U.S. Federal Reserve Meeting Minutes for December 11

U.S. Federal Reserve Meeting Minutes for December 11

2008-01-02 14:06 (New York)

(Bloomberg) Following are the minutes of the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee meeting that concluded on December 11.

The Manager of the System Open Market Account reported on recent developments in foreign exchange markets. There were no open market operations in foreign currencies for the System’s account in the period since the previous meeting. The Manager also reported on developments in domestic financial markets and on System open market operations in government securities and federal agency obligations during the period since the previous meeting. By unanimous vote, the Committee ratified these transactions.

The Committee approved a foreign currency swap arrangement with the Swiss National Bank that paralleled the arrangement with the European Central Bank approved during the Committee’s conference call on December 6, 2007. With Mr. Poole dissenting, the Committee voted to direct the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to establish and maintain a reciprocal currency (swap) arrangement for the System Open Market Account with the Swiss National Bank in an amount not to exceed $4 billion. The Committee authorized associated draws of up to the full amount of $4 billion, and the arrangement itself was authorized for a period of up to 180 days unless extended by the FOMC. Mr. Poole dissented because he viewed the swap agreement as unnecessary in light of the size of the Swiss National Bank’s dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves.

Seems that would make them all that much more credit worthy?

The information reviewed at the December meeting indicated that, after the robust gains of the summer, economic activity decelerated significantly in the fourth quarter. Consumption growth slowed, and survey measures of sentiment dropped further. Many readings from the business sector were also softer: Industrial production fell in October, as did orders and shipments of capital goods. Employment gains stepped down during the four months ending in November from their pace earlier in the year.

Yes, they were expecting a ‘rough spot’.

GDP was subsequently revised higher when consumer spending was subsequently released at up 1.2% with the previous month revised up as well from 0.2% to 0.4%.

Headline consumer price inflation moved higher in September and October as energy prices increased significantly; core inflation also rose but remained moderate.

November was even higher.

The slowing in private employment gains was due in large part to the ongoing weakness in the housing market. Employment in residential construction posted its fourth month of sizable declines in November, and employment in housing-related sectors such as finance, real estate, and building-material and garden-supply retailers continued to trend down.

As expected.

Elsewhere, factory jobs declined again, while employment in most serviceproducing industries continued to move up.

A multi-decade trend.

Aggregate hours of production or nonsupervisory workers edged up in October and November. Some indicators from the household survey also suggested softening in the labor market, but the unemployment rate held steady at 4.7 percent through November.

Yes, demographics keeping unemployment low, as the fed expects labor force participation to work its way lower over time. This also keeps the fed’s GDP non inflationary ‘speed limit’ lower than otherwise.

Industrial production fell in October after small increases in the previous two months. The index for motor vehicles and parts fell for the third consecutive month, and the index for construction supplies moved down for the fourth straight month. Materials output also declined in October, with production likely curbed by weak demand from the construction and motor vehicle sectors. Production in high-tech industries, however, increased modestly, and commercial aircraft production registered another solid gain. In November, output appeared to have edged up in manufacturing sectors (with the exception of the motor vehicles sector) for which weekly physical product data were available. After posting notable gains in the summer, real consumer spending was nearly flat in September and October.

Subsequently, November was up big and October was revised up as well.

Spending on goods excluding motor vehicles was little changed on net over that period. Spending on services edged down, reflecting an extraordinarily large drop in securities commissions in September. The most recent readings on weekly chain store sales as well as industry reports and surveys suggested subdued gains in November and an uneven start to the holiday shopping season.

Seems holiday sales muddled through with modest gains meeting low ends of expectations.

Sales of light motor vehicles in November remained close to the pace that had prevailed since the second quarter. Real disposable income was about unchanged in September and October. The Reuters/University of Michigan index of consumer sentiment ticked down further in early December as respondents took a more pessimistic view of the outlook for their personal finances and for business conditions in the year ahead.

In the housing market, new home sales were below their third-quarter pace, and sales of existing homes were flat in October following sharp declines in August and September.

Still down, but signs of bottoming.

These declines likely were exacerbated by the deterioration in nonprime mortgage markets and by the higher interest rates and tighter lending conditions for jumbo loans.

Those have subsequently eased some, last I checked.

Single-family housing starts stepped down again in October after substantial declines in the June-September period. Yet, because of sagging sales, builders made only limited progress in paring down their substantial inventories. Single-family permit issuance continued along the steep downward trajectory that had begun two years earlier, which pointed toward further slowing in homebuilding over the near term. Multifamily starts rebounded in October from an unusually low reading in September, and the level of multifamily starts was near the midpoint of the range in which this series had fluctuated over the past ten years.

Housing remains weak.

Real spending on equipment and software posted a solid increase in the third quarter. In October, however, orders and shipments of nondefense capital goods excluding aircraft declined, suggesting that some deceleration in spending was under way in the fourth quarter. The October decline in orders and shipments was led by weakness in the high-tech sector: Shipments of computers and peripheral equipment declined while the industrial production index for computers was flat; orders and shipments for communications equipment plunged. Some of that weakness may have been attributable to temporary production disruptions stemming from the wildfires in Southern California; cutbacks in demand from large financial institutions affected by market turmoil may have contributed as well. In the transportation equipment category, purchases of medium and heavy trucks changed little, and orders data suggested that sales would remain near their current levels in the coming months. Orders for equipment outside high-tech and transportation rose in October, but shipments were about flat, pointing to a weaker fourth quarter for business spending after two quarters of brisk increases. Some prominent surveys of business conditions remained consistent with modest gains in spending on equipment and software during the fourth quarter, but other surveys were less sanguine. In addition, although the cost of capital was little changed for borrowers in the investment-grade corporate bond market, costs for borrowers in the high-yield corporate bond market were up significantly. In the third quarter, corporate cash flows appeared to have dropped off, leaving firms with diminished internally generated funds for financing investment. Data available through October suggested that nonresidential building activity remained vigorous.

Real nonfarm inventory investment excluding motor vehicles increased slightly faster in the third quarter than in the second quarter. Outside of motor vehicles, the ratio of book-value inventories to sales had ticked up slightly in September but remained near the low end of its range in recent years. Book-value estimates of the inventory investment of manufacturers–the only inventory data available beyond the third quarter– were up in October at about the third-quarter pace. The U.S. international trade deficit narrowed slightly in September as an increase in exports more than offset higher imports. The September gain in exports primarily reflected higher exports of goods; services exports recorded moderate growth. Exports of agricultural products exhibited particularly robust growth, with both higher prices and greater volumes. Exports of industrial supplies and consumer goods also moved up smartly in September. Automotive products exports, in contrast, were flat, and capital goods exports fell, led by a decline in aircraft. The increase in imports primarily reflected higher imports of capital goods, with imports of computers showing particularly strong growth. Imports of automotive products, consumer goods, and services also increased. Imports of petroleum, however, were flat, and imports of industrial supplies fell. Output growth in the advanced foreign economies picked up in the third quarter. In Japan, real output rebounded, led by exports. In the euro area, GDP growth returned to a solid pace in the third quarter on the back of a strong recovery in investment. In Canada and the United Kingdom, output growth moderated but remained robust, as vigorous domestic demand was partly offset by rapid growth of imports. Indicators of fourth-quarter activity in the advanced foreign economies were less robust on net. Confidence indicators had deteriorated in most major economies in the wake of the financial turmoil and remained relatively weak.

Must all be watching CNBC.

In November, the euro-area and U.K. purchasing managers indexes for services were well below their level over the first half of the year; nevertheless they pointed to moderate expansion. Labor market conditions generally remained relatively strong in recent months.

No slack yet. Maybe this Friday’s number will change that.

Incoming data on emerging-market economies were positive on balance. Overall, growth in emerging Asia moderated somewhat in the third quarter from its double-digit pace in the second quarter, but remained strong. Economic growth was also solid in Latin America, largely reflecting stronger-than-expected activit in Mexico.

World demand still ok.

In the United States, headline consumer price inflation increased in September and October from its low rates in the summer as the surge in crude oil prices began to be reflected in retail energy prices. In addition, though the rise in food prices in October was slower than in August and September, it remained above that of core consumer prices. Excluding food and energy, inflation was moderate, although it was up from its low rates in the spring. The pickup in core consumer inflation over this period reflected an acceleration in some prices that were unusually soft last spring, such as those for apparel, prescription drugs, and medical services, as well as nonmarket prices. On a twelve-month-change basis, core consumer price inflation was down noticeably from a year earlier. In October, the producer price index for core intermediate materials moved up only slightly for a second month, and the twelve-month increase in these prices was considerably below that of the year-earlier period. This pattern reflected, in part, a deceleration in the prices of a wide variety of construction materials, such as cement and gypsum, and in the prices of some metal products. In response to rising energy prices, household survey measures of expectations for year-ahead inflation picked up in November and then edged higher in December. Households’ longer-term inflation expectations also edged up in both November and December.

All inflation data has subsequently deteriorated.

Average hourly earnings increased faster in November than in the previous two months. Over the twelve months that ended in November, however, this wage measure rose a bit more slowly than over the previous twelve months. At its October meeting, the FOMC lowered its target for the federal funds rate 25 basis points, to 4« percent. The Board of Governors also approved a 25 basis point decrease in the discount rate, to 5 percent, leaving the gap between the federal funds rate target and the discount rate at 50 basis points.

This shows a lack of understanding of monetary operations and reserve accounting. Otherwise, they would set the discount rate at or below the Fed Funds rate.

The Committee’s statement noted that, while economic growth was solid in the third quarter and strains in financial markets had eased somewhat on balance,

Interesting! They recognized strains have eased.

the pace of economic expansion would likely slow in the near term, partly reflecting the intensification of the housing correction. The Committee indicated that its action, combined with the policy action taken in September, should help forestall some of the adverse effects on the broader economy that might otherwise arise from the disruptions in financial markets and should promote moderate growth over time.

Again, forestall effects from ‘disruptions’ in financial markets.

Readings on core inflation had improved modestly during the year, but the statement noted that recent increases in energy and commodity prices, among other factors, may put renewed upward pressure on inflation.

They have done exactly that.

In this context, the Committee judged that some inflation risks remained and indicated that it would continue to monitor inflation developments carefully.

Markets think this means monitor with no intention to act?

The Committee also judged that, after this action, the upside risks to inflation roughly balanced the downside risks to growth.

Subsequently, the upside risks to inflation have increased dramatically. Growth seems to be at least at the levels they anticipated, especially with December being revised up.

The Committee said that it would continue to assess the effects of financial and other developments on economic prospects and would act as needed to foster price stability and sustainable economic growth.

They claim to believe low inflation is a necessary condition for optimal long term growth and employment.

The Committee’s action at its October meeting was largely expected by market participants, although the assessment that the upside risks to inflation balanced the downside risks to growth was not fully anticipated and apparently led investors to revise up slightly the expected path for policy.

February Fed Funds are, again, pricing another cut.

During the intermeeting period, the release of the FOMC minutes and associated summary of economic projections, as well as various data releases, elicited only modest market reaction. In contrast, markets were buffeted by concerns about the potential adverse effects on credit availability and economic growth of sizable losses at large financial institutions and of financial market strains in general. Market participants marked down their expected path for policy substantially, and by the time of the December meeting, investors were virtually certain of a rate cut. Two-year Treasury yields fell on net over the intermeeting period by an amount about in line with revisions to policy expectations. Ten-year Treasury yields also declined, but less than shorter-term yields. The steepening of the yield curve was due mostly to sharply lower short- and intermediate-term forward rates, consistent with investors’ apparently more pessimistic outlook for economic growth. TIPS yields fell less than their nominal counterparts, implying modest declines in inflation compensation both at the five-year and longer horizons.

After showing some signs of improvement in late September and October, conditions in financial markets worsened over the intermeeting period.

Seems they have since eased, especially FF/LIBOR.

Heightened worries about counterparty credit risk, balance sheet constraints, and liquidity pressures affected interbank funding markets and commercial paper markets, where spreads over risk-free rates rose to levels that were, in some cases, higher than those seen in August. Strains in those markets were exacerbated by concerns related to year-end pressures. In longer-term corporate markets, both investment- and speculative-grade credit spreads widened considerably; issuance slowed but remained strong. In housing finance, subprime mortgage markets stayed virtually shut, and spreads on jumbo loans apparently widened further. Spreads on conforming mortgage products also widened after reports of losses and reduced capital ratios at the housingrelated government-sponsored enterprises. Broadbased equity indexes were volatile and ended the period down noticeably.

Up for the year, but down from the highs. And nonfinancial did far better.

Financial stocks were especially hard hit, dropping substantially more than the broad indexes. Similar stresses were evident in the financial markets of major foreign economies. The tradeweighted foreign exchange value of the dollar against major currencies moved up, on balance, over the intermeeting period.

Since moved down.

Debt in the domestic nonfinancial sector was estimated to be increasing somewhat more slowly in the fourth quarter than in the third quarter. Nonfinancial business debt continued to expand strongly, supported by solid bond issuance and by a small rebound in the issuance of commercial paper.

Real economy functioning though housing weak.

Bank loans outstanding also continued to rise rapidly.

Absorbing CP.

Household mortgage debt was expected to expand at a reduced rate in the fourth quarter, reflecting softer home prices and declining home sales, as well as a tightening in credit conditions for some borrowers. Nonmortgage consumer credit in the fourth quarter appeared to be expanding at a moderate pace. In November, M2 growth picked up slightly from its October rate.

Interesting they care about that.

While liquid deposits continued to grow slowly, heightened demand for safety and liquidity appeared to boost holdings of retail money market mutual funds. Small time deposits continued to expand, likely in part due to high rates offered by some depository institutions to attract retail deposits. Currency outstanding was about flat in November. In the forecast prepared for this meeting, the staff revised down its estimate of growth in aggregate economic activity in the fourth quarter. Although thirdquarter real GDP was revised up sharply, most available indicators of activity in the fourth quarter were more downbeat than had previously been expected. Faster inventory investment contributed importantly to the upward revision to third-quarter real GDP, but part of that upswing was expected to be unwound in the fourth quarter. The available data for domestic final sales also suggested a weaker fourth quarter than had been anticipated. In particular, real personal consumption expenditures had been about unchanged in September and October, and the contraction in singlefamily construction had intensified. Providing a bit of an offset to these factors, however, was further improvement in the external sector.

Q4 subsequently revised up.

The staff also marked down its projection for the rise in real GDP over the remainder of the forecast period. Real GDP was anticipated to increase at a rate noticeably below its potential in 2008. Conditions in financial markets had deteriorated over the intermeeting period and were expected to impose more restraint on residential construction as well as consumer and business spending in 2008 than previously expected.

They have eased some since the TAFs over year end were implemented.

In addition, compared with the previous forecast, higher oil prices and lower real income were expected to weigh on the pace of real activity throughout 2008 and 2009.

Interesting that they are now expecting higher oil prices going forward.

By 2009, however, the staff projected that the drag from those factors would lessen and that an improvement in mortgage credit availability would lead to a gradual recovery in the housing market. Accordingly, economic activity was expected to increase at its potential rate in 2009. The external sector was projected to continue to suppor domestic economic activity throughout the forecast period. Reflecting upward revisions to previously published data, the forecast for core PCE price inflation for 2007 was a bit higher than in the preceding forecast; core inflation was projected to hold steady during 2008 as the indirect effects of higher energy prices on prices of core consumer goods and services were offset by the slight easing of resource pressures and the expected deceleration in the prices of nonfuel imported goods.

Projecting declining nonfuel import prices?

The forecast for headline PCE inflation anticipated that retail energy prices would rise sharply in the first quarter of 2008 and that food price inflation would outpace core price inflation in the beginning of the year. As pressures from these sources lessened over the remainder of 2008 and in 2009,

Wonder why they think pressures would drop as that’s when they think their 100 bp of easing kicks in?

both core and headline price inflation were projected to edge down, and headline inflation was expected to moderate to a pace slightly below core inflation.

Subsequently, fuel and food have gone back through their highs.

Delinquency rates on credit card loans, auto loans, and other forms of consumer credit, while still moderate, had increased somewhat, particularly in areas hard hit by house price declines and mortgage defaults. Past and prospective losses appeared to be spurring lenders to tighten further the terms on new extensions of credit, not just in the troubled markets for nonconforming mortgages but, in some cases, for other forms of credit as well. In addition, participants noted that some intermediaries were facing balance sheet pressures and could become constrained by concerns about rating-agency or regulatory capital requirements. Among other factors, banks were experiencing unanticipated growth in loans as a result of continuing illiquidity in the market for leveraged loans, persisting problems in the commercial paper market that had sparked draws on back-up lines of credit, and more recently, consolidation of assets of off-balance-sheet affiliates onto banks’ balance sheets.

Concerns about credit risk and the pressures on banks’ balance sheet capacity appeared to be contributing to diminished liquidity in interbank markets and to a pronounced widening in term spreads for periods extending through year-end.

Subsequently, FF/LIBOR narrowed with the TAFs and now the passing of year end.

A number of participants noted some potential for the Federal Reserve’s new Term Auction Facility and accompanying actions by other central banks to ameliorate pressures in term funding markets.

Some potential? More evidence of the lack of understanding of reserve accounting and monetary operations.

Participants recognized, however, that uncertainties about values of mortgage-related assets and related losses, and consequently strains in financial markets, could persist for quite some time. Some participants cited more-positive aspects of recent financial developments. A number of large financial intermediaries had been able to raise substantial amounts of new capital. Moreover, credit losses and asset write-downs at regional and community banks had generally been modest; these institutions typically were not facing balance sheet pressures and reportedly had not tightened lending standards appreciably, except for those on real estate loans. And, although spreads on corporate bonds had widened over the intermeeting period, especially for speculative-grade issues, the cost of credit to most nonfinancial firms remained relatively low; nonfinancial firms outside of the real estate and construction sectors generally reported that credit conditions, while somewhat tighter, were not restricting planned investment spending; and consumer credit remained readily available for most households. Nonetheless, participants agreed that heightened financial stress posed increased downside risks to growth and

In their discussion of the economic situation and outlook, participants generally noted that incoming information pointed to a somewhat weaker outlook for spending than at the time of the October meeting. The decline in housing had steepened, and consumer outlays appeared to be softening more than anticipated, perhaps indicating some spillover from the housing correction to other components of spending. These developments, together with renewed strains in financial markets, suggested that growth in late 2007 and during 2008 was likely to be somewhat more sluggish than participants had indicated in their October projections.

Again, December subsequently revised up.

Still, looking further ahead, participants continued to expect that, aided by an easing in the stance of monetary policy, economic growth would gradually recover as weakness in the housing sector abated and financial conditions improved, allowing the economy to expand at about its trend rate in 2009. Participants thought that recent increases in energy prices likely would boost headline inflation temporarily, but with futures prices pointing to a gradual decline in oil prices

Still using futures prices!

and with pressures on resource utilization seen as likely to ease a bit, most participants continued to anticipate some moderation in core and especially headline inflation over the next few years.

Seems to not talk about cutting rates into a negative supply shock of food and fuel was discussed?

Participants discussed in detail the resurgence of stresses in financial markets in November. The renewed stresses reflected evidence that the performance of mortgage-related assets was deteriorating further, potentially increasing the losses that were being borne in part by a number of major financial firms, including money-center banks, housing-related governmentsponsored enterprises, investment banks, and financial guarantors. Moreover, participants recognized that some lenders might be exposed to additional losses: made the outlook for the economy considerably more uncertain. Participants noted the marked deceleration in consumer spending in the national data. Real personal consumption expenditures had shown essentially no growth in September and October, suggesting that tighter credit conditions, higher gasoline prices, and the continuing housing correction might be restraining growth in real consumer spending. Retailers reported weaker results in many regions of the country, but in some, retailers saw solid growth. Job growth rebounded somewhat in October and November, and participants expected continuing gains in employment and income to support rising consumer spending, though they anticipated slower growth of jobs, income, and spending than in recent years. However, consumer confidence recently had dropped by a sizable amount, leading some participants to voice concerns that household spending might increase less than currently anticipated.

Recent data and anecdotal information indicated that the housing sector was weaker than participants had expected at the time of the Committee’s previous meeting.

OK, that is news to me.

I had thought the weakness was in line with expectations.

In light of elevated inventories of unsold homes and the higher cost and reduced availability of nonconforming mortgage loans, participants agreed that the housing correction was likely to be both deeper and more prolonged than they had anticipated in October. Moreover, rising foreclosures and the resulting increase in the supply of homes for sale could put additional downward pressure on prices, leading to a greater decline in household wealth and potentially to further disruptions in the financial markets.

Indicators of capital investment for the nation as a whole suggested solid but appreciably less rapid growth in business fixed investment during the fourth quarter than the third. Participants reported that firms in some regions and industries had indicated they would scale back capital spending, while contacts in other parts of the country or industries reported no such change. Similarly, business sentiment had deteriorated in many parts of the country, but in other areas firms remained cautiously optimistic. Anecdotal evidence generally suggested that inventories were not out of line with desired levels. Even so, participants expected that inventory accumulation would slow from its elevated third-quarter pace. Several participants remarked that, participants also noted the deterioration in the secondary market for commercial real estate loans and the possible effects of that development, should it persist, on building activity. The available data showed strong growth abroad and solid gains in U.S. exports. Participants noted that rising foreign demand was benefiting U.S. producers of manufactured goods and agricultural products, in particular. Exports were unlikely to continue growing at the robust rate reported for the third quarter, but participants anticipated that the combination of the weaker dollar and still-strong, though perhaps less-rapid, growth abroad would mean continued firm growth in U.S. exports. Several participants observed, however, that strong growth in foreign economies and U.S. exports might not persist if global financial conditions were to deteriorate further.

Seems they were putting a negative bias on everything.

Probably watching CNBC a lot.

Recent readings on inflation generally were seen as slightly less favorable than in earlier months, partly due to upward revisions to previously published data. Moreover, earlier increases in energy and food prices likely would imply higher headline inflation in the next few months, and past declines in the dollar would put upward pressure on import prices. Some participants said that higher input costs and rising prices of imports were leading more firms to seek price increases for goods and services. However, few business contacts had reported unusually large wage increases. Downward revisions to earlier compensation data, along with the latest readings on compensation and productivity, indicated only moderate pressure on unit labor costs. With futures prices pointing to a gradual decline in oil prices

Again, futures prices are getting into their models and their thinking. They fail to recognized the difference between perishable and nonperishable commodities in regards the information discounted by future prices.

and with an anticipation of some easing of pressures on resource utilization, participants generally continued to see core PCE inflation as likely to trend down a bit over the next few years, as in their October projections, and headline inflation as likely to slow more substantially from its currently elevated level. Nonetheless, participants remained concerned about upside risks to inflation stemming from elevated prices of energy and non-energy commodities; some also cited the weaker dollar. Participants agreed that continued stable inflation expectations would be essential to achieving and sustaining a downward trend to inflation, that wellanchored expectations couldn’t be taken for granted,

OK, that is inline with main stream thought.

and that policymakers would need to continue to watch inflation expectations closely.

Mainstream theory says that when expectations elevate it is too late – the inflation cat is out of the bag.

softening in the outlook for economic growth warranted an easing of the stance of policy at this meeting. In view of the further tightening of credit and deterioration of financial market conditions, the stance of monetary policy now appeared to be somewhat restrictive.

Mainstream economics would counter that it should be restrictive with inflation as high as it is.

And that if demand is strong enough to drive up prices, it is too high.

Moreover, the downside risks to the expansion, resulting particularly from the weakening of the housing sector and the deterioration in credit market conditions, had risen. In these circumstances, policy easing would help foster maximum sustainable growth and provide some additional insurance against risks.

Only if they are not concerned about inflation.

At the same time, members noted that policy had already been eased by 75 basis points and that the effects of those actions on the real economy would be evident only with a lag. And some data, including readings on the labor market, suggested that the economy retained forward momentum. Members generally saw overall inflation as likely to be lower next year, and core inflation as likely to be stable, even if policy were eased somewhat at this meeting;

Seems they were not at all concerned about inflation.

but they judged that some inflation pressures and risks remained, including pressures from elevated commodity and energy prices and the possibility of upward drift in the public’s expectations of inflation. Weighing these considerations, nearly all members judged that a 25 basis point reduction in the Committee’s target for the federal funds rate would be appropriate at this meeting. Although members agreed that the stance of policy should be eased, they also recognized that the situation was quite fluid and the economic outlook unusually uncertain. Financial stresses could increase further, intensifying the contraction in housing markets and restraining other forms of spending. Some members noted the risk of an unfavorable feedback loop in which credit market conditions restrained economic growth further, leading to additional tightening of credit; such an adverse development could require a substantial further easing of policy.

Yes, if that happens and the inflation outlook continues to not be a concern.

Members also recognized that financial market conditions might improve more rapidly than members expected, in which case a reversal of some of the rate cuts might become appropriate.

Financial market conditions have improved, but downside risks to growth remain and the inflation outlook has deteriorated.

The Committee agreed that the statement to be released after this meeting should indicate that economic growth appeared to be slowing, reflecting the intensification of the housing correction and some softening in business and consumer spending, and that strains in financial markets had increased. The characterization of the inflation situation could be largely unchanged from that of the previous meeting.

I did not think so then and certainly not any more.

Members agreed that the resurgence of financial stresses in November had increased uncertainty about the outlook. Given the In the Committee’s discussion of monetary policy for the intermeeting period, members judged that the sof unlike residential real estate, commercial and industrial real estate activity remained solid in their Districts. But heightened uncertainty, the Committee decided to refrain from providing an explicit assessment of the balance of risks. The Committee agreed on the need to remain exceptionally alert to economic and financial developments and their effects on the outlook, and members would be prepared to adjust the stance of monetary policy if prospects for economic growth or inflation were to worsen.

The risks to growth are still very real, and inflation risks are increasing.

If they continue to not care about inflation, another cut is likely. Seems to me the inflation outlook has gone from bad to worse, and by now they should realize the futures prices are not a reliable indicator of food and fuel prices in the future.

They might also realize that after seeing their GDP forecasts revised up for the last few quarters, there are risks to the upside as well as the downside.

At the conclusion of the discussion, the Committee voted to authorize and direct the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, until it was instructed otherwise, to execute transactions in the System Account in accordance with the following domestic policy directive: ?The Federal Open Market Committee seeks monetary and financial conditions that will foster price stability and promote sustainable growth in output. To further its long-run objectives, the Committee in the immediate future seeks conditions in reserve markets consistent with reducing the federal funds rate to an average of around 4¬ percent.?

The vote encompassed approval of the statement below to be released at 2:15 p.m.: ?The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to lower its target for the federal funds rate 25 basis points to 4¬ percent. Incoming information suggests that economi growth is slowing, reflecting the intensification of the housing correction and some softening in business and consumer spending. Moreover, strains in financial markets have increased in recent weeks. Today’s action, combined with the policy actions taken earlier, should help promote moderate growth over time. Readings on core inflation have improved modestly this year, but elevated energy and commodity prices, among other factors, may put upward pressure on inflation. In this context, the Committee judges that some inflation risks remain, and it will continue to monitor inflation developments carefully. Recent developments, including the deterioration in financial market conditions, have increased the uncertainty surrounding the outlook for economic growth and inflation. The Committee will continue to assess the effects of financial and other developments on economic prospects and will act as needed to foster price stability and sustainable economic growth. Votes for this action: Messrs. Bernanke, Geithner, Evans, Hoenig, Kohn, Kroszner, Mishkin, Poole, and Warsh. Votes against this action: Mr. Rosengren. Mr. Rosengren dissented because he regarded the weakness in the incoming economic data and in the outlook for the economy as warranting a more aggressive policy response. In his view, the combination of a deteriorating housing sector, slowing consumer and business spending, high energy prices, and illfunctioning financial markets suggested heightened risk of continued economic weakness. In light of that possibility a more decisive policy response was called for to minimize that risk. In any case, he felt that wellanchored inflation expectations and the Committee’s ability to reverse course on policy would limit the inflation risks of a larger easing move, should the economy instead prove significantly stronger than anticipated. It was agreed that the next meeting of the Committee would be held on Tuesday-Wednesday, January 29-30, 2008. The meeting adjourned at 1:15 p.m.


♥

A Rescue Plan for the Dollar

A Rescue Plan for the Dollar

By Ronald McKinnon and Steve H. Hanke
The Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2007

Central banks ended the year with a spectacular injection of liquidity to lubricate the economy. On Dec. 18, the European Central Bank alone pumped $502 billion — 130% of Switzerland’s annual GDP — into the credit markets.

Misleading. It’s about price, not quantity. For all practical purposes, no net euros are involved.

I have yet to read anything by anyone in the financial press that shows a working knowledge of monetary operations and reserve accounting.

The central bankers also signaled that they will continue pumping “as long as necessary.” This delivered plenty of seasonal cheer to bankers who will be able to sweep dud loans and related impaired assets under the rug — temporarily.

Nor does this sweep anything under any rug. Banks continue to own the same assets and have the same risks of default on their loans. And, as always, the central bank, as monopoly supplier of net reserves, sets the cost of funds for the banking system.

The causation is ‘loans create deposits’, and lending is not reserve constrained. The CB sets the interest rate – the price of funding – but quantity of loans advanced grows endogenously as a function of demand at the given interest rate by credit worthy borrowers.

But the injection of all this liquidity coincided with a spat of troubling inflation news.

At least he didn’t say ’caused’.

On a year-over-year basis, the consumer-price and producer-price indexes for November jumped to 4.3% and 7.2%, respectively. Even the Federal Reserve’s favorite backward-looking inflation gauge — the so-called core price index for personal consumption expenditures — has increased by 2.2% over the year, piercing the Fed’s 2% inflation ceiling.

Yes!

Contrary to what the inflation doves have been telling us, inflation and inflation expectations are not well contained. The dollar’s sinking exchange value signaled long ago that monetary policy was too loose, and that inflation would eventually rear its ugly head.

The fed either does not agree or does not care. Hard to say which.

This, of course, hasn’t bothered the mercantilists in Washington, who have rejoiced as the dollar has shed almost 30% of its value against the euro over the past five years. For them, a maxi-revaluation of the Chinese renminbi against the dollar, and an unpegging of other currencies linked to the dollar, would be the ultimate prize.

Mercantilism is a fixed fx policy/notion, designed to build fx reserves. Under the gold standard it was a policy designed to accumulate gold, for example. With the current floating fx policy, it is inapplicable.

As the mercantilists see it, a decimated dollar would work wonders for the U.S. trade deficit. This is bad economics and even worse politics. In open economies, ongoing trade imbalances are all about net saving propensities,

Yes!!!

not changes in exchange rates. Large trade deficits have been around since the 1980s without being discernibly affected by fluctuations in the dollar’s exchange rate.

So what should be done? It’s time for the Bush administration to put some teeth in its “strong” dollar rhetoric by encouraging a coordinated, joint intervention by leading central banks to strengthen and put a floor under the U.S. dollar — as they have in the past during occasional bouts of undue dollar weakness. A stronger, more stable dollar will ensure that it retains its pre-eminent position as the world’s reserve, intervention and invoicing currency.

Why do we care about that?

It will also provide an anchor for inflation expectations, something the Fed is anxiously searching for.

Ah yes, the all important inflation expectations.

Mainstream models are relative value stories. The ‘price’ is only a numeraire; so, there is nothing to explain why any one particular ‘price level’ comes from or goes to, apart from expectations theory.

They don’t recognize the currency itself is a public monopoly and that ultimately the price level is a function of prices paid by the government when it spends. (See ‘Soft Currency Economics‘)

The current weakness in the dollar is cyclical. The housing downturn prompted the Fed to cut interest rates on dollar assets by a full percentage point since August — perhaps too much. Normally, the dollar would recover when growth picks up again and monetary policy tightens. But foreign-exchange markets — like those for common stocks and house prices — can suffer from irrational exuberance and bandwagon effects that lead to overshooting. This is precisely why the dollar has been under siege.

Seems to me it is portfolio shifts away from the $US. While these are limited, today’s portfolios are larger than ever and can take quite a while to run their course.

If the U.S. government truly believes that a strong stable dollar is sustainable in the long run, it should intervene in the near term to strengthen the dollar.

Borrow euros and spend them on $US??? Not my first choice!

But there’s a catch. Under the normal operation of the world dollar standard which has prevailed since 1945, the U.S. government maintains open capital markets and generally remains passive in foreign-exchange markets, while other governments intervene more or less often to influence their exchange rates.

True, though I would not call that a ‘catch’.

Today, outside of a few countries in Eastern Europe linked to the euro, countries in Asia, Latin America, and much of Africa and the Middle East use the dollar as their common intervention or “key” currency. Thus they avoid targeting their exchange rates at cross purposes and minimize political acrimony. For example, if the Korean central bank dampened its currency’s appreciation by buying yen and selling won, the higher yen would greatly upset the Japanese who are already on the cusp of deflation — and they would be even more upset if China also intervened in yen.

True.

Instead, the dollar should be kept as the common intervention currency by other countries, and it would be unwise and perhaps futile for the U.S. to intervene unilaterally against one or more foreign currencies to support the dollar. This would run counter to the accepted modus operandi of the post-World War II dollar standard, a standard that has been a great boon to the U.S. and world economies.

‘Should’??? I like my reason better – borrow fx to sell more often than not sets you up for a serious blow up down the road.

The timing for joint intervention couldn’t be better. America’s most important trading partners have expressed angst over the dollar’s decline. The president of the European Central Bank (ECB), Jean Claude Trichet, has expressed concern about the “brutal” movements in the dollar-euro exchange rate.

Yes, but the ECB is categorically against buying $US, as building $US reserves would be taken as the $US ‘backing’ the euro. This is ideologically unacceptable. The euro is conceived to be a ‘stand alone’ currency to ultimately serve as the world’s currency, not the other way around.

Japan’s new Prime Minister, Yasuo Fukuda, has worried in public about the rising yen pushing Japan back into deflation.

Yes, but it is still relatively weak and in the middle of its multi-year range verses the $US.

The surge in the Canadian “petro dollar” is upsetting manufacturers in Ontario and Quebec. OPEC is studying the possibility of invoicing oil in something other than the dollar.

In a market economy, the currency you ‘invoice’ in is of no consequence. What counts are portfolio choices.

And China’s premier, Wen Jiabao, recently complained that the falling dollar was inflicting big losses on the massive credits China has extended to the U.S.

Propaganda. Its inflation that evidences real losses.

If the ECB, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England and so on, were to take the initiative, the U.S. would be wise to cooperate. Joint intervention on this scale would avoid intervening at cross-purposes. Also, official interventions are much more effective when all the relevant central banks are involved because markets receive a much stronger signal that national governments have made a credible commitment.

And this all assumes the fed cares about inflation. It might not. It might be a ‘beggar thy neighbor’ policy where the fed is trying to steal aggregate demand from abroad and help the financial sector inflate its way out of debt.

That is what the markets are assuming when they price in another 75 in Fed Funds cuts over the next few quarters. The January fed meeting will be telling.

While they probably do ultimately care about inflation, they have yet to take any action to show it. And markets will not believe talk, just action.

This brings us to China, and all the misplaced concern over its exchange rate. Given the need to make a strong-dollar policy credible, it is perverse to bash the one country that has done the most to prevent a dollar free fall. China’s massive interventions to buy dollars have curbed a sharp dollar depreciation against the renminbi;

Yes, as part of their plan to be the world’s slaves – they work and produce, and we consume.

they have also filled America’s savings deficiency and financed its trade deficit.

That statement has the causation backwards.

It is US domestic credit expansion that funds China’s desires to accumulate $US financial assets and thereby support their exporters.

As the renminbi’s exchange rate is the linchpin for a raft of other Asian currencies, a sharp appreciation of the renminbi would put tremendous upward pressure on all the others — including Korea, Japan, Thailand and even India. Forcing China into a major renminbi appreciation would usher in another bout of dollar weakness and further unhinge inflation expectations in the U.S. It would also send a deflationary impulse abroad and destabilize the international financial system.

Yes, that’s a possibility.

Most of the world’s government reaction functions are everything but sustaining domestic demand.

China, with its huge foreign-exchange reserves (over $1.4 trillion), has another important role to play. Once the major industrial countries with convertible currencies — led by the ECB — agree to put a floor under the dollar, emerging markets with the largest dollar holdings — China and Saudi Arabia — must agree not to “diversify” into other convertible currencies such as the euro. Absent this agreement, the required interventions by, say, the ECB would be massive, throwing the strategy into question.

Politically, this is a non starter. The ECB has ideological issues, and the largest oil producers are ideologically at war with the US.

Cooperation is a win-win situation: The gross overvaluations of European currencies would be mitigated, large holders of dollar assets would be spared capital losses, and the U.S. would escape an inflationary conflagration associated with general dollar devaluation.

Not if the Saudis/Russians continue to hike prices, with biofuels causing food to follow as well. Inflation will continue to climb until crude prices subside for a considerable period of time.

For China to agree to all of this, however, the U.S. (and EU) must support a true strong-dollar policy — by ending counterproductive China bashing.

Mr. McKinnon is professor emeritus of economics at Stanford University and a senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. Mr. Hanke is a professor of applied economics at Johns Hopkins University and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute.


Calories, Capital, Climate Spur Asian Anxiety

Higher oil prices mean lower rates from the Fed, and higher inflation rates induced by shortages mean stronger currencies abroad.

Why do I have so much trouble getting aboard this paradigm, and instead keep looking for reversals? Feels a lot like watching the NASDAQ go from 3500 to 5000 a few years ago.

:(

Calories, Capital, Climate Spur Asian Anxiety

2007-12-26 17:51 (New York)
by Andy Mukherjee

(Bloomberg) — The new year may be a challenging one for Asian policy makers.

Year-end U.S. closing stocks for wheat are the lowest in six decades; soybeans in Chicago touched a 34-year peak this week. Palm oil in Malaysia climbed to a record yesterday.

The steeply rising cost of calories may be more than just cyclical, notes Rob Subbaraman, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. economist in Hong Kong. Growing use of food crops in biofuels and increasing demand for a protein-rich diet in developing countries may have pushed up prices more permanently.

The wholesale price of pork in China has surged 53 percent in the past year.

“Consumer inflationary expectations may soon rise, feeding into wage growth and core inflation, but we expect Asian central banks to be slow to react, initially due to slowing growth and later because of strong capital inflows,” Subbaraman says.

If the U.S. Federal Reserve continues easing interest rates to combat a housing-led economic slowdown, a surge in capital inflows into Asia may indeed become a stumbling block in managing the inflationary impact of higher commodity prices.

Food and energy account for more than two-fifths of the Chinese consumer-price index, compared with 17 percent for countries such as the U.K., U.S. and Canada, and 25 percent in the euro area, according to UBS AG economist Paul Donovan in London.

As Asian central banks raise interest rates — when the Fed is cutting them — they will invite even more foreign capital into the region. That will cause Asian currencies to appreciate, leading to a loss of competitiveness for the region’s exports.

Carbon Emissions

On the other hand, paring the domestic cost of money prematurely may worsen the inflation challenge.

That isn’t all.

Higher oil prices will also boost the attractiveness of coal as an energy source, delaying any meaningful reduction in carbon emissions in fast-growing Asian nations such as China and India.

As Daniel Gros, director of the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, noted in recent research, the price of coal — relative to crude oil — has been halved since the end of 1999. And per unit of energy produced, coal is a much bigger pollutant than oil or gas.

This doesn’t augur well for the environment.

“Given that China is likely to install over the next decade more new power generation capacity than already exists in all of Europe, this implies that the current level of high oil prices provides incentive to make the Chinese economy even more intensive in carbon than it would otherwise be,” Gros said.

Beijing Olympics

Climate-related issues will be in the spotlight in Asia next year. China’s eagerness to use the Beijing Olympic Games to showcase solutions to its huge environmental challenges will be one of the “big things to watch for” in Asia in 2008, Spire Research and Consulting, a Singapore-based advisory firm, said last week.

Even if China succeeds in reducing air pollution during the Olympics, the improvements may not endure after the sporting event ends on Aug. 24, especially since the underlying economics continue to favor higher coal usage.

A drop in hydrocarbon prices might help check emissions and global warming, Gros noted last week on the Web site of VoxEu.org.

In fact, lower oil prices may also make food costs more stable by lessening the craze for biofuels.

That will leave capital flows as Asia’s No. 1 challenge in 2008. And it won’t be an easy one for policy makers to tackle.

Capital Inflows

Take India’s example.

The $900 billion economy has attracted $100 billion in capital in the 12 months through October, with a third of the money entering the country as overseas borrowings, according to Morgan Stanley economist Chetan Ahya in Singapore.

This has caused the rupee to appreciate more than 12 percent against the dollar this year, knocking off more than three percentage points from India’s inflation index, says Lombard Street Research economist Maya Bhandari in London.

Naturally, exporters are complaining.

So why doesn’t India cut domestic interest rates? It can’t do that without the risk of stoking inflation.

Money supply is growing at an annual pace of more than 21 percent in India, compared with the central bank’s target of between 17 percent and 17.5 percent. Inflation has held well below the central bank’s estimate of 5 percent for five straight months partly because of the government’s insistence on not passing the full cost of imported fuel to local consumers. It isn’t yet time for monetary easing in India.

China has it worse. Monetary conditions there remain dangerously loose. And China may be reluctant to do much about the undervalued yuan — the root cause of its record trade surpluses and the attendant liquidity glut — until the Olympics are out of the way.

Asian economies may, to a large extent, be insulated from the subprime mess. Still, 2008 won’t be all fun and games.

(Andy Mukherjee is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.)

–Editors: James Greiff, Ron Rhodes.

To contact the writer of this column:
Andy Mukherjee in Singapore at +65-6212-1591 or
amukherjee@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this column:
James Greiff at +1-212-617-5801 or jgreiff@bloomberg.net


Re: more in ism

(an interoffice email)

> ADP came in higher than expected and caused most dealers to raise their
> payroll forecasts.
>
> Productivity revised UP to 6.3% vs 4.9%preliminary. Unit Labor Costs revised
> to DOWN 2% vs. -0.2% preliminary.
> ISM Non-Manuf, Nov — slips to 54.1 vs. 55.8 prior, weaker-than-forecast.

still expanding

> Prices rose to 76.5 vs. 63.5,

inflation risks increasing

> Employment falls to 50.8 vs. 51.8,

still expanding

> New Orders
> slipped sharply to 51.1 vs. 55.7.

still expanding

> Bank of Canada cut rates this morning citing a soft outlook for US housing.

worried about their currency being too strong and losing demand to the US

> Fannie Mae cut it’s Quarterly dividend and announced it will be issuing
> preferred securities.

no business interruption


BoC cuts rates

Makes a lot more sense to Central Bankers to cut with a strong currency than a weak one, particularly with the strong currency keeping prices below their inflation targets.

The ECB, however, is looking at 3% cpi, and would rather not see the Fed cut, as they believe that would weaken the $ and bring more criticism from their eurozone exporters, as well as draw more agg demand away from the eurozone, making it that much more difficult politically for the ECB to act within its price stability mandate.

OTTAWA – The Bank of Canada today announced that it is lowering its target for the overnight rate by one-quarter of one percentage point to 4 1/4 per cent. The operating band for the overnight rate is correspondingly lowered, and the Bank Rate is now 4 1/2 per cent.Since the October Monetary Policy Report (MPR), there have been a number of economic and financial developments that have a bearing on the prospects for output and inflation in Canada.Consistent with the outlook in the MPR, the global economic expansion has remained robust and commodity prices have continued to be strong. The Canadian economy has been growing broadly in line with the Bank’s expectations, reflecting in large part underlying strength in domestic demand. However, both total CPI inflation and core inflation in October, at 2.4 per cent and 1.8 per cent respectively, were below the Bank’s expectations, reflecting increased competitive pressures related to the level of the Canadian dollar. The Bank now expects inflation over the next several months to be lower than was projected in the MPR. In the context of exceptional volatility in global financial markets, the Canadian dollar spiked well above parity with the U.S. dollar in November, but it has recently traded closer to the 98-cent-U.S. level assumed in the October MPR.Overall, the Canadian economy continues to operate above its production capacity. Given the strength of domestic demand and weak productivity growth, there continue to be upside risks to the Bank’s inflation projection.However, other developments since October suggest that the downside risks to the Bank’s inflation projection have increased. Global financial market difficulties related to the valuation of structured products and anticipated losses on U.S. sub-prime mortgages have worsened since mid-October, and are expected to persist for a longer period of time. In these circumstances, bank funding costs have increased globally and in Canada, and credit conditions have tightened further. There is an increased risk to the prospects for demand for Canadian exports as the outlook for the U.S. economy, and in particular the U.S. housing sector, has weakened.All these factors considered, the Bank judges that there has been a shift to the downside in the balance of risks around its October projection for inflation through 2009. In light of this shift, the Bank has decided to lower the target for the overnight rate. At its next interest rate decision in January, the Bank will assess all economic and financial developments and the balance of risks. A full projection for the economy and inflation will be published in the Monetary Policy Report Update on 24 January 2008.


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