Trade/FOMC Preview/China Exports/Stimulus hangups


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Karim writes:

Trade: Exports up 2%, Imports up 2.3%. Imports ex-petroleum down 1% and consumer goods imports down 4.8%. Sector strength mainly in industrial goods (restocking), but indicators of final demand still look weak.

Don’t look for dramatic changes to FOMC statement; major focus will be on Treasury purchase language.

1) Econ assessment will turn slightly more positive; May mention signs of a nascent recovery, though underlying demand likely to remain weak for the foreseeable future. Inflation will remain subdued.

2) Exceptionally low FF rate for an ‘extended period’ will remain. I’d expect this phrase to be dropped about 3-4mths before they’d actually hike, with the first move possibly being a hike in the rate they pay banks on excess reserves.

3) Likely to indicate that Treasury purchases will not continue once the $300bn level has been reached, though they may restart the program in the future if needed. Language on other credit easing programs to stay intact.

China’s export model showing little bounce (latest data last night)

Some hangups with the stimulus package (courtesy of American General Contractors):

“President Barack Obama’s stimulus spending has run into a problem: A shortage of General Electric Co. water filters,” Bloomberg News reported on Thursday. “GE makes them in Canada. Under the program’s ‘Buy American’ rules, that means the filters can’t be used for work paid for by the $787 billion fund. Contractors are searching the U.S. in vain for filters as well as bolts and manhole covers needed to build wastewater plants, sewers and water pipes financed by the economic stimulus. As officials wait for federal waivers to buy those goods outside the U.S., water projects from Maine to Kansas have been delayed….the Environmental Protection Agency, which administers the water funding, has granted six waivers and has 29 petitions pending….The rules affect water projects most because highways and bridges have been constructed under Buy American regulations for the past 30 years, and not much stimulus money has been spent so far on public housing and schools, said Chris Braddock, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s associate director for procurement.”

“Gun-shy [school] administrators might undermine a federal stimulus program that encourages school construction by helping districts pay down debt,” the (Wisconsin) Daily Reporter reported on Monday. “Some district leaders say they gladly are accepting a piece of $125 million in no-interest bonds but are reluctant to invest the savings in new projects. ‘The climate out there is terrible and with the cuts made in the state budget, it’s just really difficult right now,’ said John Whalen, president of the Sun Prairie Area School District Board of Education. ‘I don’t anticipate this will encourage us to do more projects,’ he added. The district received $23 million in federal bonding, more than any other district in the state, though the bonding did not encourage additional construction. Sun Prairie used it to help pay off the $30 million it put on taxpayers for construction of a new high school and conversion of the old high school into a middle school. Both schools are scheduled to open in fall 2010. While Sun Prairie stands pat, other districts might jump at the opportunity. The School District of La Crosse received $6.6 million in bonds to help pay off debt from $18.5 million in expansion, renovation and upgrade projects.”


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First Lady Requires More Than 20 Attendants


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Yes, seems to be seriously excessive!

First Lady Requires More Than 20 Attendants

By Dr. Paul L. Williams

1. $172,2000 – Sher, Susan (Chief Of Staff)

2. $140,000 – Frye, Jocelyn C. (Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Policy And Projects For The First Lady)

3. $113,000 – Rogers, Desiree G. (Special Assistant to the President and White House Social Secretary)

4. $102,000 – Johnston, Camille Y. (Special Assistant to the President and Director of Communications for the First Lady)

5. Winter, Melissa E. (Special Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief Of Staff to the First Lady)

6. $90,000 – Medina, David S. (Deputy Chief Of Staff to the First Lady)

7. $84,000 – Lelyveld, Catherine M. (Director and Press Secretary to the First Lady)

8. $75,000 – Starkey, Frances M. (Director of Scheduling and Advance for the First Lady)

9. $70,000 – Sanders, Trooper (Deputy Director of Policy and Projects for the First Lady)

10. $65,000 – Burnough, Erinn J. (Deputy Director and Deputy Social Secretary)

11. Reinstein, Joseph B. (Deputy Director and Deputy Social Secretary)

12. $62,000 – Goodman, Jennifer R. (Deputy Director of Scheduling and Events Coordinator For The First Lady)

13. $60,000 – Fitts, Alan O. (Deputy Director of Advance and Trip Director for the First Lady)

14. Lewis, Dana M. (Special Assistant and Personal Aide to the First Lady)

15. $52,500 – Mustaphi, Semonti M. (Associate Director and Deputy Press Secretary To The First Lady)

16. $50,000 – Jarvis, Kristen E. (Special Assistant for Scheduling and Traveling Aide To The First Lady)

17. $45,000 – Lechtenberg, Tyler A. (Associate Director of Correspondence For The First Lady)

18. Tubman, Samantha (Deputy Associate Director, Social Office)

19. $40,000 – Boswell, Joseph J. (Executive Assistant to the Chief Of Staff to the First Lady)

20. $36,000 – Armbru ster, Sally M. (Staff Assistant to the S ocial Secretary)

21. Bookey, Natalie (Staff Assistant)

22. Jackson, Deilia A. (Deputy Associate Director of Correspondence for the First Lady)

Copyright 2009 Canada Free Press.Com

There has never been anyone in the White House at any time that has created such an army of staffers whose sole duties are the facilitation of the First Lady’s social life. One wonders why she needs so much help, at taxpayer expense, when even Hillary, only had three; Jackie Kennedy one; Laura Bush one; and prior to Mamie Eisenhower social help came from the President’s own pocket.

By the way… his does not include makeup artist Ingrid Grimes-Miles, 49, and “First Hairstylist” Johnny Wright, 31, both of whom traveled aboard Air Force One on her recent trip to Europe!


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Quantitative easing


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Monetary policy in a period of financial chaos:

The political economy of the Bank of Canada in extraordinary times

Presented at the Political Economy of Central Banking conference,

Toronto, May 2009

Marc Lavoie and Mario Seccareccia

Department of Economics

University of Ottawa

July 2009


“Although quantitative easing is now referred to as an unconventional monetary policy tool, the purchase of government securities is, in fact, the conventional textbook approach to monetary policy…. In practice, most central banks have chosen to conduct monetary policy by targeting the price of liquidity because the relationship between the amount of liquidity provided by the central bank and monetary aggregates on the one hand, and between monetary aggregates and aggregate demand and inflation on the other, are not very stable.” (Bank of Canada, 2009b, p. 26).

The Bank of Canada thus feels compelled to recall that monetary aggregates are very badly correlated with price inflation, and that base money is also very badly correlated with the money supply. To provide excess bank reserves, as recommended by Monetarists, central banks must decline to sterilize its liquidity creating financial operations or it must conduct open market operations by purchasing assets. As pointed out by Deputy Governor John Murray (2009), “All quantitative easing is, by definition, ‘unsterilized’. Although this is correctly viewed as unconventional, it closely resembles the way monetary policy is described in most undergraduate textbooks, and is broadly similar to how it was conducted in the heyday of monetarism”. Murray misleadingly insinuates that such a technique has been implemented before, namely during the 1975-1982 monetarist experiment in Canada. What can really be said is that quantitative easing is an attempt to put in practice what academics have been preaching in their textbooks for decades from their ivory towers. It is merely monetarism but in reverse gear. While monetarist policy of the 1970s was implemented to reduce the rate of inflation, current monetarist quantitative easing is being applied to generate an increase in the rate of inflation.

As a result, the claims of quantitative easing are just as misleading as the claims of monetarism of the 1970s and early 1980s. Bank of Canada officials claim that “The expansion of the amount of settlement balances available to [banks] would encourage them to acquire assets or increase the supply of credit to households and businesses. This would increase the supply of deposits” (Bank of Canada, 2009b, p. 26), adding that quantitative easing injects “additional central bank reserves into the financial system, which deposit-taking institutions can use to generate additional loans” (Murray, 2009). In our opinion, these statements are misleading and indeed completely wrong. They rely on the monetarist causation, endorsed in all neoclassical textbooks, which goes from reserves to credit and monetary aggregates. It implies that banks wait to get reserves before granting new loans. This has been demonstrated to be completely false in the world of no compulsory reserves in which we live since 1994. In any event, even before 1994, as argued by a former official at the Bank of Canada, the task of central banks is precisely to provide the amount of base money that banks require (Clinton, 1991). Banks do not wait for new reserves to grant credit. What they are looking for are creditworthy borrowers.

Quantitative easing is an essentially useless channel. It assumes that credit is supply-constrained. It assumes that banks will grant more loans because they have more settlement balances. Both of these assumptions are likely to be false, at least in Canada. With the possible exception of its impact on the term structure of interest rates, the only effect of quantitative easing might be to lower interest rates on some assets relative to the target overnight rate, as these assets are being purchased by the central bank through its open market operations. It is doubtful that the amplitude of these interest rate changes will have any impact on private borrowing or on the exchange rate. Indeed, in Japan, which has had experience with zero interest rates for many years, quantitative easing was pursued relentlessly between 2001 and 2004, but with no effect, as “the expansion of reserves has not been associated with an expansion of bank lending” (MacLean, 2006, p. 96). Indeed, officials at the Bank of Japan did not themselves believe that quantitative easing could on its own be of any help, but they tried it anyway as a result of the pressure and advice of international experts. As Ito (2004, p. 27) notes in relation to the Bank of Japan, “Given that the interest rate is zero, no policy measures are available to lift the inflation rate to positive territory… The Bank did not have the tools to achieve it”.


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BERNANKE’S OP ED WSJ: THE FED’S EXIT STRATEGY


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The big concern is managing inflation expectation not realizing that inflation is not a function of inflation expectations:

The Fed’s Exit Strategy

By Ben Bernanke

July 21 (WSJ) — The depth and breadth of the global recession has required a highly accommodative monetary policy. Since the onset of the financial crisis nearly two years ago, the Federal Reserve has reduced the interest-rate target for overnight lending between banks (the federal-funds rate) nearly to zero. We have also greatly expanded the size of the Fed’s balance sheet through purchases of longer-term securities and through targeted lending programs aimed at restarting the flow of credit.

These actions have softened the economic impact of the financial crisis.

There is no evidence of that.

They have also improved the functioning of key credit markets, including the markets for interbank lending, commercial paper, consumer and small-business credit, and residential mortgages.

Yes. Though the measures taken missed the direct approach and instead involved a myriad of complex and expensive programs that burned through precious political capital and delayed the repair of those markets.

My colleagues and I believe that accommodative policies will likely be warranted for an extended period. At some point, however, as economic recovery takes hold, we will need to tighten monetary policy to prevent the emergence of an inflation problem down the road.

They continue to believe that lower interest rates fan inflation and higher interest rates fight inflation.

I suggest theory and econometric evidence show that with current institutional arrangements the opposite is true.

The Federal Open Market Committee, which is responsible for setting U.S. monetary policy, has devoted considerable time to issues relating to an exit strategy. We are confident we have the necessary tools to withdraw policy accommodation, when that becomes appropriate, in a smooth and timely manner.

Nothing could be easier. This is a non issue.

The exit strategy is closely tied to the management of the Federal Reserve balance sheet. When the Fed makes loans or acquires securities, the funds enter the banking system and ultimately appear in the reserve accounts held at the Fed by banks and other depository institutions. These reserve balances now total about $800 billion, much more than normal. And given the current economic conditions, banks have generally held their reserves as balances at the Fed.

What else could they do? Lending doesn’t diminish reserve balances in aggregate. This is accounting, not theory. And clearly the FOMC doesn’t know this.

But as the economy recovers, banks should find more opportunities to lend out their reserves.

Again, that doesn’t diminish total reserves held by the banks at the fed.

That would produce faster growth in broad money (for example, M1 or M2) and easier credit conditions, which could ultimately result in inflationary pressures—

Only if the borrowing to spend increases aggregate demand, which is certainly possible.

unless we adopt countervailing policy measures.

Those would be rate hikes, which add income to the non govt sectors and can add to inflation via the cost channel as well as the fiscal channel.

When the time comes to tighten monetary policy, we must either eliminate these large reserve balances or, if they remain, neutralize any potential undesired effects on the economy.

They have no effect on the economy in any case.

To some extent, reserves held by banks at the Fed will contract automatically, as improving financial conditions lead to reduced use of our short-term lending facilities, and ultimately to their wind down. Indeed, short-term credit extended by the Fed to financial institutions and other market participants has already fallen to less than $600 billion as of mid-July from about $1.5 trillion at the end of 2008. In addition, reserves could be reduced by about $100 billion to $200 billion each year over the next few years as securities held by the Fed mature or are prepaid.

These are just exchanges of financial assets which have no effect on the economy.

However, reserves likely would remain quite high for several years unless additional policies are undertaken.

Even if our balance sheet stays large for a while, we have two broad means of tightening monetary policy at the appropriate time: paying interest on reserve balances and taking various actions that reduce the stock of reserves. We could use either of these approaches alone; however, to ensure effectiveness, we likely would use both in combination.

Yes, increasing interest rates is a simple matter operationally.

Congress granted us authority last fall to pay interest on balances held by banks at the Fed. Currently, we pay banks an interest rate of 0.25%. When the time comes to tighten policy, we can raise the rate paid on reserve balances as we increase our target for the federal funds rate.

Yes.

Banks generally will not lend funds in the money market at an interest rate lower than the rate they can earn risk-free at the Federal Reserve. Moreover, they should compete to borrow any funds that are offered in private markets at rates below the interest rate on reserve balances because, by so doing, they can earn a spread without risk.

Thus the interest rate that the Fed pays should tend to put a floor under short-term market rates, including our policy target, the federal-funds rate. Raising the rate paid on reserve balances also discourages excessive growth in money or credit, because banks will not want to lend out their reserves at rates below what they can earn at the Fed.

Considerable international experience suggests that paying interest on reserves effectively manages short-term market rates. For example, the European Central Bank allows banks to place excess reserves in an interest-paying deposit facility. Even as that central bank’s liquidity-operations substantially increased its balance sheet, the overnight interbank rate remained at or above its deposit rate. In addition, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of Canada have also used their ability to pay interest on reserves to maintain a floor under short-term market rates.

Yes, for many, many years. It’s the obvious way to go.

Despite this logic and experience, the federal-funds rate has dipped somewhat below the rate paid by the Fed, especially in October and November 2008, when the Fed first began to pay interest on reserves. This pattern partly reflected temporary factors, such as banks’ inexperience with the new system.

However, this pattern appears also to have resulted from the fact that some large lenders in the federal-funds market, notably government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are ineligible to receive interest on balances held at the Fed, and thus they have an incentive to lend in that market at rates below what the Fed pays banks.

Yes, someone in government who did not understand reserve accounting and monetary operations excluded those accounts at the Fed.

Under more normal financial conditions, the willingness of banks to engage in the simple arbitrage noted above will tend to limit the gap between the federal-funds rate and the rate the Fed pays on reserves. If that gap persists, the problem can be addressed by supplementing payment of interest on reserves with steps to reduce reserves and drain excess liquidity from markets—the second means of tightening monetary policy. Here are four options for doing this.

First, the Federal Reserve could drain bank reserves and reduce the excess liquidity at other institutions by arranging large-scale reverse repurchase agreements with financial market participants, including banks, government-sponsored enterprises and other institutions. Reverse repurchase agreements involve the sale by the Fed of securities from its portfolio with an agreement to buy the securities back at a slightly higher price at a later date.

Yes, offers interest bearing alternatives to reserve balances.

Second, the Treasury could sell bills and deposit the proceeds with the Federal Reserve. When purchasers pay for the securities, the Treasury’s account at the Federal Reserve rises and reserve balances decline.

Yes, offers interest bearing alternatives to reserve balances.

The Treasury has been conducting such operations since last fall under its Supplementary Financing Program. Although the Treasury’s operations are helpful, to protect the independence of monetary policy, we must take care to ensure that we can achieve our policy objectives without reliance on the Treasury.

Why??? It’s all the same government.

Third, using the authority Congress gave us to pay interest on banks’ balances at the Fed, we can offer term deposits to banks—analogous to the certificates of deposit that banks offer their customers. Bank funds held in term deposits at the Fed would not be available for the federal funds market.

Yes, and, more important, this can be used to set the term structure of rates the same way treasury securities do. They are functionally identical.

Fourth, if necessary, the Fed could reduce reserves by selling a portion of its holdings of long-term securities into the open market.

Yes, which also support longer term rates at higher levels.

Each of these policies would help to raise short-term interest rates and limit the growth of broad measures of money and credit, thereby tightening monetary policy.

And only limits the growth of broad money (which presumably matters even though the fed stopped publishing M3 because they found no evidence it did matter) if the higher rates limit borrowing.

Overall, the Federal Reserve has many effective tools to tighten monetary policy when the economic outlook requires us to do so. As my colleagues and I have stated, however, economic conditions are not likely to warrant tighter monetary policy for an extended period. We will calibrate the timing and pace of any future tightening, together with the mix of tools to best foster our dual objectives of maximum employment and price stability.

—Mr. Bernanke is chairman of the Federal Reserve.


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Laffer WSJ opinion piece


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Get Ready for Inflation and Higher Interest Rates

The unprecedented expansion of the money supply could make the ’70s look benign.

By Arthur B. Laffer

June 10th (WSJ)— Rahm Emanuel was only giving voice to widespread political wisdom when he said that a crisis should never be “wasted.” Crises enable vastly accelerated political agendas and initiatives scarcely conceivable under calmer circumstances. So it goes now.

Here we stand more than a year into a grave economic crisis with a projected budget deficit of 13% of GDP. That’s more than twice the size of the next largest deficit since World War II. And this projected deficit is the culmination of a year when the federal government, at taxpayers’ expense, acquired enormous stakes in the banking, auto, mortgage, health-care and insurance industries.

Art knows the difference between purchasing financial assets (usually done by the Fed) and purchasing goods and services (and indirectly through transfer payments) but here elects to ignore it.

With the crisis, the ill-conceived government reactions, and the ensuing economic downturn, the unfunded liabilities of federal programs — such as Social Security, civil-service and military pensions, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, Medicare and Medicaid — are over the $100 trillion mark. With U.S. GDP and federal tax receipts at about $14 trillion and $2.4 trillion respectively, such a debt all but guarantees higher interest rates, massive tax increases, and partial default on government promises.

He also recognizes the demand leakages including pension fund contributions, insurance reserves, USD financial accumulations of non residents, IRA’s, other corporate reserves, etc. tend to compound geometrically and are thereby strong contractionary biases.

But as bad as the fiscal picture is, panic-driven monetary policies portend to have even more dire consequences. We can expect rapidly rising prices and much, much higher interest rates over the next four or five years, and a concomitant deleterious impact on output and employment not unlike the late 1970s.

He also knows causation runs from loans to deposits and reserves and not from reserves to anything at all.

I’ve had this discussion personally with him and I wrote ‘soft currency economics’ jointly with Mark McNary who worked at art’s firm with both involved.

About eight months ago, starting in early September 2008, the Bernanke Fed did an abrupt about-face and radically increased the monetary base — which is comprised of currency in circulation, member bank reserves held at the Fed, and vault cash — by a little less than $1 trillion. The Fed controls the monetary base 100% and does so by purchasing and selling assets in the open market. By such a radical move, the Fed signaled a 180-degree shift in its focus from an anti-inflation position to an anti-deflation position.

Bank reserves are crucially important because they are the foundation upon which banks are able to expand their liabilities and thereby increase the quantity of money.

He knows this is not the case. He knows that lending is in no case reserve constrained, and that it’s about price and not quantity.

Banks are required to hold a certain fraction of their liabilities — demand deposits and other checkable deposits — in reserves held at the Fed or in vault cash. Prior to the huge increase in bank reserves, banks had been constrained from expanding loans by their reserve positions.

There were no banks of any consequence constrained from lending by their reserve positions that I know of.

In fact, they all had excess collateral they could have taken to the discount window as needed.

There were some banks constrained by capital considerations but that’s an entirely different story.

That’s why adding the excess reserves didn’t change anything with regards to lending.

Art knows this as well.

They weren’t able to inject liquidity into the economy, which had been so desperately needed in response to the liquidity crisis that began in 2007 and continued into 2008. But since last September, all of that has changed. Banks now have huge amounts of excess reserves, enabling them to make lots of net new loans.

Yet a chart of lending shows no changes as functions of reserve positions.

The way a bank or the banking system makes new loans is conceptually pretty simple. Banks find an entity that they believe to be credit-worthy that also wants a loan, and in exchange for the new company’s IOU (i.e., loan) the bank opens up a checking account for the customer. For the bank’s sake, the hope is that the interest paid by the borrower more than makes up for the cost and risk of the loan. The recently ballyhooed “stress tests” on banks are nothing more than checking how well a bank can weather differing levels of default risk.

Correct. And these loans are not reserve constrained.

And even if they were somehow constrained by reserves, innovations in sweep accounts have reduced reserve requirements to near 0.

What’s important for the overall economy, however, is how fast these loans are made and how rapidly the quantity of money increases.

Most important is the level of spending which may or may not be a function of the lending that creates the ‘quantity of money’ as defined by Art. And he knows that as well.

For our purposes, money is the sum total of all currency in circulation, bank demand deposits, other checkable deposits, and travelers checks (economists call this M1). When reserve constraints on banks are removed, it does take the banks time to make new loans. But given sufficient time, they will make enough new loans until they are once again reserve constrained.

He knows they are never reserve constrained.

The expansion of money, given an increase in the monetary base, is inevitable, and will ultimately result in higher inflation and interest rates. In shorter time frames, the expansion of money can also result in higher stock prices, a weaker currency, and increases in commodity prices such as oil and gold.

In general the causation runs in the other direction, as he also knows.

At present, banks are doing just what we would expect them to do. They are making new loans and increasing overall bank liabilities (i.e., money). The 12-month growth rate of M1 is now in the 15% range, and close to its highest level in the past half century.

He also knows a lot of this simply replaced commercial paper issuance and other forms of non bank lending, and that total credit is the more useful indicator of lending activity.

With an increased trust in the overall banking system, the panic demand for money has begun to and should continue to recede. The dramatic drop in output and employment in the U.S. economy will also reduce the demand for money. Reduced demand for money combined with rapid growth in money is a surefire recipe for inflation and higher interest rates. The higher interest rates themselves will also further reduce the demand for money, thereby exacerbating inflationary pressures. It’s a catch-22.

He also knows interest rates are voted on by the fed and that term rates reflect anticipated Fed moves.

It’s difficult to estimate the magnitude of the inflationary and interest-rate consequences of the Fed’s actions because, frankly, we haven’t ever seen anything like this in the U.S.

He knows there are no consequences. The Fed is like the kid in the car seat with a steering wheel who thinks he’s driving.

To date what’s happened is potentially far more inflationary than were the monetary policies of the 1970s, when the prime interest rate peaked at 21.5% and inflation peaked in the low double digits. Gold prices went from $35 per ounce to $850 per ounce, and the dollar collapsed on the foreign exchanges. It wasn’t a pretty picture.

He knows that was caused by cost push from Saudi price setting that was broken by the deregulation of natural gas in 1978 that resulted in a 15 million barrel per day supply response as our utilities switched from oil to natural gas.

Now the Fed can, and I believe should, do what it must to mitigate the inevitable consequences of its unwarranted increase in the monetary base. It should contract the monetary base back to where it otherwise would have been, plus a slight increase geared toward economic expansion.

All that would do is raise rates some due to the fed selling its securities.

Or the Fed could repo its position so the banks would hold overnight collateral rather than over night reserves. Functionally that changes nothing except for creating a lot more book keeping work.

Absent this major contraction in the monetary base, the Fed should increase reserve requirements on member banks to absorb the excess reserves.

This is just plain silly.

Art knows there is no remaining ‘monetary purpose’ of reserves since we went off the gold standard, which he understands as well as anyone.

Canada and others dropped reserve requirements long ago with no consequences beyond a reduced accounting burden.

Given that banks are now paid interest on their reserves and short-term rates are very low, raising reserve requirements should not exact too much of a penalty on the banking system, and the long-term gains of the lessened inflation would many times over warrant whatever short-term costs there might be.

No penalty and no inflation consequences either.

Alas, I doubt very much that the Fed will do what is necessary to guard against future inflation and higher interest rates. If the Fed were to reduce the monetary base by $1 trillion, it would need to sell a net $1 trillion in bonds. This would put the Fed in direct competition with Treasury’s planned issuance of about $2 trillion worth of bonds over the coming 12 months. Failed auctions would become the norm and bond prices would tumble, reflecting a massive oversupply of government bonds.

Yes, yields would go higher, though not as disorderly as he forecasts.

And, as previously discussed, there’s no reason to do that unless the fed wants higher rates.

In addition, a rapid contraction of the monetary base as I propose would cause a contraction in bank lending, or at best limited expansion. This is exactly what happened in 2000 and 2001 when the Fed contracted the monetary base the last time. The economy quickly dipped into recession.

He knows the contraction of the base back then did not cause anything.

While the short-term pain of a deepened recession is quite sharp, the long-term consequences of double-digit inflation are devastating. For Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke it’s a Hobson’s choice. For me the issue is how to protect assets for my grandchildren.

The best gift he could give his grand children is to tell the story right way around as he knows is the case.

Mr. Laffer is the chairman of Laffer Associates and co-author of “The End of Prosperity: How Higher Taxes Will Doom the Economy — If We Let It Happen” (Threshold, 2008).


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from Mikenormaneconomics.org


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Mike Norman Economics

Some thoughts

If we ever enact a balanced budget amendment, take yourself and your family and move to Canada or China.

Obama believes the U.S. has “run out of money.” Scary. Our president doesn’t understand our own monetary system. Even George Bush understood this.

Any country that spends in its own currency, where that currency is not backed by gold or bound by some fixed exchange can NEVER run out of money!

We are ceding our position as the world’s largest economy to China because of stupid policies that are based on myth and fallacy.

The demise of GM was not due to putting workers’ interests over the company and shareholders. It was precisely the opposite!

The easiest way to lower “debt” (if that’s what you want to do) is to sustain full output and employment.

If the private sector can’t sustain full output and employment for whatever reason, then gov’t should!

Here in America we mock the Europeans as being, “Socialist.” Did anyone notice that Europe’s economy is larger than ours and adding size?

By definition, those Socialist Europeans are richer than us! And they have free health care, education, 6-weeks paid vacations, new cars, homes, movies, culture and all the consumer items that we have, in abundance. Not bad for a bunch of commies!

Our leadership is destroying America’s real terms of trade because of irrational sensitivity to perceived “imbalances.”

We care more about the Chinese standard of living than our own, apparently!

For every debit there is a credit. For every liability there is an asset. For every borrower there is a saver. This is all definitional. It’s double entry accounting! Did anyone in Obama’s administration take an accounting course? Has any Republican taken one? Has any Democrat taken one?


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Fed foreign currency swap lines


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(IF ANYONE HAS BUITER’S EMAIL ADDRESS KINDLY FORWARD THIS, THANKS)

The question is, why has the Fed entered into new swap lines to be able to borrow foreign currency from several CBs who already have Fed dollar lines?

Several possibilities not mutually exclusive:

  1. They may have agreed on some kind of international currency stability scheme that use swap lines to keep currencies stable to each other.
  2. More likely is the notion that these lines are needed to control global interest rates in one’s own currency. The Fed started extending the swap lines to control USD LIBOR which was partially determined by banks outside the US.
  3. Yes, it worked to do this, but as previously explained, (indirectly) lending to lesser, foreign credits at low rates to keep rates down threatens a much larger problem.

    Note that it was announced last week that Mexico was drawing down its $30 billion line from the Fed. How much sense does it make for the Fed to lend Mexico 30 billion dollars, functionally unsecured, just to somehow help keep LIBOR down? Mexican banks aren’t even in the LIBOR basket. There are other options to get LIBOR down without extending unlimited dollar loans to unknown and potentially high risk borrowers. What the Fed has done is reckless at best.

    So in a world of CBs who put the highest priority on being able to control their interest rates and don’t recognize the risk of extending potentially bad loans to do it, using these swap lines for interest rate control make perfect sense.

  4. The Fed could also be worried about the dollar getting weak and not having foreign currency reserves to directly intervene. This could be signs of the heightened level of this insecurity from having ‘increased the money supply’ by ‘printing money’ and a zero rate policy, as none of them understand that the size of their balance sheet and the low interest rate policy have nothing to do with inflation.

What they do with their balance sheet is about price and not quantity.

And with the non government sectors quickly becoming net savers to the tune of nearly $10 trillion lowering rates is fiscally contractionary. Not to mention rates are a marginal cost of production, and nowadays ‘inflation’ most often comes through the cost side.

So the Fed arranging foreign currency credit lines might be a ploy to show the other CBs they are serious about the value of the dollar long term. Of course, Bernanke has many times stated to Congress the value of a weak dollar and in his mercantilist view he’s trying to support exports and narrow our trade gap that he sees as a ‘bad thing’ per se, as he still holds on to the gold standard construct of ‘national savings’ and sees our trade gap as an imbalance, rather than an enhancement of our real terms of trade and real standard of living. So I’d say that unless something changes the Fed would welcome a weak dollar and not use the new swap lines to support it. In fact, it is more likely that in addition to getting USD interest rates down to support lending, the Fed also acted to support demand for US goods and services by keeping the world USD ‘short’ position from strengthening the dollar and hurting US exports.

Functionally these swap line advances are like World Bank or IMF lending. While the advances by those agencies always start out as loans, historically they have morphed into fiscal transfers, as, in real terms, it all becomes a race to the bottom whereby whoever borrows the most and inflates the most wins.

These central bankers, however, (errantly) rely on ‘inflations expectations theory’ for their understanding of inflation, which of course is inapplicable, but it’s all they have and it’s deeply believed.

Therefore they aren’t worried about the inflationary aspects of swap lines,
and the incentive for an inflationary race to the bottom. (They do however worry to some degree about weak currencies causing inflation expectations to elevate)

So currently, for example, the Fed is hanging out a free lunch to any Central Bank that stops worrying about the possibility of paying back the Fed, and simply starts behaving as if the dollar loans are fiscal transfers, by looking the other way when their member banks start using them as such. I see signs of this possibility in the eurozone where the borrowings have been outstanding far too long for comfort that the banks are making good faith efforts to pay them down.

Regarding USD LIBOR, if I were running the Fed I’d ban the use of LIBOR with member banks. The idea of a mob of old men in bow ties sipping sherry at 9am arbitrarily setting my interest rates that flow through to trillions of my banking system’s dollar loans just doesn’t seem optimal for public purpose.

Lastly, to address a technical issue that’s been raised, while the lines are swaps, they provide usable currency deposits only for the counter party that activates the line.

For example while the ECB has borrowed dollars from the Fed and has provided euro deposits for the Fed as collateral, the Fed can’t use those euro deposits except in the case of an ECB default. And even if was somehow agreed that the Fed could use those euro deposits, when the ECB payed back the dollar loans the Fed would have to pay back the euro deposits, which is an unworkable arrangement.

So even with euro deposits as collateral for its dollar loans to the ECB, if the Fed wants to spend euro it has to borrow them. Hence the new lines to the Fed from the ECB and others.

Bottom line? The CBs think they have ‘learned something’ from the crisis- swap lines can be used to help CBs control interest rates in their currencies around the world, and therefore it makes sense to set them up in advance for that purpose.

That’s what happens with a world that doesn’t fully understand reserve accounting, monetary operations, and that the currency is a public monopoly. Never in a crisis have the CBs done so much that actually accomplished so little- at least not in the desired direction.

Why did the Fed, the Bank of England, the ECB, the Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank announce a dubbel openslaande porte-brisée deur?

by Willem Buiter

April 9 (Financial Times) — On April 6, 2009, the Fed, the ECB, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank simultaneously made announcements about currency swap arrangements. I consider these statements to be misleading and quite possibly redundant.

The Bank of England, for instance, made the following announcement:

“The Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, and the Swiss National Bank are announcing swap arrangements that would enable the provision of foreign currency liquidity by the Federal Reserve to US financial institutions. Should the need arise, euro, yen, sterling and Swiss francs would be provided to the Federal Reserve via swap agreements with the relevant central banks. Central banks continue to work together and are taking steps as appropriate to foster stability in global financial markets.

Bank of England Actions

The Bank of England has agreed that it would enter into arrangements to provide sterling liquidity to the Federal Reserve should it be required. The sterling would be provided via a swap arrangement with the Federal Reserve, similar to that which underpins the Bank of England’s US dollar repo operations. Both swap arrangements run until 30 October 2009.”

The Fed’s statement concerning this same swap arrangement was rather more illuminating. For starters, it actually gave the amounts of the swaps:

“The Bank of England, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, and the Swiss National Bank are announcing swap arrangements that would enable the provision of foreign currency liquidity by the Federal Reserve to U.S. financial institutions. Should the need arise, euro, yen, sterling and Swiss francs would be provided to the Federal Reserve via these additional swap agreements with the relevant
central banks. Central banks continue to work together and are taking steps as appropriate to foster stability in global financial markets.

Federal Reserve Actions
The Federal Open Market Committee has authorized new temporary reciprocal currency arrangements (foreign currency liquidity swap lines) with the Bank of England, the ECB, the Bank of Japan, and the Swiss National Bank. If drawn upon, these arrangements would support operations by the Federal Reserve to provide liquidity in sterling in amounts of up to £30 billion, in euro in amounts of up to EUR80 billion, in yen in amounts of up to ¥10 trillion, and in Swiss francs in amounts of up to CHF 40 billion.

These foreign currency liquidity swap lines have been authorized through October 30, 2009.”

What this really amounted to was a renewal of swap arrangements agreed earlier (on September 18, 2008), which had expired on January 30, 2009. Canada, which was included in the earlier swap arrangement, is no longer a party to the new version.

The antecedents of the ‘new’ swap arrangements

The swap arrangements between the Fed and assorted foreign central banks that were the antecedent of the arrangement ‘announced’ on April 6, 2009, were initiated at the end of 2007. On September 18, 2008, the Fed made the following announcement, providing the most direct antecedents of the April 6, 2009 swap arrangements: “The Federal Open Market Committee has authorized a $180 billion expansion of its temporary reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines). This increased capacity will be available to provide dollar funding for both term and overnight liquidity operations by the other central banks.

The FOMC has authorized increases in the existing swap lines with the ECB and the Swiss National Bank. These larger facilities will now support the provision of U.S. dollar liquidity in amounts of up to $110 billion by the ECB, an increase of $55 billion, and up to $27 billion by the Swiss National Bank, an increase of $15 billion.

In addition, new swap facilities have been authorized with the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Canada. These facilities will support the provision of U.S. dollar liquidity in amounts of up to $60 billion by the Bank of Japan, $40 billion by the Bank of England, and $10 billion by the Bank of Canada.

All of these reciprocal currency arrangements have been authorized through January 30, 2009.”

In parallel with other central banks, the Bank of England extended, on 3rd February 2009, the term of this swap facility agreement with the Federal Reserve until 30 October 2009.

Framing matters
A swap is a swap is a swap. The arrangement between the Fed and the Bank of England provides the Fed with sterling and the Bank of England with US dollars. The swap arrangement with the ECB provides the Fed with euros and the ECB with US dollars. Etc. Etc. You don’t have to make two announcements, one that the Fed is getting Swiss francs, euros, yen and sterling and one, a couple of months later, that the SNB, the ECB, the BoJ and the BoE are getting US dollars. So why the redundant announcement on April 6, 2009?

With the original swap arrangements, the rationale for the arrangements was clearly a US dollar scarcity among financial institutions outside the US. Even with the extension of the September 18, 2008 arrangements announced on February 3, 2009, US dollar scarcity outside the US was given as the reason by the Bank of England: “To address continued pressures in global U.S. dollar funding markets, the temporary reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines) between the Federal Reserve and other central banks have been extended to October 30, 2009.”

But on April 6, 2009, the statement by the Fed is not about the Fed supplying US dollars to foreign central banks to meet an excess demand for US dollars by banks outside the US. The statement is all about foreign central banks supplying the Fed with euros, sterling, yen and Swiss francs to accommodate a US thirst for these foreign currencies: “The Bank of England, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, and the Swiss National Bank are announcing swap arrangements that would enable the provision of foreign currency liquidity by the Federal Reserve to U.S. financial institutions. Should the need arise, euro, yen, sterling and Swiss francs would be provided to the Federal Reserve via these additional swap agreements with the relevant central banks. Central banks continue to work together and are taking steps as appropriate to foster stability in global financial markets.”

It may well be that in a swap arrangement between central banks, one party is the supplicant and the other party the bestower of favours. When Iceland tried to arrange swap arrangements with the ECB and the Fed in the spring of 2008, there certainly was very little appetite for Icelandic kroner in the ECB and the Fed – so little in fact, that Iceland failed in its attempt to arrange the swaps.

Two things are very weird about the April 6, 2009 announcement. The first is that it was redundant. It provided no new information beyond the extension of the old swap arrangements of September 18, 2008, that had been announced on February 3, 2009. The February 3, 2009 announcement extended the swap arrangements to October 30, 2009. The April 6, 2009 announcement did not change that. And the April 6, 2009 announcement did not change the size of the swap materially (the Bank of England can probably draw up to $44 bn or so under the latest swap arrangement).

It is conceivable – the statements are worded quite clumsily – that the April 6, 2009 announcement is about swap arrangements additional to the swaps previously announced (on February 3, 2009). In that case, the size of the swap arrangements has effectively been doubled. The redundancy objection disappears, but the misleading framing objection continues to apply in spades. If this is indeed the case, my concerns (explained below) about the fate of the US dollars provided by the Fed in the original swaps are strengthened.

The second strange feature is that the April 6, 2009 statement by the Fed is misleading. It is clearly phrased to convey a sense of the Fed needing foreign exchange (euros, yen, Swiss francs and sterling) to provide this foreign currency liquidity to US financial institutions. That is rhubarb. The US dollar shortage abroad continues today in much the same way as on February 3, 2009 or on September 18, 2008. Financial institutions in the US can get foreign exchange liquidity quite readily from the US subsidiaries of Euro Area, British, Swiss and Japanese banks. They don’t need the Fed for that.

On April 6, 2009 as on September 18, 2008, the non-US central banks were the beggars in the swap arrangements and the Fed the chooser. So why pretend that the opposite is the case? Why make a redundant and misleading announcement about the swap arrangements? The answer “beats me”, comes to mind. So does: “a collective central bank screw-up”. Finally there is the possible explanation that by re-framing an existing swap arrangements as the reflection of a Fed need for foreign exchange rather than as a non-US central bank need for US dollars, attention is diverted from foreign exchange shortages outside the US.

I can certainly make a quite convincing case that the UK is woefully short of foreign exchange reserves. At the end of March 2009, UK official foreign exchange reserveswere $49.3 bn gross and $28.3 bn net. The Bank of England’s net foreign currency assets are negligible ($6 mn at the end of 2008)

Clearly, the UK swap facility with the Fed is large relative to the size of UK Government Foreign Currency Assets. Gross foreign exchange reserves exceed the size of the swap facility ($44 bn, say) by less than $5 bn and net foreign exchange reserves are more than $15 bn lower than the size of the swap facility.

Small net or gross foreign exchange reserves don’t matter as long as the solvency of the government and the nation are beyond doubt, because in that case the authorities will always be able to borrow whatever foreign exchange reserves they require. This is arguably no longer the case anywhere. The massive prospective government deficits of the UK and the impressive size of the nation’s short-term foreign currency-denominated liabilities are such that one can without too much effort visualise a scenario where both the government and the private sector are rationed out of the foreign exchange markets and debt markets. When a ‘sudden stop’ is a non-negligible risk, foreign exchange reserves matter. Ask the Asian and South American countries that went through the 1997-1998 crises.

Recently, interest in the Bank of England’s US dollar repos has petered out, but at the beginning of the programme, amounts close to the $40 bn limit were taken up. If those US dollars were borrowed by banks like RBS and HBOS, both insolvent except for past, current and anticipated future government financial support, they may well have been lost. These banks (and other UK banks that are still standing more or less on their own two feet) had (and continue to have) very large US dollar exposures on which they made massive losses – well in excess of $40 bn. These banks also have few liquid foreign currency assets.

Assume one or more banks that borrowed US dollars from the Bank of England cannot pay them back. The Bank of England takes the collateral that secured these US dollar loans. Eligible collateral for these loans consists of those securities that are routinely eligible in the Bank’s short-term repo open market operations and Standing Facilities, as published on the Bank’s website, together with conventional US Treasury securities. Assume that little if any of the collateral offered for the US dollar loans from the Bank of England consisted of US Treasury securities. So the Bank gets a mitt full of sterling securities back in lieu of the US dollars it has lost. Nice, but not good enough. When the swap arrangements expires, the Bank of England has to repay the Fed in US dollars, not in sterling securities. So unless the swap arrangement is extended, or extended and expanded, the Bank of England would have to send the Fed an ‘Oops’ note.

If the full swap line was lost ($40 bn), the UK would be completely out of (net) foreign exchange reserves – if we consolidate the foreign exchange assets and liabilities of the government and the US dollar swap exposure of the Bank of England. Not a good place to be. Of course, the beauty of swaps if that they are off-balance sheet items.

I haven’t checked the details about the official foreign exchange reserves of Switzerland and the Euro Area nations, nor do I know much about the foreign exchange losses of Swiss and Eurozone banks, although I expect that these losses are vast. It is possible that the earlier use of the swap lines by the ECB and the SNB has also made a rather large dent in the net foreign exchange reserves of Switzerland and the Eurozone nations.

In any case, the Machiavallian interpretation of the redundant second announcement of the central bank swaps is that it was intended to divert attention from the dire condition of the official foreign exchange reserves of a number of European countries, especially the UK. Extending the duration of the swaps delays the moment that the loss of the US dollars will have to be recognised. If this was indeed the case, it is bound to fail. Markets can be stupid, but not that stupid. This will not reduce the risk that Reijkjavik-on-Thames will have to seek IMF assistance at some point.


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Canada has it right


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Flaherty seems to have the fiscal aspects right today.

Anyone know who his advisors are?

Pace of bank remedies too slow, Flaherty says

by Eric Reguly

Apr 3 (Globe and Mail) — “Running large deficits is inflationary, eventually,” Flaherty said. “The spending will end. It is a use-it-or-lose- it proposition.”

Flaherty’s Conservative Party government is facing pressure from opposition parties and business groups to take additional measures to bolster growth in the world’s eighth-largest economy, on top of a two-year, C$40 billion ($32.3 billion) stimulus plan he announced in January.

Flaherty reiterated he’s in no rush to add to his stimulus plan and that Canada, along with other Group of 20 economies, is looking to see the impact of measures already taken. The Finance Ministry and the Bank of Canada will act together against the risk of inflation, Flaherty said.

In an interview with Business News Network today, Prime Minister Stephen Harper said the size of the stimulus is less important than the speed at which money flows into the economy. He said new government spending could end up “crowding out” investments by businesses if it takes place in the middle of a recovery.

“The real issue with stimulus is less size than whether these various stimulus packages are actually going to get out the door,” Harper said.


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Claims/Sales annd Overnight Eco headlines


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Karim writes:

  • Claims resume their upward march—initial up 9k to 654k (prior week revised up 6k)
  • Yes, but slightly, progressively, lower for the last two weeks.

  • Continuing claims up a whopping 197k to 5317k, new series high.
  • Yes, they lag some.

    • Initial claims reflect new layoffs and outright income loss; continuing claims reflect longer duration of unemployment and downward pressure on wages/prices.
    • Retail sales -0.1% headline and 0.7% ex-autos
    • Ex-gas -0.4%
    • Prior month revised from 1% to 1.8%

    Yes, core retail sales now up two months in a row. January income/spending up as well.

  • Q1 GDP estimates likely to be revised back to -3% to -5% area from -5% to -7%.
  • Yes, and with increasing consumption the decline in GDP isn’t sustainable.

    And this is before the fiscal adjustments kick in.

    Some overnight eco news that caught my eye:

    • German industrial production -7.5% m/m in January and -39% y/y
    • French employment falls by most in 40yrs in Q4; -117k
    • Spanish Core CPI falls to 19yr low in January; 1.6%
    • Chrysler threatens to pull out of Canada unless it gets $2.3bn in govt loans and a 25% wage cut from the auto union


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    Canada News- Lawmakers Approve Budget, Stimulus Package


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    Lots of fiscal adjustments being implemented all over the world will help stop the slide in world aggregate demand.

    Look for more evidence emerging that things are going from down to sideways.

    Except unemployment which both lags and will probably keep going up until positive gdp growth exceeds productivity gains.

    Canadian Lawmakers Approve Flaherty’s Budget, Stimulus Package

    by Alexandre Deslongchamps and Greg Quinn

    Mar 4 (Bloomberg) — Canadian lower house lawmakers voted to approve Finance Minister Jim Flaherty’s budget, which projects C$84.9 billion ($66.6 billion) in deficits over the next five years.

    The plan passed by a vote of 204 to 78, after legislators from the Liberal Party, the biggest opposition bloc, supported it. The other opposition parties voted against the budget. The bill now goes to the Senate, where it will likely be approved as the unelected upper chamber rarely blocks legislation.

    It was the third and final vote on the budget in the lower house. A defeat on a budget bill would trigger an election under the country’s parliamentary tradition.

    Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Conservatives hold 143 of the legislature’s 308 seats and need opposition support to pass laws and stay in power. The Liberals haven’t tried to bring down the government, saying Canadians want legislators to deal with the economic crisis.

    The budget projects a C$1.1 billion deficit for the current fiscal year. The deficit will widen to C$33.7 billion in fiscal 2009-10 and C$29.8 billion in 2010-11 as the government provides funding for infrastructure, low-income families and tax credits for home renovation.


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