Wholesale trade, BOE on Greece, Redbook sales, Jolts

Inventories looking excessive:

Wholesale Trade
wholesale-trade-dec
Highlights
The economy may be solid right now but inventories at the wholesale level look heavy, rising 0.1 percent in December vs a noticeable 0.4 percent decline in sales at the wholesale level. The mismatch drives up the stock-to-sales ratio by 1 tenth to 1.22 which is the heaviest reading since way back in the troubled days of late 2009. This ratio was at 1.17 through the middle of last year but has since been moving higher.

December’s unwanted wholesale build is centered in the non-durable component where sales, in contrast to durable goods which rose 1.1 percent, fell 1.7 percent in the month. Here the culprit is petroleum where sales, reflecting both price effects and lower demand, fell 13.7 percent in the month. And the supply overhang, based on weekly petroleum inventory data, has continued to build into the new year. Showing a big draw in the month are lumber and electrical goods, two products that may be signaling rising demand out of the construction sector.

The nation’s inventories have been moving higher but the imbalance has been centered in the wholesale sector, though inventories at the factory level are showing a little pressure. Watch Thursday for the business inventories inventory report which will round out December’s data with data on the retail sector.

Wholesale inventories up 0.1% in December, versus expectations for 0.2% gain

Feb 10 (Reuters) — U.S. wholesale inventories barely rose in December, the latest suggestion that fourth-quarter growth could be revised lower.

The Commerce Department said on Tuesday wholesale inventories edged up 0.1 percent as lower crude oil prices weighed on the value of petroleum stocks. Stocks at wholesalers had increased by an unrevised 0.8 percent in November.

Economists polled by Reuters had forecast wholesale inventories rising 0.2 percent in December.

Inventories are a key component of gross domestic product changes. The component that goes into the calculation of GDP – wholesale stocks excluding autos—nudged up 0.1 percent.

The report, together with last week’s data showing a 0.3 percent fall in manufacturing inventories in December, suggested the boost to GDP growth from restocking in the fourth quarter was probably not as large as initially thought.

The government estimated last month that inventories added 0.8 percentage point to the economy’s annualized 2.6 percent growth pace in the fourth quarter.

Sales at wholesalers fell 0.4 percent in December after a similar decline in November. At December’s sales pace it would take 1.22 months to clear shelves, down from 1.21 months in November.

The last thing Greece needs are collaborators. First Italy and now the BOE:

BOE’s Carney Applauds ECB Policy (WSJ) “There are many reasons why the ECB’s actions are important, one of them is it shows the ECB has the full tool kit to support the underlying economy as necessary…the ECB is taking bold action,” BOE Governor Mark Carney said. While the ECB move is constructive, it won’t deliver medium-term prosperity to the eurozone economy, Mr. Carney said.

This isn’t supposed to be declining with the presumed boost to the consumer from low oil prices:

Redbook
redbook-2-7
Highlights
Retail sales slowed substantially in the February 7 week, to a year-on-year plus 2.1 percent from 3.8 percent in the prior week. The 2.1 percent rate is very low which the report attributes to the Super Bowl which diverted consumer attention. Redbook sees sales picking up in the next report due to Valentine’s Day. The government’s retail sales report this Thursday is the week’s big event on the calendar and is expected to show a bounce-back rise in core sales for January (ex-auto ex-gas).

JOLTS
jolts-dec
Highlights
There were 5.028 million job openings on the last business day of December, slightly improved from 4.847 million in November. Hires (5.148 million) and separations (4.886 million) were little changed in December. Within separations, the quits rate (1.9 percent) and the layoffs and discharges rate (1.2 percent) were unchanged. This release includes estimates of the number and rate of job openings, hires, and separations for the nonfarm sector by industry and by four geographic regions.

There were 5.148 million hires in December, slightly higher than November’s 5.054 million. This was the highest level of hires since November 2007. The hires rate in December was 3.7 percent. The number of hires was little changed for total private and government. Hires increased over the month in construction.

Total separations include quits, layoffs and discharges, and other separations. Total separations are referred to as turnover. Quits are generally voluntary separations initiated by the employee. Therefore,
the quits rate can serve as a measure of workers’ willingness or ability to leave jobs. Layoffs and discharges are involuntary separations initiated by the employer. Other separations include separations
due to retirement, death, and disability, as well as transfers to other locations of the same firm.
There were 4.9 million total separations in December, little changed from November. This was the highest level of separations since October 2008. The separations rate was 3.5 percent. The number of total separations was little changed for total private and government.

There were 2.717 million quits in December, little changed from November. The quits rate in December was 1.9 percent. The number of quits was little changed for total private and government. Quits increased in construction and durable goods manufacturing. The number of quits was little changed in all four regions.

Overall, the JOLTS numbers portray a slowly improving jobs market with job openings rising along with hires.

Jobs, Currency wars, etc.

Heaps stronger than expected:

Employment Situation
payrolls-jan
Highlights
Today’s employment situation was heavily positive even though the unemployment rate edged up. Payroll jobs gained 257,000 in January after strong increases of 329,000 in December and 423,000 in November. December and November were revised up a net 86,000. With the revision, November is the strongest month since May 2010. Today’s report may tip the balance for the Fed to think about a first increase in policy rates this year rather than next-although still at a slow pace.

The unemployment rate nudged up to 5.7 percent from 5.6 percent in December. The rise was due to a sharp rebound in the labor force. The labor force participation rate rose to 62.9 percent from 62.7 percent in December. It appears that some discouraged workers are returning to the labor force—a positive sign for how workers view the economy.

Turning back to the establishment survey, private payrolls increased 267,000 in January after a 329,000 boost the month before.

Goods-producing jobs increased 58,000 after a 73,000 boost in December. Manufacturing increased 22,000 after rising 26,000 in December. Construction jumped 39,000 in January after gaining 44,000 the month before. Mining slipped 4,000 after rising 3,000 in December. These numbers offer hope that the manufacturing and construction sectors are improving. In recent months, they have been sluggish.

Private service-providing industries posted a 209,000 increase after a gain of 247,000 in December. Government jobs declined by 10,000 in January after a rise of 9,000 the month before.

The labor force may be tightening a bit as average hourly earnings rebounded 0.5 percent, following a 0.2 percent dip in December. However, part of the boost in wages was due to increases in some states’ minimum wage. The average workweek held steady at 34.6 hours.

Overall, the latest employment situation suggests that the consumer sector is still the current backbone of the recovery. Also, the labor market has been given an upgrade with upward revisions to November and December. A caveat for the latest report is that seasonal factors for cold weather months can be volatile.

So anyone remember what that big spike in November was all about?

I don’t recall anything at the time in the news, etc. that would have indicated any kind of hiring surge was happening?

Anyway, whatever it was seems to be unwinding?
payrolls-jan-2

payrolls-jan-3

payrolls-jan-4

Currency wars, deflation fights, and with all the guns shooting backwards. As the carpenter said, ‘no matter how much I cut off it’s still too short.’

History will not be kind to these people…

Currency war a worry ahead of G-20 finance gathering (Nikkei) With a number of countries loosening monetary policy, avoiding competitive currency devaluation has emerged as a key issue for the meeting of Group of 20 finance ministers and central bankers that kicks off Monday in Istanbul. The communique released after the September G-20 meeting in Cairns, Australia, included language that in effect tacitly condoned monetary easing aimed at economic improvement. “Monetary policy in advanced economies … should address, in a timely manner, deflationary pressures where needed,” it read in part. The IMF, in January, projected growth of 1.2% in the eurozone, down 0.2 point from the October 2014 edition. The IMF cut its outlook for emerging markets by 0.6 point as well.

Fed’s Rosengren: Weak inflation is key challenge for central banks (WSJ) “The problem of significantly undershooting inflation—a dynamic which could well keep interest rates at the zero lower bound—is likely to be a key challenge to central bankers in the first two decades of the 21st century,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston President Eric Rosengren said. “As with the oil shock in the 1970s, the current shock has served to accentuate a potential monetary policy pitfall—in this case, the failure to quickly and vigorously address a significant undershooting of inflation targets,” the central banker said. “We still are a long way from normalizing either short-term interest rates or our balance sheet,” the official said.

Benefits of aggressive Fed policy still to peak (WSJ) “The net stimulus to real activity and inflation was limited by the gradual nature of the changes in policy expectations and term premium effects, as well as by a persistent belief on the part of the public that the pace of recovery would be much faster than proved to be the case,” according to a new Fed board paper. “The peak unemployment effect—subtracting 1¼ percentage points from the unemployment rate relative to what would have occurred in the absence of the unconventional policy actions—does not occur until early 2015, while the peak inflation effect—adding ½ percentage point to the inflation rate—is not anticipated until early 2016,” write the authors.

Denmark Cuts Rates Again to Protect Currency Peg (WSJ) Denmark’s central bank scrambled to defend its under-pressure currency peg Thursday, cutting its benchmark interest rate for the fourth time in less than three weeks. The decision to cut the interest rate on deposits—to -0.75% from -0.5%–marks the latest effort to maintain the peg. Last week, the central bank, known as Nationalbanken, announced the surprise suspension of government bond auctions, and the bank said Tuesday it sold record amounts of kroner in January to weaken its currency. Nationalbanken Governor Lars Rohde tried to calm any fears about the future of the policy cornerstone. The central bank “has the necessary instruments to defend the fixed exchange rate policy for as long as it takes,” he said in a statement.

China cuts bank reserve requirement to spur growth (Reuters) China’s central bank made a system-wide cut to bank reserve requirements on Wednesday, the first time it has done so in over two years, to unleash a fresh flood of liquidity to fight off economic slowdown and looming deflation.

Greek leadership assures policy is good for its banks, while real economy and real people are devastated:

Greek central bank says ‘absolutely no problem’ with banks (Reuters) Greek central bank governor Yannis Stournaras said on Thursday that Greek banks were solid and under control. “Deposits and liquidity are absolutely safe,” Stournaras, who is also a member of the European Central Bank’s Governing Council, told reporters. “There is absolutely no problem with the banks. We are under control. It was a calm day today,” he said referring to bank deposits. Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis have been seeking support for a new deal with Greece’s international lenders that would allow an end to years of imposed austerity. “The ECB’s decision can be taken back if there is a deal from the Greek government (and its EU partners),” he said.

Not a good sign:

Baltic Dry Freight Index Plummets Amid Commodities Slump (WSJ) The Baltic Dry Index fell to 577 this week, a far cry from its peak of 11,793 in 2008. The size of the world’s fleet of dry-bulk ships far exceeds demand for the vessels which carry commodities, with over capacity estimated at around 20% above demand over the past few years. Many ships ordered at a time of booming global trade before the 2008 financial crisis have come into service as economic growth has spluttered in the years since. Rui Guo, a freight analyst at ICAP Shipping, said the tonnage in the water of dry-bulk vessels has gone up 85% since 2008, even as demand has fallen. Mr. Guo said daily freight rates for a 150,000-ton freight vessel are now around $5,500, with the break-even point around $7,500.

The Korea International Trade Association reported that exports of general machinery to China declined 7.1% in the January-November period of 2014, in contrast to a 2.0% increase in 2013.

payrolls-jan-5

A Modest Response

A Modest Proposal for Resolving the Eurozone Crisis

By Y. Varoufakis, S. Holland AND J.K. Galbraith

1. Prologue
Europe is fragmenting. While in the past year the European Central Bank has managed to stabilise the bond markets, the economies of the European core and its periphery are drifting apart. As this happens, human costs mount and disintegration becomes an increasing threat.

It is not just a matter for the Eurozone. The fallout from a Eurozone breakup would destroy the European Union, except perhaps in name. And Europe’s fragmentation poses a global danger.

Following a sequence of errors and avoidable delays Europe’s leadership remains in denial about the nature of the crisis, and continues to pose the false choice between draconian austerity and a federal Europe.

By contrast, we propose immediate solutions, feasible within current European law and treaties.

There are in this crisis four sub-crises: a banking crisis, a public debt crisis, a crisis of under-investment, and now a social crisis – the result of five years of policy failure. Our Modest Proposal therefore now has four elements. They deploy existing institutions and require none of the moves that many Europeans oppose, such as national guarantees or fiscal transfers. Nor do they require treaty changes, which many electorates anyway could reject. Thus we propose a European New Deal which, like its American forebear would lead to progress within months, yet through measures that fall entirely within the constitutional framework to which European governments have already agreed.

2. The nature of the Eurozone crisis
The Eurozone crisis is unfolding on four interrelated domains. Banking crisis: There is a common global banking crisis, which was sparked off mainly by the catastrophe in American finance. But the Eurozone has proved uniquely unable to cope with the disaster, and this is a problem of structure and governance. The Eurozone features a central bank with no government, and national governments with no supportive central bank, arrayed against a global network of mega-banks they cannot possibly supervise. Europe’s response has been to propose a full Banking Union – a bold measure in principle but one that threatens both delay and diversion from actions that are needed immediately.

Better understood as a lack of credible deposit insurance, which logically requires that the entity that provides the insurance- the ECB in this case- is responsible for the regulation and supervision of its banks.

Debt crisis: The credit crunch of 2008 revealed the Eurozone’s principle of perfectly separable public debts to be unworkable. Forced to create a bailout fund that did not violate the no-bailout clauses of the ECB charter and Lisbon Treaty, Europe created the temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and then the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The creation of these new institutions met the immediate funding needs of several member-states, but retained the flawed principle of separable public debts and so could not contain the crisis. One sovereign state, Cyprus, has now de facto gone bankrupt, imposing capital controls even while remaining inside the euro.

During the summer of 2012, the ECB came up with another approach: the Outright Monetary Transactions’ Programme (OMT). OMT succeeded in calming the bond markets for a while. But it too fails as a solution to the crisis, because it is based on a threat against bond markets that cannot remain credible over time. And while it puts the public debt crisis on hold, it fails to reverse it; ECB bond purchases cannot restore the lending power of failed markets or the borrowing power of failing governments.

Better understood as failure of the ECB to explicitly guarantee national govt bonds against default. It was only when Mario Draghi said the ECB would ‘do what it takes to prevent default of national govt debt’ that spreads narrowed and the national funding crisis faded. And it is only the threat that Greece will be allowed to default that is causing the current Greek funding crisis.

Investment crisis: Lack of investment in Europe threatens its living standards and its international competitiveness.

He doesn’t differentiate between public investment in public infrastructure, vs private investment that responds to prospects for profits.

As Germany alone ran large surpluses after 2000, the resulting trade imbalances ensured that when crisis hit in 2008, the deficit zones would collapse.

How is ‘collapse’ defined here? The funding crisis was a function of ECB policy that presumably would allow member nations to default, as when Draghi said that would not happen that crisis ended.

And the burden of adjustment fell exactly on the deficit zones, which could not bear it.

However, there were and remain alternatives to said ‘adjustments’ including the permission to run larger budget deficits than the current, arbitrary, 3% limit. Note that this ‘remedy’ is never even suggested or seriously discussed.

Nor could it be offset by devaluation or new public spending, so the scene was set for disinvestment in the regions that needed investment the most. Thus, Europe ended up with both low total investment and an even more uneven distribution of that investment between its surplus and deficit regions.

True, however it is not recognized that the fundamental cause is that the 3% deficit limit is too low.

Social crisis: Three years of harsh austerity have taken their toll on Europe’s peoples.

From Athens to Dublin and from Lisbon to Eastern Germany, millions of Europeans have lost access to basic goods and dignity. Unemployment is rampant. Homelessness and hunger are rising. Pensions have been cut; taxes on necessities meanwhile continue to rise. For the first time in two generations, Europeans are questioning the European project, while nationalism, and even Nazi parties, are gaining strength.

True

3. Political constraints for any solution.
Any solution to the crisis must respect realistic constraints on political action. This is why grand schemes should be shunned. It is why we need a modest proposal.

But immodest enough to do more than rearrange the deck chairs on the titanic.

Four constraints facing Europe presently are: (a) The ECB will not be allowed to monetise sovereigns directly.

Not necessary

There will be no ECB guarantees of debt issues by member-states,

They already said they will do what it takes to prevent default, meaning at maturity and when interest payments are due the ECB will make sure the appropriate accounts are credited. However this policy is discretionary, with threats Greece would be allowed to default.

no ECB purchases of government bonds in the primary market,

Not necessary

no ECB leveraging of the EFSF-ESM to buy sovereign debt from either the primary or secondary markets.

Not necessary

(b) The ECB’s OMT programme has been tolerated insofar as no bonds are actually purchased. OMT is a policy that does not match stability with growth and, sooner or later, will be found wanting.

And accomplishes nothing of consequence for the real economy.

(c) Surplus countries will not consent to ‘jointly and severally’ guaranteed Eurobonds to mutualise debt and deficit countries will resist the loss of sovereignty that would be demanded of them without a properly functioning federal transfer union which Germany, understandably, rejects.

Said eurobonds not necessary for fiscal transfers.

(d) Europe cannot wait for federation. If crisis resolution is made to depend on federation, the Eurozone will fail first.

Probably true.

The treaty changes necessary to create a proper European Treasury, with the powers to tax, spend and borrow, cannot, and must not, be held to precede resolution of this crisis.

Nor are they necessary to sustain full employment.

The next section presents four policies that recognise these constraints.

4. THE MODEST PROPOSAL – Four crises, four policies The Modest Proposal introduces no new EU institutions and violates no existing treaty. Instead, we propose that existing institutions be used in ways that remain within the letter of European legislation but allow for new functions and policies.

These institutions are:

· The European Central Bank – ECB

· The European Investment Bank – EIB

· The European Investment Fund – EIF

· The European Stability Mechanism – ESM

Policy 1 – Case-by-Case Bank Programme (CCBP)

For the time being, we propose that banks in need of recapitalisation from the ESM be turned over to the ESM directly – instead of having the national government borrow on the bank’s behalf.

‘In need of recapitalization’ is not defined. With credible deposit insurance banks can function in the normal course of business without capital, for example. That means ‘need of capital’ is a political and not an operational matter.

Banks from Cyprus, Greece and Spain would likely fall under this proposal. The ESM, and not the national government, would then restructure, recapitalize and resolve the failing banks dedicating the bulk of its funding capacity to this purpose.

Those banks are necessarily already ‘funded’ via either deposits or central bank credits, unless their equity capital is already negative and not simply below regulatory requirements, as for every asset there is necessarily a liability. And I have not been aware of the banks in question have negative capital accounts.

The Eurozone must eventually become a single banking area with a single banking authority.

Yes, with the provider of deposit insurance, the ECB, also doing the regulation and supervision.

But this final goal has become the enemy of good current policy. At the June 2012 European Summit direct bank recapitalisation was agreed upon in principle, but was made conditional on the formation of a Banking Union. Since then, the difficulties of legislating, designing and implementing a Banking Union have meant delay and dithering. A year after that sensible decision, the deadly embrace between insolvent national banking systems and insolvent member-states continues.

Today the dominant EU view remains that banking union must be completed before the ESM directly recapitalises banks.

Again, I don’t recall the problem being negative bank capital, but merely capital that may fall short of required minimums, in which case not only is no ‘public funding’ is required with regard to capital, but the concept itself is inapplicable as adding public capital doesn’t alter the risk to ‘public funds’

And that when it is complete, the ESM’s contribution will be partial and come only after a bail in of depositors in the fiscally stressed countries of the periphery. That way, the banking crisis will either never be resolved or its resolution be delayed for years, risking a new financial implosion.

Our proposal is that a national government should have the option of waiving its right to supervise and resolve a failing bank.

This carries extreme moral hazard, as it removes the risk of inadequate supervision from the national govt, and instead rewards lax supervision. Instead that right to supervise and regulate should immediately be transferred to the ECB for the entire national banking system in exchange for ECB deposit insurance.

Shares equivalent to the needed capital injection will then pass to the ESM, and the ECB and ESM will appoint a new Board of Directors. The new board will conduct a full review of the bank’s position and will recommend to the ECB-ESM a course for reform of the bank. Reform may entail a merger, downsizing, even a full resolution of the bank, with the understanding that steps will be taken to avoid, above all, a haircut of deposits.

That is functionally what I call sustaining credible deposit insurance which largely eliminates bank liquidity issues.

Once the bank has been restructured and recapitalised, the ESM will sell its shares and recoup its costs.

I agree with the resolution process.

The above proposal can be implemented today, without a Banking Union or any treaty changes.

The experience that the ECB and the ESM will acquire from this case-by-case process will help hone the formation of a proper banking union once the present crisis recedes.

POLICY 2 – Limited Debt Conversion Programme (LDCP)
The Maastricht Treaty permits each European member-state to issue sovereign debt up to 60% of GDP. Since the crisis of 2008, most Eurozone member-states have exceeded this limit. We propose that the ECB offer member-states the opportunity of a debt conversion for their Maastricht Compliant Debt (MCD), while the national shares of the converted debt would continue to be serviced separately by each member-state.

The ECB, faithful to the non-monetisation constraint (a) above, would not seek to buy or guarantee sovereign MCD debt directly or indirectly. Instead it would act as a go-between, mediating between investors and member-states. In effect, the ECB would orchestrate a conversion servicing loan for the MCD, for the purposes of redeeming those bonds upon maturity.

The conversion servicing loan works as follows. Refinancing of the Maastricht compliant share of the debt, now held in ECB-bonds, would be by member-states but at interest rates set by the ECB just above its bond yields. The shares of national debt converted to ECB-bonds are to be held by it in debit accounts. These cannot be used as collateral for credit or derivatives creation.6 Member states will undertake to redeem bonds in full on maturity, if the holders opt for this rather than to extend them at lower, more secure rates offered by the ECB.

Governments that wish to participate in the scheme can do so on the basis of Enhanced Cooperation, which needs at least nine member-states.7 Those not opting in can keep their own bonds even for their MCD. To safeguard the credibility of this conversion, and to provide a backstop for the ECB-bonds that requires no ECB monetisation, member-states agree to afford their ECB debit accounts super-seniority status, and the ECB’s conversion servicing loan mechanism may be insured by the ESM, utilising only a small portion of the latter’s borrowing capacity. If a member-state goes into a disorderly default before an ECB-bond issued on its behalf matures, then that ECB-bond payment will be covered by insurance purchased or provided by the ESM.

This can more readily be accomplished by formalizing and making permanent the ‘do what it takes to prevent default’ policy that’s already in place, and it will immediately lower the cost of new securities as well.

Why not continue with the ECB’s OMT? The ECB has succeeded in taming interest rate spreads within the Eurozone by means of announcing its Outright Monetary Transactions’ programme (OMT). OMT was conceived as unlimited support of stressed Euro-Area bonds – Italy’s and Spain’s in particular – so as to end the contagion and save the euro from collapse.

Instead I give credit for the low rates to the ‘do what it takes’ policy.

However, political and institutional pressures meant that the threat against bond dealers, which was implicit in the OMT announcement, had to be diluted to a conditional programme. The conditionality involves troika-supervision over the governments to be helped by the OMT, who are obliged to sign a draconian memorandum of understanding before OMT takes effect. The problem is not only that this of itself does nothing to address the need for both stability and growth, but that the governments of Spain and Italy would not survive signing such a memorandum of understanding, and therefore have not done so.

Thus OMT’s success in quelling the bond markets is based on a non-credible threat. So far, not one bond has been purchased. This constitutes an open invitation to bond dealers to test the ECB’s resolve at a time of their choosing. It is a temporary fix bound to stop working when circumstances embolden the bond dealers. That may happen when volatility returns to global bond markets once the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan begin to curtail their quantitative easing programmes.

There will be no funding issues while ‘do what it takes to prevent default’ policy is in force.

POLICY 3 – An Investment-led Recovery and Convergence Programme (IRCP)
In principle the EU already has a recovery and convergence strategy in the European Economic Recovery Programme 2020. In practice this has been shredded by austerity. We propose that the European Union launch a new investment programme to reverse the recession, strengthen European integration, restore private sector confidence and fulfill the commitment of the Rome Treaty to rising standards of living and that of the 1986 Single European Act to economic and social cohesion.

The Investment-led Recovery and Convergence Programme (IRCP) will be cofinanced by bonds issued jointly by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Investment Fund (EIF). The EIB has a remit to invest in health, education, urban renewal, urban environment, green technology and green power generation, while the EIF both can co-finance EIB investment projects and should finance a European Venture Capital Fund, which was part of its original design.

A key principle of this proposal is that investment in these social and environmental domains should be europeanised. Borrowing for such investments should not count on national debt anymore than US Treasury borrowing counts on the debt of California or Delaware. The under-recognised precedents for this are (1) that no major European member state counts EIB borrowing against national debt, and (2) that the EIB has successfully issued bonds since 1958 without national guarantees.

EIB-EIF finance of an IRCP therefore does not need national guarantees or a common fiscal policy. Instead, the joint bonds can be serviced directly by the revenue streams of the EIB-EIF-funded investment projects. This can be carried out within member states and will not need fiscal transfers between them.

A European Venture Capital Fund financed by EIF bonds was backed unanimously by employers and trades unions on the Economic and Social Committee in their 2012 report Restarting Growth. Central European economies (Germany and Austria) already have excellent finance for small and medium firms through their Mittelstandpolitik. It is the peripheral economies that need this, to build new sectors, to foster convergence and cohesion and to address the growing imbalances of competitiveness within the Eurozone.

Rationale

The transmission mechanism of monetary policy to the periphery of Europe has broken down. Mr Mario Draghi admits this. He has gone on record to suggest that the EIB play a active role in restoring investment financing in the periphery. Mr Draghi is right on this point.

But, for the IRCP to reverse the Eurozone recession and stop the de-coupling of the core from the periphery, it must be large enough to have a significant effect on the GDP of the peripheral countries.

If EIB-EIF bonds are to be issued on this scale, some fear that their yields may rise. But this is far from clear. The world is awash in savings seeking sound investment outlets. Issues of EIF bonds that co-finance EIB investment projects should meet these demands, supporting stability and working to restore growth in the European periphery. We therefore submit that joint EIB-EIF bond issues can succeed without formal guarantees. Nonetheless, in fulfillment of its remit to support “the general economic policies in the Union”, the ECB can issue an advance or precautionary statement that it will partially support EIB-EIF bonds by means of standard central bank refinancing or secondary market operations. Such a statement should suffice to allow the EIB-EIF funded IRCP to be large enough for the purposes of bringing about Europe’s recovery.

Misleading arguments and unworkable alternatives:

There are calls for bonds to finance infrastructure, neglecting the fact that this has been happening through the European Investment Bank (EIB) for more than half a century. An example is a recent European Commission proposal for ‘Project Bonds’ to be guaranteed by member states. This assures opposition from many of them, not least Germany, while ignoring the fact that the EIB has issued project bonds successfully since 1958, without such guarantees.10

There is no high-profile awareness that EIB investment finance does not count on the national debt of any major member state of the EU nor need count on that of smaller states.11

There is a widespread presumption that public investment drains the private sector when in fact it sustains and supports it. There is similar presumption that one cannot solve the crisis by ‘piling debt on debt’. It depends on which debt for which purpose, and at what rates. Piling up national debt at interest rates of up to seven per cent or more without recovery is suicidal. Funding inflows from global surpluses to Europe to promote economic recovery through joint EIB-EIF bonds at interest rates which could be less than two per cent is entirely sustainable.

There is little awareness of the EIB’s sister organisation, the European Investment Fund (EIF), which has a large potential for investment funding of SMEs, high technology clusters and a variety of other projects, which it can cofinance with bonds, issued jointly with the EIB (see note 9). Why aren’t the EIB-EIF doing this now? Until the onset of the Eurozone crisis the EIB had succeeded in gaining national co-finance, or co-finance from national institutions, for its investments. But with the crisis and constraints on co-finance, total annual EIB financing fell from over €82bn in 2008 to only €45bn last year. The EIF can counterpart and thereby countervail this. It is a sister institution of the EIB within the EIB Group. Like EIB bonds, EIF bonds need not count on national debt nor need national guarantees. The EIB would retain control over project approval and monitoring. In sum, we recommend that:

The IRCP be funded by means of jointly issued EIB and EIF bonds without any formal guarantees or fiscal transfers by member states.

Both EIB and EIF bonds be redeemed by the revenue stream of the investment • projects they fund, as EIB bonds always have been.

If needed, the ECB should stand by to assist in keeping yields low, through direct purchases of EIB-EIF bonds in the secondary market.

I agree the role of the EIB could be expanded, however the political difficulties are substantial and the time to initial implementation will likely be a year or more- time the EU may not have.

POLICY 4 – An Emergency Social Solidarity Programme (ESSP)

We recommend that Europe embark immediately on an Emergency Social Solidarity Programme that will guarantee access to nutrition and to basic energy needs for all Europeans, by means of a European Food Stamp Programme modelled on its US equivalent and a European Minimum Energy Programme. These programmes would be funded by the European Commission using the interest accumulated within the European system of central banks, from TARGET2 imbalances, profits made from government bond transactions and, in the future, other financial transactions or balance sheet stamp duties that the EU is currently considering.

These revenues currently are returned to the member nations and without them compliance with the 3% deficit limit will reduce other spending and/or require additional taxes.

Rationale

Europe now faces the worst human and social crisis since the late 1940s. In member-states like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, but also elsewhere in the Eurozone, including core countries, basic needs are not being met. This is true especially for the elderly, the unemployed, for young children, for children in schools, for the disabled, and for the homeless. There is a plain moral imperative to act to satisfy these needs. In addition, Europe faces a clear and present danger from extremism, racism, xenophobia and even outright Nazism – notably in countries like Greece that have borne the brunt of the crisis. Never before have so many Europeans held the European Union and its institutions in such low esteem. The human and social crisis is turning quickly into a question of legitimacy for the European Union.

Reason for TARGET2 funding

TARGET2 is a technical name for the system of internal accounting of monetary flows between the central banks that make up the European System of Central Banks. In a well balanced Eurozone, where the trade deficit of a member state is financed by a net flow of capital to that same member-state, the liabilities of that state’s central bank to the central banks of other states would just equal its assets.

Not true. Target 2 is about clearing balances that can cause banks to gain or lose liquidity independent of national trade balances.

Such a balanced flow of trade and capital would yield a TARGET2 figure near zero for all member-states.

Again, it’s not trade per se that alters bank liquidity issues.

And that was, more or less, the case throughout the Eurozone before the crisis.

However, the crisis caused major imbalances that were soon reflected in huge TARGET2 imbalances.

The clearing imbalances were caused by lack of credible deposit insurance exacerbated by potential bank failures, not trade per se.

As inflows of capital to the periphery dried up, and capital began to flow in the opposite direction, the central banks of the peripheral countries began to amass large net liabilities and the central banks of the surplus countries equally large net assets.

Yes, but not to confuse capital, which is bank equity/net worth, and liquidity which is the funding of assets and is sometimes casually called ‘capital’ the way ‘money’ is casually called capital.

The Eurozone’s designers had attempted to build a disincentive within the intraEurosystem real-time payments’ system, so as to prevent the build-up of huge liabilities on one side and corresponding assets on the other. This took the form of charging interest on the net liabilities of each national central bank, at an interest rate equal to the ECB’s main refinancing level.

The purpose of this policy rate is to make sure the ECB’s policy rate is the instrument of monetary policy, reflected as the banking system’s cost of funds.

These payments are distributed to the central banks of the surplus member-states, which then pass them on to their government treasury.

In practice, one bank necessarily has a credit balance at the ECB when another has a debit balance, and net debit balances exist to the extent there is actual cash in circulation that banks get in exchange for clearing balances. This keeps the banking system ‘net borrowed’ which provides the ECB with interest income. Additionally buying securities that yield more than deposit rates adds income to the ECB.

Thus the Eurozone was built on the assumption that TARGET2 imbalances would be isolated, idiosyncratic events, to be corrected by national policy action.

The system did not take account of the possibility that there could be fundamental structural asymmetries and a systemic crisis.

Today, the vast TARGET2 imbalances are the monetary tracks of the crisis. They trace the path of the consequent human and social disaster hitting mainly the deficit regions. The increased TARGET2 interest would never have accrued if the crises had not occurred. They accrue only because, for instance, risk averse Spanish and Greek depositors, reasonably enough, transfer their savings to a Frankfurt bank.

Yes, my point exactly, and somewhat counter to what was stated previously. Depositors can shift banks for a variety of reasons, with or without trade differentials.

As a result, under the rules of the TARGET2 system, the central bank of Spain and of Greece have to pay interest to the Bundesbank – to be passed along to the Federal Government in Berlin.

Which then pays interest to its depositors. The ECB profits to the extent it establishes a spread between the rate it lends at vs the rate paid to depositors. That spread is a political decision.

This indirect fiscal boost to the surplus country has no rational or moral basis. Yet the funds are there, and could be used to deflect the social and political danger facing Europe.

There is a strong case to be made that the interest collected from the deficit member-states’ central banks should be channelled to an account that would fund our proposed Emergency Social Solidarity Programme (ESSP). Additionally, if the EU introduces a financial transactions’ tax, or stamp duty proportional to the size of corporate balance sheets, a similar case can be made as to why these receipts should fund the ESSP. With this proposal, the ESSP is not funded by fiscal transfers nor national taxes.

The way I see it, functionally, it is a fiscal transfer, and not that I am against fiscal transfers!

My conclusion is that any improvement in the economy from these modest proposals, and as I’ve qualified above, will likewise be at least as modest. That is, the time and effort to attempt to implement these proposals, again, as qualified, will make little if any progress in fixing the economy as another generation is left to rot on the vine.

5. CONCLUSION: Four realistic policies to replace of five false choices Three years of crisis have culminated in a Europe that has lost legitimacy with its own citizens and credibility with the rest of the world. Europe is unnecessarily back in recession. While the bond markets were placated by the ECB’s actions in the summer of 2012, the Eurozone remains on the road toward disintegration.

While this process eats away at Europe’s potential for shared prosperity, European governments are imprisoned by false choices:

between stability and growth

between austerity and stimulus

between the deadly embrace of insolvent banks by insolvent governments, and an admirable but undefined and indefinitely delayed Banking Union

between the principle of perfectly separable country debts and the supposed need to persuade the surplus countries to bankroll the rest

between national sovereignty and federalism. These falsely dyadic choices imprison thinking and immobilise governments. They are responsible for a legitimation crisis for the European project. And they risk a catastrophic human, social and democratic crisis in Europe.

By contrast the Modest Proposal counters that:

The real choice is between beggar-my-neighbour deflation and an investmentled recovery combined with social stabilisation. The investment recovery will be funded by global capital, supplied principally by sovereign wealth funds and by pension funds which are seeking long-term investment outlets. Social stabilisation can be funded, initially, through the Target2 payments scheme.

Taxpayers in Germany and the other surplus nations do not need to bankroll the 2020 European Economic Recovery Programme, the restructuring of sovereign debt, resolution of the banking crisis, or the emergency humanitarian programme so urgently needed in the European periphery.

Neither an expansionary monetary policy nor a fiscal stimulus in Germany and other surplus countries, though welcome, would be sufficient to bring recovery to Europe.

Treaty changes for a federal union may be aspired by some, but will take too long , are opposed by many, and are not needed to resolve the crisis now. On this basis the Modest Proposal’s four policies are feasible steps by which to deal decisively with Europe’s banking crisis, the debt crisis, underinvestment, unemployment as well as the human, social and political emergency.

Version 4.0 of the Modest Proposal offers immediate answers to questions about the credibility of the ECB’s OMT policy, the impasse on a Banking Union, financing of SMEs through EIF bonds enabling a European Venture Capital Fund, green energy and high tech start-ups in Europe’s periphery, and basic human needs that the crisis has left untended.

It is not known how many strokes Alexander the Great needed to cut the Gordian knot. But in four strokes, Europe could cut through the knot of debt and deficits in which it has bound itself.

In one stroke, Policy 1, the Case-by-Case Bank Programme (CCBP), bypasses the impasse of Banking Union (BU), decoupling stressed sovereign debt and from banking recapitalisation, and allowing for a proper BU to be designed at leisure

By another stroke, Policy 2, the Limited Debt Conversion Programme (LDCP), the Eurozone’s mountain of debt shrinks, through an ECB-ESM conversion of Maastricht Compliant member-state Debt

By a third stroke, Policy 3, the Investment-led Recovery and Convergence Programme (IRCP) re-cycles global surpluses into European investments

By a fourth stroke, Policy 4, the Emergency Social Solidarity Programme (ESSP), deploys funds created from the asymmetries that helped cause the crisis to meet basic human needs caused by the crisis itself.

At the political level, the four policies of the Modest Proposal constitute a process of decentralised europeanisation, to be juxtaposed against an authoritarian federation that has not been put to European electorates, is unlikely to be endorsed by them, and, critically, offers them no assurance of higher levels of employment and welfare.

We propose that four areas of economic activity be europeanised: banks in need of ESM capital injections, sovereign debt management, the recycling of European and global savings into socially productive investment and prompt financing of a basic social emergency programme.

Our proposed europeanisation of borrowing for investment retains a large degree of subsidiarity. It is consistent with greater sovereignty for member-states than that implied by a federal structure, and it is compatible with the principle of reducing excess national debt, once banks, debt and investment flows are europeanised without the need for national guarantees or fiscal transfers.

While broad in scope, the Modest Proposal suggests no new institutions and does not aim at redesigning the Eurozone. It needs no new rules, fiscal compacts, or troikas. It requires no prior agreement to move in a federal direction while allowing for consent through enhanced cooperation rather than imposition of austerity.

It is in this sense that this proposal is, indeed, modest.

Visa on consumer spending, GDP, Consumer sentiment, Greece update, Personal income, Employment costs

Visa quantifies impact to consumer spending from lower gas prices (from its earnings call Thurs night) –

US fuel prices are down ~30% since June. The drop amounts to ~$60/month for the avg. consumer according to our survey. Approximately 50% of the savings are being saved, 25% is being used to pay down debt & ~25% is being spent in other discretionary categories including grocery, clothing & restaurants. As we look forward, we would anticipate the savings will accumulate & ultimately we’ll see more spend in the discretionary categories including higher ticket items (i.e. home improvement, electronics, travel and entertainment)

No sign of ‘acceleration’ here but continues to be operating under the previously discussed macro constraint with regard to the need for agents spending more than their incomes to offset those spending less than their incomes in the context of lower federal deficits. Moreover, the drop in oil prices that has led to a drop in capital expenditures removes what had been the marginal support for even the modest growth we’ve been seeing, and not the reversal of data I highlighted previously as subject to reversal, and the Q4 inventory build should reverse in Q1:

GDP
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Highlights
The advance estimate for fourth quarter GDP growth disappointed with a 2.6 percent figure versus analysts’ estimate of 3.2 percent and following 5.0 percent for the third quarter.

Final sales of domestic product slowed to 1.8 percent, following a 5.0 percent jump in the third quarter. Final sales to domestic purchasers eased to 2.8 percent from 4.1 percent in the third quarter.

The increase in real GDP in the fourth quarter reflected positive contributions from personal consumption expenditures, private inventory investment, exports, nonresidential fixed investment, state and local government spending, and residential fixed investment that were partly offset by a negative contribution from federal government spending. Imports, which are a subtraction in the calculation of GDP, increased.

The deceleration in real GDP growth in the fourth quarter primarily reflected an upturn in imports, a downturn in federal government spending, and decelerations in nonresidential fixed investment and in exports that were partly offset by an upturn in private inventory investment and an acceleration in PCEs. PCE growth posted at 4.3 percent in the fourth quarter versus 3.2 percent the prior quarter. Inventories rose $113.1 billion, compared to $82.2 billion in the third quarter.

On the price front, the chain-weighted price index was unchanged, compared to the1.4 percent rise in the third quarter. Market expectations were for a 1.0 percent gain. The core chain index, excluding food and energy, eased to 0.7 percent from 1.7 percent in the third quarter.

From the BEA:

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The growth of actual $ spent by people in fact grew at a lower rate, reinforcing the narrative that the ‘consumer savings’ was not being spent. But it also further reinforces my narrative that at the macro level there is no net savings, as for every agent spending less there are other agents getting exactly that much less income.

The first chart is the change in actual $ spent:
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This second chart is adjusted for inflation, indicating the slower growth in actual dollars spent none the less resulted in a faster growth of ‘real’ purchases. Keep in mind, however, the inflation adjustment methodology is necessarily highly problematic at best with quite a bit of volatility in the short term, so Q1 will likely show a similar reduction in the growth of ‘real’ PCE if oil prices stabilize at current levels:
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It’s service prices that tend to be ‘sticky’ so they show ‘real’ increases when the price deflator falls, so interesting how the annual growth rate actually came down some:
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And spending growth on health care remains low enough to not be a political issue:
eco-release-1-30-8
Again, this is one man one vote, not one dollar one vote, and while more people are saving on fuel than are losing income, which is what is driving the chart, the income losses = the income gains:
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Regarding Greece, I have no idea how this translates into actual policy proposals:

Varoufakis said he had assured Dijsselbloem that Athens planned to implement reforms to make the economy more competitive and have balanced budgets but that it would not accept a “self-fed crisis” of deflation and non-viable debt.

eco-release-1-30-10
Yes, the growth rate is almost about what it was before, but it would have to grow faster to make up for the lost ground shown above.
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The only cause for alarm is how low this is:

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Jobless claims, Pending home sales, Danish CB cuts rate to -.5%, comments on Greece, Canada job losses, Shell capex cut, Gasoline and utility demand soft

Jobless Claims 265k, -43k to 15-Year Low in Holiday Week.

This is the lowest level for initial claims since April 15, 2000 when it was 259,000. The previous week’s level was revised up by 1,000 from 307,000 to 308,000. The 4-week moving average was 298,500, a decrease of 8,250 from the previous week’s revised average.

Pending Home Sales Index
pending-home-sales-dec
Highlights
Indications on housing had been turning up — but not after today’s pending home sales index which fell a very steep 3.7 in December. A decline was not expected at all with the result far underneath the Econoday low estimate for plus 0.3 percent. All regions show single digit declines in the month including the two most closely watched regions, the South (down 2.6 percent) and the West (down 4.6 percent).

Final sales of existing homes did pop higher in last week’s report for December but amid a still flat trend. Today’s pending sales report doesn’t point to any improvement, which is a bit of a mystery given how low mortgage rates are and how strong the job market is.

Another CB ‘raises taxes’:

*DANISH CENTRAL BANK CUTS DEPOSIT RATE TO -0.5% FROM -0.35%

Reads like a showdown brewing.

Greece won’t be able to fund itself in euro and will bounce checks without at least implied ECB support. That leaves going back to their own new currency, which carries the usual high risks of mismanagement by leadership that gets in it way over their heads, etc. That is, even with its own currency Greece has been ‘in crisis’ with unemployment, inflation, and interest rates all in double digits along with the corresponding currency depreciation. And it would fundamentally be a ‘strong euro’ bias, as Greek euro debt and bank deposits would likely vanish.

Eurozone May Not Blink First in Confrontation With Greece (WSJ) Alexis Tsipras has been prime minister of Greece for only 48 hours and has done little to back his claim of wanting to keep his country in the eurozone. His strategy appears to be to put himself at the head of a Europe-wide leftist assault against “austerity,” playing to an anti-German gallery in the hope of isolating Berlin. Mr. Tsipras and his finance minister have already been in contact with leftist governments in France and Italy. Madrid is clear that any deal with the Greek leader must be based on reform commitments at least as tough as those demanded of former Prime Minister Antonis Samaras. Anything less would represent a win for Mr. Tsipras and fuel support for Spain’s own new radical leftist party, Podemos.

Greece Moves Quickly to Roll Back Austerity (WSJ) Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras said “our priority is to support the economy, to help it get going again. We are ready to negotiate with our partners in order to reduce debt and find a fair and viable solution.” Government ministers said that the planned sale of the state’s 67% stake in the main port of Piraeus had been halted, that Greece would freeze the planned restructuring and sell off the country’s dominant, state-controlled utility company, and that the government would reverse some of the thousands of layoffs imposed as part of the bailout. Labor Minister Panos Skourletis also said that an increase to Greece’s basic wage will be among the first bills the government will submit to parliament.

Oil capex cuts continue:

Canada December Job Losses Deeper After Revisions (WSJ) The Canadian economy shed 11,300 net jobs last month instead of the 4,300 decline reported earlier in January, Statistics Canada said. December’s jobless rate was 6.7%, compared with the previously estimated 6.6%. Adjusted to U.S. concepts, the jobless rate was 5.7% last month, compared with 5.6% south of the border, Statistics Canada said. Net job creation in Canada for all of 2014 totaled 121,300 positions, the lowest level since the country posted a net loss in jobs in 2009, at the height of the global recession.

Shell oil:

The $15 billion spending cut, which will involve cancelling and deferring projects through 2017, which would represent a 14 percent cut per year from 2014 capital investment of $35 billion.

Reflecting the new oil price environment, Shell, having said in October it would keep its 2015 spending unchanged, announced it would have to cut what is one of the largest capital investment programmes in the industry.

“Shell is considering further reductions to capital spending should the evolving market outlook warrant that step, but is aiming to retain growth potential for the medium term,” it said in a statement.

No sign yet of US gasoline or electric consumption materially increasing:

pce-gas-elec

ip-elec-gas

Credit check, euro slipping on Greece

Yes, bank lending is growing some, but it’s just back to where it was a couple of years back when it took a step back, and below the prior cycle’s growth rate:
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No action here:
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And commercial paper is down about $85 billion since Dec 3, which means the rise in bank lending has been at the expense of shadow bank lending, and total lending is going nowhere:
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Meanwhile, the euro has fallen a bit further vs the dollar after the Greek election results. I still don’t see this leading to any kind of fiscal expansion, and the proposed debt restructuring is functionally just a tax on bondholders that if anything further removes aggregate demand.

Additionally, the ECB’s latest moves, while actually contractionary/deflationary, are perceived as the reverse and Greece and others will likely give them time ‘kick in’ and spur growth. And while lower oil costs are a plus for most euro consumers, the lower cost of imports adds to the trade surplus, which is a force for a stronger euro.

The latest QE policy removes ECB ‘conditionality’

Several years ago Mario Draghi announced the ECB would do what it takes (within the rules) to prevent national govt defaults, which immediately reversed the climb of national govt rates, bringing them down to where they are today. But it also came with ‘conditionality’ regarding fiscal policy, where a violation of the fiscal rules carried the threat of the removal of ECB support.

This time it’s different. As part of this broad based fight to reverse the current deflationary forces, the national CB’s will now be buying their own nation’s debt, thereby, for all practical purposes, eliminating default risk. And with no mention of fiscal conditionality. Taken at its word, this means the latest QE policy has removed the ECB’s leverage over national govt fiscal policy, as the ECB did not tie it’s securities purchases to fiscal compliance.

Therefore Greece and Italy, the two members desiring fiscal expansion, are operationally free to do so without the threat of default driving up their interest rates. They may face EU penalties, etc. but those are a very different matter than the prior default risk.

So the door is now open to anyone bold enough to step through. However they probably don’t know it and probably wouldn’t go there if they did…

And, as previously discussed, QE per se is a deflationary/contractionary strong euro bias in the process of making a very bad situation that much worse.

Comments on Greece

A couple of ‘fundamentals’

A default/restructure/debt reduction of any form removes euro financial assets and is a contractionary/deflationary bias that makes euro ‘harder to get’ and thereby firms the currency.

Also, Greece has been running a budget deficit, which adds net euro the global economy, making euro easier to get, etc. so if Greece leaves the euro that source of net euro financial assets goes away as well, also fundamentally firming the euro.

And any Greek contribution to the euro trade surplus would be lost, which would work to weaken the euro.

Not that markets would initially react this way!!!
;)

As we had been expecting, the third and final round of the Greek parliamentary vote to elect a new President failed this morning and the country is now headed for a general election. The most likely date for this is January 25th (+/- a week, elections are always held on a Synday), with the constitution stipulating that parliament has to now be dissolved within ten days (most likely tomorrow) and elections held as soon as possible after. With Greek banks still reliant on the ECB for funding and bond maturities ongoing throughout 2015, a significant period of political and financial uncertainty now opens up for Greece and the Eurozone as a whole. Here are the three major questions that need to be answered as we enter the New Year:

1. What will the European response to early elections be?
Greece now has to deal with exceptionally pressing deadlines from its creditors. The current financing programme has been extended to the end of February to allow Troika negotiations to conclude and disburse the remaining 1.8bn EFSF funding before transitioning into a new financing arrangement (most likely an ECCL). If this deadline lapses without agreement, Greece will legally no longer be “under a program” and the undisbursed amounts will cease to exist. The European position across three fronts will therefore need to be clarified.

First, how “hard” is the February headline? Assuming the election takes place on January 25th, it will take around another 10 days to elect a new president (three 5-day distance parliamentary rounds are required, but the second round only requires 150 MP majority), and probably at least a week to form a new governing coalition.* With at best a few weeks left for a new government to negotiate the disbursement of the final tranche and a new credit line, completing talks will be a tall order. European partners will need to discuss if they would be open to another program extension, or if talks would have to start on a blank slate. Both avenues would require fresh approval of the extension or new funding from national parliaments.

The second question relates to ECB funding of Greek banks. We estimate that at least a third of the current 42bn EUR of Eurosystem financing is reliant on collateral that currently benefits from a credit rating threshold suspension from the ECB. It would become ineligible in the event the Greek program expires in February without a financing umbrella. Where the program to lapse after February, part of Greek bank funding would have to shift to Emergency Lending Assistance (ELA) at the Bank of Greece. With the size and scope of ELA financing being under bi-weekly review and press reports suggesting that the Governing Council is considering a broader re-think of its terms and conditions, ECB policy on Greek bank funding remains a key source of uncertainty as well as the most direct means of putting pressure on a new Greek government.

The third and final question relates to the Troika’s broader willingness to negotiate and compromise with a new government. As with the negotiations this year, the primary source of disagreement is likely to remain the fiscal gap for 2015, with the Troika’s current demands standing at a 3 percent primary balance target equivalent to a 2bn fiscal gap versus the current government’s budgeted measures. Our prior is that with a new government in place and a fresh 4-year mandate, the Troika would be more willing to give leeway to authorities to assess budget execution over the course of 2015 rather than voting a large number of proposed fiscal measures upfront, if not revising the primary balance target lower. Still, the timing and extent of such concessions remains highly uncertain, if at all possible.

Despite the pressing nature of the above questions, we would not expect full clarity from European authorities on any of the three fronts above while the election period in Greece is in full swing. The Eurogroup next meets on January 18th where local press reports that the European Commission will present a preliminary report on the terms and conditions which Greece would need to satisfy to remain eligible for an ECCL as well as complete the final review of the current program. A further extension of the latter in any case requires a formal request from the Greek government, and we would expect international creditors to remain quiet on most fronts until a new Greek government has emerged.

2. Who will win the Greek election?

The ability to meet the deadlines above in large part depends on the outcome of the general election and the position of the new government. Opinion polls have been showing a consistent lead for the Radical Left SYRIZA party over ruling New Democracy in the last few months, and our baseline remains that SYRIZA wins the elections. Still, the parliamentary and governmental outcome is not a foregone conclusion. First, SYRIZA’s opinion poll lead over New Democracy has narrowed from 4-6 percentage points over the last few months to 3-4 percent currently. With the political environment remaining particularly fluid (and polls unreliable), the outcome on voting day is not a done deal. Second, a SYRIZA first does not guarantee a parliamentary majority. Greek electoral law operates under an enhanced representation system that allocates the first 50 parliamentary seats as a bonus to the first party, with the rest split proportionately. This in practice requires a party to win 34-38 percent of the national vote to gain an absolute majority. As things stand, SYRIZA would win around 140 MPs in parliament and be required to form a coalition* with at least one of the following four smaller parties that are projected to enter parliament:

The River (“To Potami”) – this is a newly founded moderate left-off-centre party that has been founded by journalist Stavros Theodorakis a few months ago. We would consider this the most likely coalition partner, given that the party has openly expressed a desire for coalition-making. The party is currently polling around 7pct.

Independent Greeks – this is a radical populist party sitting on the right of the current government, whose main policy plank has been opposing current “memorandum policies”. While the party stands at the opposite end of the spectrum from SYRIZA on a number of non-economic issues (eg. immigration, separation of church and state), both sides have indicated they would be open to discussions on a governmental program. The party is currently polling at the fringe of the 3 percent threshold required to enter parliament.

PASOK – the current junior coalition party member, the stigma attached to this party would make it a more difficult coalition candidate for SYRIZA. Still, it is possible that the party is faced with internal pressure in coming weeks that forces a leadership change making coalition-making easier. Indeed, local press is reporting that former prime minister Papandreou (whose father founded the party) is considering running under his own separate platform.

Communists – with the agenda of this party being firmly against EU membership, it is the least likely coalition partner of the above.

As things stand, our baseline remains that either a SYRIZA-Potami or SYRIZA- Independent Greek coalition remain the most likely outcomes after a Greek election.

3. What will the new government’s position be?

A New Democracy win is likely to lead to a relatively swift agreement with the Troika by the end of February, likely meeting the relevant deadlines. In contrast, a SYRIZA government has the potential to create a much wider set of possible outcomes. Even more so that international creditors, the negotiating position of a new SYRIZA government is highly uncertain, and not yet fully clarified within the party itself.

Speaking in a Reuters interview a few days ago, SYRIZA leader Alexis Tsipras stated that the party is fully committed to Eurozone membership, and has no intention of making unilateral moves on the existing agreements “unless forced”. Ultimately however, the party’s position is likely to be dependent on a number of factors: (i) the internal political dynamics within the party, which is composed of a number of competing groups. Most vocal of these is the “left platform” led by current parliamentary spokesperson Panagiotis Lafazanis, who sits to the left of the leadership and favours a more confrontational stance versus international lenders; (ii) the outcome of the general election and the potential partner that emerges, with a “River” or PASOK coalition having a much greater moderating influence on the party than Independent Greeks or an outright SYRIZA majority; (iii) market pressure in the run-up to the election.

Ultimately, the party’s position on Europe is unlikely to be fully fleshed out until February, most likely formulated by the leadership team that emerges around party leader Tsipras, inclusive of the person that is appointed to lead the finance ministry. Nikos Pappas (party leader’s chief of staff), Yannis Milios (responsible for economic policy), George Stathakis (responsible for development policy), Yannis Dragasakis (current deputy Speaker of parliament) and Dimitris Papadimoulis (current member of the European parliament) all stand out as potential influential members of a new SYRIZA-led government.

Conclusion
To sum up, markets are likely to be left with more questions than answers until the domestic political progress in Greece plays out more fully over the next two months. In the meantime Greek financing needs over the course of 2015 are ongoing, with large uncertainty on when the government will lose its ability to repay maturing obligations. We estimate this would take place at some point in the second quarter of next year, with a 1.4bn IMF maturity being due in March, another 2.5bn due to the IMF over Q2 and a large 4.2bn GGB payment due to the ECB in July. Ahead of that the role of the ECB – in particular the willingness to tolerate ELA financing of Greek banks in the face of potential renewed deposit pressure on the financial system – will be a key pressure point between Europe and a new Greek government.

Ultimately, we see a consensual outcome between a SYRIZA-led government and its creditors as achievable, but it would require a moderation from both sides. On the European front, it would consist of a lowered primary balance target for this and coming years and an offer of additional official sector debt-relief via maturity extensions – we would consider neither impossible given the adjustments in fiscal targets already granted to other peripheral economies and the low political cost of maturity extensions. On the SYRIZA side, agreement would require the party to give up on its pledges to reverse structural reforms as well as a commitment to maintaining a path of fiscal prudence.

This notwithstanding, convergence is not currently apparent and is unlikely to become so until well after January. It requires both sides to shift to a consensual rather than confrontational approach, in turn perhaps dependent on greater market pressure. Either way, large uncertainty and path-dependent outcomes suggest damaging confrontation cannot be ruled out, which in turn has the potential to generate much greater destabilizing outcomes for Greece and the Eurozone as a whole in 2015. The New Year welcomes Europe with renewed challenges.

George

*If a government does not win an outright 151 majority of MPs, the leader whose party leader comes first is given a 3-day mandate to explore the possibility of a coalition government with other parties. If this fails, the mandate is passed to the second largest party and so on. If all three largest parties fail to secure a coalition, the country goes to a new general election

**The rating threshold exemption is apparent in the ECB document detailing GGB haircuts here: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_ecb_2014_46_f_sign.pdf

comments on euro zone and india

Do you think they know austerity causes loans to go bad?

Troubled loans at Europe’s banks double in value (FT) European banks’ non-performing loans have doubled in just four years to reach close to €1.2tn and are expected to keep rising. A report by PwC found that non-performing loans (NPLs) rose from €514bn in 2008 to €1.187tn in 2012, with rises in the most recent year driven by deteriorating conditions in Spain, Ireland, Italy and Greece. It predicted further rises in the years ahead because of the “uncertain economic climate”. Richard Thompson, a partner at PwC, said the “reshaping” of European bank balance sheets had several more years to run as lenders shed troubled and unwanted loans and attempted to strengthen their balance sheets. He estimates European banks are sitting on €2.4tn of non-core loans that they plan to wind down or sell off. The first eight months of 2013 have seen €46bn of European loan portfolio transactions, equal to the entire amount recorded in 2012.

Do you think they know higher rates support higher inflation and weaken the currency?

India’s Central Bank Expects Inflation to Remain Stubborn (WSJ) The Reserve Bank of India Monday sounded concern about inflation, which it said would remain outside its comfort zone this fiscal year. In its half-yearly review of macroeconomic and monetary developments, released a day before its monetary-policy meeting, the RBI also highlighted the need to boost economic growth. But its stress was more on inflation. Inflation at the wholesale level—the main measure of prices in India—notched a seven-month high of 6.46% in September. It has remained above the central bank’s comfort level of 5% for four consecutive months through September. The RBI said it expects both consumer and wholesale inflation to remain around their current levels. “This indicates persistence of inflation at levels distinctly above what was indicated by the Reserve Bank earlier in the year,” it said.