Thoughts on the bailout of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae


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It comes down to public purpose.

The agencies were set up to provide low cost funding for moderate income home buyers.

They have done that reasonably well.

However, for probably 20 years I’ve been saying the agencies should fund themselves directly with the Treasury or Fed financing bank (same as Treasury). This both lowers their cost of funds, which would get passed through to the home mortgages they originate, and eliminates the possibility of a liquidity crisis.

Market discipline should not be on the liability side. It subjects them to risk of a ‘liquidity crisis’ where those funding you can decide to go play golf one day and cut you off for no reason and put you out of business. (And any entity subject to private sector funding to continue operations is subject to this kind of liquidity risk.) Regulation should focus instead on the asset side with assets and capital fully regulated.

This was done for the most part, and this is the same as the general banking model which works reasonably well. Yes, it blows up now and then as banks find flaws in the regulations, but the losses are taken, regulations adjusted, and life goes on.

The agencies made some loans to lower income borrowers as that went bad.

Even with this, most calculations show that at today’s rates of mortgage default they still have adequate capital to squeak by – the cash flow from the remaining mortgages and their capital is pretty much adequate to pay off their lenders (those who hold their securities).

But if defaults increase their ‘cash flow net worth’ could turn negative; hence, it would currently not be prudent for the private sector to fund them.

Paulson has now moved funding to the Treasury where it should have been in the first place.

This removes the possibility of a liquidity crisis and allows the agencies to continue to meet their congressional charge of providing home mortgages for moderate and lower income borrowers at low rates.

There was no operational reason for Paulson to do more than that, only political reasons.

The agencies could then have continued to function as charged by Congress.

If there were any long-term cash flow deficiencies, they would be ‘absorbed’ by the Treasury as that would have meant some of the funding for new loans was in fact a Treasury expense as it transferred some funds to borrowers who defaulted.

Congress has always been free to change underwriting standards.

In fact, the program was all about easier underwriting for targeted borrowers.

If there were any ultimate losses, that was the cost of serving those borrowers.

To date there have been only profits, and the program has ‘cost’ the government nothing.

With Treasury funding and a review of underwriting standards the program could have continued as before, which it might still do.

The entire episode was a panic over a possible liquidity crisis due to the possibility of the Treasury not doing what it did, and what should have been done at inception.

I don’t think the Treasury getting 79.1% of the equity after making sure it took no losses and got a premium on any ‘investment’ it made served any non-political purpose.

There was no reason current equity holders could not have gotten the ‘leftovers’ after the government got its funds and a premium also determined by the government.

Equity IS the leftovers and could have been left alone. (It wouldn’t surprise me if some of the shareholders challenge this aspect of the move.)

Yes, holders of direct agency securities were ‘rescued’, but they were taking a below market rate to buy those securities due to the implied government backing and lines of credit to the government.

I don’t see it as a case of ‘market failure’ but instead poorly designed institutional structure with a major flaw that forced a change of structure.

It’s a failure of government to do it right the first time, probably due to politics, and much like the flaw in the eurozone financial architecture (no credible deposit insurance – another form of allowing the liability side of the banking system to be subject to market discipline), also due to politics.

As for compensation, that too was ultimately under the control of Congress, directly or indirectly.

Lastly, in the early 1970s, with only 215 million people, housing starts peaked at 2.6 million per year.

Today, with over 300 million people we consider 2 million starts ‘gangbusters’ and a ‘speculative boom’.

And in the early 1970s, all there were was bunch of passive S&Ls making home loans – no secondary markets, no agencies, etc.

Point is, we don’t need any of this ‘financial innovation’ to further the real economy.

Rather, the financial sector preys on they real sectors, in both financial terms and real terms via the massive brain drain from the real sectors to the financial sector.

At the macro level, we’d be better off without 90% or more of the financial sector.


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2008-09-08 USER


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Consumer Credit (Jul)

Survey $8.5B
Actual $4.6B
Prior $14.3B
Revised $11.0B

 
Lower than expected which could mean there was less spending than expected.

This is a very volatile series.

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Consumer Credit YoY (Jul)

Survey n/a
Actual 5.0%
Prior 5.4%
Revised n/a

 
Doesn’t look bad from this angle.

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Consumer Credit TABLE 1 (Jul)

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Consumer Credit TABLE 2 (Jul)


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Re: Agency details


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(an email exchange)

>   
>   On Sun, Sep 7, 2008 at 8:33 PM, Mike wrote:
>   
>   
>   In exchange the Treasury receives a quarterly fee, dividend payments and
>   ”warrants representing an ownership stake of 79.9% in each GSE going
>   forward.”
>   
>   Support of Agency MBS market: The Treasury will set up an investment fund
>   to “purchase Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) mortgage-backed
>   securities (MBS) in the open market.” The scale of this program is yet to be
>   determined. The Treasury noted that it “is committed to investing in agency
>   MBS with the size and timing subject to the discretion of the Treasury
>   Secretary. The scale of the program will be based on developments in the
>   capital markets and housing markets.” This should eliminate the majority of
>   investor concerns about the functioning of this market, improve liquidity and
>   lower borrowing costs.
>   
>   Credit facility: The Treasury has agreed to create a back-stop short-term
>   lending facility for the Agencies. In light of the other programs being put into
>   place, this seems unlikely to be utilized, in our view.
>   

Shareholders give up 79.9% of their residual value as the agencies wind down.

Must have been some technical reason the government used that % and left the shareholders just north or 20%.


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2008-09-08 Weekly Credit Graph Packet


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Should resume narrowing from here.

IG On-the-run Spreads (Aug 8)

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IG6 Spreads (Aug 8)

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IG7 Spreads (Aug 8)

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IG8 Spreads (Aug 8)

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IG9 Spreads (Aug 8)


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2008-09-01 Weekly Credit Graph Packet


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Seems these spreads relate directly to the equity markets, which are simply that last step down in the capitalization.

I’ll be looking to see if the equity markets can rally much without these spreads tightening as well.

IG On-the-run Spreads (Aug 1)

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IG6 Spreads (Aug 1)

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IG7 Spreads (Aug 1)

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IG8 Spreads (Aug 1)

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IG9 Spreads (Aug 1)


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NYT: China central bank is short of capital


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Main Bank of China Is in Need of Capital

by Keith Bradsher

HONG KONG — China’s central bank is in a bind.

It has been on a buying binge in the United States over the last seven years, snapping up roughly $1 trillion worth of Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed debt issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

This was part of a ‘weak yen’ policy designed to support exports by keeping real domestic wages in check.

Those investments have been declining sharply in value when converted from dollars into the strong yuan,

Why should they care?

What matters from an investment point of view is what the USD can buy now, what the yuan can buy.

casting a spotlight on the central bank’s tiny capital base. The bank’s capital, just $3.2 billion, has not grown during the buying spree, despite private warnings from the International Monetary Fund.

Doesn’t matter what currency the bank’s capital is denominated in because he doesn’t know it matters.

The government has infinite yuan to spend without operational constraint; so, stated yuan capital doesn’t matter.

Now the central bank needs an infusion of capital.

Why? That’s a self-imposed constraint. Operationally central banks don’t need a local currency capital.

Central banks can, of course, print more money, but that would stoke inflation.

Operationally, this makes no sense. There is no such thing as ‘printing money’ apart from actually printing a pile of bills and leaving them on a shelf, which does nothing.

If they spend those bills, that’s government deficit spending with the same effect as any other government deficit spending.

‘Printing money’ has nothing to do with anything.

Instead, the People’s Bank of China has begun discussions with the finance ministry on ways to shore up its capital, said three people familiar with the discussions who insisted on anonymity because the subject is delicate in China.

Yes, there are self-imposed constraints imposed on various agencies of the government.

There are no operational constraints.

The central bank’s predicament has several repercussions. For one, it makes it less likely that China will allow the yuan to continue rising against the dollar, say central banking experts.

The way they keep a strong currency down is by buying more USD.

A weak currency goes down on its own.

To make a weak currency rise, you have to see your USD.

This could heighten trade tensions with the United States.

Yes.

The Bush administration and many Democrats in Congress have sought a stronger yuan to reduce the competitiveness of Chinese exports and trim the American trade deficit.

Yes, but if the yuan has turned fundamentally weak, the way for the US to keep it from falling is for the US Treasury to buy yuan.

The central bank has been the main advocate within China for a stronger yuan.

They want to fight inflation by keeping nominal input costs down.

But it now finds itself increasingly beholden to the finance ministry, which has tended to oppose a stronger yuan.

Right, they want to support exports by keeping real wages down.

As the yuan slips in value, China’s exports gain an edge over the goods of other countries.

The two bureaucracies have been ferocious rivals. Accepting an injection of capital from the finance ministry could reduce the independence of the central bank, said Eswar S. Prasad, the former division chief for China at the International Monetary Fund.

“Central banks hate doing that because it puts them more under the thumb of the finance ministry,” he said.

True.

This matters for foreign exchange policy. In the US, Japan, and others, the Treasury makes the foreign exchange decisions, not the Central Bank. And this if far more potent than interest rate policy.

Mr. Prasad said that during his trips to Beijing on behalf of the I.M.F., he had repeatedly cautioned China over the enormous scale of its holdings of American bonds, emphasizing that it left China vulnerable to losses from either a strengthening of the yuan or from a rise in American interest rates. When interest rates rise, the prices of bonds fall.

Those are not risks, as above.

Officials at the central bank declined to comment, while finance ministry officials did not respond to calls or questions via fax seeking comment. Data in a study by the Bank of International Settlements based in Basel, Switzerland, sometimes called the central bank for central banks, shows that many central banks had small capital bases relative to foreign reserves at the end of 2002,

They don’t need any capital base relative to foreign exchange holdings.

Foreign exchange holding are themselves capital.

though few were as low as the People’s Bank of China.

Given the poor performance of foreign bonds, the Chinese government could decide to shift some of its foreign exchange reserves into global stock markets.

If they shift to financial assets denominated in other currencies, this serves to shift the value of the yuan vs those currencies.

Stocks vs bonds is an investment decision only.

The central bank started making modest purchases of foreign stocks last winter, but has kept almost all of its reserves in bonds, like other central banks.

The finance ministry, however, has pushed for investments in overseas stocks. Last year, it wrested control of the $200 billion China Investment Corporation, which had been bankrolled by the central bank. That corporation’s most publicized move, a $3 billion investment in the Blackstone Group in May of last year, has lost more than 43 percent of its value.

The central bank’s difficulties do not, by themselves, pose a threat to the economy, economists agree. The government has ample resources and is running a budget surplus. Most likely, the finance ministry would simply transfer bonds of other Chinese government agencies to the bank to increase its capital. But even in a country that strongly discourages criticism of its economic policies, hints of dissatisfaction are appearing over China’s foreign investments.

For instance, a Chinese blogger complained last month, “It is as if China has made a gift to the United States Navy of 200 brand new aircraft carriers.”

Bankers estimate that $1 trillion of China’s total foreign exchange reserves of $1.8 trillion are in American securities. With aircraft carriers costing up to $5 billion apiece, $1 trillion would, in theory, buy 200 of them.

By buying United States bonds, the Chinese government has been investing a large chunk of the country’s savings in assets earning just 3 percent annually in dollars. And those low returns turn into real declines of about 10 percent a year after factoring in inflation and the yuan’s appreciation against the dollar.

The yuan has risen 21 percent against the dollar since China stopped pegging its currency to the dollar in July 2005.

The actual declines in value of the central bank’s various investments are a carefully guarded state secret.

Still China finds itself hemmed in. If it were to curtail its purchases of dollar-denominated securities drastically, the dollar would likely fall and American interest rates could soar.

China spent more than one-eighth of its entire economic output last year on foreign bonds, and then picked up the pace during the first half of this year. Chinese officials have suggested in recent comments that they are increasingly interested in stopping the yuan’s rise, and thus are willing to continue buying foreign securities to support the dollar. In fact, the yuan weakened slightly against the dollar last month after 26 consecutive months of gains.

Along with Treasuries, China has invested heavily in mortgage-backed bonds from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the struggling mortgage finance giants that are sponsored by the United States government. Standard & Poor’s estimates China’s holdings at $340 billion.

Some bond traders suspect that the central bank has scaled back its purchases of these securities, as have China’s commercial banks. But the central bank trades this debt through many third parties in many countries, making its activity opaque to outside analysts.

The central bank has gone to great lengths to maintain its foreign purchases. The money to buy foreign bonds has come from the reserves required that commercial banks must deposit with the central bank. In effect, China’s commercial banks have been lending the central bank more than $1 trillion at an interest rate of less than 2 percent.

To keep the banks strong when they were getting such little interest on their reserves, the central bank has kept deposit rates low. The gap between what banks are paying on deposits and the rates they are charging ordinary customers to borrow is several percentage points. This amounts to a transfer of wealth from ordinary Chinese savers to the central bank and on to Americans who are selling their debt to the Chinese.

The central bank is now under considerable pressure to reduce the commercial banks’ reserve requirements to encourage growth as the Chinese economy shows signs of slowing.

Victor Shih, a specialist in Chinese central banking at Northwestern University, said that when he visited the People’s Bank of China for a series of meetings this summer, he was surprised by how many officials resented the institution’s losses.

He said the officials blamed the United States and believed the controversial assertions set forth in the book “Currency War,” a Chinese best seller published a year ago. The book suggests that the United States deliberately lured China into buying its securities knowing that they would later plunge in value.

“A lot of policy makers in China, at least midlevel policy makers, believe this,” Mr. Shih said.


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Agency take over


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Recap:

  1. If I’m reading it right, the agencies will fund directly through the Treasury. I’ve been suggesting this for many years. This lowers the cost of funds for housing, the point of the entire program, by removing a premium that’s been paid by the lack of an explicit guarantee.
  1. Agency portfolios being phased out, to be replaced by direct purchasing of the MBS (mortgage-backed securities) by the Treasury. This has no real implications for the non government sectors, just accounting on ‘their’ side of the ledger. But it does mean lending can continue and funds will be available for all eligible borrowers.
  1. Some kind of government preferred stock coming between profits and the remaining shareholders of various classes. This should leave stocks with some value depending on actual portfolio losses, unless I’m missing something.

 
I’d guess most markets have been pricing in worse outcomes than this.


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Crude liquidation


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Heard last night index funds have liquidated the equivalent of maybe 140 million barrels of crude.

Add to that trend followers who went from long to short, and it’s way more than enough to explain the sell-off.

Since the Saudis don’t want to make their price setting status obvious, they ‘get out of the way’ for these type of liquidations, and if they want prices back up, as I suspect they do, they start bringing them up after the smoke clears.


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