Daily Archives: May 3, 2010 @ 5:34 pm (Monday)

my euro essay from 2001

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I wrote this in 2001, the euro has been an accident waiting to happen.

It’s an unstable equilibrium, as Mike just reminded me I used to say.

Like balancing a marble on top of an upside down bowl, if it starts to go it accelerates downward

Vs the dollar, a stable equilibrium system, which is like placing a marble in a bowl right side up, and any movement meets forces which brings it back to the starting point.

And like many ponzi schemes, it works just fine on the way up, and can go on a long time before it crumbles.

Rites of Passage

The Child of Consensus

Conceived in post WWII politics, and baptized in the political waters of the 90’s, a new common currency- the euro- assumed its position on January 1, 1999. Representatives of the prospective member nations masterfully achieved political consensus by both the absence of objectionable clauses and the inclusion of national constraints, as manifested in the Treaty of Maastricht. During that tumultuous process, with deep pride, the elders grasped and shielded the credit sensitive heel of the infant euro. The ‘no bailout’ directive for the new ECB (European Central Bank) emerged as a pillar of the political imperative to address the ‘moral hazard’ issue that so deeply concerned the political leadership, and, two years later, that same rhetoric of fiscal responsibility continues to ring at least as loudly when the merits of the EMU (European Monetary Union) are proclaimed. Unfortunately, however well intended as protection from a genetic proclivity toward fiscal irresponsibility, the naked heel is but a magnet for the financial market’s arrows of our hero’s mortal demise.

As Apollo’s chariot adeptly carries its conflagration from east to west, the European Monetary Union carries its members on the path of economic growth. Unlike the path of the sun, however, the path of an economy continuously vacillates, including occasional dips into negative territory. And, like the sign most rental car agencies post by the entrance for returning cars about to drive over a one way bump strip, the new EMU, with its lurking unidirectional bias, could do a service to it members with a similar posting – WARNING- DO NOT BACK UP!

The Dynamics of the Instability

The euro-12 nations once had independent monetary systems, very much like the US, Canada, and Japan today. Under EMU, however, the national governments are now best thought of financially as states, provinces, or cities of the new currency union, much like California, Ontario, and New York City. The old national central banks are no longer the issuers of their local currency. In their place, the EMU has added a new central bank, the ECB, to manage the payments system, set the overnight lending rate, and intervene in the currency markets when appropriate. The EP (European Parliament) has a relatively small budget and limited fiscal responsibilities. Most of the governmental functions and responsibilities remain at the national level, having not been transferred to the new federal level. Two of those responsibilities that will prove most problematic at the national level are unemployment compensation and bank deposit insurance. Furthermore, all previous national financial liabilities remain at the national level and have been converted to the new euro, with debt to GDP ratios of member nations as high as 105%, not including substantial and growing unfunded liabilities. These burdens are all very much higher than what the credit markets ordinarily allow states, provinces, or cities to finance.

Since inception a little over two years ago the euro-12 national governments have experienced moderate GDP growth, declining unemployment, and moderate tax revenue growth. Fiscal deficits narrowed and all but vanished as tax revenues grew faster than expenditures, and GDP increased at a faster rate than the national debts, so that debt to GDP ratios declined somewhat. Under these circumstances investors have continued to support national funding requirements and there have been no substantive bank failures. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that as long as this pattern of growth continues finance will be readily available. However, should the current world economic slowdown move the euro-12 to negative growth, falling tax revenues, and concerns over the banking system’s financial health, the euro-12 could be faced with a system wide liquidity crisis. At the same time, market forces can also be expected to exacerbate the downward spiral by forcing the national governments to act procyclically, either by cutting national spending or attempting to increase revenue.

For clues to the nature and magnitude of the potential difficulties, one can review the US Savings and Loan crisis of the 80’s, with the difference being that deposit insurance would have been a state obligation, rather than a federal responsibility. For example, one could ask how Texas might have fared when faced with a bill for some $100 billion to cover bank losses and redeem depositors? And, once it was revealed that states could lack the borrowing power for funds to preserve depositors insured accounts, how could any bank have funded itself? More recently, if Bank of America’s deposit insurer and lender of last resort were the State of California rather than the Federal Reserve, could it have funded itself under the financial cloud of the state’s ongoing power crisis and credit downgrade? And, if not, would that have triggered a general liquidity crisis within the US banking system? Without deposit insurance and lender of last resort responsibilities the legal obligation of a non-credit constrained entity, such as the Federal Reserve, is systemic financial risk not ever present?

The inherent instability can be expressed as a series of questions:
*Will the euro-12 economy slow sufficiently to automatically increase national deficits via the reduction of tax revenues and increased transfer payments?
*Will such a slowdown cause the markets to dictate terms of credit to the credit sensitive national governments, and force procyclical responses?
*Will the slowdown lead to local bank failures?
*Will the markets allow national governments with heavy debt burdens, falling revenues and rising expenses the finance required to support troubled banks?
*Will depositors lose confidence in the banking system and test the new euro-12 support mechanism?
*Can the entire payments system avoid a shutdown when faced with this need to reorganize?

Conclusion

Water freezes at 0 degrees C. But very still water can be cooled well below that and stay liquid until a catalyst, such as a sudden breeze, causes it to instantly solidify. Likewise, the conditions for a national liquidity crisis that will shut down the euro-12’s monetary system are firmly in place. All that is required is an economic slowdown that threatens either tax revenues or the capital of the banking system.
A prosperous financial future belongs to those who respect the dynamics and are prepared for the day of reckoning. History and logic dictate that the credit sensitive euro-12 national governments and banking system will be tested. The market’s arrows will inflict an initially narrow liquidity crisis, which will immediately infect and rapidly arrest the entire euro payments system. Only the inevitable, currently prohibited, direct intervention of the ECB will be capable of performing the resurrection, and from the ashes of that fallen flaming star an immortal sovereign currency will no doubt emerge.

Warren Mosler
May 1, 2001

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The USA is broke and something needs to be done NOW

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Yet Another ‘Innocent Fraud’ Attack On Social Security And Medicare

The Future of Public Debt

By John Mauldin

For the rest of this letter, and probably next week as well, we are going to look at a paper from the Bank of International Settlements, often thought of as the central bankers’ central bank. This paper was written by Stephen G. Cecchetti, M. S. Mohanty, and Fabrizio Zampolli. ( http://www.bis.org/publ/work300.pdf?noframes=1)

The paper looks at fiscal policy in a number of countries and, when combined with the implications of age-related spending (public pensions and health care), determines where levels of debt in terms of GDP are going. The authors don’t mince words. They write at the beginning:

“Our projections of public debt ratios lead us to conclude that the path pursued by fiscal authorities in a number of industrial countries is unsustainable.

Solvency is never the issue with non convertible currencies/ floating exchange rates. The risk is entirely inflation, yet I’ve never seen a manuscript critical of deficit spending that seriously looks at the inflation issue apart from solvency concerns.

Drastic measures are necessary to check the rapid growth of current and future liabilities of governments and reduce their adverse consequences for long-term growth and monetary stability.”

The negative consequences are always due to the moves presumed necessary to reduce deficits, not deficit spending per se.

Drastic measures is not language you typically see in an economic paper from the BIS. But the picture they paint for the 12 countries they cover is one for which drastic measures is well-warranted.

That would mean a hyper inflation scare, not solvency fear mongering.

I am going to quote extensively from the paper, as I want their words to speak for themselves, and I’ll add some color and explanation as needed. Also, all emphasis is mine.

“The politics of public debt vary by country. In some, seared by unpleasant experience, there is a culture of frugality. In others, however, profligate official spending is commonplace. In recent years, consolidation has been successful on a number of occasions. But fiscal restraint tends to deliver stable debt;

Stable public debt means stable non govt nominal savings with economies that require expanding net financial assets to support expanding credit structures and offset institutional demand leakages.

rarely does it produce substantial reductions. And, most critically, swings from deficits to surpluses have tended to come along with either falling nominal interest rates, rising real growth, or both. Today, interest rates are exceptionally low and the growth outlook for advanced economies is modest at best. This leads us to conclude that the question is when markets will start putting pressure on governments, not if.

Govts with non convertible currency/floating fx are not subject to pressure from markets with regards to funding or interest rates.

“When, in the absence of fiscal actions, will investors start demanding a much higher compensation for the risk of holding the increasingly large amounts of public debt that authorities are going to issue to finance their extravagant ways?

Investors have to take what’s offered, or exit the currency by selling it so someone else. And floating exchange rates continuously express the indifference levels

In some countries, unstable debt dynamics, in which higher debt levels lead to higher interest rates, which then lead to even higher debt levels, are already clearly on the horizon.

Only countries such as the euro zone members who are not the issuer of the euro, but users of the euro. They are analogous to us states in that regard, and are credit sensitive entities.

“It follows that the fiscal problems currently faced by industrial countries need to be tackled relatively soon and resolutely.

Agreed, except fiscal drag needs to be removed to restore private sector output and employment. They have this backwards.

Failure to do so will raise the chance of an unexpected and abrupt rise in government bond yields at medium and long maturities, which would put the nascent economic recovery at risk.

Like Japan? Triple the ‘debt’ of the US with a 1.3% 10 year note? And never a hint of missing a payment. And Japan, the US, UK, etc. all have the same institutional structure.

It will also complicate the task of central banks in controlling inflation in the immediate future and might ultimately threaten the credibility of present monetary policy arrangements.

Yes, inflation is the potential risk, which is mainly a political risk. People don’t like inflation and will topple a govt over it. But there is no economic evidence that inflation is a negative for growth and employment.

“While fiscal problems need to be tackled soon, how to do that without seriously jeopardising the incipient economic recovery is the current key challenge for fiscal authorities.”

Yes, exactly. Because they have it wrong. The fiscal problem that has to be tackled soon is that it’s too tight, as evidenced by the high rates of unemployment.

They start by dealing with the growth in fiscal (government) deficits and the growth in debt. The US has exploded from a fiscal deficit of 2.8% to 10.4% today, with only a small 1.3% reduction for 2011 projected. Debt will explode (the correct word!) from 62% of GDP to an estimated 100% of GDP by the end of 2011.

Yes, and not nearly enough, as unemployment is projected to still be over 9%, and core inflation is what is considered to be dangerously low.

Remember that Rogoff and Reinhart show that when the ratio of debt to GDP rises above 90%, there seems to be a reduction of about 1% in GDP. The authors of this paper, and others, suggest that this might come from the cost of the public debt crowding out productive private investment.

Can be true for fixed exchange rate regimes/convertible currency, but not true for today’s non convertible currency and floating fx regimes. And today, deficits generally rise due to slowdowns that drive up transfer payments and cut revenues ‘automatically’ (automatic stabilizers) so it’s no mystery that rising deficits are associated with slowing economies, but the causation is the reverse RR imply.

Think about that for a moment. We are on an almost certain path to a debt level of 100% of GDP in less than two years. If trend growth has been a yearly rise of 3.5% in GDP, then we are reducing that growth to 2.5% at best. And 2.5% trend GDP growth will NOT get us back to full employment. We are locking in high unemployment for a very long time, and just when some one million people will soon be falling off the extended unemployment compensation rolls.

Nothing that a sufficient tax cut won’t cure. There is a screaming shortage of aggregate demand that’s easily restored by a simple fiscal adjustment- tax cut and/or spending increase.

Government transfer payments of some type now make up more than 20% of all household income. That is set up to fall rather significantly over the year ahead unless unemployment payments are extended beyond the current 99 weeks. There seems to be little desire in Congress for such a measure. That will be a significant headwind to consumer spending.

Yes, backwards policy. They need to work to restore demand, not reduce it.

My first proposal is for a full payroll tax (fica) holiday, for example.

Government debt-to-GDP for Britain will double from 47% in 2007 to 94% in 2011 and rise 10% a year unless serious fiscal measures are taken.

Or unless the economy rebounds. In that case the deficit comes down and the danger is they let it fall too far as happens with every cycle.

Greece’s level will swell from 104% to 130%,

Yes, and they are credit sensitive like the US states.
This is ponzi.
Ponzi is when you must borrow to pay maturing debt

The US, UK, Japan, etc. Have no borrowing imperative to pay debt, the way Greece does.
They make all payments the same way- they just mark up numbers on their computers at their own central banks:

(SCOTT PELLEY) Is that tax money that the Fed is spending?
(CHAIRMAN BERNANKE) It’s not tax money. The banks have accounts with the Fed, much the same way that you have an account in a commercial bank. So, to lend to a bank, we simply use the computer to mark up the size of the account that they have with the Fed.

Bernanke didn’t call china to beg for a loan or check with the IRS to see if they could bring in some quick cash. He just changed numbers up with his computer.

so the US and Britain are working hard to catch up to Greece, a dubious race indeed.

Confused!

Spain is set to rise from 42% to 74% and “only” 5% a year thereafter; but their economy is in recession, so GDP is shrinking and unemployment is 20%. Portugal? 71% to 97% in the next two years, and there is almost no way Portugal can grow its way out of its problems.

Yes, they are in Ponzi

Japan will end 2011 with a debt ratio of 204% and growing by 9% a year. They are taking almost all the savings of the country into government bonds, crowding out productive private capital.

Nothing is crowded out with non convertible currency and floating fx. Banks have no shortage of yen lending power. The yen the govt net spends can be thought of as the yen that buy the jgb’s (japan govt bonds)

Reinhart and Rogoff, with whom you should by now be familiar, note that three years after a typical banking crisis the absolute level of public debt is 86% higher, but in many cases of severe crisis the debt could grow by as much as 300%. Ireland has more than tripled its debt in just five years.

Ireland is in Ponzi as they are users of the euro.

The BIS continues:

“We doubt that the current crisis will be typical in its impact on deficits and debt. The reason is that, in many countries, employment and growth are unlikely to return to their pre-crisis levels in the foreseeable future. As a result, unemployment and other benefits will need to be paid for several years, and high levels of public investment might also have to be maintained.

“The permanent loss of potential output caused by the crisis also means that government revenues may have to be permanently lower in many countries. Between 2007 and 2009, the ratio of government revenue to GDP fell by 2-4 percentage points in Ireland, Spain, the United States and the United Kingdom.

Again, failure to recognize the critical differences between issuers and users of the currency.

It is difficult to know how much of this will be reversed as the recovery progresses. Experience tells us that the longer households and firms are unemployed and underemployed, as well as the longer they are cut off from credit markets, the bigger the shadow economy becomes.”

Yes, responsible fiscal policy would not have let demand fall this far. The US should have had a full payroll tax holiday no later than sept 08, and most of the damage to the real economy would have been avoided.

We are going to skip a few sections and jump to the heart of their debt projections. Again, I am going to quote extensively, and my comments will be in brackets [].Note that these graphs are in color and are easier to read in color (but not too difficult if you are printing it out). Also, I usually summarize, but this is important. I want you to get the full impact. Then I will make some closing observations.

The Future Public Debt Trajectory

“We now turn to a set of 30-year projections for the path of the debt/GDP ratio in a dozen major industrial economies (Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States). We choose a 30-year horizon with a view to capturing the large unfunded liabilities stemming from future age-related expenditure without making overly strong assumptions about the future path of fiscal policy (which is unlikely to be constant). In our baseline case, we assume that government total revenue and non-age-related primary spending remain a constant percentage of GDP at the 2011 level as projected by the OECD. Using the CBO and European Commission projections for age-related spending, we then proceed to generate a path for total primary government spending and the primary balance over the next 30 years. Throughout the projection period, the real interest rate that determines the cost of funding is assumed to remain constant at its 1998-2007 average, and potential real GDP growth is set to the OECD-estimated post-crisis rate.

[That makes these estimates quite conservative, as growth-rate estimates by the OECD are well on the optimistic side.]

Yes, future liabilities are always quoted in isolation from future demand leakages including growth of reserves in pension funds, insurance companies, corps, foreign govts, etc.

And they are always used to imply solvency issues. No actual calculations are ever done regarding inflation.

Debt Projections

“From this exercise, we are able to come to a number of conclusions. First, in our baseline scenario, conventionally computed deficits will rise precipitously. Unless the stance of fiscal policy changes, or age-related spending is cut, by 2020 the primary deficit/GDP ratio will rise to 13% in Ireland; 8-10% in Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States; [Wow!] and 3-7% in Austria, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal. Only in Italy do these policy settings keep the primary deficits relatively well contained – a consequence of the fact that the country entered the crisis with a nearly balanced budget and did not implement any real stimulus over the past several years.

Yes, this is big trouble for the solvency of the euro zone members, but not the rest.

“But the main point of this exercise is the impact that this will have on debt. The results plotted as the red line in Graph 4 [below] show that, in the baseline scenario, debt/GDP ratios rise rapidly in the next decade, exceeding 300% of GDP in Japan; 200% in the United Kingdom; and 150% in Belgium, France, Ireland, Greece, Italy and the United States. And, as is clear from the slope of the line, without a change in policy, the path is unstable. This is confirmed by the projected interest rate paths, again in our baseline scenario. Graph 5 [below] shows the fraction absorbed by interest payments in each of these countries.From around 5% today, these numbers rise to over 10% in all cases, and as high as 27% in the United Kingdom.

“Seeing that the status quo is untenable, countries are embarking on fiscal consolidation plans. In the United States, the aim is to bring the total federal budget deficit down from 11% to 4% of GDP by 2015. In the United Kingdom, the consolidation plan envisages reducing budget deficits by 1.3 percentage points of GDP each year from 2010 to 2013 (see eg OECD (2009a)).

Why would anyone who understood actual monetary operations want to increase fiscal drag with elevated unemployment and excess capacity .

“To examine the long-run implications of a gradual fiscal adjustment similar to the ones being proposed, we project the debt ratio assuming that the primary balance improves by 1 percentage point of GDP in each year for five years starting in 2012. The results are presented as the green line in Graph 4. Although such an adjustment path would slow the rate of debt accumulation compared with our baseline scenario, it would leave several major industrial economies with substantial debt ratios in the next decade.

“This suggests that consolidations along the lines currently being discussed will not be sufficient to ensure that debt levels remain within reasonable bounds over the next several decades.

“An alternative to traditional spending cuts and revenue increases is to change the promises that are as yet unmet. Here, that means embarking on the politically treacherous task of cutting future age-related liabilities.

Here we go- this is too often the ‘hidden agenda’

It’s all about cutting social security and medicare.

Who would have thought!!!

Yes, the euro zone’s institutional arrangements that make member govt spending revenue constrained have it on the road to collapse, maybe very soon, and for reasons other than long term liabilities.

The rest of the world doesn’t have that issue, as govt spending is not revenue constrained, and the risk to prosperity is acting as if we all have the same revenue constraints as the euro zone.

With this possibility in mind, we construct a third scenario that combines gradual fiscal improvement with a freezing of age-related spending-to-GDP at the projected level for 2011. The blue line in Graph 4 shows the consequences of this draconian policy. Given its severity, the result is no surprise: what was a rising debt/GDP ratio reverses course and starts heading down in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. In several others, the policy yields a significant slowdown in debt accumulation. Interestingly, in France, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States, even this policy is not sufficient to bring rising debt under control.

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Greece Bailout Plan Will Include Support Fund for Domestic Banks, EU Says…

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The size Greece ‘needed’ implies the others will need numbers beyond euro zone capacity, especially as the Greek deal used up euro zone capacity.

So this means Greece is the last rescue possible- the rest are on there own.

They wanted to stop the contagion, but that would have had to be done by showing they could save Greece without weakening themselves, and in a manner that shows they can help any and all.

They didn’t do that.

Instead they showed the effort necessary save Greece was so large that they don’t have the means to save anyone larger than Greece.

So now they are performing without a net.

And, as Marshall put it, the austerity measures are likely to increase rather than decrease deficits, making it all that much worse.

This euro zone problem is not going away.

From: Marshall
Sent: Sunday, May 02, 2010 8:23 PM


Well, it’s early, but euro is weakening again in early FX trading in Australia and US bonds are much stronger. Still early, but that’s very telling. And frankly, as good as the data has “looked” in the US, I don’t believe it myself. The gasoline consumption numbers in California that I saw last week were terrible and California is a good lead indicator. I started getting bullish on the equity markets (or at least less bearish) in Jan. 2009 when the California housing data started to pick up. And regardless of whether Greece is “saved”, the events of the past few weeks have been profoundly DEFLATIONARY for the entire euro zone. How can the global economy not be affected by the downturn in the second most important economic bloc in the world?


Combine that with a legal and political attack against Wall Street that gives every indication of INTENSIFYING and I think you have to say that things are definitely changing for the worst at the margin.

Hey, the data post the Bear Stearns rescue looked pretty good for a while as well until the whole foundation came tumbling down. The termites never look like their making much progress until the structure suddenly collapses.

Then again, I’m usually more bearish than Warren, so take what I say with a grain of salt.

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Valance Weekly Economic Chart Book

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All the charts are looking about the same to me.

We had a big move down, which found support helped by the automatic fiscal stabilizers, followed by a brief V shaped bounce that appears to be followed by a leveling off at modest rates of growth and absolute levels well below previous highs of a few years ago, which weren’t all that high to begin with.

And most of the V looks to have been from oversold inventories.

Looks like at least for now the great moderation has returned but with a much larger output gap/unemployment rate?

New jobs can get us back to a ‘get a job buy a car’ credit expansion, but looks like that could be a while.

And external risks remain, with euro zone aggregate demand at risk and maybe China as well if second half State sponsored lending does its usual swan dive.

Also, my nagging suspicion that a 0 rate policy is fundamentally highly deflationary, allowing the benefit of lower levels of taxation, continues to be reinforced by the data.

In other words, it feels like for the current size of govt. we are grossly overtaxed.
See the smaller attachment for my selected charts, the larger for the full chart package.

Link:

Abreviated Chart Book

Full Chart Book

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Ed Harrison’s post

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Out of control US deficit spending

By Edward Harrison

April 30 — Regular readers know that, while I have a little of what Marshall Auerback calls deficit terrorism in my DNA, I fully support fiscal stimulus as a means to arrest a deep downturn.

Yes, though I like to say ‘removing fiscal drag’ but same thing.

The horrendous Keynesian nightmare

My move into Keynesian mode came in December 2008 with Confessions of an Austrian economist. In fact, I have argued the ObamaAdministration needed to use more stimulus in early 2009, not less (see January 2009’s Obama’s stimulus bill is a tough sell so far as an example).

Yes, needed to remove more drag.

As early as February 2009, I argued that Obama took a middle road on stimulus and taxes that leads nowhere which would discredit stimulus as a policy tool. And that is indeed what has happened.

Agreed. Which would be ok if they recognized it and opted for further adjustment.

Now, of course many of you don’t feel that way because you share my visceral disaffection for deficit spending.

Given there is a ‘right size’ govt based on public purpose of the public sector, and not revenues, the fiscal adjustments fall on the tax side.

So I feel the visceral disaffection for the over taxation that comes from a too small deficit.

But I laid out where the US economy is headed without stimulus in “The recession is over but the depression has just begun” six months ago. And right now we are heading exactly where I said we would. Witness my last post on the economy “US GDP growth rate is unsustainable; recovery will fade”

Anyway, the point is that the US economy will not be able to sustain recovery for long without stimulus. The likely result of withdrawing stimulus is a recession that is deeper than the last one aka a major depression.

Yes, it sure looks like the shortfall in aggregate demand calls for an immediate fiscal adjustment.

Deficits as far as the eye can see

But right now, a lot of talking heads are trying to bamboozle people with tales of woe about hyperinflation and sovereign bankruptcy in the US to support specific claims about what deficit spending can and can’t do. Deficit hawks, in particular, are on the warpath – a completely predictable outcome since I anticipated it just as Obama was elected in November 2008 (see Beware of deficit hawks).

Agreed!

Of course the US deficits are too large. Come on: 10% deficits as far as the eye can see are unsustainable over the long-term.

I don’t see that. Especially if govt spending isn’t ‘forced’ into the economy which would be evidenced by a closing of the output gap.

Until the output gap closes, deficits are simply offsetting non govt ‘savings desires’ for dollar financial assets.

That is, deficits add directly to non gov savings and until those savings desires are saturated govt isn’t ‘forcing’ financial assets into the economy.

The key word, however, is long-term. However, no one seems to understand the difference between short-term and long-term and the debate has become an ideological free-for-all.

It would help if they realized there is not necessarily a long term problem either.

Earlier this month, I told you I am throwing in the towel on policy makers because it’s clear that Obama has been captured by the deficit hawks and we are headed for a painful recession within the next two years (maybe even as soon as next year).

Agreed!

Policy is exogenous and deficits are endogenous

So let’s stop talking about policy as if we are going to change anything. I started moving away from stimulus happy talk to focus on malinvestment in December of last year.

The policy debates aren’t working because the actual mechanics of a fiat monetary system are being obscured by ideological political debates. So, what I want to do is lay the foundations of modern money with you so we can strip away the politics and ideology from the economics.

The goal is to demonstrate that fiscal deficits and surpluses are endogenous to our economic system and depend on exogenous policy decisions which are inherently political and ideological.

Let me give you an example. What if we allowed the US economy to proceed without making one economic policy decision for the next two years? What would happen? The answer is that the government would have a fiscal deficit of X billions of dollars exactly matched by X billions of surpluses in the non-government sector (remember the sectors must balance). The deficit outcome is endogenous. It is a function of the inputs i.e. of the private sectors desire to save and the government’s spending decisions.

Agreed, as above.

On the other hand, government economic policy decisions are exogenous. They are input variables which alter outcomes. This is an important point because if we know how the monetary system works, then we can get a much better handle on how different policy decisions actually affect deficits and surpluses. And remember, policy decisions are almost entirely political. That is they are driven by ideological positions.

Agreed.

So, if I say to you that I am against government spending and it must be cut, this creates a specific outcome path. On the other hand, if I say I am pro-stimulus, this too creates a specific outcome.

Modern Money

Here’s how I am going to go about this one:

I went to a conference on Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) on Wednesday. Over the next few weeks, I will present some ideas from the Modern Money people (Randy Wray, Marshall Auerback, Bill Mitchell, etc). I’ll start the post titles with “MMT:….”

Yes, good to see you there!

I will take a somewhat antagonistic approach because I think that’s probably going to the best way to introduce this to people who have a more libertarian bent like myself.

Now, my bio says:

From an ideological perspective, Edward calls himself a libertarian realist: a firm believer in the primacy of markets over a statist approach. but not in an ideological way. Often government intervention and oversight is not just wanted but warranted.

What that essentially means is that when I think about government, I view it with suspicion and my inclination is to seek to limit its size and scope.

Yes, there is a right sized govt that serves public purpose that varies from person to person. It’s a political decision.

That means I have an innate disaffection for big government,

Ok, that’s a legitimate political position shared by tens of millions, and maybe a majority.

deficit spending,

That’s the size of additions to net non govt savings which can only come from fiscal balance. The political decision here is the outcome (growth, employment, etc.) Of the level of savings govt allows through its policy.

money printing,

That’s a gold standard term relating to the ratio of paper claims on the gold reserves to the actual gold reserves. It’s no longer applicable as originally defined, so needs to be redefined or otherwise specified.

For example, the fed buying securities is an exchange of financial assets, both of which generally fall under some monetary aggregate, at which level that aggregate remains unchanged.

etc. – but not in an ideological way. It all depends on the circumstances. (For instance, see “A brief philosophical argument about the role of government” and “A few thoughts about the limitations of government” which outline my ideological positioning).

So, my goal in this is to separate the policy and the politics from the mechanics of how our fiat money system operates. That way it will be clear what is actually happening in our monetary system right now and what is pure political posturing. You will also then probably see a lot of congruence between how I see the economic mechanics and how Marshall sees them. The difference, of course, is ideology.

The way I intend to position this is that Modern Money Theory economists are really the True Modern Money Operations economists because they present the true mechanics of modern fiat money operation, which I will show you.

Now, policy decisions are largely political, exogenous decisions about which informed decision-makers can disagree. However, if we aren’t at least informed about the mechanics of how modern money works, it is very difficult to have an intelligent debate about deficits, social security, fiscal stimulus or anything else for that matter.

I know that I have learned a lot from what the likes of Randy Wray and Bill Mitchell have said (remember, I studied economics in a time heavily influenced by the prevailing economic orthodoxy). I don’t ‘buy into’ a lot of what they propose on policy, but on modern money they have it right.

Agreed, though i probably support most of their policies as well. But not always.

The purpose is to present the underpinnings where we can all agree and separate it from the ideological piece. My ideological foil in this will be Marshall Auerback. Afterward, I hope we can have a framework from which to talk about the political piece.

I hope you enjoy the debate and a presentation of the ideas.

Looking forward to it, thanks!!!

Best,
Warren

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Greece CAN go it alone

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Greece CAN Go it Alone
Yesterday at 5:00pm
By Marshall Auerback and Warren Mosler

Greece can successfully issue and place new debt at low interest rates. The trick is to insert a provision stating that in the event of default, the bearer on demand can use those defaulted securities to pay Greek government taxes. This makes it immediately obvious to investors that those new securities are ‘money good’ and will ultimately redeem for face value for as long as the Greek government levies and enforces taxes. This would not only allow Greece to fund itself at low interest rates, but it would also serve as an example for the rest of the euro zone, and thereby ease the funding pressures on the entire region.

We recognize, of course, that this proposal would also introduce a ‘moral hazard’ issue. This newly found funding freedom, if abused, could be highly inflationary and further weaken the euro. In fact, the reason the ECB is prohibited from buying national government debt is to allow ‘market discipline’ to limit member nation fiscal expansion by the threat of default. When that threat is removed, bad behavior is rewarded, as the country that deficit spends the most wins, in an accelerating and inflationary race to the bottom.
It is comparable to a situation where a nation like the US, for example, did not have national insurance regulation. In this kind of circumstance, the individual states got into a race to the bottom, where the state with the laxest standards stood to attract the most insurance companies, forcing each State to either lower standards or see its tax base flee. And it tends to end badly with AIG style collapses.

Additionally, the ECB or the Economic Council of Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) effectively loses the means to enforce their austerity demands and keep them from being reversed once it’s known they’ve taken the position that it’s too risky to let any one nation fail.

What Europe’s policy makers would like to do is find a way to isolate Greece and mitigate the contagion effect, while maintaining the market discipline that comes from the member nations being the credit sensitive entities they are today; hence, the mooted “shock and awe” proposals now being leaked, which did engender an 8% jump in the Greek stock market on Thursday.

But these proposals don’t really get to the nub of the problem. Any major package weakens the others who have to fund it in the market place, because the other member nations are also revenue dependent, credit sensitive entities. Much like the US States, they do not control central bank operations, and must have good funds in their accounts or their checks will bounce.

The euro zone nations are all still in a bind, and their mandated austerity measures mean they don’t keep up with a world recovery. And Greek financial restructuring that reduces outstanding debt reduces outstanding euro financial assets, strengthening the euro, and further weakening output and employment, while at the same time the legitimization of restructuring risk weakens the credit worthiness of all the member nations.

It does not appear that the markets have fully discounted the ramifications of a Greek default. If you use a Chapter 11 bankruptcy analogy, large parts of the country would be shut down and the “company” (i.e. Greece Inc) could spend only its tax revenues. But the implied spending cuts represent a further substantial cut in aggregate demand and decreased revenues, in a most un-virtuous spiral that ends only with an increase in exports or privation driven revolt.

The ability of Greece to use the funds from the rescue package as a means to extinguish Greek state liabilities would improve their financial ratios and stave off financial collapse, at least on a short term basis, with the side effect of a downward spiral in output and employment, while the sovereign risk concerns are concurrently transmitted to Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and beyond. Those sovereign difficulties also morph into a full-scale private banking crisis which can quickly extend to bank runs at the branch level.

Our suggestion will rescue Greece and the entire euro zone from the dangers of national government insolvencies, and turn the euro zone policy maker’s attention 180 degrees, back to their traditional role of containing the potential moral hazard issue of excessive deficit spending by the national governments through the Stability and Growth Pact. If the member states ultimately decide that the Stability and Growth Pact ratios need to be changed, that’s their decision. But the SGP represents the euro zone’s “national budget”, precisely designed to prevent the hyperinflationary outcome that the “race to the bottom” could potentially create. At the very least, our proposal will mitigate the deflationary impact of markets disciplining credit sensitive national governments and halting the potential spread of global financial contagion, without being inflationary.

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