From Senate Deficit Plan working document


Karim writes:

Not sure how they pull this off:

“If CBO scored this plan, it would find net tax relief of approximately $1.5 trillion. To the extent future Congresses find that the dynamic effects of tax reform result in additional revenue beyond these targets, this revenue must go to additional rate reductions and deficit reduction, not to new spending.”

Classic!

Bottom line- they sign Grover Norquist pledges because it gets them elected

MMT to President Obama and Members of Congress:

Comments welcome, and feel free to repost:

MMT to President Obama and Members of Congress:
Deficit Reduction Takes Away Our Savings

SO PLEASE DON’T TAKE AWAY OUR SAVINGS!

Yes, it’s called the national debt, but US Treasury securities are nothing more than savings accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank.

The Federal debt IS the world’s dollars savings- to the penny!

The US deficit clock is also the world dollar savings clock- to the penny!

And therefore, deficit reduction takes away our savings.

SO PLEASE DON’T TAKE AWAY OUR SAVINGS!

Furthermore:

There is NO SUCH THING as a long term Federal deficit problem.

The US Government CAN’T run out of dollars.

US Government spending is NOT dependent on foreign lenders.

The US Government can’t EVER have a funding crisis like Greece-
there is no such thing for ANY issuer of its own currency.

US Government interest rates are under the control of our Federal Reserve Bank, and not market forces.

The risk of too much spending when we get to full employment
is higher prices, and NOT insolvency or a funding crisis.

Therefore, given our sky high unemployment, and depressed economy,

An informed Congress would be in heated debate over whether to increase federal spending, or decrease taxes.

GDP Gain Just 1.8%

No actual evidence, but my point remains that if the executive branch can cut spending they don’t like simply by not spending what’s authorized by Congress, they can take the pressure off demands for other spending cuts.

Also, again conjecture on my part, the QE and zero rate ‘tax’ (reduced interest income) may be what’s keeping a lid on growth here much like what’s happened to Japan for nearly 20 years.

As previously discussed, with 0 rates seems to me taxes can be quite a bit lower for any given size govt (larger deficit) without being ‘inflationary’. Unfortunately our fearless leaders are all going the other way.

Economic Growth Disappoints as GDP Gain Just 1.8%

May 26 (Reuters) — Surging gasoline prices and sharp cutbacks in government spending caused the economy to grow only weakly in the first three months of the year. Consumer spending slowed even more than previously estimated.

The Commerce Department says the overall economy grew at an annual rate of 1.8 percent in the January-March quarter.

That was the same as the government’s first estimate a month ago. Consumer spending grew at just half the rate of the previous quarter. And a surge in imports widened the U.S. trade deficit.

Many economists believe the economy is growing only slightly better in the current April-June quarter. Consumers remain squeezed by gas prices near $4 a gallon and renewed threats from Europe’s debt crisis.

The Wall of Shame (cont.)

Today is year and in Japan,
which means the last few days could be mainly quarter end and year end maneuvers,
with a high probability of ‘buy the rumor sell the news’ types of unwinds coming up.

This would include the anticipation of another 200,000 new private sector jobs to be reported tomorrow am.
And the euro strength we’ve seen in front of the announced ECB rate hike next week.

There have been lots of promotional reasons to rush to get stocks on your books for year and/quarter end reporting,
as well as a bit of gold, silver, foods, and other commodities.

But fundamentally I see what’s going on below- a world heck bent on removing aggregate demand.

More noises from Japan on how they will pay for the rebuild, which looks to be a very modest appropriation tempered by fears of being at a fiscal tipping point.

UK austerity ratchets up April 1.

China still fighting inflation with further reduced spending and lending.

The euro zone demanding and getting austerity in return for funding, with signs in some members of austerity no longer bringing down deficits as revenues fall off from economic weakness. And no fiscal safety net if it does all go bad as markets have shown extreme reluctance to fund countercyclical deficits.

And food and fuel from monopoly pricing both eating into consumer demand and driving large segments of the world population into desperation.

Talk of Q1 US GDP down to maybe only +2%, housing still bumping along the bottom, and Q2 threatened by supply shortages due to the earthquake in Japan.

And the US debt ceiling showdown now possibly happing late next week as the deficit terrorists seal their congressional victory with the promised down payment on net spending cuts that won’t end there.

In fact, their army of support is now all but universal.

Everyone in DC and the mainstream media and economics profession agrees on the problem.

The only discussion is where the cuts should be, and who should pay more.

March 31, 2011
President Barack Obama
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500
The Honorable John Boehner
Speaker of the House
1101 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
House Minority Leader
235 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
The Honorable Harry Reid
Senate Majority Leader
522 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510
The Honorable Mitch McConnell
Senate Minority Leader
361-A Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear President Obama, Speaker Boehner, Minority Leader Pelosi, Majority Leader Reid, and Minority Leader McConnell:


As you continue to work on our current budget situation, we are writing to let you know that we join with the 64 Senators who recently wrote that comprehensive deficit reduction measures are imperative, and to urge you to work together in support of a broad approach to solving the nation’s fiscal problems. As they said in their letter to President Obama:

“As you know, a bipartisan group of Senators has been working to craft a comprehensive deficit reduction package based upon the recommendations of the Fiscal Commission. While we may not agree with every aspect of the Commission’s recommendations, we believe that its work represents an important foundation to achieve meaningful progress on our debt. The Commission’s work also underscored the scope and breadth of our nation’s long-term fiscal challenges.

Beyond FY2011 funding decisions, we urge you to engage in a broader discussion about a comprehensive deficit reduction package. Specifically, we hope that the discussion will include discretionary spending cuts, entitlement changes and tax reform.

By approaching these negotiations comprehensively, with a strong signal of support from you, we believe that we can achieve consensus on these important fiscal issues. This would send a powerful message to Americans that Washington can work together to tackle this critical issue. Thank you for your attention to this matter.”

We agree with this letter and hope that you will work together to agree on a comprehensive, multi-year debt stabilization package.

Sincerely,
The Honorable Roger C. Altman
Former Assistant Secretary of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury; Founder
and Chairman, Evercore Partners

Barry Anderson
Former Acting Director, Congressional
Budget Office

Joseph Antos
Wilson H. Taylor Scholar in Health Care
and Retirement Policy, American
Enterprise Institute

The Honorable Martin Baily
Former Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisers

Robert Bixby
Executive Director, Concord Coalition

Charles Blahous
Research Fellow, Hoover Institute

Erskine Bowles
Former Co-Chair, National Commission
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform

The Honorable Charles Bowsher
Former Comptroller General of the
United States

The Honorable John E. Chapoton
Former Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury

David Cote
Former Member, National Commission
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform;
Chairman and CEO, Honeywell
International

Pete Davis
President, Davis Capital Investment
Ideas

John Endean
President, American Business
Conference

The Honorable Vic Fazio
Former Member of Congress

The Honorable Martin Feldstein
Former Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisers

The Honorable William Frenzel
Former Ranking Member, House
Budget Committee; Co-Chair,
Committee for a Responsible Federal
Budget

Ann Fudge
Former Member, National Commission
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform;
Former CEO, Young & Rubicam Brands

William G. Gale
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution William A. Galston
Senior Fellow and Ezra K. Zilkha Chair,
Brookings Institution

The Honorable Bill Gradison
Former Ranking Member, House
Budget Committee

The Honorable Judd Gregg
Former Chairman, Senate Budget
Committee

Ron Haskins
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Kevin Hassett
Senior Fellow and Director of Economic
Policy Studies, American Enterprise
Institute

G. William Hoagland
Former Staff Director, Senate Budget
Committee

The Honorable Glenn Hubbard
Former Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisers; Dean, Columbia Business
School

David B. Kendall
Senior Fellow for Health and Fiscal
Policy, Third Way

The Honorable Bob Kerrey
Former Member of Congress

Donald F. Kettl
Dean, School of Public Policy,
University of Maryland

The Honorable Charles E.M. Kolb
President, Committee for Economic
Development

The Honorable Jim Kolbe
Former Member of Congress

Lawrence B. Lindsey
President and CEO, The Lindsey Group;
Former Director, National Economic
Council

Maya MacGuineas
President, Committee for a Responsible
Federal Budget

The Honorable N. Gregory Mankiw
Former Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisers

The Honorable Donald Marron
Director, Urban-Brookings Tax Policy
Center; Former Acting Director,
Congressional Budget Office

William Marshall
President, Progressive Policy Institute

The Honorable James T. McIntyre, Jr.
Former Director, Office of Management
and Budget

Olivia S. Mitchell
Economist

The Honorable William A. Niskanen
Chairman Emeritus and Distinguished
Senior Economist, Cato Institute; Former
Acting Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisers

The Honorable Jim Nussle
Former Director, Office of Management
and Budget; Former Chairman, House
Budget Committee; Co-Chair,
Committee for a Responsible Federal
Budget Michael E. O’Hanlon
Senior Fellow and Sydney Stein Jr.
Chair, Brookings Institution

The Honorable Paul O’Neill
Former Secretary of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury

Marne Obernauer, Jr.
Chairman, Beverage Distributors
Company

Rudolph G. Penner
Former Director, Congressional Budget
Office

The Honorable Timothy Penny
Former Member of Congress; Co-Chair,
Committee for a Responsible Federal
Budget

The Honorable Alice Rivlin
Former Director, Congressional Budget
Office; Former Director, Office of
Management and Budget; Former
Member, National Commission on
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform

The Honorable Charles Robb
Former Member of Congress

Diane Lim Rogers
Chief Economist, Concord Coalition

The Honorable Christina Romer
Former Chairwoman, Council of
Economic Advisers

The Honorable Robert E. Rubin
Former Secretary of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury

The Honorable Martin Sabo
Former Chairman, House Budget
Committee

Isabel V. Sawhill
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Allen Schick
Distinguished University Professor,
University of Maryland

Sylvester J. Schieber
Former Chairman, Social Security
Advisory Board

Daniel N. Shaviro
Wayne Perry Professor of Taxation,
New York University School of Law

The Honorable George P. Shultz
Former Secretary of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury; Former
Secretary of the U.S. Department of
State; Former Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Labor

The Honorable Alan K. Simpson
Former Member of Congress; Co-Chair,
National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform

C. Eugene Steuerle
Institute Fellow and Richard B. Fisher
Chair, Urban Institute

The Honorable Charlie Stenholm
Former Member of Congress; Co-Chair,
Committee for a Responsible Federal
Budget The Honorable Phillip Swagel
Former Assistant Secretary for
Economic Policy, U.S. Department of the
Treasury

The Honorable John Tanner
Former Member of Congress

John B. Taylor
Mary and Robert Raymond Professor of
Economics, Stanford University; George
P. Shultz Senior Fellow in Economics,
Hoover Institution
The Honorable Laura D. Tyson
Former Chairwoman, Council of
Economic Advisers; Former Director,
National Economic Council
The Honorable George Voinovich
Former Member of Congress

The Honorable Paul Volcker
Former Chairman, Federal Reserve
System

Carol Cox Wait
Former President, Committee for a
Responsible Federal Budget

The Honorable David M. Walker
Former Comptroller General of the
United States


The Honorable Murray L.
Weidenbaum
Former Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisers

The Honorable Joseph R. Wright, Jr.
Former Director, Office of Management
and Budget
Mark Zandi
Chief Economist, Moody’s Analytics

Bernanke testimony

The Economic Outlook and Monetary and Fiscal Policy

Chairman Ben S. Bernanke

Before the Committee on the Budget, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

January 7, 2011

Chairman Conrad, Senator Sessions, and other members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to offer my views on current economic conditions, recent monetary policy actions, and issues related to the federal budget.

The Economic Outlook
The economic recovery that began a year and a half ago is continuing, although, to date, at a pace that has been insufficient to reduce the rate of unemployment significantly.1 The initial stages of the recovery, in the second half of 2009 and in early 2010, were largely attributable to the stabilization of the financial system, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, and a powerful inventory cycle. Growth slowed somewhat this past spring as the impetus from fiscal policy and inventory building waned and as European sovereign debt problems led to increased volatility in financial markets.

More recently, however, we have seen increased evidence that a self-sustaining recovery in consumer and business spending may be taking hold. In particular, real consumer spending rose at an annual rate of 2-1/2 percent in the third quarter of 2010, and the available indicators suggest that it likely expanded at a somewhat faster pace in the fourth quarter. Business investment in new equipment and software has grown robustly in recent quarters, albeit from a fairly low level, as firms replaced aging equipment and made investments that had been delayed during the downturn. However, the housing sector remains depressed, as the overhang of vacant houses continues to weigh heavily on both home prices and construction, and nonresidential construction is also quite weak. Overall, the pace of economic recovery seems likely to be moderately stronger in 2011 than it was in 2010.

Although recent indicators of spending and production have generally been encouraging, conditions in the labor market have improved only modestly at best. After the loss of nearly 8-1/2 million jobs in 2008 and 2009, private payrolls expanded at an average of only about 100,000 per month in 2010–a pace barely enough to accommodate the normal increase in the labor force and, therefore, insufficient to materially reduce the unemployment rate.2 On a more positive note, a number of indicators of job openings and hiring plans have looked stronger in recent months, and initial claims for unemployment insurance declined through November and December. Notwithstanding these hopeful signs, with output growth likely to be moderate in the next few quarters and employers reportedly still reluctant to add to payrolls, considerable time likely will be required before the unemployment rate has returned to a more normal level. Persistently high unemployment, by damping household income and confidence, could threaten the strength and sustainability of the recovery. Moreover, roughly 40 percent of the unemployed have been out of work for six months or more. Long-term unemployment not only imposes exceptional hardships on the jobless and their families, but it also erodes the skills of those workers and may inflict lasting damage on their employment and earnings prospects.

A very ‘dovish’ assessment of this leg of the dual mandate, indicating the low rate policy will continue.

Recent data show consumer price inflation continuing to trend downward. For the 12 months ending in November, prices for personal consumption expenditures rose 1.0 percent, and inflation excluding the relatively volatile food and energy components–which tends to be a better gauge of underlying inflation trends–was only 0.8 percent, down from 1.7 percent a year earlier and from about 2-1/2 percent in 2007, the year before the recession began. The downward trend in inflation over the past few years is no surprise, given the low rates of resource utilization that have prevailed over that time. Indeed, as a result of the weak job market, wage growth has slowed along with inflation; over the 12 months ending in November, average hourly earnings have risen only 1.6 percent. Despite the decline in inflation, long-run inflation expectations have remained stable; for example, the rate of inflation that households expect over the next 5 to 10 years, as measured by the Thompson Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers, has remained in a narrow range over the past few years. With inflation expectations stable, and with levels of resource utilization expected to remain low, inflation is likely to be subdued for some time.

A very dovish assessment of the inflation mandate as well, which he links to the output gap and inflation expectations.

Monetary Policy
Although it is likely that economic growth will pick up this year and that the unemployment rate will decline somewhat, progress toward the Federal Reserve’s statutory objectives of maximum employment and stable prices is expected to remain slow. The projections submitted by Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) participants in November showed that, notwithstanding forecasts of increased growth in 2011 and 2012, most participants expected the unemployment rate to be close to 8 percent two years from now. At this rate of improvement, it could take four to five more years for the job market to normalize fully.

FOMC participants also projected inflation to be at historically low levels for some time. Very low rates of inflation raise several concerns: First, very low inflation increases the risk that new adverse shocks could push the economy into deflation, that is, a situation involving ongoing declines in prices. Experience shows that deflation induced by economic slack can lead to extended periods of poor economic performance; indeed, even a significant perceived risk of deflation may lead firms to be more cautious about investment and hiring. Second, with short-term nominal interest rates already close to zero, declines in actual and expected inflation increase, respectively, both the real cost of servicing existing debt and the expected real cost of new borrowing. By raising effective debt burdens and by inhibiting new household spending and business investment, higher real borrowing costs create a further drag on growth. Finally, it is important to recognize that periods of very low inflation generally involve very slow growth in nominal wages and incomes as well as in prices. (I have already alluded to the recent deceleration in average hourly earnings.) Thus, in circumstances like those we face now, very low inflation or deflation does not necessarily imply any increase in household purchasing power. Rather, because of the associated deterioration in economic performance, very low inflation or deflation arising from economic slack is generally linked with reductions rather than gains in living standards.

It doesn’t get any more dovish than that.

In a situation in which unemployment is high and expected to remain so and inflation is unusually low, the FOMC would normally respond by reducing its target for the federal funds rate. However, the Federal Reserve’s target for the federal funds rate has been close to zero since December 2008, leaving essentially no scope for further reductions. Consequently, for the past two years the FOMC has been using alternative tools to provide additional monetary accommodation. Notably, between December 2008 and March 2010, the FOMC purchased about $1.7 trillion in longer-term Treasury and agency-backed securities in the open market. The proceeds of these purchases ultimately find their way into the banking system, with the result that depository institutions now hold a high level of reserve balances with the Federal Reserve.

Although longer-term securities purchases are a different tool for conducting monetary policy than the more familiar approach of managing the overnight interest rate, the goals and transmission mechanisms of the two approaches are similar. Conventional monetary policy works by changing market expectations for the future path of short-term interest rates, which, in turn, influences the current level of longer-term interest rates and other financial conditions. These changes in financial conditions then affect household and business spending. By contrast, securities purchases by the Federal Reserve put downward pressure directly on longer-term interest rates by reducing the stock of longer-term securities held by private investors.3 These actions affect private-sector spending through the same channels as conventional monetary policy. In particular, the Federal Reserve’s earlier program of asset purchases appeared to be successful in influencing longer-term interest rates, raising the prices of equities and other assets, and improving credit conditions more broadly, thereby helping stabilize the economy and support the recovery.

Reads like he’s finally got it right, and that it’s about price not quantity.

In light of this experience, and with the economic outlook still unsatisfactory, late last summer the FOMC began to signal to financial markets that it was considering providing additional monetary policy accommodation by conducting further asset purchases. At its meeting in early November, the FOMC formally announced its intention to purchase an additional $600 billion in Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, about one-third of the value of securities purchased in its earlier programs. The FOMC also maintained its policy, adopted at its August meeting, of reinvesting principal received on the Federal Reserve’s holdings of securities.

The FOMC stated that it will review its asset purchase program regularly in light of incoming information and will adjust the program as needed to meet its objectives. Importantly, the Committee remains unwaveringly committed to price stability and, in particular, to maintaining inflation at a level consistent with the Federal Reserve’s mandate from the Congress.4 In that regard, it bears emphasizing that the Federal Reserve has all the tools it needs to ensure that it will be able to smoothly and effectively exit from this program at the appropriate time. Importantly, the Federal Reserve’s ability to pay interest on reserve balances held at the Federal Reserve Banks will allow it to put upward pressure on short-term market interest rates and thus to tighten monetary policy when needed, even if bank reserves remain high. Moreover, the Fed has invested considerable effort in developing methods to drain or immobilize bank reserves as needed to facilitate the smooth withdrawal of policy accommodation when conditions warrant. If necessary, the Committee could also tighten policy by redeeming or selling securities on the open market.

More evidence he’s finally got it right.

As I am appearing before the Budget Committee, it is worth emphasizing that the Fed’s purchases of longer-term securities are not comparable to ordinary government spending. In executing these transactions, the Federal Reserve acquires financial assets, not goods and services.

And he’s taken to heart some good coaching from his Monetary Affairs executives on this as well.

Ultimately, at the appropriate time, the Federal Reserve will normalize its balance sheet by selling these assets back into the market or by allowing them to mature. In the interim, the interest that the Federal Reserve earns from its securities holdings adds to the Fed’s remittances to the Treasury; in 2009 and 2010, those remittances totaled about $120 billion.

No mention that functions much like a tax, removing that much income from the non govt. sectors.

Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policymakers also face a challenging policy environment. Our nation’s fiscal position has deteriorated appreciably since the onset of the financial crisis and the recession. To a significant extent, this deterioration is the result of the effects of the weak economy on revenues and outlays, along with the actions that were taken to ease the recession and steady financial markets. In their planning for the near term, fiscal policymakers will need to continue to take into account the low level of economic activity and the still-fragile nature of the economic recovery.

Substitute ‘adjusted’ for deteriorated and it’s something I perhaps could have said. And the last sentence opens the door for further fiscal adjustment. But then it all goes bad:

However, an important part of the federal budget deficit appears to be structural rather than cyclical; that is, the deficit is expected to remain unsustainably elevated even after economic conditions have returned to normal. For example, under the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) so-called alternative fiscal scenario, which assumes that most of the tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003 are made permanent and that discretionary spending rises at the same rate as the gross domestic product (GDP), the deficit is projected to fall from its current level of about 9 percent of GDP to 5 percent of GDP by 2015, but then to rise to about 6-1/2 percent of GDP by the end of the decade. In subsequent years, the budget outlook is projected to deteriorate even more rapidly, as the aging of the population and continued growth in health spending boost federal outlays on entitlement programs. Under this scenario, federal debt held by the public is projected to reach 185 percent of the GDP by 2035, up from about 60 percent at the end of fiscal year 2010.

The CBO projections, by design, ignore the adverse effects that such high debt and deficits would likely have on our economy. But if government debt and deficits were actually to grow at the pace envisioned in this scenario, the economic and financial effects would be severe. Diminishing confidence on the part of investors that deficits will be brought under control would likely lead to sharply rising interest rates on government debt and, potentially, to broader financial turmoil. Moreover, high rates of government borrowing would both drain funds away from private capital formation and increase our foreign indebtedness, with adverse long-run effects on U.S. output, incomes, and standards of living.

It is widely understood that the federal government is on an unsustainable fiscal path. Yet, as a nation, we have done little to address this critical threat to our economy. Doing nothing will not be an option indefinitely; the longer we wait to act, the greater the risks and the more wrenching the inevitable changes to the budget will be. By contrast, the prompt adoption of a credible program to reduce future deficits would not only enhance economic growth and stability in the long run, but could also yield substantial near-term benefits in terms of lower long-term interest rates and increased consumer and business confidence. Plans recently put forward by the President’s National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform and other prominent groups provide useful starting points for a much-needed national conversation about our medium- and long-term fiscal situation. Although these various proposals differ on many details, each gives a sobering perspective on the size of the problem and offers some potential solutions.

This is absolute garbage from the good Princeton professor.

With this testimony he continues to share the blame for the enlarged output gap.

Because he fears we could be the next Greece, he remains part of the process that is turning us into the next Japan.

Of course, economic growth is affected not only by the levels of taxes and spending, but also by their composition and structure. I hope that, in addressing our long-term fiscal challenges, the Congress will seek reforms to the government’s tax policies and spending priorities that serve not only to reduce the deficit but also to enhance the long-term growth potential of our economy–for example, by encouraging investment in physical and human capital, by promoting research and development, by providing necessary public infrastructure, and by reducing disincentives to work and to save. We cannot grow out of our fiscal imbalances, but a more productive economy would ease the tradeoffs that we face.

more on the man of the year


[Skip to the end]

More on the Bernanke testimony:

Shortly after the failure of Lehman Brothers, I was in Brazil at an international meeting, and I had a meeting there with bankers, and I asked them how the Brazilian economy was doing. And they said well, it had been doing fine, but within a week after Lehman Brothers collapsed, it was like a frigid wind descended on the economy in Brazil. And there was an enormous impact almost immediately on their economy, on their ability to raise funds and make loans.

In dollars, I’m sure.

And it’s astonishing how quickly that one failure spread throughout the world, and created a very severe recession, not just in the U.S., but around the world.

The Federal Reserve, by making a large loan under very tough terms to AIG,

But allowing those funds to be used to meet margin calls on CDS and probably other related market losses. That’s perhaps the most controversial part. Those payments to creditors perhaps could have been labeled ‘loans from the Fed’ subject to AIG ultimate solvency rather than payments from the Fed.

prevented the failure of that institution, and, therefore, tried to contain the impact of the Lehman Brothers failure on the rest of the global financial system. I’ll come back and talk more about AIG, and those things later, but that was just the first step of many that we took to try to stop the crisis.

Subsequently, again, very concerned with the possibility of a global financial meltdown, we worked with Treasury and the Congress to develop a bill that would provide funding that the Fed, the Treasury and other agencies could use to stabilize the financial system, to prevent collapse of the financial system.

This immediately became relevant, because in mid-October, the crisis heated up again to the point that we thought that we were again within days or hours of a collapse of many of the largest financial firms in the world. It was a dramatic weekend. It was Oct. 10 or 11, Columbus Day weekend, when the Finance Ministers and the central bankers of seven of the largest industrial economies had a meeting here in Washington, which, of course, I attended. Usually, those meetings are very scripted and very dry. In this case, there was palpable concern among the participants that the collapse of their financial system might be just days away, and there was a great deal of discussion about how we, collectively, as the policy makers leading those countries could stop the collapse.

In the days that followed, countries all over the world, particularly the advanced industrial countries, took strong measures to prevent the collapse of the financial systems. That included putting capital into banks;

Obviously they didn’t know it was nothing more than regulatory forbearance.

it included preventing the failure of large financial firms; it included guaranteeing the debts of financial firms so they could borrow and keep themselves afloat; it included making short-term loans to firms so that they would have the short-term credit they needed to pay off lenders who were withdrawing their funding. And, again, this was the U.S. doing this, but also many of the most important industrial countries around the world simultaneously, including the U.K., Germany, France, Switzerland and others.

Again, many of those creditors ‘bailed out’ by the Fed’s liquidity provisions could have had those funds labeled ‘loans from the Fed’ rather than simply receiving payments from the Fed.

The result of this collective global effort over that week was essentially to succeed in stabilizing the global banking system, in that subsequent to that week the fears of utter collapse were largely overcome.

Now, in the following months after that, there were still many, many great difficulties in the financial markets. And the Fed, and other central banks and Treasuries around the world, worked very hard to restore the normal functioning of those markets. For example, following the Lehman failure, there was a run where ordinary investors went as quick as they could to pull their money out of money market mutual funds, which are a common investment vehicle for many Americans. It was very analogous to 100 years ago when a bank was about to fail, and the depositors would go to the bank, they would run and pull their money out as quickly as possible, and then the bank would fail. The money market mutual funds were experiencing exactly the same phenomenon.

The Fed and the Treasury working together provided short-term loans to these funds. The Treasury provided some insurance to depositors, or to investors so they would know they wouldn’t lose their money. We stopped the run on the money market mutual funds, and that was an example of how we helped stabilize the situation.

Not sure why that was critical?

There were many other steps we had to take helping individual institutions, and providing programs for backstop lending to make sure that the key markets in the financial system were functioning again, because for months after Lehman Brothers, the amount of fear and uncertainty in the financial markets was so elevated that these markets were, essentially, not functioning properly, and it took really many months until we had reached the point that these markets had begun to approach a normal state.

Doesn’t mention the dollar swap lines to foreign CB’s???

But bank lending is still weak. The banks had a near-death experience, they are now lending in a difficult economic environment. We are strongly encouraging them to lend. We have taken a lot of steps to help them raise new capital, so they’ll have a basis on which to make new loans. And we are taking a number of steps to try to open up markets through which investors invest directly in various forms of credit, like auto loans and credit card loans. All of these steps are improving the financial situation, but particularly the banking sector, we’re still in the convalescent stage.

They only bought AAA traunches which didn’t address the credit issues. They were more worried about taking losses than restoring auto credit, but wanted to give the appearance they were doing something.

As I said, I was a professor. I never worked for Wall Street. I have no connections on Wall Street. In fact, when I first became chairman, I was criticized in some quarters for not being close enough, or knowing enough about Wall Street. So, why did I take these actions?

I didn’t take these actions, or the Federal Reserve didn’t take these actions because we were trying to help bankers, or trying to help Wall Street. What I understood, and what knowledgeable people all around the world understood, is that the financial system is essential to the functioning of any economy. And that if the financial system had collapsed to the extent to which we believed was very likely in September and October 2008, then no force on earth, no policy, could have prevented the collapse of the entire U.S. economy with long-lasting and extreme consequences for every American.

How about a proportionate fiscal response, like a payroll tax holiday and per capita revenue distributions to the States? Instead, he continues to preach ‘fiscal responsibility.’

It was because we were concerned about jobs and incomes and the economic well-being of every American that we intervened to prevent the collapse of the financial system.

Now, going forward, we have a lot to do to get the economy back to stability, get jobs created. You can talk as much as you like about the things we’re doing there, but we’re also going to have to take some very strong steps to make sure that the crisis doesn’t ever happen again.

There were, certainly, weaknesses in our financial regulatory system. There were weaknesses in the way that financial regulators supervised the banks and other financial institutions. And the financial institutions themselves made lots of mistakes in terms of their ability to measure the risks that they were taking, and to control them properly. And to make sure we don’t ever have a crisis like this again, we need to have extensive reform in the private sector, in the public sector, to eliminate these risks in the future.

You had said that the banks were convalescent still, Mr. Chairman. Can you talk to us a little bit more about what that means?

Well, the banks have been stabilized. They’ve raised a good deal of capital, so they’re in much better shape than they were. They are lending, but they are not lending enough to support a healthy recovery. One important reason for that, is that given their losses, given what they’ve been through, they’re being very conservative in the face of what is still a very weak economy; and, therefore, a sense that many borrowers are quite risky.

As bank supervisors, we have a difficult challenge. We have told the banks very clearly that we want them to make loans to credit-worthy borrowers, where there are borrowers who can repay the loans. It’s in the interest of the banks, it’s in the interest of the economy, and, of course, it’s in the interest of the borrowers for those loans to get made.

But the problem is, of course, that we got into trouble in the first place by banks making loans that couldn’t be repaid, so we don’t want banks to make bad loans. Therefore, we are trying to work with banks to make sure that they are, in fact, able to make as many good loans as possible, that they have enough capital, that they have enough short-term funding, and that the examiners and the regulators who work with the banks are not unduly restricting the loans that they make. We want to work with the banks to make sure that they balance the appropriate prudence and caution against the need to make good loans for the economy, and for their own profits.

Banks and the entire private sector is necessarily procyclical.

Only govt via fiscal policy can be countercyclical.

So, what this means is that economic policy, and financial oversight have to take into account all the international dimensions of that. So, for example, on the monetary policy side, we have worked carefully and closely with other central banks to talk about monetary policy in different parts of the world. In fact, during the heat of the crisis in October 2008, the Federal Reserve and five other major central banks cut interest rates together on the same day, as a sign of how committed we were to cooperating on monetary policy.

Doesn’t seem concerned that interest rate cuts may in fact be deflationary as he knows they remove interest income for the private sectors (Bernanke, Sacks, Reinhart, 2004 Fed paper- see ‘the fiscal channel’)

The system worked.

It did work. It was an important first step. I mean, even after we took those steps, the financial markets were in a great deal of stress, and credit at all levels was very much constrained. But it stabilized the situation, and from there, we were able to take a number of steps to – both we, and our partners in other countries – to get the key markets working again, to get the banks stabilized, and to begin the very difficult process of getting the financial system back on its feet.

Never realizing that all the alphabet soup measures to get liquidity going missed the point that all the Fed had to do was lend fed funds to member banks without limit, as the ECB effectively did by immediately accepting any and all bank collateral, to immediately restore bank liquidity.

So, while it’s difficult to know exactly what the outcome would have been, certainly, just judging on what happened after the failure of a single firm, the collapse of the global financial system would surely have led to a far deeper recession, higher unemployment, much greater fiscal cost to the taxpayer, and to rebuild the financial system, and to get the economy moving again. And almost certainly, [we would have had] many, many years of subnormal – substandard – performance by the U.S. economy, and by other industrial economies, as well. Again, we can’t know precisely, but I think if anything, the financial crisis last fall was as severe, and as dangerous as anything we’ve ever seen, including the 1930s.

The whole point of going off the gold standard in 1934 was to be able to provide liquidity without limit to the banking system, so the fact that he did that, however belatedly, is nothing to brag about. It also allowed for unlimited fiscal responses, which he still seems to not fathom.

There is an irony here that’s literary, that here’s this man who spends his life distinguishing himself studying economic history. And then one day you wake up and realize that you’re at the center of economic history in this really unusual chapter. How do you process that personally? I mean, how does that change how you go from being the academic expert to you are in the arena?

Well, I certainly didn’t anticipate when I came to Washington in 2002, I certainly didn’t anticipate these events, or how things would evolve. No question about it. And when I became chairman in 2006, I thought that – I hoped that my main objectives would be improving the management, communication and monitoring policy.

We were certainly attentive to the risks of financial crisis. Secretary Paulson and I talk frequently to people on Wall Street, and we secured the Federal Reserve. We set up a team of staff drawn from different disciplines to try to identify problems and weaknesses in the financial sector. So, we were certainly aware of the risks of financial crisis, but one as large and as dangerous as this one, I certainly did not anticipate. I wish I had, but I didn’t.

Then when the crisis came, you know, rather unexpectedly, a different part of my training and research became relevant, which was to work on financial crises generally, and also on the Great Depression. And I believe very much that that experience, and that knowledge, was very helpful to me in many dimensions of this effort, ranging from – I think the most important lesson, there are many lessons, but I think the most important lesson was that we were not going to have a healthy stable economy with a completely dysfunctional financial system. We had to take strong measures to prevent that from happening.

And in the 1930s, the Federal Reserve was quite passive, and allowed the banks to fail, and we know the result of that. So, we were determined that that wasn’t going to happen on my watch, on our watch, so we were prepared to take very strong actions to avoid that.

That was under the gold standard. Nothing could be done without losing the nation’s gold supply. It was only after the banks reopened in 1934 with a non convertible currency could there be credible deposit insurance unlimited Fed provision of liquidity. Clearly he doesn’t understand that or a) he’d be stating it b) I don’t want to say…

You’ve been quite forthcoming, I think, in your testimony about saying, there’s a lot of things you didn’t see, there’s some things that we didn’t do. If I gave you a kind of do-over to go back as long as you want to say you know what, if we’d seen this, if we’d looked at the sub-prime mortgage crisis. I mean, how could you have handled it, and the Fed handled it better to have a different outcome?

Well, we have, based on the experience of the crisis, we – the Treasury and others – have made proposals for how the financial regulatory system ought to be reformed and restructured. I’ll say a word about that. If we had been in that forum, I think we would have avoided the crisis. So, there were some important lessons.

One was that our regulatory system was too myopic. It was too focused on individual firms, or individual markets, and there was nobody paying attention to the broad overall financial system. So, the Federal Reserve was not entrusted with looking at the whole financial system. We were – we had very specific assignments. We were supposed to look at specific institutions. Those institutions did not include many of the firms that had severe problems, like Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns or AIG. Those were outside of our purview, and since they were outside of our purview, we didn’t look at them.

They missed one critical factor- allowing bank loan officers to work on a commission basis. Nor, did the regulators look into actual loan files to check for fraudulent appraisals and income statements promoted by loan officers working on a commission basis. Regulation is necessarily a work in progress. Mistakes will be made, including mistakes of this scale. Critical to our well being is the knowledge of how to keep these errors in the financial sector from damaging the real economy. And that requires appropriate fiscal responses to sustain aggregate demand, preferably in an equitable manner.

But there were many situations where there was really nobody who was looking carefully at what was going on, and nobody who was looking at how the parts of the system fit together. So, a very important recommendation that we have made is that there be a more systemic approach – that is, have some arrangement whereby a regulator, or a group of regulators, has responsibility to look at the system as a whole, and try to identify emerging problems, or gaps in the regulatory apparatus, or weaknesses in individual institutions, as they relate to other institutions, that threaten the integrity of the system as a whole.

Better still, most of the issues came from allowing banking activities that in fact served no further public purpose. That includes any bank participation in secondary markets, loaning against financial assets, using LIBOR as an index, and many others.

We didn’t have that. Therefore, nobody paid enough attention to AIG, nobody paid enough to attention to credit and call swaps, nobody paid enough attention to some of the activities of investment banks. You go on, and on, and on. Again, if we had had a more comprehensive overview approach that would have been helpful.

A second key element is the problem too big to fail, and how to address that. So, I just want to be very, very clear that even though the Federal Reserve was involved in rescuing Bear Stearns and AIG, we did that extremely reluctantly, and with – it was a very distasteful thing for us to do. We did not do it – we were not set up to do it. We were – it was very difficult for us to do, but we did it because there was no appropriate mechanism, there was no set of laws that would allow the government to intervene in a situation like that in a way that would allow the firm to fail, but would not have all the negative consequences for the financial system and the economy.

So, we had a situation where there were firms who were literally too big to fail, or too complex to fail, or too interconnected to fail. When they came to the edge of collapsing, we had only two very, very bad choices: we either bailed them out, put taxpayer money at risk, put the Federal Reserve at risk in terms of our lending, or we could let them collapse and have all the hugely negative consequences for the financial system and for the economy.

So, what we did not have, and what we very much need going forward, is a third option, and that option should be a legal framework which allows the government – and I think that means, in practice, the Treasury and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation – to intervene when a large complex systemically critical firm is about to fail, and to allow the firm to fail, impose losses on the lenders, the creditors of the firm, the shareholders, fire the management, protect the taxpayer, but be able to do that in a way that protects the system, so that the financial system is protected from the immediate impact of that collapse.

I submit we already have that for the large banks, and the others as well. He just didn’t grasp how to use it. The receivership they did set up did not have to pay off all the creditors, and if there were issues, it would have been a relatively simple matter to petition congress for an ’emergency’ alteration of current law. They didn’t even try.

We did not have a system like that in place. I think if we had, we could have dealt with Lehman Brothers and AIG in a much more satisfactory way. We would have avoided many of the problems. And, most importantly, we would have not, in some sense, rewarded failure, which is what happened. In the future, it’s important that firms be allowed to fail if they, in fact, take excessive risks, and make bad gambles.

But that mechanism is not in place now.

The mechanism is not in place, and we have asked Congress to address it, and I believe that they will. But until they do, we are really still in a situation where we don’t have good options in dealing with potential collapse of a global financial firm.

It isn’t that hard to do.

Right now people are sort of looking to you, and to Congress, to kind of break the back of unemployment. And you’ve talked about how that is really our biggest challenge right now. Do you feel there is anything else that can be done, or has the Fed shot all its bullets, and has Congress shot all its bullets?

Well, the Federal Reserve has been very aggressive on the unemployment side. So, let me just first say that even though the recession may be technically over., in a sense that the economy is growing, it’s going to feel like a recession for some time, because unemployment remains very high, about 10%. And even people who have jobs, there are many people who are on short hours, that are in voluntary part-time, or maybe people who are not technically unemployed, only because they stopped looking. So, the labor market is in very weak condition, and we’re not going to see a healthy, vibrant economy again until the labor market – the job market – has recovered. So, that is really an extraordinarily important objective for policy going forward. And, certainly, our job won’t be done until the economy is growing again, and jobs are being created.

The Federal Reserve’s attempts to address employment issues, we’ve done several things. Certainly, one of the things is we’re using our monetary policy. In December 2008, while the crisis was still in an intense phase, we cut the short-term interest rate that is the measure of our monetary policy almost to zero. The first time that had ever been the case, the Fed had ever done that, in order to provide the maximum amount of support to the economy, and it remains close to zero today. So, that is a very powerful measure.

Again, he gives no weight to the possibility that the interest income he removed from ‘savers’ is weighing on the economy, even though it’s in his own paper from 2004.

Having used that tool to its maximum extent, we have then turned to new and innovative tools, things that have never been done before in the Federal Reserve. I’ll give you two examples. One, we’ve purchased about $1 trillion worth of mortgages that are guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the U.S. Treasury. And in doing those purchases, we have succeeded in reducing the national 30-year fixed-rate mortgage rate from about 6-1/2% to about 4.8%. By lowering mortgage rates that way, we have helped to stabilize the housing sector, to help stabilize the housing crisis, and allow people to refinance, to buy homes. And that, obviously, should get construction started again and house prices stabilizing, and people being able to meet their mortgages. That’s obviously going to be helpful.

The far more effective way would be to directly fund the agencies at the fixed rate the Fed wanted for mortgages and allow that funding to be prepaid without penalty if the mortgages prepaid. But that was never even a consideration.

We’ve also created a program that helps bring credit from Wall Street to support a wide variety of consumer and small-business loans. So, for example, our program allows Wall Street money to come in and support auto loans, credit card loans, student loans, small business loans, commercial real estate loans. By providing that conduit, we are supporting what the banks are doing to get credit flowing into those important sectors.

But only the AAA pieces, as previously discussed.

And I guess a third thing, an additional thing I would mention is that we serve not only as monetary policy makers, but also as bank supervisors. And there we’ve been sparing no effort, as I talked about earlier, to get the banks able and willing to lend again, to create – particularly the small businesses – to create the credit that’s needed to create new jobs and get employment back on track.

I would mention, in particular, our leadership of the stress tests. In the spring, the Federal Reserve led an effort to evaluate the balance sheets of 19 of the largest banking companies in the U.S., and our report on those balance sheets, along with the FDIC, the OCC, to other banking agencies, our reports on those balance sheets is public, greatly increased the confidence in the banking system, which meant that they were able to go out and raise new capital in the stock market, and many of them have paid back the capital to the government.

Still no clue it was only regulatory forbearance.

But by raising new capital, they increased their own capacity to lend. And, as conditions improve, they’ll be able to make new loans as well.

So, by keeping interest rates low, including both short-term rates and long-term rates, like mortgage rates, by supporting a flow of credit to small businesses, consumers and the like, that is our primary effort. Those are the tools that we have. We can always do more, if necessary, but those are the tools that we are applying trying to get job growth going again.

They have more tools but aren’t using them? Unless this is a bluff, what are they waiting for? This is an extraordinary statement.

And we have seen, obviously, the labor market is still very weak, but the last report we saw shows that we’re now coming closer to the point where we’ll stop seeing job losses and start seeing job gains.

We’ve talked about a lot of those extraordinary things you’ve done. But is that it? Like now do we have to – because there’s still really bad numbers, even your forecasts are like what, 10% [unemployment] this year, 9% going forward, I think like 8% in 2012. Do we just have to kind of now sit back and take it?

Well, the Federal Reserve will continue to see what other policy actions we can take. And we’ve really been very aggressive, thus far. And the additional steps aren’t as obvious or clear as the ones that we’ve already taken.

Right, they don’t have any actual ideas.

A lot of the scope now is on the fiscal side of the house. As you know, the government passed a major fiscal program earlier this year, and I think it was just today the President announced a number of individual – a package of programs to try to address unemployment. So, [there are] a lot of new initiatives probably coming from the fiscal side.

While he preaches fiscal responsibility. See below.

Did they ask you for your opinion of those before…

Well, our staffs confer frequently with the Treasury and other parts of the Economic Advisory Groups that advise the President. And we often give our views. Our views are solicited. But, of course, they are responsible for their policy choices.

Have you said before, or are you prepared to say now, that a second stimulus, a round of incentives, is a good idea, on the fiscal side?

So, my domain is monetary policy and financial stability. And we have done, of course, a lot of aggressive things to try to support the economy, try to support job creation. I generally leave the details of fiscal programs to the Administration and Congress. That’s really their area of authority and responsibility, and I don’t think it’s appropriate for me to second guess.

You have said that there’s a long-term deficit program that needs to be dealt with. You said health care costs ought to be cut back, so it’s not like you won’t talk at all about the fiscal situation. Regardless of the details, which I understand that you don’t want to tell them how to do it, do you think that the fiscal side ought to do something?

Well, let me say this, I think that it’s very important that whatever actions that Congress and Administration take on the fiscal side, that they begin soon, or even sooner, to develop a credible medium-term interest strategy for fiscal policy, one that will persuade the markets and the public that over the medium term, the next few years, we will – we, as government, we, as a country – will be able to bring our deficits down to a level that could be sustained over a period of time.

Yes, he’s clearly part of the problem, not part of the answer. He’s failed to realize the ramifications of lifting convertibility in 1934 (and 1971 internationally) and is one of the leading deficit terrorists.

If we can do that, which will increase the confidence of the markets in American fiscal policy, that would give us more scope to take action today, because, again, there would be confidence that we have a way out, a way back towards sustainability.

There is no sustainability issue and he should know that. But he doesn’t even fully understand monetary operations of the Fed itself.

In your testimony the other day, one Senator talked about here’s the money that the federal government takes in, here’s what we spend on entitlements. It’s basically the same. Everything else we have to borrow for. I mean, there are a lot of people saying that it’s not sustainable, as you have said. And they said one of the only solutions is some kind of tax, a sales tax, value-added tax, something other than an income tax. But would you be in favor of any of those alternatives?

So, the way I put this before Congress before is that the one law that I strongly advocate is the law of arithmetic. (Laughter.) That law of arithmetic says that if you are a low-tax person, then you have to – you are responsible for finding ways on saving on expenditure, so that you don’t have enormous imbalances between revenues and spending. And by the same law of arithmetic, if you were somebody who believes that government spending is important, and you are for bigger and more spending, and bigger programs, then it’s incumbent upon you to figure out where the revenues are going to come from to meet that spending. So, again, I think that’s, again, Congress’ main responsibility.

I have spoken about deficit, and I think deficits are important, because they address broad economic and financial stability. We need to talk about that. But in terms of the specifics about how to get to fiscal balance, that’s the elected officials’ responsibility.

He sees spending as revenue constrained where that concept is entirely inapplicable to non convertible currency and floating fx policy.

Do you think Congress is fiscally illiterate? Economically illiterate?

No, of course not. But what they have to deal with is not just a question of understanding. It’s a question of making very, very tough choices, and in a political environment, where people understandably are resistant to cuts in programs or benefits, or increases of taxes. So, there needs to be tough choices made, there needs to be leadership. And I don’t envy Congress those choices, because they’re very difficult ones to make.

Are you saying that time for fiscal and monetary stimulus is over? And, if so, what’s the downside of pushing even harder?

There are not easy solutions. It’s an enormous problem. I think the Federal Reserve – one direction that we can go is to continue to encourage the extension of credit, small businesses, in particular, create a lot of jobs, particularly during economic recoveries. And we have lots and lots of evidence and anecdotes suggesting that small businesses are particularly harmed by the tightness of the bank lending standards and unavailability of credit. So, everything we can do, and that the Administration and Congress can do, to support credit extension to all business, but primarily small business, would be a very powerful.

You don’t think it’s a liquidity problem?

Well, I mean, interest rates are very low, so I think it’s going to be a question, first of all, of getting credit flowing again. And the Federal Reserve has got a role to play there. And then, Congress and the Administration will consider possible programs and fiscal policies.

You’re definitely not okay with long-term profligacy, but are you okay with them doing something in the short-term?

I think if they do that, it’s critically important they clarify the longer-term plan for establishing sustainable fiscal [policy].

Again ducking the question. But it’s clear he is not a supporter of using fiscal adjustments to sustain aggregate demand.

Adair Turner, the chief British [financial services] regulator, said that we’ve learned that much of what the financial services sector did in the past 10 years has no economic or social value. Do you agree? Did the financial services sector just get too big, and should it be smaller?

Okay. Well, a strong financial system is very important. It allocates capital to new businesses and new industries. It allows for people to invest in a wide range of activities, so it’s critically important to have a good financial system. And the evidence for that is that when the financial system breaks down, the system just doesn’t function.

That is not evidence for that. Seems a breakdown of logic???

You see what the impact has had on the economy. With that being said, the financial system is unique to the extent, first, that it is so critical to the economy, and, secondly, to the very, very old tendency to succumb to booms and busts.

Again, this is too confused to not be an insight into his basic sense of logic.

And, therefore, we do need to have an effective comprehensive financial regulatory system that will essentially allow us to tame the beast so that it provides the benefits, the growth and development without creating these kinds of crisis.

And then this says it all regarding his understanding of monetary operations:

Okay. When the Federal Reserve buys mortgages, it pays for them by creating reserves the banks hold in Federal Reserve. So, as we purchase $1 trillion of mortgages, we’ve created roughly $1 trillion of reserves that banks hold at the Federal Reserve. The banks, at this point, are just willing to hold those reserves with the Fed, and not do anything with them.

Banks don’t ‘do anything’ with reserves.

Ultimately, if the economy normalized, and the Fed took no action, the banks would take those reserves, try to lend them out, and they would begin to circulate, and the money supply would start to grow.

Banks don’t ‘lend out’ reserves.

And then, ultimately, that would create an inflationary risk.

This is not how it works.

So, therefore, as the economy begins to recover, and as we move away from this very weak economic environment, the Federal Reserve is going to have to pull those reserves out of the system.

We have a number of means for doing that, which we have explained to the markets, and the public, and everyone is confident we can do that. And we will do that over time, in order to make sure that as we come out of this crisis, we don’t generate inflation at the end.

Reserve management has nothing to do with inflation with a non convertible currency and floating fx. This is ancient gold standard rhetoric.

So, the reserves can be pulled out through various mechanisms or can mobilize. And we don’t have to do that yet, but when the time comes, we have tools to do that.

And are there lurking dangers in those mortgages that you purchased that we don’t even know about now?

Well, the mortgages are guaranteed. The credit, even if they go bad, Fannie and Freddie with the backing of the U.S. Treasury will pay them off, so the Fed is not taking any credit risk by holding these mortgages.

It’s comforting for you, but not for the taxpayers. Right?

Well, on the other hand, what’s happening is that we earn the interest from those mortgages, and then we remit that interest back to the Treasury, so the money finds its way back to the taxpayer.

That’s exactly how the Fed’s portfolio removes interest income from the private sectors.

And, indeed, the Federal Reserve will be paying the Treasury a good bit more money the next few years than it has in the past, because of the interest we’re earning on these mortgages we acquired.

On that note, this week we did learn the TARP is going to pay back nearly all of what it was required to from the taxpayer. Looking back a year later, are surprised by that?

Well, we said at the beginning that the TARP money was an investment. It was going to acquire assets, and that most or all might come back to the taxpayer. Right now, if you look at all these repayments from banks, and the fact that the government is sitting on capital gains, as well as other investments, I think it’s a reasonable probability that the TARP money invested in financial institutions, that the great majority of it will come back to the taxpayer. So, in the end, we will have stabilized the financial system and avoided this global crisis at not a small amount of money, but relative to the alternative, a quite small amount of money.

Were there days where you woke up and you thought, what am I not thinking of that we could be doing?

We had a philosophy right here, which was what we called blue-sky thinking. And what blue-sky thinking was, was we have a problem, I want everybody to give me just three associations. What can you think of? How can we approach this, what can we do? And we’ll worry about getting rid of the silly answers later. So, there’s been a lot of creativity here, and I give credit to terrific staff . I think one of the lessons of the depression, and this is something that Franklin Roosevelt demonstrated, was that when orthodoxy fails, then you need to try new things. And he was very willing to try unorthodox approaches when the orthodox approach had shown that it was not adequate.


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fixing the economy


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I was asked by a reporter to state how I’d fix the economy in 500 words and replied:

Fixing the Economy

1. A full ‘payroll tax holiday’ where the US Treasury makes all FICA payments for us (15.3%). This will restore ‘spending power’ allowing households to make their mortgage payments, which ‘fixes the banks’ from the ‘bottom up.’ It also helps keep prices down as competitive pressures will cause many businesses to lower prices due to the tax savings even as sales increase.

2. A $500 per capita Federal distribution to all the States to sustain employment in essential services, service debt, and reduce the need for State tax hikes. This can be repeated at perhaps 6 month intervals until GDP surpasses previous high levels at which point state revenues that depend on GDP are restored.

3. A Federally funded $8/hr job for anyone willing and able to work that includes healthcare. The economy will improve rapidly with my first two proposals and the private sector far more readily hires people already working vs people idle and unemployed.
In 2001 Argentina, population 34 million, implemented this proposal, putting to work 2 million people who had never held a ‘real’ job. Within 2 years 750,000 were employed by the private sector.

4. Returning banking to public purpose. The following are disruptive and do not serve no public purpose:
a. No secondary market transactions
b. No proprietary trading
c. No lending vs financial assets
d. No business activities beyond approved lending and providing banking accounts and related services.
e. No contracting in LIBOR, only fed funds.
f. No subsidiaries of any kind.
g. No offshore lending.
h. No contracting in credit default insurance.
5. Federal Reserve- The liability side of banking is not the place for market discipline. The Fed should lend in the fed funds
market to all member banks to ensure permanent liquidity. Demanding collateral from banks is disruptive and redundant, as
the FDIC already regulates and supervises all bank assets.
6. The Treasury should issue nothing longer than 3 month bills. Longer term securities serve to keep long term rates higher than
otherwise.
7. FDIC
a. Remove the $250,000 cap on deposit insurance. Liquidity is no longer an issue when fed funds are available from the Fed.
b. Don’t tax the good banks for losses by bad banks. All that does is raise interest rates.
8. The Treasury should directly fund the housing agencies to eliminate hedging needs and directly target mortgage rates at
desired levels.
9. Homeowners being foreclosed should have the option to stay in their homes at fair market rents with ownership going to the
government at the lower of the mortgage balance or fair market value of the home.
10. Remove the ‘self imposed constraints’ that are disruptive to operations and serve no public purpose.
a. Treasury debt ceiling- Congress already voted for the spending and taxes
b. Allow Treasury ‘overdrafts’ at the Fed. This is left over from the gold standard days and is currently inapplicable.
11. Federal taxes function to regulate aggregate demand, not to raise revenue per se, and therefore should be increased only
to cool down an overheating economy, and not to ‘pay for’ anything.


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US Government will go “bankrupt” if health care bill doesn’t pass


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The stupidity of the rhetoric (from both sides) just keeps getting worse:

President Obama: Federal Government ‘Will Go Bankrupt’ if Health Care Costs Are Not Reined In

President Obama told ABC News’ Charles Gibson in an interview that if Congress does not pass health care legislation that will bring down costs, the federal government “will go bankrupt.”

The president laid out a dire scenario of what will happen if his health care reform effort fails.

Gibson Obama“If we don’t pass it, here’s the guarantee….your premiums will go up, your employers are going to load up more costs on you,” he said. “Potentially they’re going to drop your coverage, because they just can’t afford an increase of 25 percent, 30 percent in terms of the costs of providing health care to employees each and every year. “

The president said that the costs of Medicare and Medicaid are on an “unsustainable” trajectory and if there is no action taken to bring them down, “the federal government will go bankrupt.”


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Assessing the Fed under Chairman Bernanke


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“Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”
Keynes, Chapter 12, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money

The Fed has failed, but failed conventionally, and is therefore being praised for what it has done.

The Fed has a stated goal of “maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long term interest rates” (Both the Federal Act 1913 and as amended in 1977).

It has not sustained full employment. And up until the recent collapse of aggregate demand, the Fed assumed it had the tools to sustain the demand necessary for full employment. In fact, longer term Federal Reserve economic forecasts have always assumed unemployment would be low and inflation low two years in the future, as those forecasts also assumed ‘appropriate monetary policy’ would be applied.

The Fed has applied all the conventional tools, including aggressive interest rate cuts, aggressive lending to its member banks, and extended aggressive lending to other financial markets. Only after these actions failed to show the desired recovery in aggregate demand did the Fed continue with ‘uncoventional’ but well known monetary policies. These included expanding the securities member banks could use for collateral, expanding its portfolio by purchasing securities in the marketplace, and lending unsecured to foreign central banks through its swap arrangements.

While these measures, and a few others, largely restored ‘market functioning’ early in 2009, unemployment has continued to increase, while inflation continues to press on the low end of the Fed’s tolerance range. Indeed, with rates at 0% and their portfolio seemingly too large for comfort, they consider the risks of deflation much more severe than the risks of an inflation that they have to date been unable to achieve.

The Fed has been applauded for staving off what might have been a depression by taking these aggressive conventional actions, and for their further aggressiveness in then going beyond that to do everything they could to reverse a dangerously widening output gap.

The alternative was to succeed unconventionally with the proposals I have been putting forth for well over a year. These include:

1. The Fed should have always been lending to its member banks in the fed funds market (unsecured interbank lending) in unlimited quantities at its target fed funds rate. This is unconventional in the US, but not in many other nations that have ‘collars’ where the Central Bank simply announces a rate at which it will borrow, and a slightly higher rate at which it will lend.

Instead of lending unsecured, the Fed demands collateral from its member banks. When the interbank markets ceased to function, the Fed only gradually began to expand the collateral it would accept from its banks. Eventually the list of collateral expanded sufficiently so that Fed lending was, functionally, roughly similar to where it would have been if it were lending unsecured, and market functioning returned.

What the Fed and the administration failed to appreciate was that demanding collateral from loans to member banks was redundant. The FDIC was already examining banks continuously to make sure all of their assets were deemed ‘legal’ and ‘appropriate’ and properly risk weighted and well capitalized. It is also obligated to take over any bank not in compliance. The FDIC must do this because it insures the bank deposits that potentially fund the entire banking system. Lending to member banks by the Fed in no way changes the asset structure of the banks, and so in no way increases the risk to government as a whole. If anything, unsecured lending by the Fed alleviates risk, as unsecured Fed lending eliminates the possibility of a liquidity crisis.

2. The Fed has assumed and continued to assume lower interest rates add to aggregate demand. There are, however, reasons to believe this is currently not the case.

First, in a 2004 Fed paper by Bernanke, Sacks, and Reinhart, the authors state that lower interest rates reduce income to the non government sectors through what they call the ‘fiscal channel.’ As the Fed cuts rates, the Treasury pays less interest, thereby reducing the income and savings of financial assets of the non government sectors. They add that a tax cut or Federal spending increase can offset this effect. Yet it was never spelled out to Congress that a fiscal adjustment was potentially in order to offset this loss of aggregate demand from interest rate cuts.

Second, while lowering the fed funds rate immediately cut interest rates for savers, it was also clear rates for borrowers were coming down far less, if at all. And, in many cases, borrowing rates rose due to credit issues. This resulted in expanded net interest margins for banks, which are now approaching an unheard of 5%. Funds taken away from savers due to lower interest rates reduces aggregate demand, borrowers aren’t gaining and may be losing as well, and the additional interest earned by lenders is going to restore lost capital and is not contributing to aggregate demand. So this shift of income from savers to banks (leveraged lenders) is reducing aggregate demand as it reduces personal income and shifts those funds to banks who don’t spend any of it.

3. The Fed is perpetuating the myth that its monetary policy will work with a lag to support aggregate demand, when it has no specific channels it can point to, or any empirical evidence that this is the case. This is particularly true of what’s called ‘quantitative easing.’ Recent surveys show market participants and politicians believe the Fed is engaged in ‘money printing,’ and they expect the size of the Fed’s portfolio and the resulting excess reserve positions of the banks to somehow, with an unknown lag, translate into a dramatic ‘monetary expansion’ and inflation. Therefore, during this severe recession where unemployment has continued to be far higher than desired, market participants and politicians are focused instead on what the Fed’s ‘exit strategy’ might be. The the fear of that presumed event has clearly taken precedence over the current economic and social disaster. A second ‘fiscal stimulus’ is not even a consideration, unless the economy gets substantially worse. Published papers from the NY Fed, however, clearly show how ‘quantitative easing’ should not be expected to have any effect on inflation. The reports state that in no case is the banking system reserve constrained when lending, so the quantity of reserves has no effect on lending or the economy.

4. The Fed is perpetuating the myth that the Federal Government has ‘run out of money,’ to use the words of President Obama. In May, testifying before Congress, when asked where the money the Fed gives the banks comes from, Chairman Bernanke gave the correct answer- the banks have accounts at the Fed much like the rest of us have bank accounts, and the Fed gives them money simply by changing numbers in their bank accounts. What the Chairman explained was there is no such thing as the government ‘running out of money.’ But the government’s personal banker, the Federal Reserve, as decided not publicly correct the misunderstanding that the government is running out of money, and thereby reduced the likelihood of a fiscal response to end the current recession.

There are also additional measures the Fed should immediately enact, such banning member banks from using LIBOR in any of their contracts. LIBOR is controlled by a foreign entity and it is counter productive to allow that to continue. In fact, it was the use of LIBOR that prompted the Fed to advance the unlimited dollar swap lines to the world’s foreign central banks- a highly risky and questionable maneuver- and there is no reason US banks can’t index their rates to the fed funds rate which is under Fed control.
There is also no reason I can determine, when the criteria is public purpose, to let banks transact in any secondary markets. As a point of logic, all legal bank assets can be held in portfolio to maturity in the normal course of business, and all funding, both short term and long term can be obtained through insured deposits, supplemented by loans from the Fed on an as needed basis. This would greatly simply the banking model, and go a long way to ease regulatory burdens. Excessive regulatory needs are a major reason for regulatory failures. Banking can be easily restructured in many ways for more compliance with less regulation.

There are more, but I believe the point has been made. I conclude by giving the Fed and Chairman Bernanke a grade of A for quickly and aggressively applying conventional actions such as interest rate cuts, numerous programs for accepting additional collateral, enacting swap lines to offset the negative effects of LIBOR dependent domestic interest rates, and creative support of secondary markets. I give them a C- for failure to educate the markets, politicians, and the media on monetary operations. And I give them an F for failure to recognize the currently unconventional actions they could have taken to avoid the liquidity crisis, and for failure inform Congress as to the necessity of sustaining aggregate demand through fiscal adjustments.


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