BIS getting there (yet not fully)

Yes, his causation is off on the less important point of the central bank eliminating opportunity costs when in fact market forces eliminate opportunity cost as they express indifference levels to central bank rate policies.

But apart from that it’s very well stated and what we’ve been saying all along, thanks!!! The highlighted part is especially on message and hopefully becomes common knowledge.

Jaime Caruana, General Manager of the BIS says ‘unconventional
measures’ do not increase lending, nor are inflationary:

In fact, bank lending is determined by banks’ willingness to grant
loans, based on perceived risk-return trade-offs, and by the demand
for those loans. An expansion of reserves over and above the level
demanded for precautionary purposes, and/or to satisfy any reserve
requirement, need not give banks more resources to expand lending.
Financing the change in the asset side of the central bank balance
sheet through reserves rather than some other short-term instrument
like central bank or Treasury bills only alters the composition of the
liquid assets of the banking system. As noted, the two are very close
substitutes. As a result, the impact of variations in this composition
on bank behaviour may not be substantial.

This can be seen another way. Recall that in order to finance balance
sheet policy through an expansion of reserves the central bank has to
eliminate the opportunity cost of holding them. In other words, it
must either pay interest on reserves at the positive overnight rate
that it wishes to target, or the overnight rate must fall to the
deposit facility floor (or zero). In effect, the central bank has to
make bank reserves sufficiently attractive compared with other liquid
assets. This makes them almost perfect substitutes, in particular for
other short-term government paper. Reserves become just another type
of liquid asset among many. And because they earn the market return,
reserves represent resources that are no more idle than holdings of
Treasury bills.

(…) What about the concern that large expansions in bank reserves
will lead to inflation – the second issue? No doubt more accommodative
financial conditions resulting from central bank lending and asset
purchases, insofar as they stimulate aggregate demand, can generate
inflationary pressures. But the point I would like to make here is
that there is no additional inflationary effect coming from an
increase in reserves per se. When bank reserves are expanded as part
of balance sheet policies, they should be viewed as simply another
form of liquid asset that is comparable to short-term government
paper. Thus funding balance sheet policies with reserves should be no
more inflationary than, for instance, the issuance of short-term
central bank bills.


(…) Ultimately, any inflationary concerns associated with
monetisation should be mainly attributed to the monetary authorities’
accommodating fiscal deficits by refraining from raising rates. In
other words, it is not so much the financing of government spending
per se – be it in the form of bank reserves or short-term sovereign
paper – that is inflationary, but its accommodation at inappropriately
low interest rates for too long a time. Critically, these two aspects
are generally lumped together in policy debates because the prevailing
paradigm has failed to distinguish changes in interest rate from
changes in the amount of bank reserves in the system. One is seen as
the dual of the other: more reserves imply lower interest rates. As I
explained earlier, this is not the case. While both the central bank’s
balance sheet size and the level of reserves will reflect an
accommodating policy, neither serves as a summary measure of the
stance of policy.

Fed on social value of interbank market

Excellent! About 6 months ago I handed out my ‘proposals,’ and we have made the below point on many occasions. Looks like real progress!

>   
>   (email exchange)
>   
>   On Sun, Apr 25, 2010 at 5:43 AM, Andrea wrote:
>   
>   It seems that Fed tries hard to see value in the interbank market but
>   they are close to admit it has none?
>   

FROM DIVORCING MONEY FROM MONETARY POLICY,
For example, market participants must monitor the
creditworthiness of borrowers. If the overnight market were
substantially less active, such monitoring may not take place on
a regular basis; this in turn could make borrowing even harder
for a bank that finds itself short of funds. Such monitoring may
also play a socially valuable role in exposing banks to market
discipline. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the
market for overnight loans of reserves differs from other
markets in fundamental ways. As we discussed, reserves are not
a commodity that is physically scarce; they can be costlessly
produced by the central bank from other risk-free assets.
Moreover, there is no role for socially useful price discovery
in this market, because the central bank’s objective is to set a
particular price. Weighing the costs and benefits of a reduction
in market activity is therefore a nontrivial task and an
important area for future research.

Starving the beast

How to fight back against Wall Street

Much like we killed the buffalo to defeat the American Indians, we can work to tame Wall Street by working to reduce its food supply. And a large part of that food supply is the US pension system. Created and sustained by the innocent fraud that savings funds investment in a ‘loans create deposits’ world, the powerful attraction of being able to accumulate ‘savings’ on a pre-tax basis has generated nearly $20 trillion in US pension assets in thousands of scattered plans, from the giant State retirement funds to the small corporate pension funds, to the various smaller individual retirement funds.

Before I get to the way we can eliminate these bloated whales being eaten alive by the sharks, let me first suggest a few ways to whales from becoming shark food. The first is to get back to ‘narrow investing’ and public purpose by creating a list of investments deemed legal for any government supported pension funds. And ‘government supported’ would include any funds that are in any way tax advantaged. Legal investments would be investments that are in line with further public purpose. Not a lot comes to mind. If the public purpose is safety for the investors government securities would be appropriate, as government securities are functionally government guaranteed annuities. New issue equities might make sense if portfolio managers were required to be sufficiently educated and tested to make sure they are up for the responsibility of deciding where new real investment is best directed. But that’s a major and impractical undertaking. And there is no public purpose in simply trading new issues for relatively short term gain with no longer term stake in the merits of the underlying business. Nor is there any public purpose to investing in the secondary equity markets. In fact, with the rules and corporate governance stacked against shareholders, there is public purpose to not investing in those markets. Nor are these my first choice for the institutions I’d want investing in corporate bonds. It makes more sense to utilize the 8,000 regulated and supervised Fed member banks, all of which already specialize in credit analysis. If there is public purpose to buying corporate bonds, better the banks perform that function and not the pension funds.

So it looks like the only investments that make sense are government securities. The problem there, however, is I’m also advocating the government stop issuing securities. So that would mean the only investments for pension funds that make sense from a public purpose point of view are insured, overnight bank deposits. And that would go a long way towards taking away Wall Street’s food supply, thereby greatly reducing the troubling kinds of activities that we’ve been witnessing. This drastic reduction in financial sector activity would make regulation and supervision of what’s left a lot less complex and far more effective, and at the same time work to stabilize the financial aspects of the real economy.

Longer term, with the recognition that we don’t need savings to have money for investment, we can change the tax laws that are fostering these problematic pools of savings, and let them wind down over time.

Racing to the bottom

Government is about public infrastructure for further public purpose. That includes the usual suspects such as the military and the legal system, but Federal public infrastructure also includes regulation to stop what are called ‘races to the bottom,’ which usually involve what are known as ‘fallacies of composition.’ The textbook example is the football game, where if one person stands up he can see better, but if all stand up not only is nothing is gained, and no one gets to sit and watch. Allowing anyone to stand to see better is what creates that race to the bottom, where all become worse off. A ‘no standing’ rule would be a regulation that supports the public purpose of preventing this race to the bottom.

Another example is pollution control. With no Federal regulation, the States find themselves in a race to the bottom where the State that allows the most pollution gets the most business. The need to attract business drives all the States to continuously lower their pollution standards resulting in minimal regulation and unthinkable national pollution. Again, Federal regulation that sets national minimum standards is what it takes to prevent this race to the bottom.

Insurance regulation has been at the State level, which was deemed too lax only after the failure of AIG, which was the end result of a race to the bottom the Federal Government should have addressed long ago. Discussion has now begun regarding national insurance regulatory standards.