Fed’s Low Rates Killing Credit, Slowing Recovery: Gross

By Jeff Cox

Feb 1 (CNBC) — The Federal Reserve’s zero-interest-rate policy is hampering economic recovery by discouraging bank lending, Pimco bond titan Bill Gross said in an analysis.

For banks, a healthy lending environment exists where they can borrow at low rates in the short term and lend at significantly higher rates over the long term, a situation that creates a profit through a positively sloped yield curve

Bank liquidity is something like wheels on a car.
Without wheels the car won’t function, but neither are wheels alone enough to make it go.

Banks are public/private partnerships, with govt’s role being liquidity provider, as private capital in the first loss position prices risk. And with unlimited liquidity provision comes the necessity of full regulation and supervision of the asset/capital side.

In the US the unlimited liquidity provision comes mainly via FDIC insured deposits, supplemented by funding from the Fed. The Fed is the liquidity provider of last resort for its member banks, while at the same time it uses the banking system’s cost of funds as its instrument of monetary policy.

The euro zone hasn’t figured this out yet.
The liquidity provider of last resort is the ECB, as it’s the ‘issuer of the currency’, and as such not itself liquidity constrained. The member nations are like the US states, and are necessarily liquidity constrained, and therefore not ‘empowered’ to be liquidity providers of last resort to their member banks.

So in that sense, as the bank funding by the ECB grows, it’s all gravitating towards what all other nations have in place. The problem is the euro zone leaders don’t understand that aspect of banking, as evidenced by the way they are resisting the shift to ECB funding, and, in fact, working towards moving banks away from ECB funding.

Draghi Sees No Evidence ECB Loans Are Financing Economy Yet

By Jana Randow and Simone Meier

Jan 28 (Bloomberg) — “Do we know that actually this money is going to finance the real economy? We don’t have evidence of this kind yet,” ECB President Mario Draghi told Davos. “There is a lag. We will have to see.” “We know for sure we have avoided a major, major credit crunch, a major funding crisis,” he said today. “You have parts of the euro area where credit is more or less normal, but you have other parts where credit is seriously contracting.” “If you take 0.5 trillion euros and then you take off the reimbursement of other short-term facilities by the banking system in December, you get a figure of roughly 220 billion euros, which is exactly the amount of bank bonds that were to come due in this period of time,” he said.

Karim writes:
U.S. GDP growth in Q4 a bit weaker than expected at 2.8%

Perhaps the FOMC had word of this, explaining the unexpected dovishness?

1.9% of that growth accounted for by inventories. Other contributions: (consumer spending 2%, fixed investment 0.4%, government spending -0.9%, net exports -0.1%).

Rebuilding post earthquake supply lines probably now complete.
Govt spending continues weak, as revenues increase some and the federal deficit falls some.
Imports rise quickly with any increase in consumer spending.

In growth terms: (consumer spending 2%, fixed investment 3.3%, government spending -4.6%, exports 4.7% and imports 4.4%).

So stripping away inventories, growth was below trend. Plus savings rate fell back to 3.7% from 3.9%.

Domestic savings down with spending up indicates increasing consumer debt.
The question is whether this is ‘wanted’ as per increased desires to buy on credit,
or because the decline in govt deficit spending ‘forced’ more consumer debt for ‘essentials’

And, core PCE slowed from 2.1% to 1.1%.

Also explains FOMC dovishness as they see risk as asymmetrical, fearing deflation more than inflation.

In sum, will keep QE3 talk very much alive

And somewhat moot, even as Q1 GDP forecasts are being revised down some, as most don’t think QE matters much for the real economy.

What’s becoming understood is that while there is ‘more the Fed can do’
for all practical purposes there is nothing they can do to further support the real economy.

Euro money and lending data shockingly weak in December.

Might partially explain how some banks apparently got the balance sheet room to buy more national govt debt?

In particular, record single month decline in lending to the non-bank private sector (74bn). Of that, 37bn decline in lending to non-financial corporates and 8bn drop in lending to households.

This should be very supportive of additional ECB rate cuts over the next few months.

The 3 year variable rate funding from the ECB may have helped some banks with room on their balance sheets, but with general liquidity concerns, buy more national govt debt, but that would be a one time adjustment. Once the banking system is ‘topped off’ it only buys more national govt bonds to replace maturing issues, or to add to its balance sheet should its capital increase.

Italy Bond Auction Fails to Match Spain Success

By Valentina Za

Jan 25 (Reuters) — Italy’s three-year debt costs fell below 5 percent but its first bond sale of the year failed to match the success of a Spanish auction the previous day, reflecting the heavy refinancing load Rome faces over the next three months.

Italy raised the maximum planned amount of 4.75 billion euros at the auction but did not live up to market expectations raised by a Spanish tender on Thursday where Madrid raised 10 billion euros, twice the planned amount, at lower rates.

Both Italy and Spain are benefiting from half a trillion euros of cheap three-year funds the European Central Bank injected into the banking system in an unprecedented move last month. Investors, however, remain more cautious towards Rome in the light of its much larger refinancing needs.

“The auction metrics look robust on aggregate, although not as spectacular as yesterday’s Spanish supply,” said Michael Leister, a strategist at DZ Bank in Frankfurt.

Italian bonds rallied after domestic banks awash with ECB money snapped up Spain’s bonds on Thursday. The mixed results of the Italian sale tempered market enthusiasm and Italy’s 10-year yields rose back above 6.60 percent in the secondary market, after falling below 6.50 earlier in the session, to their lowest level in more than a month.

“This will serve to dampen some of the markets’ enthusiasm in the wake of yesterday’s Spanish auction … It doesn’t defeat the notion that the ECB extraordinary liquidity provisioning will support peripheral debt but it perhaps tempers expectations as to what degree these operations will support,” said Richard McGuire, a strategist at Rabobank in London.

LOWEST SINCE SEPTEMBER

Italy sold its November 2014 three-year benchmark bond at an average rate of 4.83 percent on Friday, down sharply from a yield of 5.62 yield at an auction just two weeks ago.

In a sign of improving funding conditions, this was the lowest yield at a three-year auction since September last year though fellow debt struggler Spain only had to pay 3.384 percent on three-year bonds on Thursday.

The bid-to-cover ratio fell to around 1.22, versus an already weak 1.36 ratio at the end-December sale, showing anemic demand for the paper. This time, however, Italy sold the top planned amount of its three-year benchmark.

Rome also sold debt due in July 2014 and August 2018.

The ECB’s liquidity boost, evident also at an Italian bill sale on Thursday where one-year yields more than halved, leaves Italy’s Treasury better placed to refinance some 90 billion euros of bonds maturing between February and April.

That is more than Spain aims to issue in medium and long-term maturities in the whole of 2012.

What analysts now describe as a challenging task may have been an impossible one at the end of November, when market fears of a financial collapse pushed Italy’s short-term debt costs towards 8 percent.

Under the leadership of a new technocrat government, Italy has embarked on a bold austerity push aimed at balancing the budget in 2013.

Analysts at Barclays Capital noted in a report that third-quarter budget data showed a decline in current expenditures for the first time ever, when excluding debt servicing costs.

But Prime Minister Mario Monti must now convince markets it can revive Italy’s ailing growth rate by overcoming entrenched resistance to its liberalization program.

Analysts warn that sentiment on the markets remains fragile with worries over a deal with private investors to voluntarily write down half of the value of their Greek debt lingering in the background.

“Looking beyond this one auction, the issuance challenge for Italy remains significant. Market pressures are most apparent in the 10-year sector of the curve which will face supply in two weeks time,” Citi analysts wrote in a research note.

Italy will sell five- and ten-year bonds at the end of January. On this longer maturities demand from foreign investors plays a bigger role but analysts say Italy would be able to shift only part of its funding burden to the short-term ahead of a second three-year liquidity tender at the end of February.

“THE LTRO DIDN’T DO ANYTHING. ALL THE MONEY WOUND UP AS DEPOSITS AT THE ECB” “QE DIDN’T DO ANYTHING. ALL THE MONEY BECAME EXCESS RESERVES BACK AT THE FED.”
(Apologies in advance to all who have heard me give this one ten times before)

1. Central Banks, whenever they buy any asset (eg lend eg grow balance sheet) create new reserves.

2. Commercial banks and people do NOT have the capacity to destroy those reserves. Once the Fed or ECB wires the money or creates that asset line item on its spreadsheet, there is an equal and offsetting liability on its spreadsheet called reserves. This spreadsheet cannot be broken.

3. All that commercial banks can do is lending, which moves some of those reserves from ‘excess’ to ‘required’ but they are still there.

4. Commercial Banks make this lending decision based upon regulatory capital and profit motives, not based upon reserves. They have a ‘captive audience’ in their Central Banks, who MUST create the necessary reserves (a floored amount) to prevent interest rates from going to infinity.

5. When a Central Bank does a lot of Balance Sheet expansion in a short time, it’s going to wind up as deposits/excess NO MATTER WHAT. If the Fed does 1T of QE, Banks don’t suddenly ‘find’ the regulatory capital to make 10T of loans. And even if they did, there would be the SAME AMOUNT OF TOTAL RESERVES.

6. Bank lending to a 0% risk weighted sovereign actually does NOTHING to diminish excess reserves.

7. Simplified Illustration: ECB does a very large unsterilized LTRO. They take a lot of sov paper on balance sheet (temporarily), and they wire NEW FUNDS to thie member banks. Those member banks take some of the money and buy paper from the ITalian government. That government spends the money by wiring it to its pensioners. Those pensioners take it to buy food from the local grocer. The local grocer DEPOSITS IT IN HIS BANK. SOMEWHERE DOWN THE CHAIN the money winds up on deposit in some member bank, be the chain long or short. WHATEVER MONEY THE ECB CREATES WINDS UP ON DEPOSIT IN ITS MEMBER BANKS, WHETHER OR NOT IT IS ‘USED’ TO BUY SOVEREIGN DEBT, ‘USED’ TO MAKE LOANS, OR NOT USED AT ALL.

8. Please. I never wish to read again that ‘Central Bank money went unused because it wound up as deposits.’ IT HAS NO WHERE ELSE TO GO. THE BANKING SYSTEM IS A CLOSED LOOP. With the possible exception of someone making a withdrawal, taking the paper, and making a bonfire (actually not feasible in the hundreds of billions anyway bec there are constraints)

9. And that is probably how Italy just managed to borrow at 1.64%
Good luck!

Central Banks ‘Printing Money Like Gangbusters’: Gross

By Margo D. Beller

Jan 11 (CNBC) — The world’s central banks are “printing money like gangbusters,” which could revive the threat of inflation , Pimco founder Bill Gross told CNBC Wednesday.

By putting “hundreds of billions” in currency in circulation, the central banks “can produce reflation—that’s why we’re seeing the pop in oil, gold” and other commodities, he said in a live interview.

At the same time, “there’s the potential for deflation if the private credit markets can’t produce some sort of confidence and solvency going forward,” Gross said. “So we’re at great risk here, not only in the U.S. but on a global basis.”

Gross has previously predicted a “paranormal” market in 2012 characterized by “credit and zero-bound interest rate risk” and fewer incentives for lenders to extend credit.

He said stock and bond investors must lower their expectations when it comes to returns, with 2 percent to 5 percent as good as they get this year.

He also told CNBC he expects the Federal Reserve will keep interest rates “exactly where it is at 25 basis points for the next three to four years.”

Gross’s Total Return Fund, the world’s largest bond fund, had over $10 billion in outflows in 2011, but Gross stressed the fund “started 2011 at $240 billion and ended it at $244 billion.”

He said he will run the Pimco Total Return Fund ETF , which starts March 1, the same way he runs the bond Total Return Fund, adding, “They’re twins.”

So what does locking in their funds via LTRO do for most banks? Not much. Helps keep interest rate risk off the table, but they’ve always had other ways of doing that. It takes away some liquidity risk, but not much, as the banks haven’t been euro liquidity constrained. And banks still have the same constraints due to capital and associated risks.

To it’s credit, the ECB has been pretty good on the liquidity front all along. I’d give it an A grade for liquidity vs the Fed where I’d give a D grade for liquidity. Back in 2008 the ECB was quick to provide unlimited euro liquidity to its member banks, while the Fed dragged its feet for months before expanding its programs sufficiently to ensure its member banks dollar liquidity. And the FDIC did the unthinkable, closing WAMU for liquidity rather than for capital and asset reasons.

But while liquidity is a necessary condition for banking and the economy under current institutional arrangements, and while aggregate demand would further retreat if the CB failed to support bank liquidity, liquidity provision per se doesn’t add to aggregate demand.

What’s needed to restore output and employment is an increase in net spending, either public or private. And that choice is more political than economic.

Public sector spending can be increased by simply budgeting and spending. Private sector spending can be supported by cutting taxes to enhance income and/or somehow providing for the expansion of private sector debt.

Unfortunately current euro zone institutional structure is working against both of these channels to increased aggregate demand, as previously discussed.

And even in the US, where both channels are, operationally, wide open, it looks like FICA taxes are going to be allowed to rise at year end and work against aggregate demand, when the ‘right’ answer is to suspend it entirely.

That doesn’t make sense to me. I see the 20 billion euro/wk bond purchases as possibly being enough to stabilize things, but not this.

Here’s my take:

So even if a bank officer now wants to buy, say, Italian debt out to 3 years because he can get ECB funding for that term, he probably has to go to an investment committee, so it is unlikely to happen overnight.

And the investment committees go something like this.

Investment officer:

‘now that we can get 3 year term funding from the ECB, i recommend we add to our italian debt position and make a 3% spread, which is a 30% return on equity’

committee responses:

‘why does the availability of term funding alter our current policy of reducing holdings to reduce credit risk?
what are the regulatory limits?
will the regulators allow us to own more?
what about the risk of downgrade which could force a sale?
what about repo haircuts if prices fall?
what if it’s decided Italy is unsustainable and the euro ministers vote on private sector haircuts?
how will taking on this risk affect our ability to raise capital?’

etc.

While banks may indeed buy more euro member nation debt due to the availability of the new term funding, I don’t think that new funding is enough to cause them to make that decision.

I do think the term funding will be used by banks with problems obtaining term funding to lock in the term cost of funds.

John Maynard Keynes Knew What Occupy Wall Street Tells Us Today: “Banks and bankers are by nature blind.”

By James Galbraith

November 11 (Alternet) — Economist Friedrich Hayek is the darling of conservatives. Progressives prefer John Maynard Keynes. But when it comes to sensible policy, there’s really no contest.

Thank you for your attention to this matter!
My comments appear below:

The Veil of Secrecy at the Fed Has Been Lifted, Now It’s Time for Change

By Senator Bernie Sanders

November 2 (Huffington Post) — As a result of the greed, recklessness, and illegal behavior on Wall Street, the American people have experienced the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression.

Not to mention the institutional structure that rewarded said behavior, and, more important, the failure of government to respond in a timely manner with policy to ensure the financial crisis didn’t spill over to the real economy.

Millions of Americans, through no fault of their own, have lost their jobs, homes, life savings, and ability to send their kids to college. Small businesses have been unable to get the credit they need to expand their businesses, and credit is still extremely tight. Wages as a share of national income are now at the lowest level since the Great Depression, and the number of Americans living in poverty is at an all-time high.

Yes, it’s all a sad disgrace.

Meanwhile, when small-business owners were being turned down for loans at private banks and millions of Americans were being kicked out of their homes, the Federal Reserve provided the largest taxpayer-financed bailout in the history of the world to Wall Street and too-big-to-fail institutions, with virtually no strings attached.

Only partially true. For the most part the institutions did fail, as shareholder equity was largely lost. Failure means investors lose, and the assets of the failed institution sold or otherwise transferred to others.

But yes, some shareholders and bonds holders (and executives) who should have lost were protected.

Over two years ago, I asked Ben Bernanke, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, a few simple questions that I thought the American people had a right to know: Who got money through the Fed bailout? How much did they receive? What were the terms of this assistance?

Incredibly, the chairman of the Fed refused to answer these fundamental questions about how trillions of taxpayer dollars were being spent.

The American people are finally getting answers to these questions thanks to an amendment I included in the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill which required the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to audit and investigate conflicts of interest at the Fed. Those answers raise grave questions about the Federal Reserve and how it operates — and whose interests it serves.

As a result of these GAO reports, we learned that the Federal Reserve provided a jaw-dropping $16 trillion in total financial assistance to every major financial institution in the country as well as a number of corporations, wealthy individuals and central banks throughout the world.

Yes, however, while I haven’t seen the detail, that figure likely includes liquidity provision to FDIC insured banks which is an entirely separate matter and not rightly a ‘bailout’.

The US banking system (rightly) works to serve public purpose by insuring deposits and bank liquidity in general. And history continues to ‘prove’ banking in general can work no other way.

And once government has secured the banking system’s ability to fund itself, regulation and supervision is then applied to ensure banks are solvent as defined by the regulations put in place by Congress, and that all of their activities are in compliance with Congressional direction as well.

The regulators are further responsible to appropriately discipline banks that fail to comply with Congressional standards.

Therefore, the issue here is not with the liquidity provision by the Fed, but with the regulators and supervisors who oversee what the banks do with their insured, tax payer supported funding.

In other words, the liability side of banking is not the place for market discipline. Discipline comes from regulation and supervision of bank assets, capital, and management.

The GAO also revealed that many of the people who serve as directors of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks come from the exact same financial institutions that the Fed is in charge of regulating. Further, the GAO found that at least 18 current and former Fed board members were affiliated with banks and companies that received emergency loans from the Federal Reserve during the financial crisis. In other words, the people “regulating” the banks were the exact same people who were being “regulated.” Talk about the fox guarding the hen house!

Yes, this is a serious matter. On the one hand you want directors with direct banking experience, while on the other you strive to avoid conflicts of interest.

The emergency response from the Fed appears to have created two systems of government in America: one for Wall Street, and another for everyone else. While the rich and powerful were “too big to fail” and were given an endless supply of cheap credit, ordinary Americans, by the tens of millions, were allowed to fail.

The Fed necessarily sets the cost of funds for the economy through its designated agents, the nations Fed member banks. It was the Fed’s belief that, in general, a lower cost of funds for the banking system, presumably to be passed through to the economy, was in the best interest of ‘ordinary Americans.’ And note that the lower cost of funds from the Fed does not necessarily help bank earnings and profits, as it reduces the interest banks earn on their capital and on excess funds banks have that consumers keep in their checking accounts.

However, there was more that Congress could have done to keep homeowners from failing, beginning with making an appropriate fiscal adjustment in 2008 as the financial crisis intensified, and in passing regulations regarding foreclosure practices.

Additionally, it should also be recognized that the Fed is, functionally, an agent of Congress, subject to immediate Congressional command. That is, the Congress has the power to direct the Fed in real time and is thereby also responsible for failures of Fed policy.

They lost their homes. They lost their jobs. They lost their life savings. And, they lost their hope for the future. This is not what American democracy is supposed to look like. It is time for change at the Fed — real change.

I blame this almost entirely on the failure of Congress to make the immediate and appropriate fiscal adjustments in 2008 that would have sustained employment and output even as the financial crisis took its toll on the shareholder equity of the financial sector.

Congress also failed to act with regard to issues surrounding the foreclosure process that have worked against public purpose.

Among the GAO’s key findings is that the Fed lacks a comprehensive system to deal with conflicts of interest, despite the serious potential for abuse. In fact, according to the GAO, the Fed actually provided conflict of interest waivers to employees and private contractors so they could keep investments in the same financial institutions and corporations that were given emergency loans.

The GAO has detailed instance after instance of top executives of corporations and financial institutions using their influence as Federal Reserve directors to financially benefit their firms, and, in at least one instance, themselves.

For example, the CEO of JP Morgan Chase served on the New York Fed’s board of directors at the same time that his bank received more than $390 billion in financial assistance from the Fed. Moreover, JP Morgan Chase served as one of the clearing banks for the Fed’s emergency lending programs.

This demands thorough investigation, and in any case the conflict of interest should have been publicly revealed at the time.

Getting this type of disclosure was not easy. Wall Street and the Federal Reserve fought it every step of the way. But, as difficult as it was to lift the veil of secrecy at the Fed, it will be even harder to reform the Fed so that it serves the needs of all Americans, and not just Wall Street. But, that is exactly what we have to do.

Yes, I have always supported full transparency.

To get this process started, I have asked some of the leading economists in this country to serve on an advisory committee to provide Congress with legislative options to reform the Federal Reserve.

Here are some of the questions that I have asked this advisory committee to explore:

1. How can we structurally reform the Fed to make our nation’s central bank a more democratic institution responsive to the needs of ordinary Americans, end conflicts of interest, and increase transparency? What are the best practices that central banks in other countries have developed that we can learn from? Compared with central banks in Europe, Canada, and Australia, the GAO found that the Federal Reserve does not do a good job in disclosing potential conflicts of interest and other essential elements of transparency.

Yes, full transparency in ‘real time’ would serve public purpose.

2. At a time when 16.5 percent of our people are unemployed or under-employed, how can we strengthen the Federal Reserve’s full-employment mandate and ensure that the Fed conducts monetary policy to achieve maximum employment? When Wall Street was on the verge of collapse, the Federal Reserve acted with a fierce sense of urgency to save the financial system. We need the Fed to act with the same boldness to combat the unemployment crisis.

Unfortunately employment and output is not a function of what’s called ‘monetary policy’ so what is needed from the Fed is full support of an active fiscal policy focused on employment and price stability.

3. The Federal Reserve has a responsibility to ensure the safety and soundness of financial institutions and to contain systemic risks in financial markets. Given that the top six financial institutions in the country now have assets equivalent to 65 percent of our GDP, more than $9 trillion, is there any reason why this extraordinary concentration of ownership should not be broken up? Should a bank that is “too big to fail” be allowed to exist?

Larger size should be permitted only to the extent that it results in lower fees for the consumer. The regulators can require institutions that wish to grow be allowed to do so only in return for lower banking fees.

4. The Federal Reserve has the responsibility to protect the credit rights of consumers. At a time when credit card issuers are charging millions of Americans interest rates between 25 percent or more, should policy options be established to ensure that the Federal Reserve and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau protect consumers against predatory lending, usury, and exorbitant fees in the financial services industry?

Banks are public/private partnerships chartered by government for the further purpose of supporting a financial infrastructure that serves public purpose.

The banks are government agents and should be addressed accordingly, always keeping in mind the mission is to support public purpose.

In this case, because banks are government agents, the question is that of public purpose served by credit cards and related fees, and not the general ‘right’ of shareholders to make profits.

Once public purpose has been established, the effective use of private capital to price risk in the context of a profit motive should then be addressed.

5. At a time when the dream of homeownership has turned into the nightmare of foreclosure for too many Americans, what role should the Federal Reserve be playing in providing relief to homeowners who are underwater on their mortgages, combating the foreclosure crisis, and making housing more affordable?

Again, it begins with a discussion of public purpose, where Congress must decide what, with regard to housing, best serves public purpose. The will of Congress can then be expressed by the institutional structure of its Federal banking system.

Options available, for example, include the option of ordering that appraisals and income statements not be factors in refinancing loans originated by Federal institutions including banks and the Federal housing agencies. At the time of origination the lenders calculated their returns based on mortgages being refinanced as rates came down, assuming all borrowers would be eligible for refinancing. The financial crisis and subsequent failure of policy to sustain employment and output has given lenders an unexpected ‘bonus’ through a ‘technicality’ that allows them to refuse requests for refinancing at lower rates due to lower appraisals and lower incomes.

6. At a time when the United States has the most inequitable distribution of wealth and income of any major country, and the greatest gap between the very rich and everyone else since 1928, what policies can be established at the Federal Reserve which reduces income and wealth inequality in the U.S?

The root causes begin with Federal policy that has resulted in an unprecedented transfer of wealth to the financial sector at the expense of the real sectors. This can easily and immediately be reversed, which would serve to substantially reverse the trend income distribution.

Sincerely,

Warren Mosler