Also, Trichet Friday, the German elections, and G8 reports seem to be setting the tone for the euro zone to do something about the solvency issue. This is very good for equities and the rest of the credit stack.

At the same time it does not seem likely that any growth proposals will include fiscal relaxation, so the euro zone will have to get by the best it can with the deficits it has, which I’d guess should mean flat GDP, +/- 1% or so.

The US should also continue to muddle through with modest top line growth, and inflation low enough and the output gap wide enough to keep this Fed from hiking any time soon.

Lower crude prices should also help some.

I had guessed the Saudis would hold prices at the $120 Brent level, given their output of just over 10 million bpd showed strong demand
and their capacity to increase to their stated 12.5 million bpd capacity remains suspect. And so with the Seaway pipeline now open (last I heard)
to take crude from Cushing to Brent priced markets I’d guessed WTI would trade up to Brent.

But what has happened is the Saudi oil minister started making noises about lower prices and when ‘market prices’ started selling off the Saudis ‘followed’ by lowering their posted prices, sustaining the myth that they are ‘price takers’ when in reality they are price setters.

So to date, contrary to my prior guess, both wti and brent have sold off quite a bit, and cheaper imported crude is a plus for the US economy. Which is also a plus for the $US, as a lower import bill makes $US ‘harder to get’ for foreigners.

But the trade for quite a while has been strong dollar = weak US stocks due to export pricing/foreign earnings translations, and also because US stocks have weakened on signs of euro zone stress, which has been associated with a weaker euro. So when things seem to be looking up for the euro zone, the euro tends to go up vs the dollar, with US stocks doing better with any sign of ‘improvement’ in the euro zone.

It’s all a tangled case of cross currents, which makes forecasting anything particularly difficult.

Not to mention possible dislocations from the whale, which may or may not have run their course, etc.

And then there’s the news from Greece.

First, they made a full bond payment yesterday of nearly 500 million euro to bond holders who did not accept the PSI discounts. This is confounding for the obvious reasons, signals it sends, moral hazard, credibility, etc. etc. But it’s also a sign the politicians are doing what they think it takes to keep the euro going as the currency of the euro zone. Same goes for the decision to fund Greece as per prior agreements even when there is no Greek govt to talk to, and lots of signs any new govt may not honor the arrangements.

Even if that means tricking private investors out of 100 billion, rewarding those who defy them, whatever. Tactics may be continuously reaching new lows but all for the end of keeping the euro as the single currency.

It also means that while, for example, 10 year Spanish yields may go up or down, the intention is for Spain, one way or another, to fund itself, even if short term. Doesn’t matter.

And more EFSF type discussions. The plan may be to start using those types of funds as needed, keeping the ECB out of it for that much longer, regardless of where longer term bonds happen to trade.

As for the euro zone economy, yes, growth is probably negative, but if they hold off on further fiscal adjustments, the 6%+ deficit they currently are running for the region is probably, at this point, enough to muddle through around the 0 growth neighborhood. The upside isn’t much from there, as with limited private sector credit growth opportunities, and substantial net export growth unlikely, and strong ‘automatic stabilizers’ any growth could be limited by those automatic fiscal stabilizers. Not to mention that this type of optimistic scenario likely strengthens the euro and keeps a lid on net exports as well.

And sad that this ‘bullish scenario’ for the euro zone means their massive output gap doesn’t even begin to close any time soon.

For the US, this bullish scenario has similar limitations, but not quite as severe, so the output gap could start to narrow some and employment as a percentage of the population begin to improve. But only modestly.

The US fiscal cliff is for real, but still far enough away to not be a day to day factor. And it at least does show that fiscal policy does work, at least according to every known forecaster with any credibility, which might open the door to proactive fiscal? Note the increasing chatter about how deficits don’t seem to drive up interest rates? And the increasing chatter about how the US, Japan, UK, etc. aren’t like the euro zone members with regards to interest rates?

Same in the euro zone, where discussion is now common regarding how austerity doesn’t work to grow their economies, with the reason to maintain it now down to the need to restore solvency. This is beginning to mean that if they solved the solvency riddle some other way they might back off on the austerity. And now there is a political imperative to do just that, so things could move in that direction, meaning ECB support for member nation funding, directly or indirectly, which removes the ‘ponzi’ aspect.

Click here for larger version

Been bearish all along from mid March and still thinking same.

Euro zone still melting down.

US coming off Q4 rebuild of Japan’s pipeline.

And now unemployment benefits expiring in 9 states with more to come?

State and local cutbacks are ‘high multiple’ and actual state and local deficit spending coming down as well?

Housing not picking up enough to add meaningfully to aggregate demand/GDP.

With ‘real productivity’/technology and management advances’ continually reducing labor needed per unit of output, recent declines in productivity in line with softer employment?

Global austerity = global slow motion train wreck?

So still looking to me like a case of

‘Because we fear becoming the next Greece, we continue to turn ourselves into the next Japan’

The only way out at this point is a private sector credit expansion, which, in the US, traditionally comes from housing, but doesn’t seem to be happening this time. Past cycles have seen it come from the sub prime expansion phase, the .com/y2k boom, the S&L expansion phase, and the emerging market lending boom.

But this time we’re being more careful of ‘bubbles’ (just like Japan has done for the last two decades). So I don’t see much hope there.

Still watching for the euro bond tax idea to surface, which I see as the immediate possibility of systemic risk, but no real sign yet.

Click here for larger version

The idea of Greek default transformed from being a Greek punishment to a gift, with the pending question: ‘If Greece doesn’t have to pay, why do I?’- threatening a far more disruptive outcome that is yet to be fully discounted.

That is, should Greek bonds be formally discounted, the consequences of merely the political discussion of that question will be all it takes to trigger a financial crisis rivaling anything yet seen.

And note, also as previously discussed, that there has yet to be an actual Greek default, and that all Greek bonds have continued to mature at par, as there has yet to be an acceptable alternative.

So what are the alternatives?

1. Continue to fund Greece with terms and conditions.
2. Don’t fund Greece which forces:
  a. Greece is forced to limit spending to actual tax revenues
  b. Greece moves back to the drachma

And what are the ‘terms and conditions’?

Austerity is always the lead demand, which slows both the Greek economy and to some extent the euro zone in general.

Additional demands currently include discounting Greek bonds to bring down their debt to GDP ratio to ‘sustainable’ levels. However, after 8 months of negotiations, this has proven highly problematic, probably for reasons yet to be fully disclosed. And, as just discussed, there may be a growing awareness that discounting opens Pandora’s box with the politically attractive question ‘if Greece doesn’t have to pay, why do we?’

So what actually happens?

My best guess, and not with a lot of conviction, is that nothing is concluded before the coming maturity dates, and the ECB winds up writing the check to support short term Greek funding to buy more time for more inconclusive discussion. So, again as previously discussed, seems like this is the solution- death by 1,000 cuts and reluctant ECB bond buying when push comes to shove to keep it all going.

And, currently, the catastrophic risk I’d highly recommend immediately hedging is the risk that Greek bonds are formally discounted, rapidly followed by a global discussion of ‘so why should we have to pay?’ Possible immediate consequences of that discussion include a sharp spike in gold, silver, and other commodities in a flight from currency, falling equity and debt valuations, a banking crisis, and a tightening of ‘financial conditions’ in general from portfolio shifting, even as it’s fundamentally highly deflationary. And while it probably won’t last all that long, it will be long enough to seriously shake things up.

This is one of the inherent risks of being a common shareholder under current law.

It keeps stocks cheaper than otherwise, which makes them more attractive as takeover candidates, as
when you own the whole thing you don’t have this risk.

BUS 08/25 13:10 Berkshire Hathaway to Invest $5 Billion in Bank of America
BN 08/25 13:12 *BERKSHIRE WARRANTS FOR 700M SHRS EXERCISE PRICE $7.142857/SHR
BN 08/25 13:10 *BOFA TO SELL 50,000 SHRS PFD, LIQUIDATION VALUE $100K/SHR
BN 08/25 13:10 *BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY TO GET WARRANTS TO BUY 700M SHRS :BAC US
BN 08/25 13:10 *BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY TO INVEST $5B IN BANK OF AMERICA :BAC US
BN 08/25 13:10 *BOFA TO SELL 50,000 SHRS PFD :BAC US
BN 08/25 13:10 *BOFA TO SELL 50,000 SHRS :BAC US
BN 08/25 13:10 *BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY TO INVEST $5B IN BANK OF AMERICA

Berkshire Hathaway to Invest $5 Billion in Bank of America

By JoAnne Norton

August 25 (Bloomberg) — Berkshire Hathaway Inc. agreed to
buy 50,000 preferred shares of Bank of America Corp. for $5
billion, the bank said today in a statement.

Published August 8, 2011

* Following Friday’s downward revisions, we now expect real GDP to increase just 2%-2½% (annualized) through the end of 2012 and the unemployment rate to rise slightly to 9¼% during this period.

This is still higher than the first half, so presumably corporations will have a better second half as well, and they did just fine in the first half.

And with lower gasoline prices, consumers get a nice break there which should firm their spending on other things as well.

The tighter fiscal won’t matter for this year, and markets won’t discount what may happen in November until it’s closer to actually happening.

So still looks to me like the recent sell off in stocks was mainly technical, as the initial knee jerk sell off from the debt ceiling and downgrade uncertainties triggered further selling by those with short options positions, much like the crash of 1987.

And, like then, and unlike early 2008, the current federal deficit seems more than large to me to keep things chugging along at muddle through levels of modest growth, continued too high unemployment, and decent corporate profits and investment.

Yes, risks remain. Europe is a continuous risk, but the ECB, once again, stepped in and wrote the check. China looks to be slipping but the lower commodity prices will help US consumers maybe about as much as they hurt the earnings of some corps.

So for now, with the options related stock selling over, it looks like we’re back to calmer waters for a while.

And Congress goes back to trying to cut the deficit to put people back to work.
Someone needs to tell them they haven’t run out of dollars, they aren’t dependent on China, and they can’t become the next Greece, and so yes, the deficit is too small given the current output gap.

But until then, we keep working to become the next Japan.

The Australian dollar is likewise falling, indicating shifting circumstances at China’s coal mine as well.

While good for the US consumer and US domestic demand, it’s not good for the earnings of quite a few
major corporations.

It’s also good for the dollar, which is also not good for corporate foreign earnings translations.

It also brings down headline inflation and could help moderate core CPI as well.

And if China doesn’t like US Fed style QE, ECB style QE- buying member nation debt- has to be all the more distasteful,
and could shift their reserve preference away from the euro.

Especially as the ECB check writing escalates much like it did when it supported the banking system’s liquidity. In theory the ECB’s check writing for the national govts could approach the size of the US budget deficit. Somewhat as ECB liquidity support for the euro member banks is analogous to FDIC insurance for the US banking system.

With the US budget deficit chugging along at about 9% of GDP, domestic demand and earnings should be no worse than they were in the first half of this year, as previously discussed, which means equities should be ok in general, though with some names benefiting as others get hurt.