So much for the LTRO “bazooka”:

EMU Growth Watch: Credit Growth Slows

Frankfurt, Germany (AP) — The European Central Bank says the flow of credit available to businesses slowed down in February — a sign that the bank’s massive series of cheap loans to the financial system has yet to kickstart a lagging eurozone economy. Figures Wednesday showed loans to nonfinancial corporations — a key credit indicator — grew by only 0.4 percent on an annual basis, down from 0.7 percent in January. The ECB made two massive rounds of cheap loans to banks Dec. 21 and Feb. 29, adding about €500 billion ($666 billion) in net new credit to the financial system. The loans were introduced in the hope that the money would eventually find its way to businesses and consumers as loans and, in turn, promote growth. The loans are credited with easing the eurozone debt crisis by removing fears that one or more of Europe’s shaky banks might fail, and by making it easier for heavily indebted governments such as Italy to borrow on bond markets.

Our Take: LTRO’s do not mean banks will be lending.

And not only no change in fiscal policy, but more of same. As the carpenter said about his piece of wood, ‘no matter how much I cut off it’s still too short.’

Fertile ground for the ‘bond tax’ (PSI) for the next round of austerity, to reduce the need to further cut public services and raise domestic taxes.

Karim writes:

This data should certainly push up the probability of an ECB policy rate cut in May or June.

From Morgan Stanley
Note the talk of a PSI (bond tax):

5. Portugal: Portugal’s five-year bonds are trading at ~16%, right around the level where Greek bonds traded last April when Eurozone officials began to turn their attention to forcing losses on private sector creditors. The key area of concern in the market is a €9.7B bond maturing in September 2013 that is not covered by the country’s €78B bailout. Portugal needs ~€25B-€30B to fund itself through 2015. Portuguese officials hope that a pickup in market confidence will allow it to return to the bond market in time to refinance the 2013 bond. The Portuguese funding concerns have been widely discussed in the press. While there has been speculation that the country could be next in line for a debt restructuring, this outcome has been disputed by both Portuguese and troika officials.

Spend in euro denominated tax credits.

Central banks pay ecb rates on said deposits charged to issuer.

Eurachma
Esceuro
Passeuro
Punteuro
Leuro

All perfectly legal under current institutional arrangements

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   One prominent Irish minister said explicitly that we should use Greece as a bargaining chip >   to renegotiate the promissory note. The whole government and press went crazy saying that >   she was completely out of line etc.
>   

that’s how it starts?
;)

Yes, assured that taxing bond holders works to lower deficits. That is, their public debt is sustainable after the PSI bond tax.

If anything, seems to me this kind of talk serves to keep investors away from any euro zone member debt.

Market Should Be Assured by Debt Deal: Greek Minister

By Reported by Silvia Wadhwa, Written by Catherine Boyle

March 12 (CNBC) — Greece has been tossed on the turbulent sea of global markets for almost two years now – but the bond swap deal secured on Friday should reassure markets about the country’s future, Greek Finance Minister and possible future prime minister Evangelos Venizelos told CNBC.

“Now we have a sustainable debt for a sustainable country,” he said. “And now we can persuade the market because we have a new, very important and very concrete argument: the sustainability of the public debt after the PSI (the private sector investor deal).”

“We have a very clear political declaration and position from the part of our institutional partners. We have a very clear statement from the part of the Eurogroup, but also of the Euro Summit. We have the support of the so-called “Official Sector” until the return of Greece in the market,” he added.

From David Zervos:

(BN) *ISDA SAYS CREDIT EVENT HAS OCCURRED WITH RESPECT TO GREECE


(BN) *GREECE CREDIT SWAPS AUCTION TO BE `EXPEDITED,’ ISDA SAYS

“I’ve always said publicly that default is out of the question,” – Trichet

“There will be no default.” – Rehn

“People fail to see the costs to both Greece and the eurozone of a restructuring: the cost to its citizens, the cost to its access to markets. If Greece restructures, why on earth would people invest in other peripheral economies? It would be a fundamental break to the unity of the eurozone.” – Papaconstantinou

Its been a great 2 years watching this thing unfold and listening to lie after lie from European officials. While it has been a calm response in global markets today, there is some justice in the world. Those folks who bought Greek bonds lost their shirts – both accrual and mark to market folks. This is a clear victory for the Euroskeptics and I have no doubt that we will see the letters “PSI” in the European headlines once again.

In regard to the euro zone officials insisting there will be no further haircuts:

‘The lady doth protest too much, me thinks.’

Mr. Dallara and the rest of the euro mob have as yet not come up with any reason any one nation wouldn’t be better off, as evidenced by Greece, with a whopping big tax on bond holders vs the usual tax hikes and spending cuts otherwise demanded.

Rest of Europe Shouldn’t Follow Greek Bailout: Dallara

By Margo D. Beller

Mar 9 (CNBC) — Charles Dallara, who represented bond holders in the Greek debt talks, told CNBC Friday he doesn’t expect other troubled EU countries such as Italy, Portugal and Ireland to need a similar bond swap.

“I would strongly discourage other governments, other peoples of Europe from going this route,” he said, adding the Greek situation “cast a cloud over the entire euro zone.”

None of these other countries “have the same extraordinary high levels of debt and deficits and none of them have quite the same distortions in the economic system. They are on the right path and should maintain the path of reform.”

Greece’s problems were unique, he said, and the resulting financial crisis was “extremely painful for the citizens of Greece” and “prevented the building of confidence” throughout the euro zone.

Dallara, managing director of the U.S.-based Institute of International Finance, was the chief negotiator representing private-sector holders of Greek debt in the largest bond restructuring in history.

He said he was “quite pleased” that 83.5 percent of the bond holders voluntarily accepted losses of some 74 percent on the value of their investments in a deal that will cut more than 100 billion euros from Greece’s crippling public debt.

“To see so many bondholders voluntarily deliver their bonds into this exchange is remarkable” and speaks to the desire for Europe and investors to “turn the page” on the whole European sovereign debt problem, he added.

Athens had said it would enforce the deal on all its bondholders, activating collective action clauses on the 177 billion euros worth of bonds regulated under Greek law.

That would potentially trigger payouts on the credit default swaps that some investors held on the bonds, an event which would have unknown consequences for the market.

Dallara said activating the collective action clauses was “one of the unfortunate dimensions” of the debt swap, but stressed it shouldn’t stop foreign investment in European sovereign debt.

“The issue is not just one of legal risk in investing in sovereign debt, it’s better credit analysis,” he said. “You have to understand the underlying credit risks.”

Will Greece Resolution Spark a Bigger Crisis?

By John Carney

Mar 8 (CNBC) — Markets around the world were buoyed on hopes that Greece’s long and winding journey to debt restructuring may at last be its final port of call.

But some are warning that this may actually be the beginning of a new and more dangerous crisis.

The private sector is being asked to write off more than 70 percent of the face value of their Greek government bonds in return for new debt. This will help Greece meet its debt obligations and enable it to tap into bailout funds from the EU and IMF.

It seems likely that other nations burdened by heavy debt loads and high interest rates may seek to follow Greece’s path to debt relief. If Greece doesn’t have to pay what it owes, they might argue, why should we? Call it Haircut Contagion.

European officials insist that Greece is a one-time deal, not meant to set a precedent for other nations. But it is easy to see that minority parties in debt-burdened European nations could find a demand for relief an attractive platform. Imposing a “tax” on bondholders rather asking citizens to pay higher taxes while public services are cut might prove popular with voters.

Demands for debt relief could take many forms. Greece has been able to encourage bond holders to participate in the debt swap by enacting laws that incorporated “collective action clauses” into the 86 percent of bonds governed by Greek law. These clauses allow super-majorities of bond holders to force hold-outs to participate in swaps. Other countries in the euro zone could replicate this strategy.

“Effectively, this is a large gift from the Greeks to the parts of the euro zone that face debt crises. By conducting its debt exchange in the way it did, Greece has in effect resurrected the plausibility of purely voluntary debt-reduction operations in Europe,” Moody’s has explained.

Such demands would put new strains on the global financial system. While Europe’s banks and insurance companies can withstand losses on Greek debt, a series of similar haircuts might destabilize the system and render some institutions insolvent.

Warren Mosler, a trader based in the Virgin Islands who is credited with creating the euro-swap futures contract, fears that all it would take to set off a panic would be serious political discussion of widespread haircuts.

“The idea of Greek default transformed from being a Greek punishment to a gift, with the pending question: ‘If Greece doesn’t have to pay, why do I?’ — threatening a far more disruptive outcome that is yet to be fully discounted,” Mosler writes on his website, Mosler Economics. “That is, should Greek bonds be formally discounted, the consequences of merely the political discussion of that question will be all it takes to trigger a financial crisis rivaling anything yet seen.”

He has spelled out exactly what he thinks would happen in a Haircut Contagion crisis.

“Possible immediate consequences of that discussion include a sharp spike in gold, silver, and other commodities in a flight from currency, falling equity and debt valuations, a banking crisis, and a tightening of ‘financial conditions’ in general from portfolio shifting, even as it’s fundamentally highly deflationary. And while it probably won’t last all that long, it will be long enough to seriously shake things up,” Mosler writes.

A recent paper cited by Reuters took a much more sanguine approach to the likelihood of Haircut Contagion. The ratings agency figures that countries may attempt to receive modest debt relief in exchange for giving up their rights to unilaterally change the terms of their debt. They could do this, for example, by restructuring bonds governed by domestic law into foreign law bonds, mostly likely governed by English law.

“Holders of local-law governed bonds in other euro zone countries that are perceived to be at risk might want to make a trade for English-law governed bonds,” Jeromin Zettelmeyer, deputy chief economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Duke University Professor Mitu Gulati, wrote in the paper. “Depending on how much these bondholders would be willing to pay to make this trade, it could serve the interest of the country as well to make it.”

Of course, countries that agreed to make this swap would be sacrificing a lot of their future flexibility. Some might find it too high a price to pay. In a sense, converting their debt to foreign jurisdiction bonds would be like doubling-down on the structural problems with the euro zone. The countries that did this would sacrifice sovereignty over their debt to achieve lower interest rates, much like they sacrificed monetary sovereignty for the currency union.

And it’s not clear that this would be all that attractive to bondholders, either. After all, a country that cannot or will not pay its debt cannot be forced to, just because the bonds are subject to foreign law.

The hope of European leaders was that preventing a disorderly default in Greece would avoid a domino effect of sovereign debt defaults. The danger, however, is that debt relief for Greece could spark a new and unexpected Haircut Contagion crisis.

I agree that the ECB is ‘backing off’ and will only again engage if it gets bad enough.

Back to the analogy of watering the flower only when it’s about to die.

They don’t realize that it needs continuous watering in the normal course of events.

14 more days to the Greek payment date.

Unfortunately, looking like darned if you do and darned if you don’t.

ECB after the LTROs: It is up to governments now

After the implementation of the second 3-year LTRO last week, the ECB now is likely to believe it has done enough to stabilise the Euro area’s financial system and, implicitly, the funding situation for peripheral governments. Any announcement of further non-standard measures seems unlikely at this stage, as the Governing Council now views the ball as being squarely in the court of governments.

Even as they work to fix the solvency issues, the austerity policies continue to work to weaken growth and increase the deficits they are trying to reduce, which sustains the solvency issues.

Euro-Region Manufacturing Output Contracts for Seventh Month

German Machine Orders Fell in January as Domestic Demand Waned

French Unemployment Rate Jumps as Economy Stalls on Euro Crisis

French Consumer Spending Drops as Job Losses, Budget Cuts Bite

Italy’s Jobless Rate Surged in January to Highest Since 2001

Monti Expects Firewall Deal This Month as Crisis Abates

Are Japanese Banks Bailing Out Europe?

Eurozone: How to Drive an Economy in Reverse

By Warren Mosler

February 27 — The situation in Greece brings me back to the conclusion that merely resolving solvency issues in the Eurozone doesn’t fix the economy. Solvency must not be an issue, but if there is negative growth, solvency math simply doesn’t work for any of the Euro members.

Without growth in the Eurozone the resolution (for now) of the Greek crisis will simply result in the focus moving on to one of the next weaker sisters. As this happens the risk remains that other countries in trouble will ask for haircuts on their debt (similar to Greece) as part of their rescue. And that could trigger a general, global, catastrophic financial meltdown.

Follow up:
Monetary and Fiscal Expansion are Needed

My first order proposal remains an ECB distribution on a per capita basis to the euro member nations of maybe 10% of euro zone GDP per year to put the solvency issue behind them. Along with relaxed budget rules, maybe allowing deficits up to 6% of GDP annually, further supported by the ECB funding a transition job at a non disruptive wage to facilitate the transition from unemployment to private sector employment. I might also recommend deficits be increased by suspending VAT as a way to increase aggregate demand and lower prices at the same time.

Alternatively, the ECB could simply guarantee all national government debt and rely on the growth and stability pact for fiscal discipline, which would probably require enhanced authorities.

And rather than trying to bring Greece’s deficit down to current target levels, they could instead relax the growth and stability pact limits to something closer to full employment levels. And, again, I’d look into suspending VAT to both increase aggregate demand and lower prices.

Strong Euro First

However, all policies seem to be ‘strong euro’ first. And the ‘success’ of the euro continues to be gauged by its ‘strength’.

The haircuts on the Greek bonds are functionally a tax that removes that many net euro financial assets. Call it an ‘austerity’ measure extending forced austerity to investors.

Other member nations will likely hold off on turning towards that same tax until after Greece is a ‘done deal’ as early noises could work to undermine the Greek arrangements, and take the ‘investor tax’ off the table.

Like most other currencies, the euro has ‘built in’ demand leakages that fall under the general category of ‘savings desires’. These include the demand to hold actual cash, contributions to tax advantaged pension contributions, contributions to individual retirement accounts, insurance and other corporate ‘reserves’, foreign central bank accumulations of euro denominated financial assets, along with all the unspent interest and earnings compounding.

Offsetting all of that unspent income (private savings) is, historically, the expansion of debt, where agents spend more than their income. This includes borrowing for business and consumer purchases, which includes borrowing to buy cars and houses. In other words, net savings of financial assets are increased by the demand leakages and decreased by credit expansion. And, in general, most of the variation is due to changes in the credit expansion component.

Austerity in the euro zone consists of public spending cuts and tax hikes, which have both directly slowed the economies and increased net savings desires, as the austerity measures have also reduced private sector desires to borrow to spend. This combination results in a decline in sales, which translates into fewer jobs and reduced private sector income. Which further translates into reduced tax collections and increased public sector transfer payments, as the austerity measures designed to reduce public sector debt instead serve to increase it.

Now adding to that is this latest tax on investors in Greek debt, and if the propensity to spend any of the lost funds of those holders was greater than zero, aggregate demand will see an additional decline, with public sector debt climbing that much higher as well.

All of this serves to make the euro ‘harder to get’ and further support the value of the euro, which serves to keep a lid on the net export channel. The ‘answer’ to the export dilemma would be to have the ECB, for example, buy dollars as Germany used to do with the mark, and as China and Japan have done to support their exporters. But ideologically this is off the table in the euro zone, as they believe in a strong euro, and in any case they don’t want to build dollar reserves and give the appearance that the dollar is ‘backing’ the euro.

Three Reverse Thrusters in Use

This works to move all the euro member nation deficits higher as the ‘sustainability math’ of all deteriorate as well, increasing the odds of the ‘investor tax’ expanding to the other member nations – and that continues the negative feedback loop.

Given the demand leakages of the institutional structure, as a point of logic, prosperity can only come from some combination of increased net exports, a private sector credit expansion, or a public sector credit expansion.

And right now it looks like they are still going backwards on all three. And with the transmission in reverse, pressing the accelerator harder only makes you go backwards that much faster.

As previously discussed, all policies seem to be ‘strong euro’ first.

And the ‘success’ of the euro continues to be gauged by its ‘strength’.

The haircuts on the Greek bonds are functionally a tax that removes that many net euro financial assets. Call it an ‘austerity’ measure extending forced austerity to investors.

Other member nations will likely hold off on turning towards that same tax until after Greece is a ‘done deal’ as early noises could work to undermine the Greek arrangements, and take the ‘investor tax’ off the table.

Like most other currencies, the euro has ‘built in’ demand leakages that fall under the general category of ‘savings desires’. These include the demand to hold actual cash, contributions to tax advantaged pension contributions, contributions to individual retirement accounts, insurance and other corporate ‘reserves’, foreign central bank accumulations euro denominated financial assets, along with all the unspent interest and earnings compounding.

Offsetting all of that unspent income is, historically, the expansion of debt, where agents spend more than their income. This includes borrowing for business and consumer purchases, which includes borrowing to buy cars and houses. In other words, net savings of financial assets are increased by the demand leakages and decreased by credit expansion. And, in general, most of the variation is due to changes in the credit expansion component.

Austerity in the euro zone consists of public spending cuts and tax hikes, which have both directly slowed the economies and increased net savings desires, as the austerity measures have also reduced private sector desires to borrow to spend. This combination results in a decline in sales, which translates into fewer jobs and reduced private sector income. Which further translates into reduced tax collections and increased public sector transfer payments, as the austerity measures designed to reduce public sector debt instead serve to increase it.

Now adding to that is this latest tax on investors in Greek debt, and if the propensity to spend any of the lost funds of those holders was greater than 0, aggregate demand will see an additional decline, with public sector debt climbing that much higher as well.

All of which serves to make the euro ‘harder to get’ and further support the value of the euro, which serves to keep a lid on the net export channel. The ‘answer’ to the export dilemma would be to have the ECB, for example, buy dollars as Germany used to do with the mark, and as China and Japan have done to support their exporters. But ideologically this is off the table in the euro zone, as they believe in a strong euro, and in any case they don’t want to build dollar reserves and give the appearance that the dollar is ‘backing’ the euro.

And all of which works to move all the euro member nation deficits higher as the ‘sustainability math’ of all deteriorate as well, increasing the odds of the ‘investor tax’ expanding to the other member nations that continues the negative feedback loop.

Given the demand leakages of the institutional structure, as a point of logic prosperity can only come from some combination of increased net exports, a private sector credit expansion, or a public sector credit expansion.

And right now it looks like they are still going backwards on all three.

Marshall Auerback video

Got a nice mention here:

http://www.cnbc.com/id/46345302

The issues I’ve been discussing over the last year or two while now crystallizing, remain highly problematic.

The idea of Greek default transformed from being a Greek punishment to a gift, with the pending question: ‘If Greece doesn’t have to pay, why do I?’- threatening a far more disruptive outcome that is yet to be fully discounted.

That is, should Greek bonds be formally discounted, the consequences of merely the political discussion of that question will be all it takes to trigger a financial crisis rivaling anything yet seen.

And note, also as previously discussed, that there has yet to be an actual Greek default, and that all Greek bonds have continued to mature at par, as there has yet to be an acceptable alternative.

So what are the alternatives?

1. Continue to fund Greece with terms and conditions.
2. Don’t fund Greece which forces:
  a. Greece is forced to limit spending to actual tax revenues
  b. Greece moves back to the drachma

And what are the ‘terms and conditions’?

Austerity is always the lead demand, which slows both the Greek economy and to some extent the euro zone in general.

Additional demands currently include discounting Greek bonds to bring down their debt to GDP ratio to ‘sustainable’ levels. However, after 8 months of negotiations, this has proven highly problematic, probably for reasons yet to be fully disclosed. And, as just discussed, there may be a growing awareness that discounting opens Pandora’s box with the politically attractive question ‘if Greece doesn’t have to pay, why do we?’

So what actually happens?

My best guess, and not with a lot of conviction, is that nothing is concluded before the coming maturity dates, and the ECB winds up writing the check to support short term Greek funding to buy more time for more inconclusive discussion. So, again as previously discussed, seems like this is the solution- death by 1,000 cuts and reluctant ECB bond buying when push comes to shove to keep it all going.

And, currently, the catastrophic risk I’d highly recommend immediately hedging is the risk that Greek bonds are formally discounted, rapidly followed by a global discussion of ‘so why should we have to pay?’ Possible immediate consequences of that discussion include a sharp spike in gold, silver, and other commodities in a flight from currency, falling equity and debt valuations, a banking crisis, and a tightening of ‘financial conditions’ in general from portfolio shifting, even as it’s fundamentally highly deflationary. And while it probably won’t last all that long, it will be long enough to seriously shake things up.

Yes, as previously discussed, the obvious political move is to demand the same discounts as Greece.

Especially with the pending Greek ‘restructure’ and ECB check writing to support the banking system seemingly making the euro stronger and not causing inflation.

And the ‘sustainability maths’ is just about the same for all of them as well, particularly given the current slowdown.

Once the markets realize the politics are moving in that direction, all euro member nation bonds again become suspect and the crisis enters the next stage, resulting in the ECB pretty much funding everything, one way or another.

It’s just a question of how it all gets from here to there.

Portugal Union Leader Wants Debt Renegotiation

By Axel Bugge and Daniel Alvarenga

Feb 7 (Reuters) — Portugal must renegotiate its debts rather than impose harsh austerity measures to overcome its economic crisis, the head of the country’s largest trade union said on Wednesday, threatening to step up strikes if the government pushed on with cuts.

Armenio Carlos, head of the CGTP union, told Reuters Portuguese workers would take a stand against attacks on labor rights, which he said were part of the government’s sweeping economic reforms promised under a 78 billion euro ($103.29 billion) bailout.

“What we defend is the renegotiation of debts, in terms of deadlines, in terms of interest and in terms of the amount,” Carlos said in an interview, adding that the country’s bailout had made it impossible to meet its obligations.

Portugal’s debt currently equals about 105 percent of gross domestic product.

“We are being confronted with a neo-liberal attack on workers’ rights,” he added, saying the government’s recent labor reform, making it easier to hire and fire, could spark a growing wave of protests.

The union leader, a former electrician and an ex-Communist lawmaker who took over as head of the CGTP a week ago, warned that with the austerity policies demanded by the bailout, Portugal was heading down the same road to ruin as Greece.

No let up on the austerity demands, which are now to be legislated via balanced budget rules.

EU Leaders to Agree on Rescue Fund, Balanced Budget

Jan 29 (Reuters) — European Union leaders will sign off on a permanent rescue fund for the euro zone at a summit on Monday and are expected to agree on a balanced budget rule in national legislation, with unresolved problems in Greece casting a shadow on the discussions.

The summit – the 17th in two years as the EU battles to resolve its sovereign debt problems – is supposed to focus on creating jobs and growth, with leaders looking to shift the narrative away from politically unpopular budget austerity. The summit is expected to announce that up to 20 billion euros of unused funds from the EU’s 2007-2013 budget will be redirected towards job creation, especially among the young, and will commit to freeing up bank lending to small- and medium-sized companies.

But discussions over the permanent rescue fund, a new ‘fiscal treaty’ and Greece will dominate the talks.

Negotiations between the Greek government and private bondholders over the restructuring of 200 billion euros of Greek debt made progress over the weekend, but are not expected to conclude before the summit begins.

Until there is a deal between Greece and its private bondholders, EU leaders cannot move forward with a second, 130 billion euro rescue program for Athens, which they originally agreed to at a summit last October.

Instead, they will sign a treaty creating the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a 500 billion-euro permanent bailout fund that is due to become operational in July, a year earlier than first planned. And they are likely to agree the terms of a ‘fiscal treaty’ tightening budget rules for those that sign up.

The ESM will replace the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), a temporary fund that has been used to bail out Ireland and Portugal and will help in the second Greek package.

Leaders hope the ESM will boost defenses against the debt crisis, but many – including Italian premier Mario Monti, IMF chief Christine Lagarde and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner – say it will only do so if its resources are combined with what remains in the EFSF, creating a super-fund of 750 billion euros ($1 trillion).

The International Monetary Fund says an agreement to increase the size of the euro zone ‘firewall’ will convince others to contribute more resources to the IMF, boosting its crisis-fighting abilities and improving market sentiment.

But Germany is opposed to such a step.

Chancellor Angela Merkel has said she will not discuss the issue of the ESM/EFSF’s ceiling until leaders meet for their next summit in March. In the meantime, financial markets will continue to fret that there may not be sufficient rescue funds available to help the likes of Italy and Spain if they run into renewed debt funding problems.

“There are certainly signals that Germany is willing to consider it and it is rather geared towards March from the German side,” a senior euro zone official said.

The sticking point is German public opinion which is tired of bailing out the euro zone’s financially less prudent. Instead, Merkel wants to see the EU – except Britain, which has rejected any such move – sign up to the fiscal treaty, including a balanced budget rule written into constitutions. Once that is done, the discussion about a bigger rescue fund can take place.

Good report!
Additional notations below:

Karim writes:
U.S. GDP growth in Q4 a bit weaker than expected at 2.8%

Perhaps the FOMC had word of this, explaining the unexpected dovishness?

1.9% of that growth accounted for by inventories. Other contributions: (consumer spending 2%, fixed investment 0.4%, government spending -0.9%, net exports -0.1%).

Rebuilding post earthquake supply lines probably now complete.
Govt spending continues weak, as revenues increase some and the federal deficit falls some.
Imports rise quickly with any increase in consumer spending.

In growth terms: (consumer spending 2%, fixed investment 3.3%, government spending -4.6%, exports 4.7% and imports 4.4%).

So stripping away inventories, growth was below trend. Plus savings rate fell back to 3.7% from 3.9%.

Domestic savings down with spending up indicates increasing consumer debt.
The question is whether this is ‘wanted’ as per increased desires to buy on credit,
or because the decline in govt deficit spending ‘forced’ more consumer debt for ‘essentials’

And, core PCE slowed from 2.1% to 1.1%.

Also explains FOMC dovishness as they see risk as asymmetrical, fearing deflation more than inflation.

In sum, will keep QE3 talk very much alive

And somewhat moot, even as Q1 GDP forecasts are being revised down some, as most don’t think QE matters much for the real economy.

What’s becoming understood is that while there is ‘more the Fed can do’
for all practical purposes there is nothing they can do to further support the real economy.

Euro money and lending data shockingly weak in December.

Might partially explain how some banks apparently got the balance sheet room to buy more national govt debt?

In particular, record single month decline in lending to the non-bank private sector (74bn). Of that, 37bn decline in lending to non-financial corporates and 8bn drop in lending to households.

This should be very supportive of additional ECB rate cuts over the next few months.