Marshall Auerback video

Modern Monetary Theory, an unconventional take on economic strategy

By Dylan Matthews

February 18 (Bloomberg) — About 11 years ago, James K. “Jamie” Galbraith recalls, hundreds of his fellow economists laughed at him. To his face. In the White House.

It was April 2000, and Galbraith had been invited by President Bill Clinton to speak on a panel about the budget surplus. Galbraith was a logical choice. A public policy professor at the University of Texas and former head economist for the Joint Economic Committee, he wrote frequently for the press and testified before Congress.

What’s more, his father, John Kenneth Galbraith, was the most famous economist of his generation: a Harvard professor, best-selling author and confidante of the Kennedy family. Jamie has embraced a role as protector and promoter of the elder’s legacy.

But if Galbraith stood out on the panel, it was because of his offbeat message. Most viewed the budget surplus as opportune: a chance to pay down the national debt, cut taxes, shore up entitlements or pursue new spending programs.

He viewed it as a danger: If the government is running a surplus, money is accruing in government coffers rather than in the hands of ordinary people and companies, where it might be spent and help the economy.

“I said economists used to understand that the running of a surplus was fiscal (economic) drag,” he said, “and with 250 economists, they giggled.”

Galbraith says the 2001 recession — which followed a few years of surpluses — proves he was right.

A decade later, as the soaring federal budget deficit has sharpened political and economic differences in Washington, Galbraith is mostly concerned about the dangers of keeping it too small. He’s a key figure in a core debate among economists about whether deficits are important and in what way. The issue has divided the nation’s best-known economists and inspired pockets of passion in academic circles. Any embrace by policymakers of one view or the other could affect everything from employment to the price of goods to the tax code.

In contrast to “deficit hawks” who want spending cuts and revenue increases now in order to temper the deficit, and “deficit doves” who want to hold off on austerity measures until the economy has recovered, Galbraith is a deficit owl. Owls certainly don’t think we need to balance the budget soon. Indeed, they don’t concede we need to balance it at all. Owls see government spending that leads to deficits as integral to economic growth, even in good times.

The term isn’t Galbraith’s. It was coined by Stephanie Kelton, a professor at the University of Missouri at Kansas City, who with Galbraith is part of a small group of economists who have concluded that everyone — members of Congress, think tank denizens, the entire mainstream of the economics profession — has misunderstood how the government interacts with the economy. If their theory — dubbed “Modern Monetary Theory” or MMT — is right, then everything we thought we knew about the budget, taxes and the Federal Reserve is wrong.

Keynesian roots

“Modern Monetary Theory” was coined by Bill Mitchell, an Australian economist and prominent proponent, but its roots are much older. The term is a reference to John Maynard Keynes, the founder of modern macroeconomics. In “A Treatise on Money,” Keynes asserted that “all modern States” have had the ability to decide what is money and what is not for at least 4,000 years.

This claim, that money is a “creature of the state,” is central to the theory. In a “fiat money” system like the one in place in the United States, all money is ultimately created by the government, which prints it and puts it into circulation. Consequently, the thinking goes, the government can never run out of money. It can always make more.

This doesn’t mean that taxes are unnecessary. Taxes, in fact, are key to making the whole system work. The need to pay taxes compels people to use the currency printed by the government. Taxes are also sometimes necessary to prevent the economy from overheating. If consumer demand outpaces the supply of available goods, prices will jump, resulting in inflation (where prices rise even as buying power falls). In this case, taxes can tamp down spending and keep prices low.

But if the theory is correct, there is no reason the amount of money the government takes in needs to match up with the amount it spends. Indeed, its followers call for massive tax cuts and deficit spending during recessions.

Warren Mosler, a hedge fund manager who lives in Saint Croix in the U.S. Virgin Islands — in part because of the tax benefits — is one proponent. He’s perhaps better know for his sports car company and his frequent gadfly political campaigns (he earned a little less than one percent of the vote as an independent in Connecticut’s 2010 Senate race). He supports suspending the payroll tax that finances the Social Security trust fund and providing an $8 an hour government job to anyone who wants one to combat the current downturn.

The theory’s followers come mainly from a couple of institutions: the University of Missouri-Kansas City’s economics department and the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, both of which have received money from Mosler. But the movement is gaining followers quickly, largely through an explosion of economics blogs. Naked Capitalism, an irreverent and passionately written blog on finance and economics with nearly a million monthly readers, features proponents such as Kelton, fellow Missouri professor L. Randall Wray and Wartberg College professor Scott Fullwiler. So does New Deal 2.0, a wonky economics blog based at the liberal Roosevelt Institute think tank.

Their followers have taken to the theory with great enthusiasm and pile into the comment sections of mainstream economics bloggers when they take on the theory. Wray’s work has been picked up by Firedoglake, a major liberal blog, and the New York Times op-ed page. “The crisis helped, but the thing that did it was the blogosphere,” Wray says. “Because, for one thing, we could get it published. It’s very hard to publish anything that sounds outside the mainstream in the journals.”

Most notably, Galbraith has spread the message everywhere from the Daily Beast to Congress. He advised lawmakers including then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) when the financial crisis hit in 2008. Last summer he consulted with a group of House members on the debt ceiling negotiations. He was one of the handful of economists consulted by the Obama administration as it was designing the stimulus package. “I think Jamie has the most to lose by taking this position,” Kelton says. “It was, I think, a really brave thing to do, because he has such a big name, and he’s so well-respected.”

Wray and others say they, too, have consulted with policymakers, and there is a definite sense among the group that the theory’s time is now. “Our Web presence, every few months or so it goes up another notch,” Fullwiler says.

A divisive theory

The idea that deficit spending can help to bring an economy out of recession is an old one. It was a key point in Keynes’s “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.” It was the chief rationale for the 2009 stimulus package, and many self-identified Keynesians, such as former White House adviser Christina Romer and economist Paul Krugman, have argued that more is in order. There are, of course, detractors.

A key split among Keynesians dates to the 1930s. One set of economists, including the Nobel laureates John Hicks and Paul Samuelson, sought to incorporate Keynes’s insights into classical economics. Hicks built a mathematical model summarizing Keynes’s theory, and Samuelson sought to wed Keynesian macroeconomics (which studies the behavior of the economy as a whole) to conventional microeconomics (which looks at how people and businesses allocate resources). This set the stage for most macroeconomic theory since. Even today, “New Keynesians,” such as Greg Mankiw, a Harvard economist who served as chief economic adviser to George W. Bush, and Romer’s husband, David, are seeking ways to ground Keynesian macroeconomic theory in the micro-level behavior of businesses and consumers.

Modern Monetary theorists hold fast to the tradition established by “post-Keynesians” such as Joan Robinson, Nicholas Kaldor and Hyman Minsky, who insisted Samuelson’s theory failed because its models acted as if, in Galbraith’s words, “the banking sector doesn’t exist.”

The connections are personal as well. Wray’s doctoral dissertation was advised by Minsky, and Galbraith studied with Robinson and Kaldor at the University of Cambridge. He argues that the theory is part of an “alternative tradition, which runs through Keynes and my father and Minsky.”

And while Modern Monetary Theory’s proponents take Keynes as their starting point and advocate aggressive deficit spending during recessions, they’re not that type of Keynesians. Even mainstream economists who argue for more deficit spending are reluctant to accept the central tenets of Modern Monetary Theory. Take Krugman, who regularly engages economists across the spectrum in spirited debate. He has argued that pursuing large budget deficits during boom times can lead to hyperinflation. Mankiw concedes the theory’s point that the government can never run out of money but doesn’t think this means what its proponents think it does.

Technically it’s true, he says, that the government could print streams of money and never default. The risk is that it could trigger a very high rate of inflation. This would “bankrupt much of the banking system,” he says. “Default, painful as it would be, might be a better option.”

Mankiw’s critique goes to the heart of the debate about Modern Monetary Theory —?and about how, when and even whether to eliminate our current deficits.

When the government deficit spends, it issues bonds to be bought on the open market. If its debt load grows too large, mainstream economists say, bond purchasers will demand higher interest rates, and the government will have to pay more in interest payments, which in turn adds to the debt load.

To get out of this cycle, the Fed?— which manages the nation’s money supply and credit and sits at the center of its financial system — could buy the bonds at lower rates, bypassing the private market. The Fed is prohibited from buying bonds directly from the Treasury — a legal rather than economic constraint. But the Fed would buy the bonds with money it prints, which means the money supply would increase. With it, inflation would rise, and so would the prospects of hyperinflation.

“You can’t just fund any level of government that you want from spending money, because you’ll get runaway inflation and eventually the rate of inflation will increase faster than the rate that you’re extracting resources from the economy,” says Karl Smith, an economist at the University of North Carolina. “This is the classic hyperinflation problem that happened in Zimbabwe and the Weimar Republic.”

The risk of inflation keeps most mainstream economists and policymakers on the same page about deficits: In the medium term — all else being equal — it’s critical to keep them small.

Economists in the Modern Monetary camp concede that deficits can sometimes lead to inflation. But they argue that this can only happen when the economy is at full employment — when all who are able and willing to work are employed and no resources (labor, capital, etc.) are idle. No modern example of this problem comes to mind, Galbraith says.

“The last time we had what could be plausibly called a demand-driven, serious inflation problem was probably World War I,” Galbraith says. “It’s been a long time since this hypothetical possibility has actually been observed, and it was observed only under conditions that will never be repeated.”

Critics’ rebuttals

According to Galbraith and the others, monetary policy as currently conducted by the Fed does not work. The Fed generally uses one of two levers to increase growth and employment. It can lower short-term interest rates by buying up short-term government bonds on the open market. If short-term rates are near-zero, as they are now, the Fed can try “quantitative easing,” or large-scale purchases of assets (such as bonds) from the private sector including longer-term Treasuries using money the Fed creates. This is what the Fed did in 2008 and 2010, in an emergency effort to boost the economy.

According to Modern Monetary Theory, the Fed buying up Treasuries is just, in Galbraith’s words, a “bookkeeping operation” that does not add income to American households and thus cannot be inflationary.

“It seemed clear to me that .?.?. flooding the economy with money by buying up government bonds .?.?. is not going to change anybody’s behavior,” Galbraith says. “They would just end up with cash reserves which would sit idle in the banking system, and that is exactly what in fact happened.”

The theorists just “have no idea how quantitative easing works,” says Joe Gagnon, an economist at the Peterson Institute who managed the Fed’s first round of quantitative easing in 2008. Even if the money the Fed uses to buy bonds stays in bank reserves — or money that’s held in reserve — increasing those reserves should still lead to increased borrowing and ripple throughout the system.

Mainstreamers are equally baffled by another claim of the theory: that budget surpluses in and of themselves are bad for the economy. According to Modern Monetary Theory, when the government runs a surplus, it is a net saver, which means that the private sector is a net debtor. The government is, in effect, “taking money from private pockets and forcing them to make that up by going deeper into debt,” Galbraith says, reiterating his White House comments.

The mainstream crowd finds this argument as funny now as they did when Galbraith presented it to Clinton. “I have two words to answer that: Australia and Canada,” Gagnon says. “If Jamie Galbraith would look them up, he would see immediate proof he’s wrong. Australia has had a long-running budget surplus now, they actually have no national debt whatsoever, they’re the fastest-growing, healthiest economy in the world.” Canada, similarly, has run consistent surpluses while achieving high growth.

To even care about such questions, Galbraith says, marked him as “a considerable eccentric” when he arrived from Cambridge to get a PhD at Yale, which had a more conventionally Keynesian economics department. Galbraith credits Samuelson and his allies’ success to a “mass-marketing of economic doctrine, of which Samuelson was the great master .?.?. which is something the Cambridge school could never have done.”

The mainstream economists are loath to give up any ground, even in cases such as the so-called “Cambridge capital controversy” of the 1960s. Samuelson debated post-Keynesians and, by his own admission, lost. Such matters have been, in Galbraith’s words, “airbrushed, like Trotsky” from the history of economics.

But MMT’s own relationship to real-world cases can be a little hit-or-miss. Mosler, the hedge fund manager, credits his role in the movement to an epiphany in the early 1990s, when markets grew concerned that Italy was about to default. Mosler figured that Italy, which at that time still issued its own currency, the lira, could not default as long as it had the ability to print more liras. He bet accordingly, and when Italy did not default, he made a tidy sum. “There was an enormous amount of money to be made if you could bring yourself around to the idea that they couldn’t default,” he says.

Later that decade, he learned there was also a lot of money to be lost. When similar fears surfaced about Russia, he again bet against default. Despite having its own currency, Russia defaulted, forcing Mosler to liquidate one of his funds and wiping out much of his $850 million in investments in the country. Mosler credits this to Russia’s fixed exchange rate policy of the time and insists that if it had only acted like a country with its own currency, default could have been avoided.

But the case could also prove what critics insist: Default, while technically always avoidable, is sometimes the best available option.

The issues I’ve been discussing over the last year or two while now crystallizing, remain highly problematic.

The idea of Greek default transformed from being a Greek punishment to a gift, with the pending question: ‘If Greece doesn’t have to pay, why do I?’- threatening a far more disruptive outcome that is yet to be fully discounted.

That is, should Greek bonds be formally discounted, the consequences of merely the political discussion of that question will be all it takes to trigger a financial crisis rivaling anything yet seen.

And note, also as previously discussed, that there has yet to be an actual Greek default, and that all Greek bonds have continued to mature at par, as there has yet to be an acceptable alternative.

So what are the alternatives?

1. Continue to fund Greece with terms and conditions.
2. Don’t fund Greece which forces:
  a. Greece is forced to limit spending to actual tax revenues
  b. Greece moves back to the drachma

And what are the ‘terms and conditions’?

Austerity is always the lead demand, which slows both the Greek economy and to some extent the euro zone in general.

Additional demands currently include discounting Greek bonds to bring down their debt to GDP ratio to ‘sustainable’ levels. However, after 8 months of negotiations, this has proven highly problematic, probably for reasons yet to be fully disclosed. And, as just discussed, there may be a growing awareness that discounting opens Pandora’s box with the politically attractive question ‘if Greece doesn’t have to pay, why do we?’

So what actually happens?

My best guess, and not with a lot of conviction, is that nothing is concluded before the coming maturity dates, and the ECB winds up writing the check to support short term Greek funding to buy more time for more inconclusive discussion. So, again as previously discussed, seems like this is the solution- death by 1,000 cuts and reluctant ECB bond buying when push comes to shove to keep it all going.

And, currently, the catastrophic risk I’d highly recommend immediately hedging is the risk that Greek bonds are formally discounted, rapidly followed by a global discussion of ‘so why should we have to pay?’ Possible immediate consequences of that discussion include a sharp spike in gold, silver, and other commodities in a flight from currency, falling equity and debt valuations, a banking crisis, and a tightening of ‘financial conditions’ in general from portfolio shifting, even as it’s fundamentally highly deflationary. And while it probably won’t last all that long, it will be long enough to seriously shake things up.

So it could be that the creditors have agreed to swap their bonds for 30 year bonds with ‘half their face value’ but maybe also with about equal economic value, which can in theory be done if the coupon and quality of the new bonds is high enough.

But, again, seven months of negotiations shows it’s not all that easy to come to agreement, and also that for reasons probably not entirely disclosed the bond holders have substantial bargaining power.

Greece hopes for debt swap deal by end of week

Jan 26 (AP) — Greece is aiming to complete negotiations on its debt swap deal by the end of the week, the government’s spokesman said Wednesday, adding that the talks were at their “most delicate phase.” Charles Dallara, head of the Institute of International Finance will head back to Athens on Thursday for the negotiations on a bond swap, known as the Private Sector Involvement. Athens is trying to get its private creditors to swap their Greek government bonds for new ones with half their face value, thereby slicing some euro100 billion ($130 billion) off its debt. The new bonds would also push the repayment deadlines 20 to 30 years into the future.

The Fed is Starving Economy of Interest Income

By Warren Mosler

He left out the part about needing a fiscal adjustment to compensate but this is part one of a three part presentation of something I wrote.

Preface. I generally subscribe to the view that in free currencies, deficits are mostly self-funding, and ‘enormous’ deficits needn’t be accompanied by higher yields. Government builds a bridge, pays the bridgebuilder, who pays the grocer, who eventually either buys the Treasury or deposits in a bank whose reserves are fungible vs T-bills via the intermediating Fed. Government dissavings and private sector savings are equal and offsetting, as long as the Central Bank has a working spreadsheet and an interest rate target. Yields are just a function of duration needs of savers vs borrowers, but the AMOUNTS always match up. Likewise, I don’t believe that the creation of bank reserves is inflationary or hyper-inflationary; bank lending is capital – not reserve – constrained. Loan officers don’t check the vaults. There is always enough. I continue to marvel at the armies of deficit vigilantes who take aim at Treasuries and JGBs, armed with Gold Standard thinking or even the latest Reinhart/Rogoff, only to retreat 2-3 year later. It didn’t work shorting US Treasuries in 2009-2010 for the ‘money supply’ or ‘deficit spike,’ and that roadside is stacked with corpses. Even the Home Run deficit vigilante hitters who nailed Europe this year (and Europe is, for now, operating as a quasi-Gold standard and an entirely different set of risks) offset those gains with losses betting the other way on the US, UK, and Japan. It’s evident in the returns.

Wonder if the ‘New Bonds’ are Mosler bonds?

*DJ Greece, Creditors Close To Agreeing Step-Up Coupon Of Around 3.5%-4.6% -Source
*DJ Greece, Creditors’ Deal Would Have Average 4%-4.2% Coupon On New Bonds -Source
*DJ Greek Creditors’ Real Writedown Seen At 65%-70% Under Deal Terms -Source
*DJ Final Details On Greek Coupon Deal Still Under Discussion, May Change
*DJ Greece Creditors Deal Could Have Grace Period Of About 10 Yrs On Principal

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Sat, Nov 12, 2011 at 2:19 PM, Stephanie wrote:
>   
>   John Carney loving on us again

Yes!

Paul Krugman Goes MMT on Italy

By John Carney

November 11 (CNBC) — It seems pretty clear that the school of thought known as Modern Monetary Theory has made a big impact on Paul Krugman’s thinking.

As Cullen Roche at Pragmatic Capitalism points out, just a few months ago the spread between bonds issued by Japan and Italy, which have similar debt and demographic issues, was perplexing Krugman.

“A question (to which I don’t have the full answer): why are the interest rates on Italian and Japanese debt so different? As of right now, 10-year Japanese bonds are yielding 1.09%; 10-year Italian bonds 5.76%.

…I actually don’t have a firm view. But it seems to be an important puzzle to resolve.”

But today’s column is basically right out of MMT.

“What has happened, it turns out, is that by going on the euro, Spain and Italy in effect reduced themselves to the status of Third World countries that have to borrow in someone else’s currency, with all the loss of flexibility that implies. In particular, since euro-area countries can’t print money even in an emergency, they’re subject to funding disruptions in a way that nations that kept their own currencies aren’t — and the result is what you see right now. America, which borrows in dollars, doesn’t have that problem.”

Lots of talk, particularly from Germany about the ECB not writing the check, due to (errant) inflation concerns.

But to no avail. In fact, with the Rubicon crossing decision to haircut Greek bonds 50% for the private sector’s holdings, expect the check writing to continue to intensify.

And expect economies to continue to slow under the pressure of continuing austerity demands that also work to make their deficits higher.

From today’s headlines:

Italian Bonds Advance as ECB Purchases Debt; French, Belgian Spreads Widen
A Successor, Picked by a Tainted Hand
EU Lowers Euro-Region Growth Forecasts
Italy’s Senate Speeds Austerity Vote
Merkel’s Party May Adopt Euro-Exit Clause in Platform, CDU’s Barthle Says
Greek President to Meet Party Leaders as Unity Aim in Disarray

Italian Bonds Advance as ECB Purchases Debt; French, Belgian Spreads Widen

By Paul Dobson

November 10 (Bloomberg) — Italian government bonds rose as the European Central Bank was said to purchase the securities and after the nation sold the maximum amount of one-year bills on offer at an auction.

The advance pushed the yield on 10-year securities below 7 percent. Italy’s senate is set to vote tomorrow on a package of austerity measures designed to clear the way for establishing a new government and restore confidence in Europe’s second-biggest debtor. The nation sold 5 billion euros ($6.8 billion) of bills at an average yield of 6.087 percent, up from 3.570 percent on similar-maturity securities sold last month.

“Together with reported ECB buying, this auction result should support further Italy outperformance,” said Luca Jellinek, head of European interest-rate strategy at Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank in London.

The yield on two-year Italian government notes slid 55 basis points to 6.66 percent at 9:43 a.m. London time. The 2.25 percent securities due November 2013 rose 0.915, or 9.15 euros per 1,000-euro face amount, to 92.205.

The ECB bought Italian government bonds, according to five people familiar with the transactions, who declined to be identified because the deals are confidential. It also bought Spanish securities, two of the people added. The ECB was not immediately available for comment when contacted by telephone.

As previously discussed, it’s hard to see how anyone with fiduciary responsibility can buy Italian debt or any other member nation debt after EU officials announced the plan for 50% haircuts on Greek bonds held by the private sector.

Yes, all governments have the authority, one way or another, to confiscate an investors funds. But they don’t, and work to establish credibility that they won’t.

But now that the EU has actually announced they are going to do it, as a fiduciary you’d have to be a darn fool to support investing any client funds in any member nation debt.

The last buyer standing is and was always to be the ECB, which will now be buying most all new member nation debt as there is no alternative that includes survival of the union.

And when this happens there will be a massive relief response, as the solvency issue will be behind them, with the euro firming as well.

Then the reality of the state of their economy take over, as GDP continues to fade and unemployment continues to rise until they figure out austerity can’t work and instead they need to proactively increase their member nation’s budget deficits.

Hopefully this doesn’t take quite so long as it took to figure out the ECB has to write the check.

But this one might take even longer as it will be a function of blood in the streets rather than funding capacity.

   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Wednesday, November 09, 2011 5:37 AM, Dave wrote:
>   
>    For BTPS & SPGBs all inter dealer screens have gone blank and there is no liquidity left.
>    There are really no quotes for even 10y BTPs for example and the last bids were hit
>    about 80BP wider for the day vs Bunds.
>   

The world’s poster child for losing decades looks to stay a step ahead:

(Nikkei)–Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda vowed Thursday to gradually raise the nation’s consumption tax to 10% by mid the 2010s during a summit meeting of the Group of 20 leading economies in Cannes, France.

The announcement at the summit has effectively made the tax hike an international pledge, and is expected to be included in an action program due out Friday.

Noda stressed the importance of rebuilding debt-ridden Japanese finances and told G-20 leaders that fiscal consolidation is a must “for Japan to be put back on a sound economic growth path, regardless of the debt crisis in the euro zone.”

He also spoke to reporters that a Diet dissolution should be carried out before implementing the tax hike. “If we go to the people in a general election (to seek a mandate on the consumption tax hike), we should do so after passing related bills but before implementing them,” he said.

As to Japan’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade pact, Noda told reporters he will accelerate efforts to iron out differences within the Democratic Party of Japan, which he leads. “We have to close ranks and shouldn’t be split,” he said.

Noda showed his flexibility in making concessions to a controversial redemption period of reconstruction bonds aimed at funding rebuilding efforts of the March 11 disaster, in hopes of enlisting support from the Liberal Democratic Party and New Komeito, the main opposition parties.

“Our policy chief said that we envisage a 15-year period (for the redemption of reconstruction bonds), but there’s room for concessions,” he said.

By the end of QE2 the curve had adjusted to the Fed having taken out pretty much all of the new supply out to 10 years.

After QE2 the supply out to 10 years started to be replenished auction by auction.

This was quickly followed by twist which began working to remove supply from the long end and add it to the short end.

The net is an ongoing multi trillion shift taking supply out of the long end and adding it to the short end that will continue to be a major influence on spreads.

Additionally, the Fed is seeing no material evidence of any monetary derived inflation, credit expansion, escalating inflation expectations (not that they actually matter), etc. and they are also seeing the global economy gradually slowing, and the euro zone imploding. So higher rates from the Fed remain a highly unlikely scenario.

The obvious hasn’t been making the headlines:

A no vote means a lot more immediate austerity than a yes vote.

A no vote means Greece can’t borrow at all, and therefore govt. checks will only clear if Greece immediately cuts back to where it is only spending tax revenue.

A yes vote means Greece can continue to spend quite a bit more than tax revenues, to the tune of the check from the benefactors.

And with no one in government at any level having any kind of a plan to leave the euro, and no idea how to manage a new currency in any case, that option continues to have no political support.

So the choices are:
Yes, we accept a relatively modest deficit cut as per the EU proposal.
No, we prefer to go cold turkey to a balanced budget and a seriously draconian cut.

Meanwhile, tick, tick, tick, the entire euro economy continues to slow, and continuously nudge up the entire region’s budget deficit, as they all work their way towards the same fate as Greece.

And, tick, tick, tick, the US deficit reduction process moves forward, with multi trillion dollar reductions already proposed by both parties.

Greek Vote Threatens Bailout

By Alkman Granitsas, Marcus Walker, and Costas Paris

November 1 (WSJ) — ATHENS—Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou stunned Europe by announcing a referendum on his country’s latest bailout—a high-stakes gamble that could undermine the international effort to preserve the euro.

A “yes” vote in the referendum could deflate the massive street protests and strikes that threaten to paralyze Greece as it tries to enact a brutal austerity program to earn rescue loans from the euro zone and the International Monetary Fund.

Nice, they announce proposal to confiscate 50% of Greek bonds from investors right in front of an Italian auction. And we thought we had sorry politicians…

Now it all starts unraveling. It’s all talk- another ‘optical illusion’ with no operational reality I sight. The China participation isn’t a done deal. The 50% haircut isn’t a done deal either as they haven’t yet figured out how to actually do it without a default event. The EFSF contributions aren’t a done deal either.

What they have done is further frightened investors to the point where the ECB will find itself buying a lot more bonds to keep member nation funding in check, while ‘negotiations’ drag on with no resolution, meaning, as previously discussed, this is the resolution.

Hoping i’m wrong…

Euro Bailout Fund Chief Sees No Quick China Deal

By Reuters

October 28 (CNBC) — The head of Europe’s bailout fund said on Friday he does not expect to reach a conclusive deal with Chinese leaders during a visit to Beijing but expects the surplus-rich country to continue buying bonds issued by the fund.

The markets like the announcement. Of course they also liked QE2…

Unfortunately, as previously discussed, without the ECB the EFSF isn’t sustainable. It’s like trying to lift up the bucket by the handle when you are standing in it.

Nor is it cast in stone yet, but all subject to details.

Also, the positive market response, if it continues, only encourages the continuing austerity measures that are weakening the euro economy and forcing already unsustainable deficits higher.

And, again, it’s a case of ‘the food was terrible and the portions were small.’

Starting with the 50% private sector loss on Greek bonds-

Presumably that ‘works’ if it indeed brings Greek debt down to 120% of GDP from 160% by 2020. But that implies the austerity measures won’t continue to reduce GDP and cause the Greek deficit to increase, as continues to be the case.

It presumes the 50% haircut will be considered sufficiently voluntary to not be a credit event that triggers a variety of global default clauses.

The rest of the ‘package’ presumes markets won’t reduce the presumed credit worthiness of member nations who fund the EFSF.

It presumes private sector funds will recapitalize the banks that lost capital on the write downs.

It presumes the EFSF won’t be needed to fully fund Portugal, Spain, and Italy.

It presumes banks and other investors required to be prudent and financially responsible to shareholders will continue to buy other euro member nation debt even after seeing the euro zone members allow Greece to default on half of their obligations.

That is, how could any bank now buy, for example, Italian debt, in full knowledge that euro zone policy options include a forced write down of that debt. And not in extreme, unforeseen circumstances, but under current conditions.

And how can prudent investors invest in the banks when they’ve just seen euro zone remove some 100 billion euro in equity by decree?

The problem is, it takes a presumption of general improvement to presume additional losses will not be incurred by investors.

And it takes a presumption of general improvement to presume the EFSF will be successful.

And that requires the presumption that continued austerity measures will result in a general improvement.

Even as all evidence (and most theory) is showing the opposite.

Euro deal leaves much to do on rescue fund, Greek debt

By Luke baker and Julien Toyer

October 27 (Reuters) — Euro zone leaders struck a last-minute deal to limit the damage from the currency bloc’s debt crisis early on Thursday but are still far from finalizing plans to slash Greece’s debt burden and strengthen their rescue fund.

The modern day saga of the Trojan Horse continues.
as the euro debt crisis gives Japan the cover to do something
otherwise highly problematic.

Japan buying euro zone debt is a way to bolster the euro vs the yen
and thereby support Japan’s exporters.

Fujimura Says Japan May Boost Europe Bailout Bond Purchases

October 5 (Bloomberg) — Japan may increase its purchases of bonds to finance Europe’s debt crisis rescue fund, Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura said.

Fujimura told reporters today in Tokyo the government “would like to consider” buying more bonds from the European Financial Stability Facility to help stabilize the region. Japan bought more than 20 percent of the fund’s initial five-year, 5 billion euro ($6.6 billion) bonds in January, and purchased another 1.1 billion euros of 10-year EFSF bonds issued in June.

“Europe’s fiscal problem is also very important for Japan in terms of restoring market confidence, and the Europeans are grappling with this,” Fujimura said.

First, I see no public purpose in burning any crude oil to fly the Chairman and his entourage to make any speech.

He could just as easily deliver this one from the steps of the Fed in DC.
Congress should demand a statement of public purpose before endorsing any travel by its agents.

Next is what I expect from the speech.
The short answer is not much.

I don’t see more QE as the purpose of QE is to bring long rates down, and they are already down substantially. And the Fed now has sufficient evidence to confirm that long rates are mainly a function of expectations of future FOMC votes on rate settings.

To that point, when the Fed announced QE, and market participants believed it would spur growth, and therefore FOMC rate hikes somewhere down the road, long rates worked their way higher. And when the Fed ended QE, and market participants believed the economy would be slower to recover, long rates worked their way lower. Not to mention China hates QE and it still looks to me there’s an understanding in place where China allocates reserves to $US as long as the Fed doesn’t do any QE.

The Fed could cut it’s target Fed funds rate, the cost of funds for the banking system, down to 0 and lower that cost of funds by a few basis points. But those few basis points can hardly be expected to have much effect on anything.

It’s not the Fed has run out of bullets, it’s that the Fed has never had any bullets of any consequence.
And with the few it’s fired, it hasn’t realized the odds are the gun has been pointed backwards.
For example, it still looks to me lower rates, if anything, reduce aggregate demand via the interest income channels.

And QE isn’t much other than a tax on the economy, that also removes interest income.

So look for a forecast of modest GDP growth with downside risks, core inflation remaining reasonably firm even as unemployment remains far too high, all of which support continued Fed ‘accommodation’ at current levels.

First, the euro funding issue/crisis could vanish with a simple announcement, like:

The ECB hereby guarantees all the debt of the national governments.

But they won’t do that.
They are worried about their ability to subsequently enforce the Growth and Stability Pact, which has already proven unenforceable.

In fact, the only enforcement tool for austerity seems to rest with the ECB, which conditions its funding on austerity.

This is also the disciplinary principle behind my proposed ECB annual revenue distribution of maybe 10% of euro zone GDP to the national govts on a per capita basis-
The ECB would have the right to withhold future distributions to members who fail to comply with deficit rules. But this proposal isn’t even a consideration, so not likely to happen.

Mosler bonds (in the case of default they can be used for payment of taxes) for individual euro nations offer real hope, but time is short and the political process long.

That leaves the euro zone with what it’s been doing all along.
Muddle along anticipating, entertaining, debating, various funding proposals,
but ultimately,
when it gets bad enough,
relying on the ECB writing the check and buying national govt debt in the market place to facilitate ongoing funding.

All contingent with the member nation in question complying with terms and conditions of austerity set by the ECB.

It’s all highly deflationary, strong euro medicine, while it lasts.
It’s also operationally sustainable.
And phase 1- where austerity reduces deficits- has proven politically sustainable as well.

However we may now be entering phase 2,
where austerity results in falling GDP and higher deficits for all the euro members.
Yes, it’s operationally sustainable and continues to support the euro.

So the question is whether austerity measures intended to bring deficits down, that instead cause deficits to increase, are politically sustainable.

And, if not, what next?
And when?
How bad does it all have to get before they change policy?
And what change would that be?
The first step would probably be some ‘new’ form of QE,
and maybe even an interest rate cut,
which only make things worse,
as they wait for the appropriate lag before said policy ‘kicks in’.

And how long would it all continue to deteriorate before they stop waiting for it to ‘kick in’ and again change policy?

US deficit reduction round 2 coming soon as well.

To again quote that carpenter working on his piece of wood,
‘no matter how many times i cut it, it’s still too short’.

Is a misguided fuss over a reserve drain going to bring down global capitalism?

“The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to stabilize the government’s medium-term debt dynamics,” S&P said in a statement late yesterday after markets closed.

Credit ratings are based on ability to pay and willingness to pay.

David Beers of S&P knows this and has discussed this in the past.

Including direct discussion with me where he acknowledged a nation like the US always has the ability to make US dollar payments.

Therefore any downgrade would necessarily be based on willingness to pay.

In fact, I downgraded the US on willingness to pay several months ago on this website. And the debt ceiling debate more than demonstrated a willingness to default by far too many members of Congress for even consideration of a AAA rating.

So why then did David T. Beers decide to downgrade the US on ability to pay, and not explicitly on willingness to pay?

Sure looks like a case of intellectual dishonesty.
And I have no idea why.
So much for his legacy.

And, as previously discussed, markets probably won’t care, much like when Japan was even more severely downgraded.

A credit rating simply needn’t be applicable for the issuer of its own currency, as David should well know.