the mortgage foreclosure mess- just another financial crisis

The latest mortgage foreclosure mess is just another financial crisis.

It’s not a real economic crisis- no houses have been actually destroyed- no fire, hurricane, or earthquake damage, etc.

So the responses aren’t about bulldozers, hammers, concrete pouring, etc.

The question is whether this financial discovery/event spills over into the real economy.

The question is, are the authorities standing by with policy responses as needed to make sure people can still go to work to grow food and eat it, build houses and live in them, make shoes and wear them, go to hospitals and take care of sick people, go to schools and teach classes, maintain the infrastructure, do cancer research, etc. etc. etc?

Of course not. And therefore it all might again needlessly/tragically spill over to the real sector.

Just like in August 2008, we might again let a financial crisis spill over into the real economy and make today’s still very bad economy even worse.

As I said then, yes, it’s critically important to identify and punish the bad guys with a vengeance, alter incentives that support fraud, etc. etc. etc.

And it’s even more important to not let the financial crisis spill over into the real economy by letting aggregate demand fall, sales collapse, and jobs get lost.

And now, as then, interest rate cuts and just about anything else the Fed might do aren’t going to do the trick, and, then as now, will probably just make it worse.

Now, as then, as always, an immediate fiscal adjustment IS the silver bullet that restores demand.

Now, as then, a full payroll tax (FICA) suspension will immediately work to restore private sector aggregate demand, sales, and jobs. For the most part, private sector jobs are a function of sales, directly or indirectly. Capitalism is driven by sales. Businesses large and small compete for consumer dollars. But here has to be consumer dollars to compete for.

Public infrastructure spending works as well, but takes a while, so the answer is to do both. Suspend FICA taxes and put in place desired infrastructure project funding, presumably in a well thought out basis with an eye to efficiency, and not in a blind rush to support aggregate demand.

So why is our government not standing by to suspend FICA taxes?
Why haven’t they already done it?

Especially as It’s a highly regressive punishing tax on the people we need most and the people who are hurting the most- the people actually working for a living who produce all the real goods and services that support our existence.

Yes, it’s the first deadly innocent fraud at work- government thinks it needs those FICA revenues to be able to make Social Security payments.

Our Federal government officials do not understand the function of federal taxes is to regulate the economy, and not to raise revenue.

The don’t understand the function of federal taxes is to take dollars away from us, and not to give them what they need to spend.
Their first clue should be that if we were to pay our taxes with old $20 bills they’d give us a receipt and then shred them. But it isn’t.
(And removing what’s restricting aggregate demand is not getting something for nothing.)

Instead, the deficit terrorists are firmly in control.

The best we can expect is for them not to raise taxes at year end when the tax cuts expire. There is no talk of lowering taxes, under any circumstances.

Even from the media’s ‘deficit doves’ who remain THE problem, agreeing that the ‘long term deficits’ is a problem, pointing to interest rates as evidence markets currently are willing to fund deficit spending, and talking about how austerity now is not the way to bring down deficits longer term- in general, flagrantly violating ‘Lerner’s Law’ and conceding the principle to the deficit hawks.

So will this latest mortgage crisis hurt the real economy?
Probably not, best I can tell. Looks more to me like it’s a potential transfer of dollars from banks and lenders with no propensity to spend to borrowers with high propensity to spend.

But I could easily be wrong. There is the risk that events could result in a further cutback in credit to the real economy.

And while this potential drop in aggregate demand is easily offset by a simple fiscal response, the odds our current gaggle of regulators and elected officials getting it right with an appropriate fiscal response seem slim and none.

from Randy Wray

>   
>   From Professor Randall Wray:
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>   Here is one analysis; it will take you less than 5 minutes
>   to find many similar reports, many from people with expertise
>   on industry practice.
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Mortgage and Foreclosure Wrongdoing: Road Map for Investigating AGs

By Cynthia Kouril

September 26

Dear states attorneys general in Ohio, Texas, Florida and California (and to the rest of you as well):

Let me make it easy for you. It’s much easier to find the wrongdoing if you know where to look, so let me give you a generic road map:

1) The mortgage originator is the entity that met with homeowner (unless there was a mortgage broker involved) and actually did the mortgage transaction with the homeowner, a.k.a. “the closing.” The originator had the wet ink documents in its hands at some time.

In many cases the wet ink documents never left the originator. This creates a problem down the line because often the originators were small short-lived businesses. When businesses went belly-up holding all those wet ink original documents, where did the documents go? . . .

2) Immediately (by which I mean within a very few days, sometimes a very few hours) after the closing, the originator would resell the mortgage to a bigger bank. This would free up cash for the originator to make more origination next week. The originator would electronically scan a copy of the closing documents and email them to a data bank, most often that data bank was called MERS. In later iterations, some originators would upload the scans directly into the data bank.

3) If an assignment was done at all — and very often it was not — it would often be done in blank. That is to say, John Smith, President of Originating Firm would assign to _______. However, a blank assignment is like a check with the payee left blank; it becomes a bearer instrument (and for this reason a rather dangerous item). When it became known to what entity the mortgage should be assigned, John Smith (or his successor at Originating Firm) would be asked to do the assignment after the fact.

4) However, the originating mortgage company may have gone out of business before any assignments were done; who or what was left with legal authority to assign these mortgages, and where did the wet ink originals end up? I know anecdotally that these wet ink originals sometimes ended up going home with the laid-off workers of the mortgage companies. These people worried often that the documents would be destroyed if not kept safe and the lack of paper trail would cause the homeowners all kind of grief if they tried to sell their homes. In some cases, the laid-off mortgage company workers hoped to hold the documents hostage to collect back wages they were owed when the mortgage company failed.

5) All of this could have been avoided, of course, if the mortgages had been recorded in the county clerk’s office or land office, or in other governmental Torrens title system.

6) Sometimes the wet ink originals really were physically transferred to MERS, but MERS appears to have treated the physical files as unimportant because MERS and other electronic database services like it were intended to allow transfer of documents electronically, avoiding costly and time-consuming handling of paper documentation. When challenged to come up with wet ink originals, the electronic filing system has not always worked so smoothly.

7) The bank that thought it bought the mortgage from the originator (it paid money, but what did it actually get in return?) would enter into a “Pooling and Servicing Agreement” in order to create a Residential Mortgage Backed Security (RMBS). The purchasing bank, or another bank that it thought it sold the mortgage to, would become the “depositing bank” and deposit (or so it thought) the mortgage into a trust fund. Except that it didn’t actually have the mortgage to deposit.

8) The trust fund would have a set period during which it could accept deposits, after which the trust fund was “closed” and no additional mortgages could be deposited into it except as swap-outs for mortgages already in the trust. Any assignment of mortgage into the trust executed after the closing of the deposit period would be a legal nullity unless there was a swap with a mortgage already in the trust.

9) The assignments were rarely actually made in a timely fashion, and now it’s too late to do so. In addition the entities which could have made the assignments don’t necessarily even exist anymore.

10) The trustee assigned or sold the right to collect the payments to the “servicer” and the “investors” thereby splitting the interest in land from the debt (mortgage fractionalization). The servicer collects the money from the homeowner, takes its substantial cut and forwards the remainder to the investors. The investors thought they were getting A or better rated bonds and include municipalities, and pension funds.

11) When the foreclosure tsunami first began and the foreclosing banks had no original wet ink documents to prove that they had standing to foreclose, there was a wave of “lost note affidavits”. Judges at the front end of this crisis had no inkling that anything was amiss and relied upon those affidavits. After seeing reams of lost note affidavits, they began asking for better explanations.

12) That’s when the forgeries and perjuries began. There are all sorts of people signing all sorts of documents claiming to be officers of companies for which they do not work. Contact me and I can email you a list.

There are all sorts of signatures that don’t look at all alike, all with the same person’s name. In at least one instance the name of a person who was in jail at the time and not available to be working at the company appears on documents along with his purported signature.

Color scans of mortgage papers are being passed off as wet ink originals; you can see the color printer dot matrix under magnification. Documents are being backdated, which is really fun when you find out the notary was not yet a notary on the date shown on the documents.

13) Adding to the confusion, a bank may believe that it services or is trustee for, or has a particular mortgage in an RMBS solely because a mortgage is included on an inventory list attached to a pooling and servicing agreement. However, any given mortgage might be on the wrong list, either because there was a typo when preparing a list or because an unscrupulous originator “sold” the same loan twice, or a sloppy originator accidently put the same loan on two different lists. If the original wet ink originals had been physically transferred, we would be able to match up payments from the banks with the originals and figure out who owned what.

14) Lastly, depending on the law in your state, separating the interest in land from the right to receive payment — frationalization—may have extinguished the the right to foreclose and turned the mortgage debt into regular unsecured debt. Check out 55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages § 1002