billion for losses and write-downs.

Loss less than ¼’s earnings.

“While we do not make a practice of forecasting quarterly earnings, I think you certainly can assume results will again be quite disappointing,” Lewis said.

Wachovia’s Thompson told the conference his bank was facing “as tough an environment as I’ve ever seen” and did not know when the credit crunch would be over.

Thompson said Charlotte, North Carolina-based Wachovia had boosted its loan loss provision for the fourth quarter to about $1 billion from a previous $500 million to $600 million.

He said fourth-quarter losses from commercial and consumer mortgages, leveraged finance and structured products, including subprime-backed mortgage securities, had reached about $1.4 billion, similar to the
level seen in the third quarter.

Pittsburgh-based PNC now expects to report earnings of 60 to 75 cents a share for the quarter, or between $1.00 and $1.15 excluding items. Analysts on average had expected PNC to report earnings of $1.33 a
share before items.

Still profitable as well.

The changes reflect a write-down of $1.5 billion in commercial mortgage loans, weak trading results amid market volatility and a higher provision for credit losses stemming from residential real estate development, it said.

Bank of America’s Lewis said he had hoped that the Federal Reserve would cut rates by half a point rather than the quarter point cut it made Tuesday “because the capital markets are still so fragile.”

Can’t blame him for trying!

Lewis said in response to analysts’ questions that the bank hopes to sell off some of its 9 percent stake in China Construction Bank starting in 2008 and is “talking to the Chinese to see what level they would be comfortable with us holding.”

Wachovia’s Thompson said despite the difficult environment, he expected to grow earnings in 2008. He added that the bank might consider raising capital next year in a “relatively inexpensive form,”
such as a preferred stock offering.

Seems to me these losses are ‘well contained’ and not threatening to interrupt business or aggregate demand.


GC Tsy changes post announcment

I’m mainly interested in LIBOR over the turn as an indicator or how the new international facility is doing.

Also watching to see when higher oil means higher inflation and higher rates, vs. higher oil currently meaning econ weakness and lower rates. Maybe next week after this weeks inflation numbers are out.

GC has lost some of it’s flight to quality bid on term repos. The market is higher across terms as a result of the treasury announcement. Expectations of future rate cuts have not been priced out of the market I will follow up shortly with an AGCY and MBS runs.

GC TSY Last Night Now Change
O/N 4.60 4.23 -0.37
1wk 4.12 4.12 0
2wk 4.03 3.95 -0.08
3wk 3.7 3.75 0.05
1mo 3.7 3.76 0.06
2mo 3.68 3.74 0.06
3mo 3.63 3.71 0.08
6mo 3.62 3.67 0.05
9mo 3.52 3.56 0.04
1yr 3.42 3.46 0.04

* 1wk – 2wk seasonal add need “window dressing” balance sheets


♥

Fed regs with comments

Note they’ve also added the international arrangements as per my discussion earlier today.

The same recommendations suggested in August.

7 Lending by the Federal Reserve

The Federal Reserve’s authority to extend loans is a potentially powerful tool with

which it can stimulate aggregate demand. Loans to depository institutions can help spur credit extensions to households and firms. If depository institutions are unwilling or unable to lend to firms and households, direct loans by the Federal Reserve to firms and households could provide the financing needed for economic recovery- although such lending is subject to the restrictions discussed below.

The above has the causation backwards. In the banking system, loans ‘create’ deposits, which many incur reserve requirements.

In the first instance, new reserve requirements are functionally an ‘overdraft’ in the bank’s reserve account at the fed. Since an overdraft *is* a loan, as a matter of accounting loans create both deposits and any resulting new required reserves. What the fed does is set the price of the reserves (the rate of interest), which influences bank lending decisions, but doesn’t directly control bank lending.

Therefore, all fed lending to member banks is generally to replace ‘overdrafts’ in reserve accounts. At the end of each statement period, overdrafts are booked as loans from the fed’s discount window, which are 50 bp over the fed fund rate and also carry a ‘stigma’ of implying the bank is having financial difficulties. That’s why banks are willing to bid up funds above the discount rate when trading each other,

7.1 Lending to Depository Institutions

As shown in table 7.1, lending to depositories is authorized under several sections of the Federal Reserve Act: Advances are authorized under sections 10B, 13(8) and 13(13), while discounts are authorized under sections 13(2), 13(3), 13(4), 13(6) and13A.78 In recent decades, the Federal Reserve has extended credit to depositories only through advances (under sections 10B and 13(8)) and has not made any discounts. The broadest and most flexible authority under which the Federal Reserve can extend loans to depositories is Section 10B, under which the restriction on collateral is only that the Reserve Bank making the advance deems the collateral to be “satisfactory”.

Yes, and this makes perfect sense. All bank collateral is limited to what the federal regulators deem ‘legal’ along with regulated concentration and gap limits. Also, banks can issue federally guaranteed liabilities; so, functionally the government is already funding what they deem legal assets. So, for the fed to provide another channel for this process, to assist ‘market functioning’, changes nothing of substance regarding risk for the government.

The collateral can be promissory notes, such as corporate bonds and commercial paper- instruments that cannot be purchased by the Federal Reserve.

But, as above, instruments that are categorized as bank legal by federal regulation, and can already be funded via government insured deposits.

Currently, Reserve Banks accept as collateral various types of promissory notes of acceptable quality including state and local government securities, mortgages covering one- to four-family residences, credit-card receivables, other customer notes, commercial mortgages, and business loans. Apparently, even equity shares would be legally acceptable as collateral if a Reserve Bank found them to be acceptable as collateral.

78The differences between discounts and advances are discussed briefly below and in more detail

in Section 2.1 of Small and Clouse (2000).

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Table 7.1

Credit Instruments Used in Discounts or Advances

Borrower Credit Instrument

Depositories

10B Advances* Depository’s time and demand notes secured \to the

satisfaction of [the] Reserve Bank.” * *

13(8) Advances Depository’s promissory note secured by U.S Treasury,

U.S.-guaranteed, U.S. agency, or U.S. agency-guaranteed

securities, or by credit instruments eligible for discount or purchase.

13(2) Discounts * * * Notes, drafts and bills of exchange meeting \real bills” criteria.

13(4) Discounts * * * Bills of exchange payable on sight or demand which grow out of the shipment of agricultural goods.

13(6) Discounts * * * Acceptances which grow out of the shipment of goods

(section 13(7)) or for the purpose of furnishing dollar exchange as required by the usages of trade (section 13(12)).

13A Discounts * * * Notes, drafts, and bills of exchange secured by agricultural paper.

IPCs * * * *

13(13) Advances IPC’s promissory notes secured by U.S. Treasury, U.S. Agency or U.S. agency-guaranteed obligations.

13(3) Discounts Notes, drafts, and bills of exchange endorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Reserve Bank, in unusual and exigent circumstances”, and provided the IPC cannot secure adequate credit elsewhere or is in a class for which this determination has been made.

Notes: All advances and the financial instruments used as collateral in all discounts except section 13(discounts are subject to maturity limitations. Section 13(14) authorizes discounts and advances to branches and agencies of foreign branches, subject to limitations.

*Section 10A provides for advances to groups of member banks.

* * Advances to undercapitalized and critically undercapitalized institutions are subject to limitations listed in section 10B.

* * * Must be endorsed by a depository institution.

* * * * Depository institutions are corporations and thus qualify for lending authorized for IPCs.

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Even though the Federal Reserve can extend credit to depositories through advances secured by a wide array of instruments, there may be limitations regarding the extent to which the Federal Reserve can take onto its balance sheet the credit risk of a private-sector security pledged as collateral{whether the security is pledged as part of an advance or a discount. With an advance, the loan is extended on the basis of a promissory note issued by the depository. During the course of the advance, should the ability of the depository to repay the advance come under question (for example, because the collateral is in default) the Federal Reserve would look to the depository first for repayment: The credit risk of the collateral therefore remains with the depository.79 In a discount, the depository does not issue its own note to the Federal Reserve, but the depository must endorse the security that is discounted (as indicated by the triple asterisks in table 7.1). Again, the credit risk of the underlying collateral stays with the depository institution, and the only risk the Federal Reserve takes onto its balance sheet is the risk that the depository will default.80

79In a similar vein, the Bank of Japan recently has undertaken repurchase agreements in commercial paper but has acted to protect its balance sheet from the credit risk of the issuer of the commercial paper:

The Bank recommends commercial paper (CP) operations (purchase of CP with resale agreements) in order to ensure smooth market operations.

CP will be purchased from financial institutions, securities companies, and tanshi companies (money market dealers) which hold accounts with the Bank. The CP is to be endorsed by the seller, and to have a maturity of 3 months or less from the day of the Bank’s purchase. Purchase is to be made under competitive bidding, and the period of the purchase is to be 3 months or less. (See Quarterly Bulletin (1996), page 100.)

In September of 1998, the Bank of Japan held, through repurchase agreements, about 35 percent of the outstanding stock of commercial paper in Japan. See Table VII in Economic Statistics Monthly

(See various dates).

80Discounts under sections 13(2), 13(4) or 13A for a bank require a \waiver of demand, notice and protest by such bank as to its own endorsement exclusively”, which is discussed by Hackley (1973)

(pp. 22). The effect of this waiver is to make the endorsing bank primarily liable because the Reserve Bank would not have to demand payment by the issuer of the discounted paper before proceeding against the bank. To further limit its credit-risk exposure, the Federal Reserve presumably would also take a \haircut” on the discount by extending funds that are significantly less than the value of the discounted instrument. Additionally, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement

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To the extent the credit risk of the collateral remains with the depository, lending to depositories may do very little to lower the credit-risk premiums charged by depositories in making new loans to private-sector borrowers. Credit risk premiums could be a major factor holding down credit expansion and economic recovery should nominal rates on Treasury bills be at or near zero and should the economy be weak.

In private-sector markets, credit risk can be managed through the use of credit- risk options. And, in some circumstances, the Federal Reserve’s incidental powers clause is consistent with the Federal Reserve using options.81 However, the view that the Federal Reserve could not accept the credit risk of the collateral used in discount window loans may leave little scope for the Federal Reserve to write credit-risk options in order to take that credit risk of the balance sheets of depositories and onto its balance sheet.

But even if Federal Reserve loans to depositories leave credit-risk premiums unchanged, such loans may provide some liquidity for the financial instruments used as collateral helping to lowering private-sector interest rates by reducing implicit liquidity premiums.

7.2 Lending to Individuals, Partnerships, and Corporations

Although the Federal Reserve currently does not make loans to individuals, partnerships, and corporations (IPCs), the Federal Reserve has the authorization to bypass depositories and make such loans under sections 13(3) and 13(13) of the Federal Reserve Act- as shown in table 7.1. However, lending under these authorities is subject to very stringent criteria in law and regulation, and such lending has not taken place since the Great Depression. For example, advances, under section 13(13), are limited

Act of 1991 (FDICIA), through its \prompt corrective action” provisions has imposed restrictions on depository institutions in weak capital condition. Among those restrictions are limitations on access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window.

81See footnote 46 for a discussion of the Federal Reserve’s recent use of options, and see Section 4 of Small and Clouse (2000) for a discussion of the Federal Reserve’s authority to engage in options.

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to those “secured by direct obligations of the United States or by any obligation which is a direct obligation of, or fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, an agency of the United States.”

Because IPCs with such collateral could easily sell it in the open market, section 13(13) advances may not have much effect(unless done at subsidized rates) in stimulating aggregate demand.

In contrast, private-sector instruments may lack the liquidity of Treasury debt and, therefore, Federal Reserve loans that use them as collateral may provide liquidity and help stimulate the economy. Also, in a \credit crunch”, such direct loans would circumvent depository institutions and the \non-price” terms of credit imposed by them. Hence, we shall focus on section 13(3) discounts of:

“notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are endorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank: … ”

Because notes, drafts, and bills of exchange include most forms of written credit instruments, section 13(3) provides virtually no restrictions on the form a credit instrument must take in order to be eligible for discount.82 And by merely requiring that the discount be \secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank …”, there is no restriction on the use of funds (such as for \real bills” purposes) for which the discounted security was originally issued.

However, in making section 13(3) loans directly to IPCs, the Federal Reserve must impose standards that are much more stringent in comparison to those used in lending to a depository. Such lending to IPCs is authorized only in “unusual and exigent circumstances.” In particular, the statute requires that a loan can be extended only to IPCs for which credit is not available from other banking institutions.83 Activation

82The distinctions between notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are discussed in detail in Small and Clouse (2000).

83The Federal Reserve’s Regulation A (Section 201.3(d): Emergency credit for others) species that advances to IPCs would be contemplated only in situations in which failure to advance credit would adversely affect the economy.

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of this authority requires the affirmative vote of five of the seven governors of the Federal Reserve Board.

Section 13(3) further requires that the collateral be “endorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank …” As interpreted by Hackley (1973):

… it seems clear that it was the intent of Congress that loans should be made only to credit-worthy borrowers; in other words, the Reserve Bank should be satisfied that a loan made under this authority would be repaid in due course, either by the borrower or by resort to security or the endorsement of a third party.84

If binding, this restriction could seriously curtail the effectiveness of such loans in stimulating aggregate demand in an environment of elevated credit risk and risk aversion.

But even if the Federal Reserve were able to accept private-sector credit risk onto its balance sheet, any social benefits to the Federal Reserve lending directly to the private sector would need to be balanced against the potentially serious drawbacks associated with placing the Federal Reserve squarely in the process allocating credit within the private sector. The information available to the Federal Reserve about nonbank credit would in many cases be inadequate to reliably assess credit risks{ and there is little reason to believe the Federal Reserve could assess credit risks more accurately than do private intermediaries. Problems with adverse-selection could lead to the Federal Reserve lending to precisely those credit risks that it most severely underestimates. After the credit is extended, the Federal Reserve may not be well situated to monitor the ongoing activities of the recipients of the funds to ensure the activities are consistent with the terms of the contract. Some of these problems might be addressed through the Federal Reserve using credit-ratings from private sector firms.

Moreover, such programs could develop important political constituencies that might make the programs difficult to dismantle once the immediate aim of policy|

84Hackley (1973), page 129.

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namely providing a short-run economic stimulus- had been achieved.


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