2008-03-03 US Economic Releases

2008-03-03 RPX Composite 28dy YoY

RPX Composite 28dy YoY (Dec)

Survey n/a
Actual -7.24%
Prior -4.17%
Revised n/a

2008-03-03 RPX Composite 28dy Index

RPX Composite 28dy Index (Dec)

Survey n/a
Actual 245.70
Prior 254.29
Revised n/a

Both were falling into year end.


2008-03-02 ISM Manufacturing

ISM Manufacturing (Feb)

Survey 48.0
Actual 48.3
Prior 50.7
Revised n/a

Better than expected. Not yet to recession levels.


2008-03-03 ISM Prices Paid

ISM Prices Paid (Feb)

Survey 73.5
Actual 75.5
Prior 76.0
Revised n/a

Price pressures persisting.


2008-03-03 Construction Spending MoM

Construction Spending MoM (Jan)

Survey -0.7%
Actual -1.7%
Prior -1.1%
Revised -1.3%

Very weak.


2008-03-03 Total Vehicle Sales

Total Vehicle Sales (Feb)

Survey 15.5M
Actual 15.4M
Prior 15.2M
Revised n/a

As expected, but drifting to a lower range.


2008-03-03 Domestic Vehicle Sales

Domestic Vehicle Sales (Feb)

Survey 11.9M
Actual 11.7M
Prior 11.7M
Revised n/a

Drifting lower.


Same twin themes: weak demand and higher prices.Exports keeping GDP from recession levels, but taking demand from the rest of the world that is also softening.

Bernanke House Committee Transcript

From the first day:

(EDITED)

BERNANKE:

Well, mortgage rates are down some from before this whole thing began.

But we have a problem, which is that the spreads between, say, treasury rates and lending rates are widening, and our policy is essentially, in some cases, just offsetting the widening of the spreads, which are associated with various kinds of illiquidity or credit issues.

So in that particular area, you’re right that it’s been more difficult to lower long-term mortgage rates through Fed action.

Seems he isn’t aware the tools he has to peg the entire term structure of rates as desired.

G. MILLER (?):

On January 17th, you presented your near-term economic outlook to the House Budget Committee. In that outlook, you indicated the future market suggests (inaudible) prices will decelerate over the coming year. However, since then, oil prices have reached record highs in nominal terms.

Questioning the Fed’s ability to forecast oil prices and the use of futures markets for forecasting.

If oil continues to remain at its current levels, thereby adding further pressure on the overall inflation, it may be more difficult for the Fed to cut interest rates. And if that were the case, what option do you have, beyond cutting interest rates, are you considering to help spur the economic growth?

BERNANKE:

Oil prices don’t have to come down to reduce inflation pressure. They just have to flatten out. And if they —

I would suggest that even if they flattened out, it will be years before all the cost push aspects of the current price filters through.

G. MILLER (?):

But if they don’t flatten out?

BERNANKE:

Well, if they continue to rise at this pace, it’s going to be a — create a very difficult problem for our economy. Because, on the one hand, it’s going to generate more inflation, as you described. But it’s also going to, you know, create more weakness because it’s going to be like a tax that’s extracting income from American consumers.

BERNANKE:

Well, we don’t know what oil prices are going to do. It depends a lot on global conditions, on demand around the world. It also depends on suppliers, many of which are politically unstable or politically unstable regions or have other factors that affect their willingness and ability to supply oil. So, there’s a lot of uncertainty about it.

But our analysis, combined with what we can learn from the futures market, suggests that we should certainly have much more moderate behavior this year than we have. But, again, there’s a lot of uncertainty around that estimate.

Still using futures markets for forecasting.

And he is also forecasting growth to pick up in Q3 and Q4 and inflation to moderate. Seems contradictory?

BERNANKE:

Our easing is intended to, in some sense, you know, respond to this tightening in credit conditions, and I believe we’ve succeeded in doing that, but there certainly is some offset that comes from widening spreads, and this is what’s happening in the mortgage market.

Has to be frustrating – they cut rates to hopefully cut rates to domestic borrowers, but those rates don’t go down, only the $ goes down and imported prices rise further.

FRANK:

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Neugebauer?

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE (R-TX):

Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I want to turn my attention a little bit.

You mentioned in your testimony a little bit about the dollar and the fact that it has increased our exports — because American goods are more competitive. But at the same time, it’s created — it swings the other way and the fact that it raises price — it has an inflationary impact on the American consumer.

I believe one of the reasons that oil is $100 a barrel today is because of our declining dollar. People settle oil in dollars, and I think a lot of them have, obviously, just increased the price of the commodity.

And so I really have two questions.

One is, what do you believe the continuing decline of the dollar is — what kind of inflationary impact do you think that is going to have?

And then, secondly, as this dollar declines, one of the things that I begin to get concerned with is all of these people that have all of these dollars have taken a pretty big hickey over the last year or so and continue to do that.

At what point in time do people say, you know, “We want to stop trading in dollars and trade in other currencies”? And what implication do you think then that has on the capital markets in U.S.?

BERNANKE:

Well, Congressman, I always need to start this off by saying that treasury is the spokesman for the dollar. So let me just make that disclaimer.

We, obviously, watch the dollar very carefully. It’s a very important economic variable.

As you point out, it does increase U.S. export competitiveness, and in that respect it’s expansionary but it also has inflationary consequences. And I agree with you that it does affect the price of oil. It has probably less effect on the price of consumer goods or finished goods that come in from out of the country, but it does have an inflationary effect.

Our mandate, of course, is to try to achieve full employment and price stability here in the United States, and so we look at what the dollar’s doing. And we think about that in the context of all the forces that are affecting the economy, and we try to set monetary policy appropriately.

So we don’t try to — we don’t have a target for the dollar or anything like that. What we’re trying to do is, given what the dollar’s doing, we try to figure out where we need to be to keep the economy on a stable path.

Sidestepped the heart of the question.

With respect to your other question, there is not much evidence that investors or holders of foreign reserves have
shifted in any serious way out of the dollar to this point.

The drop in the trade deficit = The change in non-resident desires to hold $US financial assets.

And, indeed, we’ve seen a lot of flows into U.S. treasuries,

Those are not evidenced of increased foreign holding of $US financial assets

which is one of the reasons why the rates of short-term U.S. treasuries are so low, reflecting their safety, liquidity and general attractiveness to international investors.

Who are scared of other $US financial assets.

In fact, the low treasury rates are probably partially responsible for the rush to get out of $US financial assets.

So we’ve not yet seen the issue that you’re raising.

And he is sincere in that answer.

NEUGEBAUER:

One of the other questions that I have — and just your thoughts — is the U.S. economy is based on encouraging the consumer to consume as much as he possibly can. And, in fact, the stimulus package that we just passed the other day, $160 billion, was really, by and large, saying to the American people, “Go out and spend.”

And this consumption mentality away from any kind of a savings mentality concerns me that makes the economy always going to be a lot more volatile because there’s not much margin.

And now — a year ago, people were testifying before this — “Don’t worry about the low savings rates,” because people had these huge equities in their homes, and so that was compensating for the lack of savings in the U.S.

That now, we see, as some reports, devaluation of real estate, 10, 12, 15 percent, and the savings rates at zero and negative rate.

Does that concern you long term that we’re trying to build an economy on people to use up every resource that they have?

BERNANKE:

Yes, Congressman.

Wonder if he is aware the only source of net financial assets for the non-government sectors is government deficit spending, by identity?

I think we — in the long term, we need to have higher saving, and we need to devote our economy more toward investment and more to foreign exports than to domestic consumption.

This is a troubling long-term view and reflects his mercantilist tendencies reviewed in earlier posts.

And that’s a transition we’re going to have to make in order to get our current account deficit down, in order to have enough capital in

(I think it should be ‘and’ – transcript error?)

foreign income to support an aging population as we go forward the next few decades.

This is a very peculiar position to be taking, not to mention formulating policy on this notion.

The stimulus package, which is going to support consumption in the very near term, there’s a difference between the very short run and the long run.

In the very short run, if we could substitute more investment, more exports, that would be great.

Exports better than consumption? He’s calling for a reduced standard of living -lower real wages- just like what has been happening.

But if we — since we can’t in the short run, a decline in total demand will just mean that less of our capacity’s being utilized, we’ll just have a weaker economy.

So that’s the rationale for the short-term measure. But I agree with you that over the medium and long term we should be taking measures to try to move our economy away from consumption dependence, more toward investment, more toward net exports.

Restating the same mercantilist view that’s non-applicable with non-convertible, floating fx $US as in my previous posts.

GREGORY MEEKS, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE (D-NY):

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Good to be with you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, you get some of these conditions, and you do one thing and it helps or you do something else and it hurts. And such is the situation that I think that we’re currently in.

It seems to me that if you move aggressively to cut interest rates and stimulate the economy, then you risk fueling inflation, on top of the fact that we’ve got a weak dollar and a trade deficit. You know, you’ve got to go into one direction or another.

Which direction do you think — are you looking at focusing on first?

BERNANKE:

Congressman, I think I’ll let my testimony speak for itself in terms of the monetary policy.

I just would say that, you know, we do face a difficult situation. We have — inflation has been high. And oil prices and food prices have been rising rapidly.

We also have a weakening economy, as I discussed. And we have difficulties in the financial market and the credit markets.

So that’s three different areas where the Fed has to, you know, worry about — three different fronts, so to speak. So the challenge for us, as I mentioned in my testimony, is for us to try to balance those risks and decide at a given point in time which is more serious, which has to be addressed first, which has to be addressed later.

That’s the kind of balancing that we just have to do going forward.

MEEKS:

So you just move back and forth as you see and try to see if you can just have a level —

BERNANKE:

Well, the policy is forward looking. We have to deal with what our forecast is. So we have to ask the question where will the economy be six months or a year down the road? And that’s part of our process for thinking about where monetary policy should be.

And that forecast is for growth to increase and prices to moderate.

Seems contradictory.

MEEKS:

Well, let me also ask you this: The United States has been heavily financed by foreign purchasers of our debt, including China, and there has been a concern that they will begin to sell our debt to other nations because of the falling dollar and the concerns about our growing budget deficits.

Will the decrease in short-term interest rates counterbalance other reasons for the weakening dollar enough to maintain demand for our debt? And, if that happens, what kind of damage does it do to our exports?

MEEKS:

And I’d throw into that, because of this whole debate currently going on about sovereign wealth funds, and some say that these sovereign wealth funds are bailing out a lot of our American companies. So, is the use of sovereign wealth funds good or bad?

BERNANKE:

Well, to address the question on sovereign wealth funds, as you know, a good bit of money has come in from them recently to invest in some of our major financial institutions.

I think, on the whole, that it’s been quite constructive. The capitalization — extra capital in the banks is helpful because it makes them more able to lend and to extend credit to the U.S. economy.

The money that’s flowed in has been a relatively small share of the ownership or equity in these individual institutions and, in general, has not involved significant ownership or control rights.

So, I think that’s been actually quite constructive. And, again, I urge banks and financial institutions to look wherever they may find additional capitalization that allow them to continue normal business.

More broadly, we have a process in place called the CFIUS process, as you know, where we can address any potential risks to our national security created by foreign investment. And that process is — I think is a good process.

Otherwise, to the extent that we are confident that sovereign wealth funds are making investments on economic basis for returns, as opposed to for some other political or other purpose, I think that’s — it’s quite constructive and we should be open to allowing that kind of investment.

Bernanke doesn’t realize there is no need for investment $ per se from sovereign wealth funds.

Part of the reciprocity of that is to allow American firms to invest abroad, as well. And so, there’s a quid pro quo for that, as well.

MEEKS:

What about the first part of my question?

BERNANKE:

I don’t see any evidence at this point that there’s been any major shift in the portfolios of foreign holders of dollars. So, I — you know, we do monitor that to the extent we can, and so far, I have not seen any significant shift in those portfolios.

Sad, but true.

SPENCER BACHUS, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE (R-AL):

Thank you.

Chairman Bernanke, have the markets repriced risk? Where do we stand there?

You know, we talked about the complex financial instruments, and…

BERNANKE:

That’s an excellent question.

Part of what’s been happening, Congressman, is that risk perhaps got underpriced over the last few years. And we’ve seen a reaction, where, you know, risk is being, now, priced at a high price.

It’s hard to say, you know, whether the change is fully appropriated or not. Certainly, part of it, at least — certainly, part of the recent change we’ve seen is a movement toward a more appropriate, more sustainable pricing of risk.

But in addition, we are now also seeing additional concerns about liquidity, about valuation, about the state of the economy, which are raising credit spreads above, sort of, the normal longer-term level. And those increased spreads and the potential restraint on credit is a concern for economic growth. And we’re looking at that very carefully.

But he does recognize they, too, are market pricing of risk.

This implies that markets are ‘functioning’.

BACHUS:

I see.

One thing you didn’t mention in your testimony is the municipal bond market and the problems with the bond insurers. Would you comment on its affect on the economy and where you see the situation?

BERNANKE:

Yes, Congressman.

The problems — the concerns about the insurers led to the breakdown of these auction-rate securities mechanisms which were a way of using short-term financing to finance longer-term municipal securities.

And a lot of those auctions have failed, and some municipal borrowers have been forced into, at least for a short period, have been forced to pay the penalty rates.

So there may be some restructuring that’s going to have to take place to get the financing for those municipal borrowers.

But as a general matter, municipal borrowers are very good credit quality. And so my expectation is that within a relatively short period of time we’ll see adjustments in the market to allow municipal borrowers to finance reasonable interest rates.

Agreed!

BACHUS:

Let me ask one final question.

You’re a former professor, and I think the word is “financial accelerator process.” What we mean there is problems in the economy cause sentiment problems; a lack of confidence.

Where do you see — is negative sentiment a part of what we’re seeing now?

I know I was in New York, and bankers there said there were a lot of industries making a lot of money who were just waiting, because of what they were reading in the papers as much as anything else, to invest.

BERNANKE:

Well, there’s an interaction between the economy and the financial system, and perhaps even more enhanced now than usual, in that the credit conditions in the financial market are creating some restraint on growth.

So far, the pass-through to the real economy has been modest, which means he’s saying that in normal times it’s even less.

I agree with that.

And slower growth, in turn, is concerning the financial markets because it may mean that credit quality is declining.

And so that’s part of this financial accelerator or adverse feedback loop is one of the concerns that we have, and one of the reasons why we have been trying to address those issues.

Never mentions in countercyclical tax structure – the automatic stabilizers that Fed research has shown to be highly effective in dampening cycles since WWII.

RON PAUL, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE (R-TX):

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(rant snipped)

And when you look at it — and I mentioned in my opening statement that M3, now, measured by private sources, is growing by leaps and bounds. In the last two years, it increased by 40, 42 percent. Currently, it’s rising at a rate of 16 percent.

It’s all in the definition of that aggregate.

The Fed dropped it for a good reason.

(more rant snipped)

So if we want stable prices, we have to have stable money. But I cannot see how we can continue to accept the policy of deliberately destroying the value of money as an economic value. It destroys — it’s so immoral in the sense that, what about somebody who’s saved for their retirement and they have CDs and we’re inflating the money at a 10 percent rate? Their standard of living is going down.

And that’s what’s happening today. The middle class is being wiped out and nobody is understanding that it has to do with the value of money. Prices are going up.

So, how are you able to defend this policy of deliberate depreciation of our money?

BERNANKE:

Congressman, the Federal Reserve Act tells me that I have to look to price stability — price stability, which I believe is defined as the domestic prices — the consumer price index, for example — and that’s what we aim to do. We look for low domestic inflation.

CPI and core is way above Fed comfort zones and rising.

Now, you’re correct that there are relationships, obviously, between the dollar and domestic inflation and the relationships between the money supply and domestic inflation. But those are not perfect relationships. They’re not exact relationships.

And, given a choice, we have to look at the inflation rate — the domestic inflation rate.

Now, I understand that you would like to see a gold standard, for example, but that it is really something for Congress. That’s not my decision.

PAUL:

But your achievement — we have now PPI going up at a 12 percent rate. I would say that doesn’t get a very good grade for price stability, wouldn’t you agree?

BERNANKE:

No, I agree. It’s not — the more relevant one, I think, is the consumer price index, which measures the price consumers have to pay, and that was, last year, between 3.5 and 4 percent.

It finished the year North of 4%.

And I agree, that’s not a good record.

PAUL:

And the PPI is going to move over into the consumer index, as well.

BERNANKE:

We’re looking forward this year and we’re trying to estimate what’s going to happen this year. And a lot of it depends on what happens to the price of oil.

And if oil flattens out, we’ll do better. But if it continues at the rate in 2007, it’ll be hard to maintain low inflation. I agree.

PAUL:

Thank you.

Expected more from Mr. Paul.

Plosser speech

From Philadelphia Fed President Plosser:

To be more concrete, many versions of the simple rules that I refer to when gauging the current stance of monetary policy call for a funds rate that is above the current funds rate.

‘Taylor Rule’ etc.

But the severity of the events affecting the smooth functioning of financial markets suggests that rates, perhaps,

PERHAPS???

should be somewhat lower than simple rules might suggest. However, determining the appropriate extent of such extra accommodation is difficult to quantify, but should also be disciplined by systematic policy.

Consequently, there are, and should be, limits to such departures from the guidance given by simple rules.

Seems he’s in the camp that the Fed is at or near its limits regarding rate cuts when inflation is this threatening.

One cannot, and should not, ignore other fundamental aspects of policy, especially the tendency for inflation to accelerate when policy is unduly easy.

This is the mainstream view – inflation doesn’t just go up, it accelerates when expectations begin to elevate.

Moreover, departures from the more systematic elements of making policy decisions must be relatively transitory and reversed in due course if we are to keep expectations of future inflation well-anchored.

Bernanke conspicuously left this out of his testimony last week.

Otherwise we risk eroding the public’s confidence in monetary policy’s commitment to deliver price stability, and we know from the 1970s and early 1980s that the cost of regaining the public’s confidence can be quite high.

Sounds like he’s in the Fisher camp and not inclined to favor another cut with inflation where it is.

The benefits of operating in an environment with the transparency afforded by simple rules is that it gives monetary policymakers the ability to anchor expectations and affords them the opportunity to temporarily deviate from the simple rules in extraordinary circumstances without eroding central bank credibility. We are now, perhaps,

‘PERHAPS’ again – meaning we might not be.

in a period of extraordinary circumstances and have deviated from the benchmarks suggested by simple rules. But such deviations should be temporary and limited and promptly reversed when conditions return to normal.

Can’t be more clear on this.

Monetary policymakers should continue to pursue their efforts to develop and put into practice more rule-like behavior. It is one of the more important paths to sound monetary policy over the long-run.

Looks like more movement to the Fisher camp as the March 18 meeting approaches.

Re: falling interest rates

(an intersibling email)

>
> On 3/3/08,  seth wrote:
> who is buying 2 year notes at 1.63????
> seth
>

simple:

high food and gas prices= weaker consumer= fed cutting rates = weaker $= even higher food and gas prices= even weaker consumer = fed cutting rates even more= even weaker $… = prices at infinity and rates at minus infinity

get long!!!

Central bank debate: Is it inflation or deflation?

Here’s how the inflation can persist indefinitely:

  1. In addition to the India/China type story for resource demand, this time around nominal demand for commodities is also coming from our own pension funds who are shifting more of their financial assets to passive commodity strategies.

    Pension funds contributions have traditionally been invested primarily in financial assets, making them ‘unspent income’ and therefore ‘demand leakages.’ Other demand leakages include IRAs (individual retirement accounts), corporate reserve funds, and other income that goes ‘unspent’ on goods and services.

    Supporting these demand leakages are all kinds of institutional structure, but primarily tax incentives designed to increase ‘savings’.

    These come about due to the ‘innocent fraud’ that savings is necessary for investment, a throwback to the gold standard days of loanable funds and the like.

    A total of perhaps $20 trillion of this ‘unspent income’ has accumulated in the various US retirement funds and reserves of all sorts.

    This has ‘made room’ for the government deficit spending we’ve done to not be particularly inflationary. In general terms, the goods and services that would have gone unsold each year due to our unspent income have instead been purchased by government deficit spending.

    But now that is changing, as a portion of that $20 trillion is being directed towards passive commodity strategies. While the nature of these allocations varies, a substantial portion is adding back the aggregate demand that would have otherwise stayed on the sidelines.

    That means a lot less government deficit spending might be needed to sustain high levels of demand than history indicates.

    And, of course, the allocations directly support commodity prices.
  1. We are faced with the same monopoly supplier/swing producer of crude oil as in the 1970’s.

    Back then the oil producers simply accumulated $ financial assets and were the source of a massive demand leakage that caused widespread recession in much of the world. And didn’t end until there was a supply response large enough to end the monopoly pricing power.

    But it did persist long enough for the ‘relative value story’ of rising crude prices to ‘turn into an inflation story’ as costs were passed through the various channels.

    And a general inflation combined with the supply response served to return the real terms of trade/real price of crude pretty much back to where they had been in the early 1970’s.
  1. This time around rather than ‘hoard’ excess oil revenues the producers seem to be spending the funds, as evidence by both the trillions being spent on public infrastructure as well as the A380’s being built for private use, and the boom in US exports- 13% increase last month.

    This results in increased exports from both the US and the Eurozone to the oil producing regions (including Texas) that supports US and Eurozone GDP/aggregate demand.

    At the macro level, it’s the reduced desire to accumulate $US financial assets that is manifested by increasing US exports.

    (This reduced desire comes from perceptions of monetary policy toward inflation, pension fund allocations away from $US financial assets, Paulson calling CBs who buy $US currency manipulators and outlaws, and ideological confrontation that keeps some oil producers from accumulating $US, etc. This all has weakened the $ to levels where it makes sense to buy US goods and services – the only way foreigners can reduce accumulations of $US is to spend them on US goods and services.)

    The channels are as follows:

    1. The price of crude is hiked continuously and the revenues are spent on imports of goods and services.
    2. This is further supported by an international desire to reduce accumulation of $US financial assets that lowers the $ to the point where accumulated $ are then spent on US goods and services.

    For the US this means the export channel is a source of inflation. Hence, the rapid rise in both exports and export prices along with a $ low enough for US goods and services (and real assets) to represent good value to to foreigners.

  1. This is not a pretty sight for the US. (Exports are a real cost to the US standard of living, imports a real benefit.)

    Real terms of trade are continually under negative pressure.

    The oil producers will always outbid domestic workers for their output as a point of logic.

    Real wages fall as consumers can find jobs but can’t earn enough to buy their own output which gets exported.

    Foreigners are also outbidding domestics for domestic assets including real estate and equity investments.
  1. The US lost a lot off aggregate demand when potential buyers with subprime credit no longer qualified for mortgages.

    Exports picked up the slack and GDP has muddled through.

    The Fed and Treasury have moved in an attempt to restore domestic demand. Interest rate cuts aren’t effective but the fiscal package will add to aggregate demand beginning in May.

    US export revenues will increasingly find their way to domestic aggregate demand, and housing will begin to add to GDP rather than subtract from it.

    Credit channels will adjust (bank lending gaining market share, municipalities returning to uninsured bond issuance, sellers ‘holding paper,’ etc.) and domestic income will continue to be leveraged though to a lesser degree than with the fraudulent subprime lending.

    Pension funds will continue to support demand with their allocations to passive commodity strategies and also directly support prices of commodities.
  1. Don’t know how the Fed responds – my guess is rate cuts turn to rate hikes as inflation rises, even with weak GDP.
  1. We may be in the first inning of this inflation story.

    Could be a strategy by the Saudis/Russians to permanently disable the west’s monetary system, shift real terms of trade, and shift world power.

Here’s how Congress sees it…

Congress sees their voters facing prices that are rising faster than incomes due to Fed rate cuts driving the $ down.

Bernanke testifies that price hikes for food and energy are not a problem for the Fed until wages go up.

So, he’s going to keep cutting rates and driving the cost of living higher until wages go up or Wall Street recovers.

Then, he hikes rates if inflation isn’t behaving.

Hardly a comforting response to those working for a living and getting squeezed by the high prices.

With elections coming, I anticipate the Congressional opposition to escalate.