Re: View from Europe (cont.)


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(email exchange)

>   
>   On Tue, Dec 23, 2008 at 2:43 PM, Russell
>   wrote:
>   
>   Warren:
>   
>   You have known I have been negative on this
>   market collapse for a long time.
>   

Yes!

I was more hopeful for the right political response after it went bad in July. :(

>   
>   And what happens on a day to day basis only
>   stirs the pot. The reason for trucks not being
>   able to lift anything at the ports is that trade
>   finance has disappeared and the reason why
>   the Baltic Dry Index declined 98% in 90 days.
>   The banks are technically bankrupt. I said that
>   about Citi way back when.
>   

Yes, they weren’t bankrupt back then, and they were open for business. Now that the government has let it go bad after an OK Q2, previously sort of OK/money good assets have further deteriorated and are no longer money good if this is left to its own ways.

A $1 Trillion of the right fiscal response turns it all around.

Idle Cranes From Long Beach To Singapore

Idle shipping cranes at Frozen Ports From Long Beach to Singapore portend a bleak 2009-2010.

Chris Lytle, chief operating officer of the port of Long Beach, California, took in a panorama of the slumping world economy from his rooftop observation deck one day this month. Shipping cranes stood still, truck traffic trickled and a cargo vessel sat idle, moored to a pier.

“You never see that,” Lytle said. “It’s quiet. Too quiet.”

Port traffic has slowed from North America to Europe and Asia as a recession erodes consumer demand and the credit crisis chokes off loans to export-dependent companies. International trade is set to fall by more than 2 percent next year, the most since the World Bank began measuring it in 1971. Idle ports around the globe are showing how quickly a collapse in trade can spread, undermining growth in each country it reaches.

“Everybody expects 2009 to be a bleak year,” said Jim McKenna, chief executive officer of the Pacific Maritime Association, a San Francisco-based group representing dock employers at U.S. West Coast ports. “Now, it looks like 2010 is going to be just as bleak.”

Coal is piling up at the Mozambique port of Maputo. Brazil’s exports of cars, household appliances, machinery and furniture fell in November from a year earlier. The port in Singapore, the world’s busiest for containers, posted its first month-over-month decline in seven years in November, at 1.5 percent.

“You take it for granted until it blows up,” said Bernard Hoekman, trade economist at the World Bank, in an interview. “Now it’s blowing up.”


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Re: Update- ECB not to terminate key Fed swap line provisions


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(email exchange)

Thanks- good heads up by Matt Franko!

With this clarification the ECB seems to recognize the systemic support these swap lines provide, and will have to find other means of keeping a lid on the euro if that’s what they want to do.

>   
>   On Tue, Dec 23, 2008 at 9:21 AM, Cesar wrote:
>   
>   I agree with Franko comments.
>   
>   See press release from Dec 19th below.
>   
>   The Governing Council of the ECB has decided, in agreement
>   with other central banks including the Federal Reserve, to
>   continue conducting US dollar liquidity-providing operations at
>   terms of 7, 28 and 84 days. These operations will continue to
>   take the form of repurchase operations against ECB-eligible
>   collateral and to be carried out as fixed rate tenders with full
>   allotment. Given the limited demand, the operations in the
>   form of EUR/USD foreign exchange swaps will be discontinued
>   at the end of January but could be started again in the
>   future, if needed in view of prevailing market circumstances.
>   

>   
>   n Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 8:05 PM, Warren wrote:
>   
>   Cesar, please check this out, thanks!
>   
>   W
>   

Matt says:

Mr Mosler,

I think the swap lines between the ECB and the US Fed may not be the same swap operations that last week the ECB talked about terminating at the end of Jan 09.

The ECB currently offers term US$ liquidity (US$ that has been provided from the Fed via a previous swap between central banks) 2 ways. 1 way is via a collateralized operation, and 2 is a swap of euros for dollars.

On 15 October the ECB announced the swap facility:

“Provision of US dollar liquidity through foreign exchange swaps: As from 21 October 2008, and at least until the end of January 2009, in parallel with the existing tenders in which the Eurosystem offers US dollar liquidity against ECB-eligible collateral, the Eurosystem will also offer US dollar liquidity through EUR/USD foreign exchange swaps. The EUR/USD foreign exchange swap tenders will be carried out at a fixed price (i.e. swap point) with full allotment. Further details on the tender procedures for EUR/USD foreign exchange swaps will be released shortly.”

These “swap” type of transactions look like they never caught on (real Euros would have to be provided after all!), as most of the USD provided by the ECB ($100s of billions) have gone the “collateralized” auction route. For instance last week they did a 28-day where the collateralized operation had 47 bidders for $47.5 billion and the swap had one bidder for $70 million. So I think the ECB is just eliminating this liquidity swap vehicle because of “lack of interest”, but plans on providing US$ liquidity via collateralized auctions until at least the April 30 current expiration of the overall ECB to US Fed swap lines.

I could be mis-reading this but I offer my observations.


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Budget surpluses and depressions


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After the last budget surplus ended in 2001, Bloomberg stated it was the longest period of surplus since 1927 -1930.

Prof. Fred Thayer wrote this before the surpluses of the late 90’s:

http://www.epicoalition.org/docs/thayer.htm

Here’s part of the intro:

From the origins to World War II

In its first 150 years, the government periodically undertook systematic multi-year reductions in the national debt by taking in more revenues than it spent.

Each of six such sustained periods led to one of the six major depressions in our history. The last three of these crashes were the truly significant depressions of the industrial era.

This is the record:

1. 1817-21: In five years, the national debt was reduced by 29 percent, to $90 million. A depression began in 1819.

2. 1823-36: In 14 years, the debt was reduced by 99.7 percent, to $38,000. A depression began in 1837.

3. 1852-57: In six years, the debt was reduced by 59 percent, to $28.7 million. A depression began in 1857..

4. 1867-73: In seven years, the debt was reduced by 27 percent, to $2.2 billion. A depression began in 1873.

5. 1880-93: In 14 years, the debt was reduced by 57 percent, to $1 billion. A depression began in 1893.

6. 1920-30: In 11 years, the debt was reduced by 36 percent, to $16.2 billion. A depression began in 1929.

There have been no such multi-year budget surpluses and debt reductions since World War II and, significantly, no major new depression. The record suggests that reducing the debt never sustained prosperity, even when the debt was virtually wiped out by 1836. The highest deficits were those of World War II, ranging from 20 to 31 percent of Gross National Product. For a few years following the war, the debt was greater than GNP, the only such case in history. The wartime borrowing and spending actually ended the Great Depression.


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Re: Budget surpluses cause depressions


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(email exchange)

All a bunch of true but not relevant crapola.

All 6 US depressions were preceded by the first 6 periods of budget surpluses.

The 7th ended in 2001, as Bloomberg announced it was the longest surplus since 1927-1930.

The difference now we are not on the gold standard so the Treasury can deficit spend at will to restore and sustain aggregate demand.

Yes, it is that simple.

A payroll tax holiday and a few hundred billion of revenue sharing and within a few weeks everyone will wonder what all the fuss was about.

And if nothing fiscally is done, it will be like the early 90’s where the deficit went up via falling tax revenues and rising transfer payments until it gets large enough to restore output and employment.

But that can take a few years.

And nothing is gained by not doing a proactive fiscal adjustment.

(And don’t forget the energy policy to keep gasoline and crude oil consumption down!)

Happy Holidays!

Warren

>   
>   On Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 7:24 PM, Morris wrote:
>   

How Recessions become Great Depressions

By Martin Hutchinson

Remember the Great Depression of 1921? Or of 1947? Or of 1981? Each of those years began with many of the same problems evident today, or that were evident in 1929-30. Yet they did not produce more than garden-variety recessions, which were soon over. It is instructive to examine why.

The preconditions for depression in 1921, 1947 and 1981 were similar to those operating today, and rather more severe than those of 1929-30. In each case, a large percentage of U.S. assets, built up over the preceding few years, had become obsolete and needed to be scrapped. In 1921 and 1947 the excesses consisted of surplus capacity built to provide munitions for World Wars I and II, together with the boom-time optimism additions of 1919 and 1946. In 1981, the excess consisted of a combination of U.S. factories that had become hopelessly internationally uncompetitive (think Youngstown, Ohio) and capacity that was impossible to retrofit to meet new tighter environmental standards, imposed with such enthusiasm in the 1970s.

All three of these downturns involved an “overhang” of assets that were no longer worth their cost, and associated debt that would default, similar to the housing overhang of 2008. Only in 1929-30 was the overhang less obvious initially, but an overhang was produced during the downturn by the insane political imposition of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, decimating world trade.

The 1921, 1947 and 1981 recessions were short and fairly mild, and 1929-32 became the Great Depression because of government action responding to the initial downturn. In 1929-32, as is well known, government produced the Smoot-Hawley tariff and the huge tax increase of 1932; and the Federal Reserve failed to prevent money supply collapsing after the Bank of the United States crashed in 1930, sparking widespread runs on banks across the country. As a minor addendum, President Herbert Hoover and his acolytes also followed a policy of keeping wage rates high, which was continued by President Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrats after 1933 – thus condemning 20% of the workforce to a decade of unemployment while unionized labor fattened its working conditions.

The mistaken policies of 1929-33 were generally not followed in other downturns. In 1921, Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, who believed in allowing the private sector to liquidate its way out of recession, was at the peak of his powers; he therefore organized no bailouts, but instead cut public spending to reduce government’s burden on the economy (he was still there in 1929, but was consistently overruled by Hoover.) In 1947, the Republican 80th Congress also cut public spending sharply and passed the Taft-Hartley Act restricting union power. The backlog of growth potential from technological advances made during the Great Depression and World War II might have lessened the destructive force of 1947’s downturn anyway, but Congress certainly helped rather than hurt. In 1981, incoming President Ronald Reagan restricted government’s spending growth, cut top marginal tax rates and allowed the Paul Volcker Fed to squeeze inflation out of the system – all actions that brought recovery closer.

In none of the 1921, 1947 or 1981 recessions did government engage in massive bailouts (the Chrysler bailout – only $1.5 billion, less than 0.1% of Gross Domestic Product – was passed in 1979, before the main leg of recession hit). Neither did the government indulge in stimulus packages in 1921, 1947 or 1981 (although President Reagan’s tax cuts had some stimulative effect in 1982-83); instead its stand on public spending on all three occasions was markedly restrictive. Finally, at no time in 1921, 1941 or 1981 did the Fed run a negative real interest rate policy; instead real interest rates were positive in all three years, sharply so in 1921 and 1981.

Internationally, the potential to become Great Depressions: 2001 was marginal as the asset overhang, from stock and telecom sectors, and was bailed out by the Fed (at the cost, we now know, of a worse recession 7 years later.); 1991 had only a modest overhang of bad housing finance assets – the rest of the economy was in great shape after the ebullient 1980s; 1974 had a substantial overhang, but the novelty of both high oil prices and environmental restrictions made the overhang less obvious than in 1981, and President Gerald Ford’s restrictive public spending policy, together with a 2001-like monetary bailout through high inflation and lower interest rates prevented it from metastasizing; 1970, 1958 and 1937 had no great new asset overhangs to deal with, although in 1937 the economy was still unbalanced from 1929-32. Thus only about a third of recessions have the potential to turn really nasty, and it appears that government actions, in one direction or the other, determine whether they do so.

Internationally, the Japanese recession after 1990 involved a huge asset overhang, from stock and real estate investments made during the 1980s bubble. The Japanese authorities got policy partly right. They did not sharply increase taxes as did Hoover in 1932, nor did they become significantly more protectionist – indeed they liberalized somewhat. On the other hand, they indulged in an orgy of unproductive infrastructure spending, driving their public debt ratio to over 180% of GDP and “crowding out” private sector borrowing, which was restricted anyway by banks’ lack of capital. After 1998, they drove real interest rates below zero, reducing the domestic savings rate and delaying true recovery.

That recovery only occurred when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi cut wasteful infrastructure spending and moved towards a balanced budget, thus freeing up finance for the private sector. However, new Prime Minister Taro Aso’s insistence on wasting yet more money on public spending and the Bank of Japan’s failure in 2006-08 to raise interest rates to a positive real level may well produce in Japan a recurrence of downturn like that of 1937 in the United States, an entirely unnecessary aftereffect of poor public policy.

In the United States in 2008, the current unpleasantness clearly has the potential to become much worse. The asset overhang from the housing bubble is comparable to those of 1921 and 1981 (relative to the U.S. economy) and probably larger than that of 1947, when the memory of Great Depression prevented much postwar “irrational exuberance.” Moreover, public policies of bailout, spending stimulus and negative real interest rates all tend towards producing a “Great Depression” although some of the worst mistakes (protectionism, savage tax rises) of 1929-32 have so far been avoided.

This time around, bailouts have been used on a scale greater than Hoover’s Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) gave a spendthrift lame-duck administration and a personally conflicted Treasury secretary complete license to throw money at any problem that appears politically threatening – thus the current attempt to use bank bailout money to assist auto manufacturers, even after Congress has failed to pass an aid package. An initial recapitalization of the banking system, costing about $200 billion, may have been necessary, but the TARP proposal to spend $700 billion on dodgy mortgage assets was an appalling waste of money and in the event unworkable.

In any case, the initial injection of capital to banks should have been definitive. When Citigroup came back for more, only weeks after having been given $25 billion of new capital, it should have been forced into bankruptcy, possibly through an orderly liquidation under government-appointed administrators to minimize market disturbance and unanticipated losses. The financial services industry needs to downsize, which involves removing the worst-run competitors, an accolade for which Citigroup certainly qualifies. Conversely the automobile industry should be able to survive, but only after Chapter 11 filings have removed old union contracts and pension obligations, and allowed the U.S.-owned auto companies to streamline their model ranges and reduce wage costs to their competitors’.

By prolonging the life of incompetent banks and overstuffed union contracts, the government is making matters worse and increasing the probability of serious trouble. It is essential that TARP be closed down and that the window for government bailouts, in banking and elsewhere, is slammed firmly shut. By preventing the market’s destruction process from operating, the government makes the recession almost certainly deeper and without doubt horribly artificially prolonged.

Stimulus plans also raise the chance of a Great Depression because of the deficits they cause. When the government sucks more than $400 billion out of the U.S. economy in two months, it should not be surprised when the credit crunch worsens for the private sector. Indeed, the earlier tax rebate stimulus of the summer may well have caused the surge in unemployment, of over 400,000 per month, which occurred from September onwards. The crunch point for finance availability in a crisis occurs not in the large companies (except those that are due to fail anyway) but in medium-sized and smaller companies, the principal creators of jobs, who find credit lines pulled and survival impossible. The money for stimulus packages has to come from somewhere; when the public sector deficit is already bloated, it comes straight from the job prospects of small company employees and the self-employed.

Loose monetary policy can work either way. When an asset overhang is limited, it can make finance cheaper, raising equilibrium asset prices and limiting the force of a downturn. It was successful in doing this in 1974 and 2001, at the cost of worsening inflation in the 1970s and a more virulent asset bubble in the 2000s. However, when the asset overhang is large enough and the collapse in banking confidence sufficiently severe, loose money can no longer bail the system out of a downturn. Instead it becomes a further depressing factor, eliminating the returns for saving, preventing capital formation and keeping stock and asset prices above the depressed level at which further investment is truly economically attractive. That’s what happened after the Smoot-Hawley tariff disrupted economic activity in 1930, and it is what appears to be happening after the banking crisis of September-October. Whether or not negative real interest rates produce inflation, they will certainly in such circumstances delay recovery.

Current policies could potentially turn today’s recession into tomorrow’s Great Depression. Let us hope that President-elect Barack Obama’s team of economic wizards can figure out a way of preventing this.


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2008-12-23 USER


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ICSC UBS Store Sales YoY (Dec 23)

Survey n/a
Actual -0.60%
Prior -0.40%
Revised n/a

 
Continues to slip.

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ICSC UBS Store Sales WoW (Dec 23)

Survey n/a
Actual 2.60%
Prior 0.60%
Revised n/a

 
Cheaper gasoline helping some?

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Redbook Store Sales Weekly YoY (Dec 16)

Survey n/a
Actual -1.00%
Prior -1.40%
Revised n/a

 
Still slipping.

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Redbook Store Sales MoM (Dec 16)

Survey n/a
Actual -0.70%
Prior -0.70%
Revised n/a

 
Still slipping.

No meaningul sign of cheaper gasoline helping here yet.

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ICSC UBS Redbook Comparison TABLE (Dec 16)

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GDP QoQ Annualized (3Q F)

Survey -0.5%
Actual -0.5%
Prior -0.5%
Revised n/a

 
As expected.

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GDP YoY Annualized Real (3Q F)

Survey n/a
Actual 0.70%
Prior 2.1%
Revised n/a

 
Tiny positive for the year.

Next quarter looking negative.

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GDP YoY Annualized Nominal (3Q F)

Survey n/a
Actual 3.3%
Prior 4.1%
Revised n/a

 
This is heading to new lows as well.

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GDP Price Index (3Q F)

Survey 4.25
Actual 3.9%
Prior 4.2%
Revised n/a

 
Should reverse.

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Core PCE QoQ (3Q F)

Survey 2.6%
Actual 2.4%
Prior 2.6%
Revised n/a

 
Should reverse some.

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GDP ALLX 1 (3Q F)

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GDP ALLX 2 (3Q F)

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Personal Consumption (3Q F)

Survey -3.7%
Actual -3.8%
Prior -3.7%
Revised n/a

 
Sudden fall from ‘muddling through’ to recession.

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Univ of Michigan Confidence (Dec F)

Survey 58.8
Actual 60.1
Prior 59.1
Revised n/a

 
Gasoline prices helping here.

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Univ of Michigan TABLE Inflation Expectations (Dec F)

 
Back to where the Fed wants them to be.

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New Home Sales (Nov)

Survey 415k
Actual 407k
Prior 433k
Revised 419k

 
A bit lower than expected and last month revised down some.

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New Home Sales Total for Sale (Nov)

Survey n/a
Actual 374.00
Prior 402.00
Revised n/a

 
Down to very low levels and one reason sales are low.

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New Home Sales MoM (Nov)

Survey n/a
Actual -2.9%
Prior -5.2%
Revised n/a

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New Home Sales YoY (Nov)

Survey n/a
Actual -35.3%
Prior -42.0%
Revised n/a

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New Home Sales Median Price (Nov)

Survey n/a
Actual 220.40
Prior 214.60
Revised n/a

 
Up, but still trending lower.

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New Home Sales TABLE 1 (Nov)

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New Home Sales TABLE 2 (Nov)

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Existing Home Sales (Nov)

Survey 4.93M
Actual 4.49M
Prior 4.98M
Revised 4.91M

 
Large drop.

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Existing Home Sales MoM (Nov)

Survey -1.0%
Actual -8.6%
Prior -3.1%
Revised -4.5%

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Existing Home Sales YoY (Nov)

Survey n/a
Actual -1.6%
Prior 0.6%
Revised n/a

 
Still well off the bottom.

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Existing Home Sales Inventory (Nov)

Survey n/a
Actual 4.234
Prior 4.272
Revised n/a

 
Falling some, but new foreclosures probably keeping this high.

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Existing Home Sales ALLX 1 (Nov)

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Existing Home Sales ALLX 2 (Nov)

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House Price Index MoM (Oct)

Survey -1.3%
Actual -1.1%
Prior -1.3%
Revised -1.2%

 
Still falling.

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House Price Index YoY (Oct)

Survey n/a
Actual -7.5%
Prior -7.0%
Revised n/a

 
No bottom in sight yet.

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House Price Index ALLX (Nov)

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Richmond Fed Manufacturing Index (Dec)

Survey -40
Actual -55
Prior -38
Revised n/a

 
Very weak.

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Richmond Fed Manufacturing Index ALLX (Dec)


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